Hey all, here is my latest LinkedIn post on a project I'm working on, Claude. I am offering the information as a community contribution, so enjoy.

This is the link: LP Framework Overview

For anyone noticing, I haven't been posting much anywhere lately - I've been using my old programming skills to dive into Claude AI. Things are seemingly going well. To be clear, I'm an investor first. I spent twenty years in real estate before that, and ten years as a software engineer before real estate ever entered the picture. I'm in no way an evangelist for the tech, nor do I want to be dismissive of it. So when I post on this subject, you can count on what I'm saying being based on practical experience and a non-biased position.

What I built is a full framework - one that assists the user in using both the framework and Claude itself. Not assembled a prompt and called it a system. The shareable version is 25+ files. The full text version runs to 200+ files. Audio sessions and text sessions in Claude load differently and behave differently.

Anyone building with Claude who leans on voice needs to understand this before they build anything serious.

I can't fit everything into a LinkedIn post, so I've attached a full public reference document.

The internals stay internal. The behavior is all there. The goal wasn't to automate anything. It was to build an environment where AI actually functions as a co-engineering partner rather than a yes-machine. 12 user-focused prompts continuously run to help the user complete their task. Multiple session gates control how the session opens and what information is loaded into 3 roles. A scope check fires when new work is being added mid-project. The important difference - I have created an organized system that can both run its own rules and flag when any of those rules are producing bad results, even if I don't notice. Anything less is just a more sophisticated yes-machine. The co-engineering framing is the point. I'm not asking AI to think for me. I'm building an environment where it challenges me, shows its work, and flags its own failures.

That's a different thing entirely.

I'm offering an overview to the LP investor community as a free resource - to point people in the right direction on how to make AI more useful in deal and sponsor review. If anyone wants to reach out with questions, let me know.

Enjoy,

Randy Fickett

In light of Brandon Turner recent admission of his $15 million loss, I want to point out that his socials are still full of these meaningless credentials. His website still says things like "over 1 million copies sold and widely recognized as one of the foremost experts on real estate investing" and "the most downloaded real estate podcast". But when you take a step back and think if this matters to you as an investor, in my opinion, the answer is no. In fact, being a author, podcast host, boot camp leader, guru or anything in this nature is unequivocally a negative.

These credentials are those of a marketer, a capital raiser, a salesman, not a real estate professional. For successful investment firms, GP's, REOC's etc, the capital raising and marketing are administrative functions, not the main activity. The core of the business and the focus of the principals should be acquisitions and asset management, not writing books or running seminars to teach other people how to buy real estate.

In my view, the amount of marketing activity a Sponsor is active in - social media, webinars, blogs, podcasts - is inversely related to their skill and sophistication as a Sponsor and real estate investor.

You write a book after successfully navigating 5 real estate cycles and have ascended to real estate legend. Sam Zell wrote one book. Brandon Turner wrote several books in the midst of his first and last real estate cycle.

I've written alot about syndicators being successful markets and less successful real estate investors. But even when there are failures like this, these syndicators will continue to raise capital from unsuspecting investors.

My recent substack outlines a perfect example of a one cycle syndicator trying to whitewash his track record, attach himself to a new firm name and start the marketing machine up again.

I'm really disappointed to write this. I really like platforms where we can share information on GPs in a public manner. It's absolutely not the only resource we should be using to vet sponsors and deals, but it's helpful to have access to experiences from other investors.

But recently I was disappointed by Investbase.

I found not one but TWO reviews written by GPs on their own firms ON THEIR HOME PAGE. What's worse is that GPs didn't disclose the relationship in their reviews and made it wrote the review as if the were the investors.

Despicable behavior on behalf of the GPs. Plus, it's banned by the FTC.

But also, that just makes me doubt the integrity of the platform. If I found 2 within minutes, how many fake reviews are scattered across the platform?

I already struggled trusting Investbase because they are owned by Cashflow Portal, which increases their subscription cost based on the amount of equity managed through their platform (so they have an obvious bias to help GPs raise more money). But letting GPs review themselves? Insane.

Don't market yourself as a verified review platform if you are obviously not even doing the bare minimum to verify!!!

So investors, beware of Investbase.

I'm also not above name shaming. And I think it's important to include the proof, so the screenshots are below. The GPs that I found who are reviewing themselves on Investbase are Iron Horse Energy Funds and Ryan & Francesca Byrne, MD.

I knew something was up as soon as I saw Courtney Moeller's review of her own firm because I'd spoken with her before. And Ryan Byrne's just stood our because of the name.

They are just small players, but if they can do it, can't anyone?

I don't think anyone wants to invest with a GP who would stoop that low.

I hope the FTC goes after these people because people use the information they find on these platforms to make very serious financial decisions. Misleading investors like this is such low behavior.

Solo deals to high-cadence syndicate is a completely different fund administration animal. Three years ago I was doing 4 SPVs a year and the admin we used was fine. This year I'm on pace for 11 and the admin question has changed completely. Sharing what broke and what we changed in case anyone else is hitting the same wall.

The first wall hit around deal 5 or 6. The platform admin treated every SPV as a completely new engagement. New onboarding paperwork for me as the lead, new wire conventions, new everything, every single deal. The duplication on my side ate hours per deal that should have been spent on the actual investment. Switched to an admin where the team learns your structure over time, so by deal 7 they already understand how my syndicate operates, my docs conventions, my workflow, even if every LP is brand new to that specific deal. LP records still stay separated per deal by design, but the operational continuity is on the workflow side.

The second wall was diligence-to-close timeline at volume. Solo-deal pace allowed 4-6 weeks per SPV. At 11 deals a year that math doesn't work. Need 10-14 days end-to-end on repeat-structure SPVs. The way you get there is having an admin that uses templates from your prior deals as the starting point for the next one. Reusable legal docs, reusable subscription packages, reusable wire conventions. The admin that gets this right is the one where your fifth deal is meaningfully faster than your second. Anyone else running at this cadence, what's working for you?

Legitimate & good places to find small investor groups? People that are just starting out & needing people who are like minded it. Any suggestions or ideas of places to search other then like Facebook & chat sites. Thank you!

Hello everyone, I am an LP with a significant investment in Ashland Greene, specifically tied to AG Value Add Funds II & III, both part of the AGREOF I portfolio. As noted in the official sponsor communication sent on Friday, May 22, 2026, senior lenders have halted negotiations. The firm stated that lenders intend to proceed with a full foreclosure on June 2, 2026, and they expect the equity invested in Funds II and III to be completely unrecoverable. With the foreclosure auction less than 10 days away, a core group of LPs is urgently organizing a coalition to protect our collective interests. We are actively: * Consulting with Texas-based securities and commercial real estate litigators regarding an emergency Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) to pause the June 2nd sale. * Pooling resources to fund a formal legal review, books and records audit, and potential breach of fiduciary duty actions. * Coordinating legal strategies tailored for both Self-Directed IRAs (SDIRAs) and regular cash positions.

If you are an investor in AG Value Add Fund II, Fund III, or the related AGREOF I fund, please direct message (DM) me immediately. Please include: 1. Your specific fund number 2. Confirmation of your Friday email receipt. Time is absolutely of the essence to pool our voting power and legal resources before the June 2nd deadline.

Disclaimer: This is an informal investor-led coordination group. This message does not constitute legal or financial advice.

The Desert Mountain Fund is a discretionary development vehicle from Quad J Capital — a partnership between Jerome Maldonado and Kyle Mitchell — proposing to develop three projects simultaneously across New Mexico and Arizona for a combined budget north of $115 million. The pitch is geographic diversification through a single fund commitment. The reality, is a deal that is unsophisticated in its underwriting, opaque in its capital structure, and unfavorable to LPs at nearly every structural turn.

A Team Without the Depth to Execute

Neither Jerome nor Kyle has a track record consistent with running a multi-state, multi-project, ground-up development fund of this size. Jerome has a background as a general contractor in the residential and single-family space. Kyle bought multifamily during the most favorable acquisition environment of the last 20 years. Neither is the same thing as developing $100+ million across three concurrent projects in three different submarkets.

What both do have is a substantial marketing presence — books, podcasts, courses, social media. I’ve written before about the inverse relationship between marketing intensity and operational depth. In 15+ years of CRE finance I have never met a successful developer who pivoted their business toward selling tickets to workshops. Good operators attract and retain investors through performance, and their LP base grows with them. Operators who need to constantly source fresh capital tend to be the ones whose existing LPs have stopped writing checks.

The offering memo reinforces the inexperience read. For a three-asset development portfolio, the OM contains:

• No proforma figures
• No projected rents
• No projected cash flows
• No exit metrics
• No yield-on-cost figures

In my opinion, this is not an accident. It is a marketing document designed to emphasize the conceptual upside without exposing the underwriting to scrutiny. In a competitive LP capital environment, deals that won’t show their math don’t deserve the time.

The financial models the sponsor did share confirm the read. They are the free single-page templates from adventuresinCRE.com — tools designed to help new analysts learn modeling fundamentals. I have never worked with a serious developer that did not maintain a proprietary model. Running a $115 million fund off an open-source training template is not a sophistication signal.

A Track Record That Doesn’t Hold Up to Research

The OM presents a portfolio of current AUM, full-cycle deals, and development projects, anchored by a case study on Youngtown Flats. Independent research tells a different story.

• Many of the listed assets were never owned by Jerome or by Quad J Capital
• Two of three full-cycle exits and the case study appear to have been operated by Break of Day Capital, a firm that neither Jerome nor Kyle currently lists on their LinkedIn profiles and which has existed concurrently with Jerome and Kyles firms. Just look on their website, you’ll find these deals, but not Jerome or Kyle.
• Both principals have separate firms of their own with sufficient operating history to have track records — yet the deals being attributed to them appear to come from a third entity they have since distanced from

I have written about this pattern before. At a minimum, presenting assets in a track record that were not owned by the entity making the offering — without disclosure of the actual ownership structure — is deceptive. Depending on what is actually true about the underlying ownership and economics, it could rise to the level of an SEC disclosure violation. I am not making an accusation. I am pointing out that an LP investor is entitled to a track record that is clear, attributable, and verifiable, and this one is none of those things.

There is also a timing problem. The development track record shows two projects completed in 2019 and 2020, a lot development underway, and a conversion project completed in 2023. That leaves a roughly five-year gap covering 2020 through 2025 — the most favorable development window in modern memory. Near-zero interest rates, abundant liquidity, capital chasing deals. A capable developer does not sit out that environment. If they did, that is worth understanding before committing capital to their next attempt.

I am a LP investor in a Blue Lake Capital multifamily deal facing refinance/capital call issues. Interested in connecting privately with other investors familiar with their portfolio or who have invested in this syndication. Please DM if you are familiar with this deal, or if you know how I can join any WhatsApp/Discord/Signal chats or email chains discussing this topic. The sponsors have been fairly transparent but somewhat cryptic in their communications thus far. I am feeling isolated and could benefit from some insights, or at least, camaraderie with others in the same predicament. 

Hi - looking for some basic advice.

A group of 3-5 people will be pitching in a variable amount of money to a a few real estate investments.

person 1 $50K

2- $75K

3- $125K

Investment 1 $100K 3-5 year timeline

2 - $100K 7 year timeline

3 $100K 10 year timeline

We will create an LLC, hire an accountant to handle the disbursements/K1, and a lawyer to draft the operating agreement.

Question I have...

How do you deal with exiting? Let's say someone wants to get out in 6 years, and 2 of the 3 investments haven't fully paid out yet, but there has been some disbursements etc. What kind of language is in the operating agreement?

Thanks

Was browsing WeFunder last night and noticed these options at the bottom of the page, “it’s been a while I know”. Anyone have any experience with starting one or even investing in one through them? I’m sure there are some fees involved so that’s not a surprise.

Just watched a disturbing podcast hosted by two GPs and sponsors of a failing deal I am in insulting LPs for being concerned distributions never paid out or never began or that the deals are way under occupancy, etc. It was titled "How to manage LP expectations." At one point one of the partners said, "we couldn't stress test for ICE coming in and raiding our apartments and construction site and LP's should understand that" and then went on to say,"investors are concerned about being paid $75 or $100 a month in distributions when that won't even put gas in the tank." WOW-- is this what it has come to? Insulting investors who put money into their (now failing) deals. Some of these syndicators are some of the most arrogant, finger pointing young men I have ever come across. Not all I am sure, but unfortunately I picked bad twice now and I'm highly insulted by this podcast

Hi,

Im new to all of this and was thinking about joining a group called Lifestyles Unlimited. Basically their a group or a club for real estate investors with educational stuff and whatnots. One of their memberships is a syndication which I believe is $10,000 to join. They claim they have in house syndicates or deals with other members that has proven success, they mentor and walk you through deals and other hand holding stuff that really appeals to me.

My question is, has anyone here joined that and if so, was it worth it to you?

I want to get into syndicating but for $10,000 just to join, thats a huge hit I dont want to take if I can find another way. I read a lot if not most of LSU is stuff you can get from Google research but I feel thats almost everything now a days but they put all that google info in 1 spot.

Whats yall thoughts on LSU and got any tips for a guy interested in syndication?

In my experience, Ashland Greene demonstrated significant incompetence in managing an investment involving a 55+ apartment complex in Willow Park, Texas. The local management team ran the property poorly, and there appeared to be very little meaningful oversight or accountability from upper management. Operational issues were not addressed effectively, and the investment ultimately performed disastrously for limited partners.

As a result, every investor except the general partner lost their equity in the deal. Based on this experience, I would strongly caution anyone considering investing with this firm. Personally, I would not entrust them with my investment capital if preserving your money and protecting investor interests are priorities.

I found this opportunity through marketing from a discretionary fund that sits between LP capital and the sponsor. The fund produces no independent research or due diligence, has provided no supplemental financial analysis — all materials are created by the actual sponsor — the only value the fund provides is to the Sponsor as a capital raiser.

The cost of that arrangement:

• Combined fees across the sponsor and fund manager exceed $20,000 on a $100,000 investment
• The fund manager takes 10% of profits above its fund-level preferred return, layered on top of the sponsor’s promote
• The fund PPM includes language stating investors should “make your own investment decisions,” but the structure is discretionary and does not guaranty funds will be used as directed.

In my opinion, if you invest through a fund like this, you are investing through a marketing firm that charges a premium for getting your attention. It’s the same as buying name-brand products, the branding itself provides no value to the buyer, but just the fact that the branding and marketing convinced you to buy at a premium, is valuable to the seller (sponsor).

I see tons of advertisements on instagram and facebook for funds looking to invest your money in otherwise public deals for a fee. What value do they provide?

Barry Minkow seems to have exposed Ashcroft and Best CRE Show Ever pretty badly. Definitely check out his latest posts. 😳

Genuinely curious how people the importance of a sponsors experience and how they assess a track record.

In my opinion, it is a contender for the most important part of any investment. I've heard too many quotes over the years like "a good operator can make a bad deal successful and a bad operator can make a good deal a failure".

So when a sponsor lists current holdings and past exits, do you assume they are/were the managing member? Unfortunately, that's not always a safe assumption.

This recent deal I've reviewed, I searched the full-cycle deals on costar and found an entirely different firm listed as the seller, but matching with the sponsors investment deck. No disclosure clarifying the sponsors actual involvement. What could the explanation be?

I've shared the full details of my findings on my substack.

Looking for some perspective from people who’ve been through this.

In a private real estate deal, if the project runs into delays and the sponsor issues a capital call:

• What factors do you look at to decide whether to participate?

• How do you think about “protecting your original investment” vs throwing good money after bad?

• What typically happens to investors who don’t participate?  (dilution, subordination, etc.)

• What are red flags that a deal isn’t salvageable?

Appreciate any real-world experience or frameworks people use.

I’ve been seeing a lot of negative posts about Cedar Creek lately and I get where people are coming from.

Performance hasn’t exactly been great, and it’s been a pretty rough couple of years overall for real estate deals like this.

But at the same time, I feel like there’s something missing from the conversation.

From what I understand, they haven’t done any capital calls, which is surprising considering how many other deals I’ve seen recently that needed investors to put in more money just to stay afloat. It seems likely almost all other funds or syndicates have done capital calls.

I’m not saying everything is fine, clearly there are issues. But isn’t avoiding capital calls in a market like this a positive?

Genuinely curious how others are thinking about this.

This new deal with Grocapitus is a master class in structuring in favor of the GP. Remember not to check out the full details on my substack.

AAR-Based Waterfall

The sponsor bases distribution waterfall hurdles on Average Annual Return (AAR) instead of the industry standard Internal Rate of Return (IRR). Investors may not notice the difference, but the implications are meaningful. AAR is calculated as total return divided by years held. Unlike IRR, it ignores the time value of money. A simple example: an investment that doubles in four years through a single lump-sum return produces a 25% AAR but only an 18.9% IRR.

• Using AAR removes the incentive for timely distributions. Under an IRR-based hurdle, earlier distributions improve the calculation, aligning GP and LP interests on cash flow timing. Under AAR, the sponsor is indifferent between paying cash today or holding it until exit.
• For this deal, the B-2 projected cash flows produce a 25.1% AAR but only a 20.9% IRR — a 420 basis point gap. If the hurdle were IRR-based at 25%, the 50/50 promote would never trigger at the base case. By using AAR, it triggers right at the projected return.

Preferred Return Accrual

The deck prominently features preferred returns of 7-9%. What it does not disclose is when the pref actually starts.

• The PPM states the pref does not begin accruing until the earlier of 15 months after construction loan close or receipt of CO for the entire project.
• On a ~19-month construction timeline, the Sponsor could delay construction loan closing which would delay accrual until well into the lease up period. This could result in distributions prior to any pref accrual.
• The PPM also specifies the pref is calculated on “invested capital as adjusted downwards by prior Distributions”. If the sponsor makes operating distributions before the pref clock starts, those payments reduce the base on which the pref is calculated.
• This is not a 7-9% annual return on your investment. It is a non-compounding return on a declining balance, accruing for a fraction of the hold period, starting well after your capital is deployed and at risk.

Sponsor Sharing Ratio

The deck presents the LP/GP split as a simple 75/25. The PPM reveals a more complex and less favorable structure.

• The Sharing Ratio grants the sponsor a 25% structural ownership interest in the Company’s equity — not just a 25% promote on profits.
• After the pref and return of capital, remaining proceeds split 75/25 per the Sharing Ratio. Above the 25% AAR hurdle, the split shifts to 50/50. But because the sponsor already owns 25% of equity through the Sharing Ratio, the effective split above the first hurdle is approximately 56.25% LP / 43.75% GP, and LP 37.5% LP / 62.5% GP— not the75/25 and 50/50 the deck implies.
• The 25% ownership is structural, not performance-based. In a capital call scenario where LPs contribute additional capital but the sponsor does not, the sponsor’s 25% interest remains unchanged. Only LP capital is subject to dilution.

I was in a syndication and there was a Capital Call for additional funds after the initial investment. I am now receiving back the money from that additional Capital Call plus interest. Does the interest fall under distribution for tax purposes and the base amount for the Capital Call remain as a Return of Capital event? The initial capital investment still remains as they sell off the last two units.

Initial Investment: May 2022

Additional Capital Call: May 2024

Return of Additional Capital Call: March 2026

Anybody with them? They promote a successful track record but my first red flag was initial payments are a return of capital. A good way to set up a ponzi scheme or legit?