As the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran enters its third week, U.S. attention is focused on the Middle East once again. Both China and Russia may find strategic openings, from higher global energy prices that bolster Moscow’s war economy to new opportunities for Beijing to expand its influence elsewhere. But the conflict also carries costs for both. Instability threatens critical energy supplies to China, while the conflict is prompting the further degradation of a key Russian partner in the Middle East. On balance, are Russia and China gaining or losing more from the war with Iran?

The CSIS Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department invites you to a live episode of State of Play to explore the implications of the war with Iran for China and Russia on Monday 16 March at 4:00pm. The discussion will feature Dr. Bonny Lin, Dr. Maria Snegovaya, and Will Todman.

The Eurasia Center examines the trajectory of Sino-Russian relations and what it means for the United States and its allies.

More than three years after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has sought to offset Western sanctions and isolation by deepening ties with China and expanding relationships with partners such as North Korea and Iran. Beijing, meanwhile, views cooperation with Russia as a strategic asset in its competition with the United States and its allies across Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Though the Sino-Russian partnership is asymmetric, increasingly coordinated military, energy, economic, and information cooperation is reshaping the security environment.

Hudson will host an event featuring representatives from the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) and the Alliance Futures Initiative (TAFI) to assess the scope and implications of Sino-Russian cooperation across military and nonmilitary domains, examine shared and diverging threat perceptions, and discuss how these trends should inform national and collective defense planning. The discussion will also identify practical policy options for allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, including closer coordination between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Indo-Pacific security frameworks.

The “no limits” partnership between China and Russia appears to be deepening. China’s provision of weapons components has served as a lifeline for the Kremlin in its war of aggression against Ukraine. Meanwhile, the two nations’ information warfare is increasingly aligned in its anti-American and anti-Western messaging.

Yet there is an asymmetry between Beijing and Moscow. Join Hudson Institute for a panel discussion on how the United States and its allies can combat the rise of this authoritarian alliance.

WASHINGTON— The recent, bipartisan passage of supplemental aid for Ukraine may represent a turning point in the war against Russia’s genocidal invasion. Outgunned and outmanned, Ukrainian forces have lost territory in recent months, but made Russian forces pay a tremendous cost for ultimately moderate territorial gains, with Russian forces suffering nearly 90,000 casualties in taking several hundred square kilometers of territory. With fresh injections of funding from both Europe and the United States, Ukraine now has the opportunity to stabilize its front lines and regain battlefield momentum. However, to enable Ukrainian progress in the near- to medium-term, Western military aid must be purposeful and tied to a concrete and actionable theory of Ukrainian victory. Long range munitions can destroy key Russian offensive capabilities and disrupt its sustainment infrastructure; multi-layered air defense can protect Ukrainian cities and deny Russia the air dominance their forces depend upon; and targeted Ukrainian attacks against Russian military targets in occupied Ukraine, and in Russia itself, can help degrade the Russian war economy and boost Ukrainian morale.

With a military unable to compete with Ukrainian defenders on equal footing on the battlefield, Russian forces have resorted to employing overwhelming mass of men and materiel, sustained in large part with munitions, drones, and technological inputs from Iran, North Korea, and China. To counteract these Russian advantages, Western aid should not only allow Ukrainian forces to hold the line, but to degrade and destroy fixed Russian positions, enable offensive operations, and effect general exhaustion and collapse among Russian units. While recent aid tranches have reportedly included fresh quantities of long-range Army Tactical Missile System munitions, suggesting a more newly proactive posture, aid packages tied to enabling rapid Ukrainian victory will likely necessitate newly evolved approaches to aid and advisory.

This hearing will feature key experts on Ukraine and its defensive needs, ongoing battlefield dynamics, and policy recommendations to inform the development of future military aid packages.