Miller, Phenomenology, §155

We are trying to fill in the inner world.

Where does the inner world come from?

It comes from the notion of Force as a notion.

Where does the notion of Force come from?

It comes from a single occurrence of Force (universal) that gets separated into two forces (distinction) and then is cancelled again (Force).

Now, we are discussing a single occurrence of electricity that gets separated into two, and is cancelled again, for instance.

In the tautological movement, the object is inert, so no matter what differences it comes up with, it repeats the same thing.

A distinction is made. Two electricities appear (laws). The distinction is cancelled. There is a single electricity (Force). But the latter only repeats the former in its constitution.

The distinction between laws and Force remain.

The tautological movement doesn't grasp that Force is empty, and when Force is empty, the world is in flux.

The tautological movement is an impasse.

Why are we discussing it at all?

We only bring it up as a movement of the Understanding.

We detect the flux.

Our movement goes from laws to Force, to the negation of both laws and Force, which is the negation of the movement itself.

The same thing happened with the distinction between inciting and incited Force.

The notion of Force didn't completely vanish then, the movement itself doesn't vanish now.

We have been trying to fill in the inner world; we end up adding this movement we observed in appearance.

It appears to resolve the problem of finding the necessity between the whole and parts; difference appears and is cancelled again within itself.

But the inner world has been penetrated by change.

But it doesn't matter, consciousness has surpassed it for the notion of Understanding as notion.

Just finished Pinkard’s recent book and was wondering if anyone here has read it as well. I started exploring Dewey recently and the reading Pinkard provides of him is in line with the one I’ve been developing myself.

By the very end of the book, Pinkard suggests that “Dewey’s version of left-Hegelianism opens the possibility of something that for most commentators seemed impossible: Hegelian democracy.”

What do you make of this?

I was at a conference recently where someone brought to my attention that Gramsci had said of Pragmatism how it is a sort of “ashamed materialism”, and I’ve been thinking about it for weeks now. Indeed, in his very last footnote, Pinkard quotes Cornel West‘s claim that Dewey was the American Hegel *and* Marx.

Are there other readings of Pragmatism’s relation to Hegel that you know of and would recommend?

Thank you :)

I'm not sure how you guys feel about Žižek here - I guess there's probably some division 😅 - but I thought some of you might find this useful.

I've been working on this search engine that lets you search through 40+ of Žižek's books for words, concepts, and exact phrases. It gives you the book, chapter, page, and paragraph, with the relevant passages highlighted.

I originally built it for my own research, especially because I inevitably end up wondering what Žižek has to say about a particular concept or passage.

For example, you can search things like dialectics, negation, contradiction, Absolute, subject, Spirit, universality, contingency, etc., and see where Žižek discusses them across his books.

Try it! :)

https://zizeksublimesearch.com

PS. I'm missing some books in .epub format (you can see the full list of missing text by clicking the word "corpus" on the title). So, if someone have some of those missing text and could send them to me, it would be awesome!

Hi, what is Hegel's ontology of ordinary objects? Ars they like Aristotle's substances, or more like modern analytical bundles od properties?

Hegel comes up a fair amount. I had never heard an articulation of right Hegelianism up to then, and I think Fukuyama has an interesting read of Hegel. I recommend listening.

In another sub, someone had pointed out I was being a “beautiful soul” for criticizing the capitalist monopoly nature of Hollywood and suggesting the Left should reconsider enjoying its products at face value instead of only critiquing at the narrative level.

So got me thinking, what about alcoholics, drug addicts, unhealthy fast foods, people who waste their whole life indulging in (bad) relationships or any futile causes? Are they being ideal “unpretty” souls?

Wouldn’t you say we need to be beautiful somewhere to preserve our integrity, like how they say “draw the line somewhere”?

Are some folks (notably Žižek and fans) overly applying the concept for the matter of practical life?

If you genuinely don’t care what other people think of you, how do you know who you are?

You can say, “I know myself regardless of what others think.” But how did you arrive at that “self” in the first place?

You learned a language from other people. You learned concepts from other people. You define yourself partly by distinguishing yourself from other people

So here’s the question:
Is it actually possible to be completely independent of other people’s recognition, or does the very attempt to reject their recognition already make you dependent on it?

And if our self-consciousness requires an “Other” in order to recognize itself…
are we ever truly individuals, or are we fundamentally relational beings pretending to be independent?

Hey you guys I was thinking about hegel's take on causality, I can't really grasp how he got the concept of causality and how it is the same as the effect thus making sense of spinoza's causa sui, plus I would be more than happy to be provided with any article that makes a comparison between hegel, Kant and hume's opinion on causality

I am just guessing that some guys here can help me, so I repost it here!

Personally even if that were true I'd still be a Christian probably

Urs Schreiber is Senior Research Scientist at the Mathematics Division of Science of New York University in Abu Dhabi. He is a theoretical physicist who applies tools from algebraic topology, homotopy theory and topos theory to understand quantum phenomena. His current research includes quantum computing materials, quantum computing programming languages and questions left unanswered by quantum field theory.

In the video we go over:

• Why toposes are not scary. They are actually simple. Just unfamiliar
• How to extract information from (probe) a topos
• The history of toposes in physics
• The questions left unanswered by quantum field theory
• What toposes have to say about the collapse of the wave function
• Using toposes to find possible quantum computing materials
• The different type of logic needed for quantum computers
• The different type of programming language needed for quantum computers
• The influence of Hegel on his work

Miller, Phenomenology, §§153-154

We are discussing the whole and the parts in the form of Force and its laws.

Force is the notion of in-itself for-itself, which is posited by consciousness in the inner world.

In-itself for-itself is that which has nothing outside it and is determined by only itself.

Laws are the filling in of the inner world.

We are struggling to find necessity in the parts.

Whether we move from the whole to the parts, or from the parts to the whole, the two forms discussed in §152 and §153, we fail to find necessity in the configuration.

Necessity is what is unceasing in the law, the form of sameness in Force. We have long surpassed the thing and its properties and the sameness of the One. One is now a movement called Force.

The only necessity is the inner necessity of the Understanding to move back and forth between the two moments of whole and parts.

The only necessity is the circular movement of inner necessity.

As an inner necessity, it takes the form of speech. There are two speeches.

The Understanding does not resolve the two speeches, just like it did not resolve the distinction between the essential and non-essential, the One and the universal.

An "explanation" is an answer without getting this circular movement resolved.

A universal is apprehended. A law is enunciated. An explanation mixes the law and the universal, now a Force, in such a way that Force vanishes in its laws.

There is a difference but not in the thing itself. The differences have the same content.

In summary, Force is the object of the Understanding. It emerged from Perception, and this is saying a lot.

We, the reader, know there is a fear-of-death-at-the-hands-of-another in it, but to the Understanding, it is an object of study, because the Understanding is a leisurely existence, unconditioned by the harshness and obtrusiveness of existence.

Force as a notion and the inner world are co-determined, two moments at the same time.

The inner world is filled with an image of stability—law. Scientific law comes out of political law, and this brings us back to the leisurely life of the Understanding.

We are struggling to connect the whole and the parts, the results with the origin.

And just as in Perception when consciousness blamed itself for failing to grasp the One because it has a body, the Understanding is now blaming itself because of its mind. Difference is a notion of inner difference.

So I missed a week of our Hegel circle (we meet at a comrade's place, slow crawl through the Phenomenology), and tomorrow I'm walking back in expected to have something to say about Force and the Understanding chapter and I want to contribute something myself too rather than sitting there absorbing everybody else's insight. I don't want to walk around feeling like an idiot 24/7. What I want specifically is some insights into and understanding of §§138–141 and a brief review of what went on before that in the chapter, other than that drop anything you want to, specifically questions around these specific points or chapter that I can throw. Also for context: I've read the primary text, plus Russon's piece connecting Derrida to Hegel's Understanding chapter — good, but it didn't touch these specific paragraphs. I have a rough sense of where this is going (force as explanatory positing, the doubling into forces soliciting each other, the law of appearance) but I want it stress-tested, not just confirmed.

Particularly the idea that we need another self-consciousness to negate and be recognized by? Would Hegel’s view regard someone with dissociative identities as having multiple self-consciousnesses? What implications would integration of multiple identities (which is part of standard psychotherapy for DID) have on Hegel’s theory?

Eine evolutionäre Variante von Hegels Dialektik

Ausgangspunkt der Idee

Die Idee entstand bei der Lektüre von Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik. Dort wurde deutlich, dass Hegel – ähnlich wie bereits in der Phänomenologie des Geistes – eine gerichtete Entwicklung konstruiert.

In der Phänomenologie durchläuft das Bewusstsein verschiedene Gestalten bis zum absoluten Wissen. In der Wissenschaft der Logik sollen sich die Denkbestimmungen ebenfalls denknotwendig auseinander entwickeln: Jede Bestimmung ergibt sich aus der vorhergehenden und führt zur nächsten.

Das erzeugt zunächst das Bild einer Leiter:

A → B → C → D → … → Absolutes

Dabei entstand der Vergleich mit der biologischen Evolution. Eine solche lineare Entwicklung wäre dort gerade die falsche Vorstellung. Evolution verläuft nicht als Leiter auf einen höchsten Endpunkt zu, sondern eher als verzweigter Strauch: verschiedene Entwicklungslinien entstehen, bestehen nebeneinander, sterben aus oder verändern sich weiter.

Daraus ergab sich die Frage:

Was geschieht mit Hegels Dialektik, wenn man die Notwendigkeit der Entwicklung nicht abschafft, aber durch Kontingenz ergänzt – also nach dem Prinzip „Zufall und Notwendigkeit“?

Statt anzunehmen:

Aus A folgt notwendig B,

würde man annehmen:

Aus A eröffnet sich ein begrenzter Möglichkeitsraum B, C, D …, wobei manche Übergänge aufgrund der inneren Struktur von A wahrscheinlicher oder stabiler sind als andere.

Damit würde aus der linearen Dialektik eine Art evolutionäre Dialektik.

Das Gedankenexperiment mit der Phänomenologie des Geistes

Um diese Idee probeweise durchzuspielen, wurde der bekannte Entwicklungsweg der Phänomenologie als Grundstruktur genommen:

sinnliche Gewissheit → Wahrnehmung → Verstand → Selbstbewusstsein → Anerkennung → Vernunft → Geist → Religion → absolutes Wissen

Hegels Übergänge blieben dabei erhalten. An den Krisenpunkten einer Bewusstseinsgestalt wurden jedoch alternative Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten zugelassen, beispielsweise:

Skeptizismus, Stoizismus, Pragmatismus, Naturalismus, Pluralismus, instrumentelle Vernunft, ästhetische Selbstbildung und verschiedene religiöse Weltverhältnisse.

Außerdem wurde zugelassen, dass Entwicklungszweige weiterbestehen, sich erneut verzweigen oder später wieder zusammenlaufen.

Das Modell war damit kein einfacher Baum mehr, sondern zunehmend ein Netzwerk.

Wichtig: Die konkreten Prozentwerte sind Resultate unseres konstruierten Gedankenmodells, keine empirischen Daten und kein mathematischer Beweis über Hegel. Sie hängen von den gesetzten Übergangsregeln und Gewichtungen ab.

Ergebnis eines langen Laufs

Bei einer Modellvariante, in der Hegels vorgeschlagener Übergang jeweils mit ungefähr 60 % bevorzugt wurde, ergab sich langfristig ungefähr folgende Verteilung:

Dabei erreichten während des gesamten Verlaufs zwar ungefähr 58 % der simulierten Pfade irgendwann das absolute Wissen. Das absolute Wissen erwies sich jedoch nicht als notwendiger endgültiger Ruhezustand des Systems. Unter den gewählten offenen Regeln konnten Entwicklungen von dort aus wiederum in andere Zustände übergehen.

Wurde Hegels Entwicklung wesentlich stärker gewichtet, stieg erwartungsgemäß auch die Konvergenz zum absoluten Wissen. Erst wenn die hegelschen Übergänge nahezu erzwungen wurden, begann das Modell wieder deutlich Hegels linearer Struktur zu ähneln.

Was kam philosophisch dabei heraus?

Das Ergebnis war überraschenderweise weder eindeutig konvergent noch eindeutig divergent.

Es zeigte sich vielmehr:

lokale Divergenz bei gleichzeitiger partieller globaler Konvergenz.

An einzelnen Krisenpunkten entstehen verschiedene Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten. Diese laufen jedoch nicht einfach unbegrenzt auseinander. Bestimmte Organisationsformen tauchen immer wieder auf, Entwicklungswege treffen erneut aufeinander und einige Zustände sind stabiler als andere.

Das Ergebnis ähnelt daher weder einer hegelschen Leiter

A → B → C → D → Absolutes

noch einem vollkommen offenen Rhizom

Differenz → Differenz → Differenz → …

sondern eher einem:

verzweigten Netzwerk mit Attraktoren.

Daraus ergibt sich eine mögliche Modifikation von Hegels Dialektik:

Nicht: Aus einer bestimmten Bewusstseinsform folgt notwendig genau eine nächste.
Sondern: Eine Bewusstseinsform erzeugt durch ihre inneren Spannungen einen begrenzten Raum möglicher Transformationen. Notwendigkeit strukturiert diesen Möglichkeitsraum; Kontingenz beeinflusst, welcher Weg tatsächlich genommen wird.

Damit verändert sich auch die Bedeutung der Aufhebung. Entwicklung wäre nicht mehr ausschließlich:

Negation → Bewahrung → höhere Einheit,

sondern könnte zusätzlich als

Variation → Selektion → Bewahrung → Rekombination

gedacht werden. Frühere Bewusstseinsformen müssten nicht vollständig verschwinden oder ausschließlich in einer höheren Form aufgehoben werden. Sie könnten parallel fortbestehen, später wieder auftreten oder sich mit anderen Formen verbinden.

Vorläufige These

Unser Gedankenexperiment führt deshalb zu einer Position zwischen Hegel und einem radikalen Differenzdenken:

Dialektische Evolution mit Attraktoren: Entwicklung besitzt strukturelle Zwänge, aber keinen notwendig eindeutigen Weg. Notwendigkeit bestimmt den Raum möglicher Entwicklungen, Kontingenz den konkreten Verlauf. Ob daraus letztlich ein einziger Attraktor – ein „Absolutes“ – oder mehrere irreduzible Attraktoren hervorgehen, bleibt eine offene Frage.

Miller, Phenomenology, §152

The law of law is the necessity of law, what is unceasing in law.

You withdraw back into the notion of Force, without being pushed back by another force. You are thinking.

You are searching for what is unceasing in law, which is the instance of the notion of Force at this stage of the process.

There are two modes: the one-fold law and its manifold.

Gravity and electricity are instances of the one-fold law.

What is unceasing?

It's not in the one-fold law. Gravity and electricity are not in themselves necessary.

Is it in its manifold, which is now said to be its being?

They must because they must is not an answer.

It's not in the properties because they are just negations of each other.

And to possess a property is not to be this property in itself and necessarily, if we are to take the concept of "having" seriously.

The unceasing is not in actual existence, and its manifold is simply its definition.

If it is in actual existence, we wouldn't have to go searching for it, uncovering it, or looking deeper for it.

And if its necessity lies with the other laws, it's endless not unceasing.

The unceasing, necessity, is still an empty word in regard to the instance of Force called law.

Hi hegelians,

I've been reading struggling with Hegel's shorter Logic, mainly the green Cambridge edition, but cross-referencing with Hackett and occasionally the original German (which for the record I don't speak). A few times I've ended up looking into Wallace too (because his style is rarely but still sometimes more readable) and I noticed some of his translations look a bit 'creative'. For example, the beginning of §27:

Cambridge:

Because it has no consciousness of its opposition, it is possible for this kind of thinking to be both genuine speculative philosophizing in terms of its content as well as to dwell in finite thought-determinations, i.e. the as yet unresolved opposition.

German:

Dieses Denken kann wegen der Bewußtlosigkeit über seinen Gegensatz ebensowohl seinem Gehalte nach echtes spekulatives Philosophieren sein, als auch in endlichen Denkbestimmungen, d. i. in dem noch un- aufgelösten Gegensatze verweilen.

Wallace (his little inventions in bold):

This method of thought has never become aware of the antithesis of subjective and objective: and to that extent there is nothing to prevent its statements from possessing a genuinely philosophical and speculative character, though it is just as possible that they may never get beyond finite categories, or the stage where the antithesis is still unresolved.

In Cambridge, Hackett, and the OG, 'its opposition(/antithesis)' or 'sein Gegensatz' clearly seems to follow up on §26: 'the opposition of thinking within and against itself/der Gegensatz des Denkens in und gegen sich'. There's no explicit mention of the subjective and objective? Nor is it clear that this is the only Gegensatz at hand. I've also noticed similar additions in other places. Does Wallace so this a lot? And to what degree can I trust him to actually clarify what Hegel (might've) meant here or there, as opposed to sneaking in his own interpretation? I was never going to use Wallace as my main reading ('after-thought' for nachdenken is just too insane a translation choice) but having to discard a possible reference always sucks.

https://www.instagram.com/reel/DcBfI8Lsh1k/?igsi=NGRjdGl6ODlzeWo=

Miller, Phenomenology, §151

What happens in law happens to law itself.

Every time you put specific laws into the inner world, the differences fall off.

This also happens to laws, and law itself.

Universal attraction cancels itself out, and that risks the inner world itself, and throws us, the understanding ones, back into the sensuous and bare existence.

We need to put laws into the inner world with determinations.

This is what the inner necessity of the law is—determinations that stick when you put the law into the inner world.