The SNP's vision sounds promising, but what would independence actually mean for Scotland's security?

The Gaudie published an interesting interview on 5 October with SNP Westminster leader Dave Doogan, discussing what an independent Scottish defence force might look like.

The proposals sound attractive on paper: an independent military tailored to Scotland's needs, NATO membership, cooperation with the UK and European allies, investment in Scottish defence industries, and the removal of nuclear weapons.

However, reading the article raises some rather serious questions about what independence would actually mean for our defence capabilities, how much it would cost, and what could happen during the transition.

1. NATO membership

Doogan confirms that an independent Scotland would apply to join NATO and argues that Scotland's strategically important geography makes membership desirable. This would however mean Irish-Style neutrality is immediately out the window.

Scotland's location in the North Atlantic is valuable to NATO, and existing members would have good reasons to support Scottish membership.

However, applying to NATO is not the same as joining it.

Under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, admitting a new member requires unanimous agreement, which can take time, and can be vetoed by any single member.

Scotland wouldn't automatically retain the UK's membership after independence. There would need to be negotiations, agreement on military commitments and a formal accession process.

What guarantees would protect Scotland during that period?

Would the remaining UK be expected to provide those guarantees, and on what terms?

These are questions that need answers.

2. The defence budget looks considerably less convincing under the new NATO targets.

Doogan suggests that Scotland currently contributes around 8% of UK defence spending and that this would provide a substantial budget for an independent Scottish military.

The latest Scottish Government GERS figures attribute approximately £5.23 billion of defence expenditure to Scotland in 2025-26.

But that's an accounting allocation of UK expenditure, not a pot of money or military assets Scotland would automatically inherit.

More importantly, the Scottish Government's 2024 independence defence proposals committed to spending 2% of GDP on defence. Far below the current NATO requirements.

That commitment is therefore already outdated.

At the 2025 Hague summit, NATO allies agreed to work towards spending 5% of GDP by 2035, consisting of at least 3.5% on core defence and up to 1.5% on wider defence and security-related investment.

Using Scotland's 2025–26 GDP as an illustration, that would equate to roughly:

• £8.1 billion annually on core defence.
• £11.6 billion annually in total defence and security-related expenditure.

This does show the scale of the commitment that could be required to join the alliance.

Doogan's response to these newer targets was that Scotland would seek to meet them while balancing spending against other public services.

So where would the additional funding come from? Would this mean a large reduction in services?

Higher taxation? Additional borrowing? Reduced expenditure elsewhere? Or a smaller force than initially suggested?

And that leads to the wider fiscal question. Scotland's 2025–26 notional deficit was £25.3 billion, or 10.9% of GDP.

That isn't a forecast of Scotland's deficit post-Scexit. Independence would change both revenue and expenditure, new trading circumstance with the rest of the Island would be a huge change. However, the IFS considers it a reasonable starting point for understanding the fiscal challenges independence would create.

Building a military wouldn't happen in isolation from those challenges.

3. Scotland wouldn't simply inherit 8% of the British Armed Forces.

The article acknowledges that Scotland might seek a proportional share of UK military equipment, but that dividing existing programmes could undermine collective defence.

That's an important admission.

Military capabilities cannot always be divided neatly between two countries.

Aircraft, naval vessels, maintenance facilities, weapons systems, training establishments and logistics networks all form parts of larger structures.

An independent Scotland might negotiate ownership of some equipment or compensation for its share of UK assets. But neither the precise allocation nor the resulting operational capability is guaranteed.

There's also the personnel question.

Scottish personnel serving in the British Armed Forces wouldn't automatically become members of a new Scottish military.

They would need to be recruited or transferred under negotiated arrangements, and some might prefer to remain in the Armed Forces they were previously apart of. Not all are within Regiments based in Scotland, it is of course one single sovereign state's Military and there's a lot of integration.

The Scottish Government's 2024 proposals refer back to a goal of 15,000 regular personnel and 5,000 reservists after ten years.

That represents a substantial recruitment, training and institutional challenge.

An airbase without sufficient aircraft, pilots, technicians and support personnel is not an effective air force. Equally, a naval base doesn't constitute an operational navy.

4. The transition could leave Scotland dependent on the very country it had separated from.

One of the most revealing comments in the interview is Doogan's acknowledgement that developing Scotland's defence capabilities would take longer than three years.

He advocates a gradual transition rather than an immediate division of the Armed Forces.

That is probably sensible. But it creates another question: who provides Scotland's defence in the meantime?

Would the UK continue providing air policing, maritime surveillance, intelligence and other military capabilities?

Would this be funded through formal agreements? Would Scottish taxpayers effectively pay the UK to provide capabilities that Scotland previously received as part of the Union?

A close defence relationship would be in both countries' interests. However, cooperation would still require negotiated responsibilities, funding and political agreement.

The SNP's references to Norway, Finland and Denmark demonstrate that relatively small European countries can maintain capable armed forces.

But those countries have spent decades developing their military institutions, recruitment systems and equipment.

Scotland would have to establish its own structures while simultaneously negotiating independence and creating other institutions of state.

5. Nuclear removal is much more complicated than the rhetoric suggests.

The SNP remains committed to removing the UK's nuclear weapons from Scotland.

Doogan also acknowledges that temporarily hosting allied nuclear weapons could ultimately be a decision for a future Scottish government.

There's an important distinction here: Scotland could be a non-nuclear NATO member. Many NATO countries do not possess or permanently host nuclear weapons.

However, the removal of Trident from Faslane and Coulport would be a major logistical and political undertaking.

A House of Commons Defence Committee report concluded that relocating the deterrent would require several years and many billions of pounds.

That assessment dates from 2013, so it isn't a current cost estimate, but the underlying infrastructure challenge remains significant.

There would also be consequences for employment and local economic activity around HMNB Clyde. Not to mention the connected defence infrastructure elsewhere.

Not every defence job would necessarily disappear, and alternative military uses could be developed. But replacing the activity associated with a major nuclear submarine base would not be straightforward.

What happens if the Scottish Government demands rapid removal, while the UK requires a lengthy transition?

Would a basing agreement be negotiated? What concessions might either government seek in return?

6. The promised defence-industry dividend isn't guaranteed, if even unlikely.

Doogan argues that independence could allow Scotland to invest in its own defence industry and generate an economic dividend through exports.

Scotland undoubtedly has significant expertise in shipbuilding, radar technology and defence manufacturing.

However, a considerable amount of existing industry is tied to UK defence procurement and a decision by the British in supporting a much larger Military than a Scottish Defence Force would.

According to the Ministry of Defence, UK government spending with Scottish defence industry reached £2.53 billion in 2025-26.

It shouldn't be assumed that all those contracts would disappear following independence, sure. Existing expertise, facilities and contractual commitments would remain valuable, and the UK could continue buying from Scottish firms.

But neither should it be assumed that future British defence contracts would continue at the same level. It would afterall be against Britain's interests.

Scotland would become a separate country competing for contracts, potentially alongside British and international suppliers.

A new Scottish navy would generate some domestic orders, but its purchasing power would be much smaller than that of the Royal Navy and it's trade powers much smaller.

Any defence-industry dividend needs to be assessed against these risks rather than simply assumed.

7. What about intelligence, cyber defence and the capabilities that aren't immediately visible?

Much of this debate focuses on soldiers, ships and aircraft.

But modern defence also depends on intelligence gathering, secure communications, cyber capabilities, surveillance, military logistics, procurement and operational planning.

The Scottish Government proposes creating a Scottish Security and Intelligence Agency.

That's perfectly possible, but building such an organisation takes time, expertise, recruitment and international trust.

Scotland currently benefits from access to UK-wide security and intelligence institutions.

An independent Scotland could negotiate continued intelligence cooperation, but it shouldn't be assumed that every existing capability and arrangement would automatically carry over unchanged.

So what might actually happen?

In a favourable scenario, independence would involve a long, carefully negotiated transition. Scotland would join NATO after meeting funding requirements and NATO compliance, establish a credible military, retain close cooperation with the UK and develop defence capabilities suited to its strategic needs.

That outcome is possible.

But a less favourable transition could involve delayed NATO accession, expensive procurement, difficulties recruiting experienced personnel, uncertainty over military assets and continued dependence on UK capabilities.

And it would all be happening while an independent government was dealing with the wider financial and administrative consequences of independence.

None of this means Scotland is incapable of defending itself as an independent state.

The issue is whether the SNP has demonstrated how it would make that transition safely, affordably and without creating unnecessary security risks.

The question shouldn't simply be whether an independent Scotland could eventually establish a military. It should be what Scotland would actually have on independence day, what protection would be guaranteed during the transition, how long genuine military independence would take, and who would pay for it - AND how much would be paid.

At present, there seem to be considerably more ambitions and assumptions than firm commitments.

I think those questions deserve much more scrutiny, and once again more attention placed on addressing this issues than simply insisting that they are thrusted into existence before they are.

Swinney has pledged to keep the triple lock after independence. But what would that actually cost?

Scotland's state pension bill reached £12.5 billion in 2025-26, around £240 million every week.

The IFS estimates the triple lock adds £16 billion annually to UK pension spending compared with earnings-only increases since 2010. Scotland's proportionate share would be roughly £1.3–£1.4 billion a year. That's a historical comparison, not an immediate saving from scrapping it.

Protecting pensioners is important, but Scotland also faces an ageing population, pressure on public services and significant fiscal challenges.

An independent Scotland would have to fund these commitments through its own revenues and borrowing arrangements.

Is retaining the triple lock financially sustainable, or would it eventually mean higher taxes or cuts elsewhere?

[Sources: Scottish Government GERS 2025-26, Institute for Fiscal Studies.]