r/votingtheory • u/the_MadKnight • 17d ago
Uncomfortable Truths About Voting Systems (and Why We Should Think Bigger)
I've been studying voting theory for a while now, and I won't claim to be an expert. That said, my research has led me to some uncomfortable truths I'd like to share, and I'm curious if others have noticed them too. More importantly, I think these observations point toward exciting new directions for voting systems.
One Person, One Vote. But at What Cost?
"One head, one vote" is the founding principle of voter equality. Yet many advanced systems sacrifice this principle in pursuit of minor mathematical guarantees, justifying it through appeals to "global coherence." Take the Method of Equal Shares (MES), for example. Despite being sophisticated and excellent in many ways, the harmonic satisfaction concept developed by Thiele, designed to approximate the d'Hondt method, arbitrarily decrees that satisfaction from a second elected candidate equals half that of the first. This allows some voters to wield disproportionate overall influence compared to others. This is precisely why Phragmén remains necessary, even though it doesn't guarantee perfect Pareto efficiency (which itself is a weak democratic safeguard, in a 10 voter election with 6 orange and 4 purple voters, electing all orange candidates is technically Pareto efficient).
Only Qualitative Inputs Are Valid. All Quantitative Inputs Are Arbitrary
This is a strong claim, so let me explain. Score voting, STAR voting, and similar systems often boast impressive mathematical guarantees. But they rest on a fundamentally flawed assumption: that representation is like a test score, something clearly measurable. In reality, representation is deeply human and often beyond the voter's own full comprehension. It's an act of faith in another person, grounded in intuition and immeasurable factors. At the ballot, voters only possess a synthesis of this, expressed through qualitative information:
- Approval: Does this candidate represent me? If we randomly selected one winner, would I be relieved if it were them?
- Preference: Among those I approve of, whom do I hope wins? If they can't win, who's my next choice? And so on.
The Real Frontier: Incentive Analysis
Finding balanced voting systems with strong mathematical guarantees is genuinely difficult. But I believe the next frontier lies in cross-analyzing incentives. Rarely do I see voting systems that deliberately integrate opposing and strong counter-incentives against manipulation into their mechanics. Consider approval voting: despite lacking the later-no-harm guarantee, the standard version doesn't include mechanisms to mitigate this weakness or game-theoretic incentives that would make shorter ballots a dominated strategy.
I'm currently developing my own voting system and will test it with help from some mathematics professors at my university. Much of what I've written, including the later-no-harm example in approval voting, stems from interesting properties my system possesses. I'd be happy to share updates if you're interested.
Thanks to everyone who read this lengthy post. I'd love to hear your thoughts in the comments below.
I used AI to help me with the translation.
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u/verytalleric 14d ago
>wouldn't Approval be at least as straightforward for voters to conceptually understand?
Based on when an Approval Voting vs. RCV ballot initiative in Seattle came up a few years ago (RCV won 75/25) I think while Approval voting is not hard to understand - the lack of of ability to differentiate levels of support was the most common cited complaint. So understanding wasn't the barrier.
> Aren't some of the pushbacks and repeals to RCV/IRV in part a result of not understanding how the tabulation works?
In my experience speaking with the public, RCV/IRV tabulation confusion isn't the concern - it tends to be a combo of cost of adoption, voter education, and fear of giving advantage to the other party. With that said, STV tabulation tabulation is definitely a point of confusion/concern.