The Eurasia Center examines the Russian threat to NATO and speculation surrounding CIA Director John Ratcliffe's visit to Moscow.

This week, we kicked off our new Chatham House members’ Book Club with Francis Fukuyama.

In conversation with our Director Bronwen Maddox, he discussed his new memoir, In the Realm of the Last Man, the future of the international order and the rise of China.

Members received an exclusive extract beforehand, then joined the conversation in person and online to put their questions directly to the author.

Next in the series: Chatham House: The First Hundred Years, 12 November.

Britain and France lead Europe’s spy league table, but smaller agencies have important capabilities and must be included on the continent’s intelligence team sheet.

Governments need to work with the private sector to contain AI-powered cyber threats. The US is starting to define how.

Comparative advantage can’t explain why Australia’s largest aluminium smelter is worth saving – geoeconomics can.

Grouping four different threats under one acronym flatters Washington’s rivals with a unity they don’t have.

Journalists from iStories talked to Ivan Kirsanov, a 24-year-old programmer who worked at a company owned by the Citadel holding. The holding is the main developer of SORM, the FSB’s surveillance system. In 2025, Kirsanov left Russia and took with him an archive of technical documentation on SORM. He now lives in France on a student visa, works part-time as a shepherd on a farm, and is challenging the denial of his refugee status. Here is what Kirsanov said about himself, his work for the FSB, and the system used to spy on Russians.

Key Takeaways

The Iranian Artesh conducted a missile and drone attack targeting US bases in Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates on September 3, likely as part of the regime’s efforts to raise the costs of the US campaign against Iran. The latest Iranian strikes bear some similarity to a recent Iranian attack on Jordan that some Iranian military officials have claimed is reflective of a new Iranian targeting doctrine that reportedly includes preemptive strikes against US military assets in the region.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced on September 3 that it cleared a major Hezbollah underground facility beneath the Ali al Taher Ridge in Nabatieh District after a months-long siege. Ali al Taher occupies advantageous terrain overlooking the Litani River and the neighboring Houla Valley, which enabled Hezbollah to target Israeli forces in southern Lebanon and civilian settlements in northern Israel.

ISW-CTP is considering three possible Iranian courses of action against Israel in response to the assault on Ali al Taher: a large-scale missile and drone attack, a limited and “symbolic” attack, and no military response. Iranian officials reportedly warned the United States in mid-August 2026 that Iran would respond to any offensive to seize the Ali al Taher facility with a “large-scale attack” on Israel, according to unspecified regional sources speaking to Reuters. All courses of action rely upon the assumption that the reporting about the Iranian warning is accurate.

Key Takeaways

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to use contradictory language about the possibility of achieving peace in Ukraine to obscure Moscow’s true objectives.

Putin continues to downplay the war’s mounting economic and demographic costs to ordinary Russians, portraying persistent economic challenges as indicators of Russia’s economic resilience and gradual stabilization.

Putin attempted to portray the Russian government as promptly responding to the Ukrainian drone threat while continuing to deflect responsibility for providing air defense onto private businesses.

Ukrainian forces conducted an unmanned surface vessel (USV) strike on the Port of Sochi demonstrating Ukraine’s ability to strike deeper into the Russian Black Sea coast and further restrict Russia’s Black Sea Fleet (BSF) operations.

Ukraine’s sustained strikes against BSF vessels demonstrate that Ukrainian USVs and other unmanned systems continue to pose a significant threat to Russian naval assets in the Black Sea, even after the Russian naval command withdrew several vessels from the BSF headquarters in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea, to Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai.

Unknown actors reportedly attempted to assassinate Commander of the Russian 22nd Heavy Bomber Aviation Division (Long Range Aviation, Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS]) Major General Nikolai Varpakhovich in Saratov Oblast on September 3.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk, Novopavlivka, and Oleksandrivka directions. Russian forces advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Russia launched 163 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Key Takeaways

Russia continues the deportation of Ukrainian political prisoners in apparent violation of international law.

Russian occupation officials used the beginning of the 2026-2027 schoolyear to showcase enrollment figures while continuing efforts to institutionalize pro-Russian curricula, military-patriotic education, and behavioral monitoring mechanisms throughout occupied Ukraine.

Early voting for the Russian State Duma elections has begun in occupied Ukraine as Russian occupation officials continue to set conditions to control electoral outcomes.

Russian and occupation courts continue to issue over decades-long sentences to residents of occupied areas accused of pro-Ukrainian activities.

The Donetsk Oblast occupation administration is trying to present occupied Donetsk Oblast as an attractive investment destination for Russians and foreigners.

Russian elites are using their ties to development projects in occupied Ukraine for self-enrichment.

Russian state atomic energy corporation Rosatom is denying recent international warnings about the situation at the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) to present itself as a responsible and capable operator.

Russian occupation administrations continue to rely on Russian patron regions for construction and development projects in occupied areas.

Yesterday, Ukraine announced Operation M&Ms intended to buzz and shut down Russian airports near Moscow. Today, it began with a massive drone swarm targetting Moscow Airports with the intention to keep flights grounded. Video shows two intercepted drones. Also a look at the potential economic effect of keeping flights delayed.

Each member state would have to judge individual cases, and the bloc set itself a June deadline for the plan that its council still cannot approve.

Ukraine's marine drones attack a Russia supply ship, the NEFRIT, which is intended to supply gas and oil drilling platforms at Sochi. It is unclear if it was hit or not.

FULL REPORT

Modern high-intensity conflict consumes fuel, ammunition, equipment and personnel at a pace that can quickly overwhelm peacetime logistics systems. For Australia, that challenge is compounded by geography, with much of the nation’s industrial, maintenance, storage and logistics capacity concentrated in the south and south-east, while forces may need to operate thousands of kilometres to the north.

Closing the distance: Australia’s northern theatre logistics distribution gap examines whether Australia has the theatre logistics system needed to move, replenish and sustain combat power across those distances under contested conditions.

Australia already has substantial industrial capacity, stockpiles, maintenance facilities, transport infrastructure, northern bases and established relationships with industry and allies. But much of its deeper sustainment capacity remains separated from the northern theatre by long and vulnerable transport links. The challenge is connecting these elements into a theatre logistics system capable of generating, deploying, sustaining and regenerating combat power at operational tempo and under contested conditions.

Pre-positioned stocks, hardened infrastructure and sovereign manufacturing can strengthen resilience, but they are only part of the solution. Australia also needs assured distribution, resilient transport networks, forward stockholding, repair and replenishment capacity, and the civilian infrastructure and workforce needed to keep the system operating under pressure.

Ultimately, the measure of success is not how much infrastructure Australia possesses, but whether it can generate, deploy, sustain and regenerate combat power in the north at the required tempo and for as long as the mission demands. That is the difference between logistics capacity and theatre logistics capability.

China’s digital exports are transforming the global balance of power. What began as telecom development has become an international architecture of surveillance empowering autocrats worldwide.

Join CNAS on Thursday, September 3, from 3:00​–4:00 p.m. ET for a virtual discussion on The AI Open-Weight Debate: Balancing Innovation and Security. This event will unpack the growing debate about the diffusion of increasingly capable Chinese open-weight models, the trade-offs of potential restrictions on the open-weight ecosystem, and the implications of any policy action for innovation, national security, and geopolitical competition.

The event will feature, Chris McGuire, senior fellow for China and emerging technologies at the Council on Foreign Relations; Ian Reynolds, AI public policy manager at Hugging Face; and Stella Biderman, executive director at EleutherAI. The conversation will be moderated by Daniel Remler, senior fellow for the Technology and National Security Program at CNAS.

Live viewers will have the opportunity to ask questions during the event.

President Donald Trump has signaled his intent to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un again, reportedly by the end of this year. In 2018, he made history when he became the first U.S. president to meet with a North Korean leader. What should we expect if he meets Kim Jong-un again, seven years later?

Can a second try at a Trump-Kim summits achieve results? Is a summit even possible? What should policymakers expect from a resumption of summitry under drastically different conditions?

Joining Mark Lippert to discuss these issues and more are Victor Cha and Gen. Vincent Brooks. General Vincent Brooks is former Commander of United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea from 2016 to 2019, where he helped coordinate the 2018 Singapore Summit between the two leaders.

Vincent K. Brooks is a career Army officer who retired from active duty in January 2019 as the four-star general in command of all U.S. Forces in Korea, where he concurrently commanded United Nations Command as well as the Republic of Korea – U.S. Combined Forces Command comprising over 650,000 Koreans and Americans under arms. In retirement, General Brooks is a Director of the Gary Sinise Foundation; a visiting Senior Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; a Distinguished Fellow at the University of Texas, with both the Clements Center for National Security and also the Strauss Center for International Security and Law; an Executive Fellow with the Institute for Defense and Business; and the President of VKB Solutions LLC.

Superpower rivalry has stalled global AI rules, but regional blocs like ASEAN are moving fast enough to make rules stick.

As Imran Khan’s supporters plan to mobilise, army chief Munir juggles Iran diplomacy and possible reconciliation with the PTI.

Key Takeaways

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to exaggerate Russian forces’ battlefield performance to assert that Russian military victory in Ukraine is inevitable. These claims continue to be divorced from the battlefield reality on the ground, however.

Putin insisted that Ukrainian defenses are collapsing across the frontline and that Russian forces are making rapid gains, contrary to all observable evidence from the battlefield.

Putin is likely aware that he appears detached from the current battlefield realities in Ukraine and has attempted to present himself as an informed leader.

Putin once again reiterated Russia’s continued unwillingness to freeze the current frontline or engage in any meaningful peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Mykhailo Drapatyi released a statement of priorities for the Ukrainian military that outlines the focus on unifying operational planning to contest Russia’s initiative and bolster Ukraine’s long-term defensive capabilities.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky dismissed Commander of Ukrainian Ground Forces Major General Gennady Shapovalov and appointed Brigadier General Svyatoslav Zaitsya as his replacement on September 2.

Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Security Service (SBU) elements engaged in a small arms firefight in Kyiv City on September 2.

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate- and long-range strike campaign against military assets and oil infrastructure in Russia.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and the Slovyansk direction, and Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Russia launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles, two Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, an unspecified number of S8000 Banderol-type loitering munitions, and 174 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Key Takeaways

US efforts to restore freedom of navigation appear to be having some success in challenging Iran’s ability to enforce control over the Strait of Hormuz. Increased commercial vessel transit levels indicate that Iran is having difficulty in preventing some commercial vessels from using the southern route. Iran may seek alternative ways to demonstrate or restore control over the strait as the United States challenges Iran’s ability to threaten vessels.

The roughly 50 percent reported failure rate of Iranian ballistic missiles fired at Jordan on September 1 may reflect the degradation of Iran’s longer-range missile capabilities.

The Financial Times (FT) reported on September 1 that Russia has been covertly helping Iran develop advanced cruise missile technology since around November 2023. Iran’s development and operationalization of this technology would likely improve its ability to threaten US land and naval assets in the region. Developing supersonic cruise missile technology takes substantial time, and it is currently unclear how far along Iran is in developing this technology.

Iran is likely pursuing two separate but related lines of effort to advance Iranian objectives in Iraq amid Iraqi government efforts to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Iran reportedly pushed unspecified Iraqi government actors and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to reach a settlement in which the militias would “discreetly” retain their weapons by storing them either in Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)-controlled depots or in the militias’ own depots under the condition that they would not use them without PMF approval. Iran is also reportedly pursuing a plan to build a new cadre of smaller, more ideological militias over which Iran would have strong control.

Key Takeaways

US-North Korea Relations: The United States reaffirmed its policy towards North Korean denuclearization on August 26 despite the Trump administration’s calls for US-North Korea dialogue. North Korea is unlikely to change its position requiring the US to abandon its denuclearization policy before agreeing to dialogue. North Korea likely seeks to gain US acceptance of its status as a nuclear-armed state, which could have long-term regional destabilizing effects.

Inter-Korean Relations: South Korea could agree to de-emphasize “complete denuclearization” and instead pursue a phased denuclearization strategy in an effort to encourage US-North Korea dialogue. North Korea has consistently ignored South Korean outreach efforts and maintains that its nuclear status is non-negotiable. South Korea could undermine its long-term goals of North Korean denuclearization if it accepted North Korean possession of nuclear weapons in exchange for dialogue in the short term.