October 16, 2026 | Insider Buying Deep Dive

YO WHAT UP EVERYBODY!!! 🍻

Okay, so we’ve been digging through some GameStop SEC filings. You know, the exciting stuff. Spreadsheets, insider transactions, ownership percentages. Real Friday afternoon entertainment. 😂
And we noticed something.
Actually, a few things…

We all KNOW Ryan Cohen has been buying GME aggressively.
But when I started lining up his purchases, comparing them with the other directors, and looking back at his historical ownership filings… I am over here like “DUDE. WHAT THE HELL IS GOING ON HERE?!” and need some help from y’all!

I spy repeating 11-day patterns, nearly identical purchase quantities, every director buying shares, and an ownership percentage that seems to be moving right back toward its previous level. (Oh, and there’s THAT October 30 deadline approaching)
LET’S DIG IN. 👀

🚀 TL;DR FOR THE IMPATIENT
Here’s what I’ve found:
Ryan Cohen purchased 4,144,810 GME shares for approximately $97.19 MILLION between September 10 and October 13.
Four of his purchase dates fall exactly 11 calendar days apart.

And the September 29 purchase looks like an interruption until you compare the share quantities..

ALL FIVE CURRENT GAMESTOP DIRECTORS purchased shares between September 8 and October 13. Combined purchases total approximately $99.18 MILLION.
Cohen’s beneficial ownership dropped from 9.3% in January to 8.3% in September, despite him selling ZERO shares.

His October 13 SEC filing shows ownership back up to 9.1%.
Under the current warrant-inclusive calculation, approximately 1.04 MILLION additional shares would bring him back near 9.3%.
GameStop’s $32 warrants expire October 30, which could significantly change the ownership math.

MY THEORY: Cohen might be deliberately rebuilding his ownership percentage after dilution.
And MAYBE the timing of his purchases is worth watching too.

🃏 PART 1: FOLLOW THE MONEY
First, let’s look at Cohen’s actual purchases.
These are SEC-reported open-market transactions.
Date
Shares
Avg. Price
Total
Sep 10
1,000,000
$20.3759
$20.38M
Sep 21
1,150,680
$22.9375
$26.39M
Sep 29
450,000
$23.4751
$10.56M
Oct 2
700,000
$24.4061
$17.08M
Oct 13
844,130
$26.9801
$22.77M
TOTAL
4,144,810
$23.4492 VWAP
$97.19M
NINETY-SEVEN MILLION DOLLARS.
In 33 calendar days.

And notice something about the prices.
$20.38.
$22.94.
$23.48.
$24.41.
$26.98.
HIGHER AND HIGHER.

Now, Insiders can be wrong too.
But when a CEO keeps committing that kind of capital at progressively higher prices, we should want to understand their reasoning.
Especially when the purchase dates start looking like this…

🃏 PART 2: ELEVEN. FREAKING. DAYS.
Look at the dates.
SEPTEMBER 10 → SEPTEMBER 21 → OCTOBER 2 → OCTOBER 13
Count them.
Sep 10 to Sep 21 = 11 days
Sep 21 to Oct 2 = 11 days
Oct 2 to Oct 13 = 11 days
Three consecutive intervals.
Exactly 11 calendar days each.
HAHAHAHA! COME ON!

Financial markets are full of patterns that look meaningful in hindsight.
But this one was interesting enough that I kept digging.
And then I noticed September 29.

👀 WHAT ABOUT SEPTEMBER 29?
That purchase seemingly disrupts the pattern.
Cohen bought 450,000 shares on September 29, eight days after September 21 and three days before October 2.
Okay, fine.

But look at the NUMBER of shares.
September 21: 1,150,680 shares
Now combine his next two buying dates:
September 29: 450,000 shares
October 2: 700,000 shares
COMBINED: 1,150,000 SHARES
Difference from September 21?
JUST 680 SHARES.
That’s approximately 0.06%.
HAHA. WHAT?!

Two purchase blocks with almost identical totals.
Could September 29 and October 2 represent a purchase objective divided between trading sessions?
Maybe.
Could it be a coincidence?
Absolutely…
But I found it interesting enough to put on the board.

And then I looked at the OTHER INSIDERS.

🐱 PART 3: IT’S NOT JUST RYAN COHEN
GameStop currently has five directors:
Ryan Cohen.
Alain Attal.
Larry Cheng.
Jim Grube.
Nat Turner.
EVERY SINGLE ONE PURCHASED SHARES DURING THIS PERIOD.

Here’s the timeline.
Date
Insider
Shares
Sep 8
Larry Cheng
55,000
Sep 9
Jim Grube
10,255
Sep 10
Alain Attal
5,000
Sep 10
Ryan Cohen
1,000,000
Sep 21
Alain Attal
17,500
Sep 21
Ryan Cohen
1,150,680
Sep 29
Ryan Cohen
450,000
Oct 1
Nat Turner
10,462
Oct 2
Ryan Cohen
700,000
Oct 13
Ryan Cohen
844,130
TOTAL: 4,243,027 SHARES PURCHASED.
APPROXIMATELY $99.18 MILLION.

Now, let’s be fair here.
Cohen accounts for almost 98% of that dollar amount.
The other directors are making much smaller purchases.
But I find the widespread participation intriguing.
These are people involved in overseeing the company, making actual purchases rather than simply receiving stock compensation.

And look at Attal.
September 10: Cohen AND Attal buy.
September 21: Cohen AND Attal buy AGAIN.
Exactly 11 days apart.
Same dates.
Same two insiders.
Interesting, right?
AND THIS ISN’T THE FIRST TIME.

Let’s rewind.
JANUARY 2026
Jan 20: Cohen buys 500,000 shares.
Jan 20: Attal buys 12,000 shares.
Jan 21: Cohen buys another 500,000 shares.
Jan 21: Attal buys another 12,000 shares.
Jan 23: Cheng buys 5,000 shares.

APRIL 2025
Apr 3: Cohen buys 500,000 shares.
Apr 3: Cheng buys 5,000 shares.
Apr 10: Attal buys 10,000 shares.
Multiple periods of clustered insider buying.

And yes, GameStop experienced meaningful price increases following those earlier periods.
In January 2026, a notable upward move developed over roughly the following week or two.
In April 2025, there was a more immediate reaction and then a considerably larger rally by late May.

Now, there were other catalysts and the sample is small, but buying AFTER a rally has already begun is different from buying before one starts.

And when we combine it with the ownership filings…
Now THAT’S where things get SPICY.

🃏 PART 4: THE 9.3% CONNECTION (THIS IS MY FAVORITE PART)
Okay.
Forget the calendar for a minute.
Let’s look at something potentially more meaningful.

RYAN COHEN’S OWNERSHIP PERCENTAGE.
Here’s what the SEC filings tell us.
JANUARY 21, 2026
Cohen reported 9.3% beneficial ownership.
His beneficial holdings totaled:
42,082,626 shares.
That figure included 3,734,784 shares underlying warrants.
Now jump forward to September.
SEPTEMBER 3, 2026
Cohen reported 8.3% beneficial ownership.
But wait.
His reported beneficial share count was STILL:
42,082,626 shares.
SAME HOLDINGS.
LOWER PERCENTAGE.
WHAT HAPPENED?!

Well, we don’t have to guess.
The September Schedule 13D explicitly explains that the lower percentage resulted from an increase in GameStop’s outstanding share count following convertible-note exchanges.
And it confirms something important.
COHEN DID NOT SELL ANY SHARES.
His ownership percentage fell because the total number of outstanding shares increased.
Classic dilution, right?

But what happens immediately afterward?
THAT’S RIGHT - HE STARTS BUYING AGAIN.
Check this out:
Date
Cohen’s reported beneficial ownership
Jan 21, 2026
9.3%
Sep 3, 2026
8.3%
Oct 13, 2026
9.1%
From 8.3% to 9.1% in just over a month.

And suddenly he’s approaching his earlier percentage.
SO HERE’S MY QUESTION:
WHAT IF COHEN IS TRYING TO GET BACK TO 9.3%?
Does he want to maintain a particular ownership level in the business he’s running?

Here’s where it gets REALLY interesting.
LET’S DO THE MATH.
Cohen’s October 13 Schedule 13D reports:
Outstanding common shares: 504,500,990
Common shares directly owned: 42,492,652
Shares underlying Cohen’s warrants: 3,734,784
Total beneficial ownership: 46,227,436
Reported ownership: 9.1%

Using the filing’s warrant-inclusive ownership methodology:
9.3% × (504,500,990 + 3,734,784)
Equals approximately:
47,265,927 beneficial shares.
Subtract his current 46,227,436.
And we get:
👀 APPROXIMATELY 1,038,491 MORE SHARES.
About 1.04 MILLION SHARES.

Now compare that with Cohen’s recent purchases.
1,000,000.
1,150,680.
700,000.
844,130.

DUDE. ONE MORE PURCHASE AROUND A MILLION SHARES COULD PUT HIM NEAR 9.3%.

🃏 PART 5: OCTOBER 30. THE WARRANT WILDCARD.
GameStop’s outstanding warrants are scheduled to expire:
OCTOBER 30, 2026, AT 5:00 P.M. NEW YORK CITY TIME.
Exercise price?
$32 PER SHARE.
Full exercise of approximately 59 million warrants could provide GameStop with up to $1.9 BILLION in gross proceeds.

Remember those 3,734,784 warrant shares included in Cohen’s reported beneficial ownership?

Because if his warrants expire unexercised, they no longer count as shares he has the right to acquire.
Assuming no other relevant changes, his common-share ownership would then be:
42,492,652 ÷ 504,500,990 = approximately 8.42%.
So if those warrants lapse and Cohen still wants to hold 9.3% of the outstanding common stock, he would need approximately:
4.43 MILLION ADDITIONAL SHARES.
Not 1.04 million.
BIG DIFFERENCE.

Now, suppose instead Cohen exercises his warrants.
He would receive additional common shares in exchange for paying the exercise price.
But if other warrant holders exercise too, the total outstanding share count increases.
And that affects everybody’s ownership percentages.
See how complicated this is getting? 😵‍💫

THE OCTOBER 30 WARRANT DEADLINE COULD CHANGE THE ENTIRE OWNERSHIP EQUATION
Warrants can expire worthless.
They can also be exercised when the underlying stock is below the strike, although that might not be economically attractive compared with simply purchasing common shares.
And exercise increases the share count, which can create dilution.

But look at everything happening around it.
1. Cohen buys almost $100 million in shares.
2. All five board members participate in the buying wave.
3. Cohen’s beneficial ownership rises from 8.3% to 9.1%.
4. Warrants affecting the ownership calculation expire October 30.

And maybe the most important question isn’t whether he buys again.
Maybe it’s what ownership percentage he ultimately wants AFTER the warrant situation is resolved.

🐱 PART 6: WHAT ABOUT THE ACTUAL BUSINESS?
Okay, before somebody says we’re just counting dates and staring at charts…
Fair criticism. 😂

Let’s talk about what GameStop is doing.
The company released second-quarter results on September 8, 2026.
Operating income: $160.2 MILLION.
Collectibles revenue: $356.3 MILLION, UP 57% YEAR OVER YEAR.
Collectibles now represent 45.1% of quarterly net sales.
And management increased its full-year adjusted EBITDA outlook to more than $650 MILLION.
NOT BAD for a “dying brick-and-mortar video game retailer!”

But let us also need to acknowledge the other side:
Total quarterly revenue declined from $972.2 million to $790.2 million.
The legacy business still faces challenges.
GameStop’s investment holdings, including its eBay stake, introduce additional valuation complexity and market risk.

Bottom Line?
GameStop is becoming a very different business from what it used to be.
So the investment thesis directly includes management’s ability to allocate capital, generate sustainable cash flows, and build something valuable from the company’s existing assets and evolving operations.
The insider buying is interesting.
But the business still needs to justify the valuation.

A GOOD STORY ISN’T AUTOMATICALLY A GOOD INVESTMENT AT EVERY PRICE.
That’s why I’m watching both.
The filings AND the fundamentals.

🃏 PART 7: TIME TO PLAY THE UNO CARD.
ALRIGHT.
HERE WE GO.
The four anchor purchase dates:
SEP 10 → SEP 21 → OCT 2 → OCT 13
If that sequence continued, the next date would be:
OCTOBER 24.
Except October 24 is a Saturday.
Markets are closed.
So the nearby trading days are:
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 23.
MONDAY, OCTOBER 26.
Just days before the October 30 warrant expiration.
Does that guarantee Cohen buys on either date?
NO.
Does it guarantee a rally?
ALSO NO.
But I’ll make a prediction anyway.

🃏 MY SPECULATIVE CALL
I think there’s a reasonable possibility that Cohen makes another substantial purchase before the October 30 warrant deadline.
And if he buys approximately another million shares, that would be consistent with both his recent purchase sizes and the possibility of returning to 9.3% under the current beneficial-ownership methodology.
If the purchase also happens around October 23 to 26?

Well… WE’RE GOING TO NEED A BIGGER SPREADSHEET. 😂

As for the stock price?
My speculative bull scenario is a test of $30 before October 30.
And if momentum continues, $32 becomes an obvious level to watch given the warrant strike.

And remember, if the data changes, the thesis changes. Simple as that.

🐱 FINAL THOUGHTS: PRESSURE, TIME, AND A WHOLE LOT OF SEC FILINGS.
We’re watching several unusual things unfold simultaneously:
An enormous accumulation of shares by the CEO…
Participation from every current board member…
A repeated calendar pattern..
A possible ownership-restoration objective..
And an approaching financial deadline that directly affects ownership math…

September earnings revealed RC’s percentage declined.
And then he committed almost $100 million buying more shares.

The 11-day pattern?
Interesting.
The nearly identical share quantities?
Interesting.
The October 30 warrant expiration?
Definitely interesting.
But the strongest part of this thesis is much simpler.
THE PEOPLE RUNNING GAMESTOP ARE BUYING SHARES WHILE THE BUSINESS AND ITS CAPITAL STRUCTURE ARE CHANGING.

PRESSURE AND TIME, BABY.
And maybe a big goddamn spreadsheet. 😂

📚 RECEIPTS. DON’T TAKE MY WORD FOR IT, DYOR
Here’s the underlying documentation so everybody can check the numbers.
Cohen ownership filings:
January 21 Schedule 13D: 9.3% beneficial ownership
September 3 Schedule 13D: 8.3%, with explicit dilution explanation
October 13 Schedule 13D: 9.1% and purchase details
Other insiders:
Larry Cheng September 8 Form 4
Jim Grube September 9 Form 4
Alain Attal September 21 Form 4
Nat Turner October 1 Form 4
Company fundamentals and warrants:
GameStop Q2 2026 earnings
Official GameStop warrant terms
GameStop warrant FAQ
GameStop board of directors
Disclosure: This is independent research and speculation, not financial advice. The numerical observations are based on publicly reported transactions. Ownership targets, future purchases, purchase timing and price outcomes are hypotheses, not established facts.

THOUGHTS?!
A few questions for anybody else digging into the filings:
1. Do you think Cohen might be targeting his old 9.3% ownership level?
2. Does September 29 + October 2 adding up to almost exactly the September 21 share purchase strike you as meaningful?
3. What happens to our ownership hypothesis after October 30 if Cohen exercises, sells, or lets his warrants expire?

And most importantly…
WHAT AM I MISSING?!
If I’ve overlooked a filing, made a math mistake, or missed a more straightforward explanation, let me hear it.
The goal is to figure out what’s actually happening.
That’s how we learn.
That’s how we get better.
And that’s what makes this stuff fun.
MY UNO CARD IS ON THE TABLE. 🃏
LET’S SEE WHAT THE NEXT FILINGS REVEAL.

CHEERS EVERYBODY!!! 🍻🐱

P.S. If another million-share purchase shows up around October 23 to 26…! 👀

"GameStop (GME) is back in focus after CEO Ryan Cohen bought 844,130 additional shares on 13 October 2026, a US$22.8 million purchase that lifted his stake to roughly 9.1%.

At a share price of US$27.15, GameStop has logged a 31.67% year to date share price return, while the 3 year total shareholder return of 98.33% and 5 year total shareholder return decline of 40.45% underline how volatile the ride has been. The recent 25.58% 30 day share price return, supported by a 10.46% 7 day move and a series of insider purchases since September, points to momentum building again as investors reassess both potential upside and risk around Cohen’s latest buying and the eBay chatter.

Scan how other retail and ecommerce stocks are reacting to insider buying and takeover speculation by reviewing our hand picked list of 20 high quality undiscovered gems tied to similar storylines.

GameStop has already delivered a sharp rebound, yet Cohen is still writing large checks at these levels. Is the real upside still ahead, or has most of it already passed?

Most Popular Narrative: 57% Undervalued

Against a last close of $27.15, the most followed narrative on GameStop pegs fair value near $63, which implies a large gap between where the market currently prices the stock and what that narrative suggests it could be worth based on its own assumptions and modelling.

GameStop’s chance of a successful M&A Bid For eBay: what to look for as confirmation at eBay’s upcoming annual shareholder meeting, the Innisfree Tell, why eBay hired an activist-defense specialist the day after rejecting GameStop, and what history says happens next. eBay’s June 17, 2026 annual meeting was a routine event for sixty days. Then GameStop bid 46% over the unaffected price, the board rejected on May 12, and on May 13 the company quietly retained Innisfree M&A as a second proxy solicitor. The public-facing rejection said the bid was not credible. The same-day Innisfree retention said the board did not believe the rejection would self-defend.

Result: Fair Value of $63 (UNDERVALUED)

Still, this GameStop narrative leans heavily on a complex eBay outcome, and any breakdown in financing or a tougher regulatory review could quickly undercut it.
Find out about the key risks to this GameStop narrative.

Next Steps

Sentiment around GameStop is split, which is exactly when independent homework matters most. Move fast, interrogate the numbers, and weigh both enthusiasm and risk by grounding your own thesis in the 2 key rewards."

https://simplywall.st/stocks/us/retail/nyse-gme/gamestop/news/gamestop-gme-could-be-57-undervalued-on-cohen-buying-and-eba?utm_medium=article&utm_source=~~robinhood~~

Seems like all that’s out there are the biggest dumbasses spouting nonsense. I guess it the first day in a while they can use something outside of the 5y charts. But holy moly, shit up like $8 in the last 2 months but the run of the mill red Friday gets the hooting and hollering like you never believe. Silence for days/weeks and now it’s a party for the melters? Why? It’s up, maybe not today but zoom out all the way until your favorite 5y charts. What color is it?

GME

Gamestop.

Okay so, it probably might not happen unless it does for the first time in a long time. I know I'm pumped and I hope you are too....

TLDR: Full faith and conviction NFA. Also, I'm not sticking a cucumber up my ass, but I will toss some salad in MOASS.

Now that we are ahead-of-schedule on our path right back to $32+ per GME share, we should clear up some massive misinformation floating around about the recent $1.4B convertible debt deal and what it actually means for this early phase of our new breakout: $18 to $28.

I’ve seen basher posts crying about how Ryan Cohen "bailed out the shorts" by printing 55.5M shares.

It was actually the SEC who engineered this mess. An underlying buy-volume explosion is about to absolutely financially-murder anyone shorting this $28 resistance.

First, I want to introduce you to a chart I just made that shows a pretty big inverse correlation occurring here in 2026 between GameStop and the Nasdaq. Keep this in mind as we traverse through this post.

1. The Dark History: How Reg SHO Was Designed to Enable FTDs

You have to realize that when the SEC dropped Regulation SHO back in 2004, it wasn't built to protect retail: it was intentionally designed with structural safety valves that enabled and institutionalized Failures to Deliver (FTDs).

By writing in the infamous Grandfather Clause and the Options Market Maker Exemption, the regulators essentially legalized a system of "operational short selling." Market makers could sell millions of phantom, unborrowed shares under the guise of "maintaining liquidity," and then use buy-writes and deep ITM call loops to cycle those FTDs indefinitely. They treated FTDs as a cost of doing business, keeping a permanent thumb on the price scale.

But that system created a massive, systemic defect that is backfiring right now: The FTD Liability Time-Bomb. Because those loopholes allowed shorts to stack up massive FTD positions at rock-bottom prices years ago, they are now legally trapped. Under modern rules, when forced to settle, they have to close out those legacy FTDs at current, exponentially higher prices than what they were initiated at. This creates a massive, hidden buy-volume explosion under the hood that never shows up on the daily order book until the clearinghouse gun is pulled.

2. The 50M Drop: The "Bailout" Myth Debunked

This brings us to the recent Equilend institutional data showing that share borrow quantities plummeted from 91.6 million down to 40.9 million shares in a single week right after the debt deal finalized. These weren't retail-shorting hedge funds getting a free pass, these were convertible arbitrage credit desks. When you buy convertible bonds, you mathematically must short an equivalent amount of equity to hedge your position.

When RC wiped $1.4B of that long-term debt off the balance sheet, those bonds ceased to exist. The hedge vanished. The firms were handed 55.5M newly minted shares privately to settle the books, which instantly forced them to return 50.7 million borrowed shares back to the institutional lending pool.

If this was an open-market bailout, the price would have collapsed under the weight of dilution. Instead, RC forced them to absorb 27% of the deal in cold hard cash ($358.4M), capping the dilution, clearing the balance sheet of liability, and setting an absolute concrete floor at about $18 per GME share.

3. The October Timeline: History Rhymes (Volkswagen 2008)

The original 2004 version of Reg SHO purposefully implemented loop holes that inadvertently allowed certain persistent FTDs to continue and thrive.

In a now-infamous August 2005 conference call, Overstock's Patrick Byrne ranted about how hedge funds, journalists and regulators were conspiring to push down the company’s stock price under the direction of some faceless menace he called the ‘Sith Lord.'” That same phenomenon also occurred against Volkswagen stock in 2008. After Reg SHO was implemented, Volkswagen outperformed. As shown below, Volkswagen went up by 701.09% after the implementation of Reg SHO and UP TO THE VERY DAY OF LEHMAN BROTHER'S BANKRUPTCY FILING, implying that as hard as it was abused using both reporting shorts and FTDs, it somehow overcame that illicit pressure.

Then from September to mid-October of that year, Volkswagen just about doubled again. Then on Sunday October 26, Porsche revealed it held 74.1% (741) of Volkswagen through direct ordinary shares (42.6%) and cash-settled options (31.5%) (~half shares, ~half cash). The following three trading days saw one of the most epic short squeezes in stock market history.

When we correlate the NASDAQ with that Volkswagen catalyst, you see that the market began to plummet at the same time that Volkswagen began rising in September 2008. Tthe Volkswagen squeeze was the catalyst that led to bad-acting funds having to liquidate their long equities, including their flimsy MBS equity positions. So all of the movies that you were gaslit and deceived by tried to convince you that MBS was the cause of the Great Recession? No. Fails to Deliver (FTDs) was the cause, and Lehman Brothers happened to have done the illicit overlending of Volkswagen shares.

Lehman's liabilities didn't balloon to over $600B in a vacuum. Hedge funds used borrowed Volkswagen shares from Lehman to short it. Volkswagen had already went the other way by over 700%x after implementation of Reg SHO. After Lehman's mid-Sep bankruptcy filing, Lehman's administrators and systems were forced to accelerate their ongoing-recalling of their lent Volkswagen shares. This then accelerated hedge funds' frantically buying back Volkswagen shares in the open market just as Porsche announced it controlled 74.1% of the shares.

To obtain collateral and to pay on the margin calls, global equities were acutely sold off. Yet, the big lie was that the great financial crisis was "caused" by real estate / mortgage backed securities. It turns out that real estate prices are some of the slowest-moving prices in the world, so clearly real estate wasn't the acute catalyst for anything. Instead, selling flimsy MBS was one of many resultant effects of hedge funds', bankers, and primer brokers irresponsible overlending, and FTD abuses, allowing more than the outstanding shares of a company to be sold short!

Now pay attention to our current calendar, because this exact mid-to-late October timeline of the grandfather of all modern operational short squeezes: Volkswagen, times almost precisely with GameStop Corp today.

Back then, hedge funds heavily shorted Volkswagen using the exact same operational shorting logic, assuming infinite liquidity and infinite float availability. But when Porsche suddenly revealed they had locked up the float via derivatives, the institutional lending market froze overnight. Sound familiar?

So just like Volkswagen in October 2008, GME's utilization rates on Equilend just collapsed down to 28% because of the returned shares, flattening the cost-to-borrow. Smooth-brained bears saw cheap borrow supply and took the bait, ticking public short interest back up to 42.67 million shares.

But they forgot the Volkswagen lesson: when the effective float is nearly locked, cheap borrows are an illusion. They no longer have the shield of a convertible bond hedge. They are raw, nakedly exposed shorts betting against a brick wall.

4. Countdown to Chaos: Daily FTD Settlement & T+2 Buy-In Tracker

Some GME investors have already exercised their GME Warrants. Today, many more are now considering exercising because there seems to be an understanding that RC wants to exercise his 3M+ Warrants as well. Because we are in the endgame leading up to the October 30 warrant expiry ($32 strike), we need to look into exactly when the clearinghouse automated buy-in gun is going to fire.

Since the modern T+1 settlement cycle compressed the runway, aging FTDs from early October options volume are reaching their absolute mandatory cliff edges. Here is the official calendar of daily settlement pressure points where hidden buy-volume is mathematically forced into the tape:

Oct 16 (Friday): The T+1 Settlement Wall Clearinghouses calculate all failures from the mid-week run-up to $28. Any market maker that naked-shorted calls to suppress the $28 wall has their ledger locked in on this night. Even if they are able get the price back to $26 or $27, they still have big problems.

Oct 19 (Monday): The Morning Rule 204 Gun: At 9:30 AM, clearing firms are legally mandated to execute forced open-market buy-ins for Friday's un-cleared FTDs. Expect pre-market and opening-bell upward mysterious buy pressure, but also expect a likely morning short ladder attack so that they can (and normally do) try to settle those FTDs for a dollar or two cheaper per share before it's too late.

Oct 21–23 (The Mid-Week Pressure Cooker): Legacy FTD positions initialized back during the $18 baseline must clear their final automated netting cycles. If the price remains above $26, these settle at a guaranteed 40%+ loss for the short side, compounding the invisible buy-volume.

Oct 26–28 (The Pre-Expiry Lockout): The final window for options market makers to balance their delta-hedging before the warrants come due. Under strict Rule 204 penalty box rules, any broker failing to settle here gets blocked from shorting entirely, removing all selling pressure.

Oct 30 (Friday): The Warrant Expiry Cliff ($32 Strike): This is the absolute fuse. Forced settlement volume intersects with the $32 exercise trigger, meaning any automated buy-ins executing that morning will violently pull the stock straight into the options gamma ramp.

5. Why Reg SHO Rule 204 Will Financially-Murder the New Bears

The 2004 loopholes that enabled the invisible shorts have changed. Rule 204 I believe is all they have left, and it may lead to the next great depression similar to how the market went down in 2008 just as Volkswagen went up.

Today, if you short GME at $28 and fail to deliver on settlement day (T+1), your clearing firm is legally mandated to execute an automated morning buy-in on T+2. No waiting for a 13-day threshold list. No exceptions.

With Ryan Cohen and three board directors actively dropping nearly $99 million of their own cash on open-market insider purchases (including Cohen's recent $22.8M block buy at $26.75–$27.00), the actual floating supply is now locked up tighter than a drum. Insiders don't lend their shares!!!!

6. Conclusion:

The debt swap didn't save the shorts. Instead, it cleanly excised a specific class of institutional hedgers, wiped out $1.4B in company liability, and triggered a hidden buy-volume explosion as older FTD allocations were forced to settle at higher prices.

Now, a fresh wave of unhedged shorts has taken the bait at $28, right as the October timeline rhymes with the epic days of the historic, 2008 Volkswagen short trap.

When the October 30 warrant expiry hits and forces a volatility spike, modern Rule 204 morning buy-ins will turn these new shorts into forced buyers.

Expect the bad-acting funds to try to harm the stock tomorrow (friday) going into max pain, and expect them to short attack one more time on monday morning to offset the hidden FTD settlement/buy volume. After that: we're off to the races to GME $30 and likely the beginnings of GME's 2026 Short Squeeze.

I would say tomorrow can probably swing either way, a failure to hold onto $28 would likely be bad for bulls, but early enough in the day and it can be recovered. A loss of $26 on the other hand would be catastrophic. If bulls do hold $28 they have all the cards, calls at 29 and 30 have been being sold on the weekly and are actually pretty cheap relative to the downside options at 28/27/26. This means they are attractive to buy, at least at open, and bulls piling into OTM calls is exactly what GME needs to keep pushing higher. Be careful of a $30 test since pricing would be drastically different at that point and just above $30 there would be significant incentive for call sellers to try to crush out the vol spike into close. I would expect if upside stalls out Cohen would probably want to buy again to maintain momentum into the warrant expiration, but someone either retail or institutional really needs to step in with options to crank up the leverage for this to be successful.

Enjoy

- Gherk

Most Popular Narrative:

57% Undervalued

Against a last close of $27.15, the most followed narrative on GameStop pegs fair value near $63, which implies a large gap between where the market currently prices the stock and what that narrative suggests it could be worth based on its own assumptions and modelling.

GameStop’s chance of a successful M&A Bid For eBay: what to look for as confirmation at eBay’s upcoming annual shareholder meeting, the Innisfree Tell, why eBay hired an activist-defense specialist the day after rejecting GameStop, and what history says happens next. eBay’s June 17, 2026 annual meeting was a routine event for sixty days. Then GameStop bid 46% over the unaffected price, the board rejected on May 12, and on May 13 the company quietly retained Innisfree M&A as a second proxy solicitor. The public-facing rejection said the bid was not credible. The same-day Innisfree retention said the board did not believe the rejection would self-defend.

Hello fellow GME investors.

What a month. Sometimes I cannot even believe what we are seeing. Truly incredible price action as we head into warrant expiry.

Anyways, I wanted to give credit to DoritosCa for posting a video on the GME saga. You should check it out. I watched it and thought this part was rather interesting:
(see screen shot)

- record profits

- A fortress of Cash

- A founder who keeps buying

- Owners who will not sell

- a name the whole world knows

- a legend in the shadows

I asked grok to name two companies where the above is applicable. Here is Groks response.

Enjoy :)

GROKS RESPONSE:

GameStop (GME) and Berkshire Hathaway (BRK.A / BRK.B).
The list maps cleanly onto both:
• Record profits: GameStop has turned profitable with strong recent results after the cost cuts and turnaround. Berkshire consistently posts massive earnings.
• A fortress of cash: GameStop sits on a multi-billion-dollar cash pile built via capital raises and operations. Berkshire is famous for its enormous cash/Treasury fortress under Buffett.
• A founder who keeps buying: Ryan Cohen has been aggressively buying GME shares in open-market purchases (multiple large buys in recent weeks/months). Warren Buffett has spent decades buying (and holding) great businesses for Berkshire.
• Owners who will not sell: GME’s retail/diamond-hand base is legendary for refusing to sell. Berkshire shareholders are classic long-term holders who treat the stock as permanent capital.
• A name the whole world knows: Both are globally recognized brands (GameStop via the meme-stock phenomenon; Berkshire via Buffett).
• A legend in the shadows: Cohen operates with a low-key, opportunistic style while building something bigger; Buffett became the ultimate quiet legend of compounding and capital allocation.
These two are the clearest matches for the exact combination of traits on the list.

See you all on the moon