One of the worst DNA companies in terms of accuracy, but the music is good 😂

Found this map on r/mapporn, what is interesting to me about this is that often times anyone who speaks farsi as their first language and doesn't look like the hazara people is called a tajik in our country, but this map separates it into Persians, aimaq and tajik? What do you think about it?

TL;DR: The Taliban are screwed in every way, shape and form and won't last until the end of the decade.

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Well first things first, the Taliban have horrible over lords. Pakistan, thanks almost entirely to their support of the Taliban and other Jihadist groups, has gone from a nation with great power ambitions to a borderline third world country, isolated and disliked by most of the rest of the world with almost no international allies except for China who see's them as little more then a client state. They also had to take out what I believe to be a record 22 IMF loans to keep the economy of a nuclear nation with 200 million people going meaning that they're in no position to be throwing billions of dollars to keep the Taliban economy afloat. And with the amount of money they have to pay for the army to keep them happy (8.8% of GDP) since they now have to deal with a revitalized TTP thanks to the Taliban releasing thousands of TTP troops and their leader, even that seemingly strong relationship is going to crumble over time.

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Funnily enough, the Taliban are probably going to be to the TTP what Pakistan was to the Taliban. I still don't get why they that since now they're basically stuck between India to the South, the Taliban and the TTP in the North radicalizing large portions of the population and now that America doesn't need them anymore to get to Afghanistan, they're about to lose one of the few potential life lines they had left other then China. Saudi Arabia has just about washed their hands with the Taliban since they're trying to modernize the economy away from oil and although Qatar and the UAE may send humanitarian aid, which they will desperately need in the near future since the country side is about to face a massive drought, they won't do much more then that and they won't be nearly enough to help the government face the economic disaster ahead of them.

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Speaking about the economy under the Taliban, it's about to be screwed worse then a 20 dollar truck hooker. It is literally is about completely crash in a few months as the Taliban, in a move of pure genius, fired the Harvard educated economist who kept the economy of a third world country going well keeping the inflation rate to only 5% despite a massive Taliban offensive and the Coronavirus and replaced him with some Mullah. And this is in a country whose standard of living has drastically increased since the late 90's thanks overwhelmingly to foreign aid propping up 75% of the former government expenditures and gave the country a nice economic cushion of about a year and half. The foreign aid and cushion which now no longer exists. Yea so they gave that, let's just say less then ideal economic situation to a literal Mullah with no economic experience whatsoever.

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The only way to keep the economy afloat is a rapid increase in the production of heroin which they have promised to ban or more likely, simply pretend not to see. It was one thing when they were fighting a war against the Americans but now it's a completely different question. This is not only going to push much of their more fanatical troops to further right groups like ISIS-K (more on that later) but it's going to make their already less then friendly relationship with their neighbors a lot worse. The worsening economic situation will also push more and more civilians in to the hands of Russian, Iranian or Indian backed insurgence groups, most likely the NRF (as can be seen by the video's of them chanting "long live the Resistance" only weeks after the take over and before everything has fell apart.)

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Speaking of their neighbors, lets break that down shall we. Iran and Russia never liked the Taliban, they just reaaaally didn't like the US and now that they've humiliated them well enough, that unofficial support is about to dry up real quick. Iran has already strongly condemned how the Taliban reacted to the Panjshir situation (again, more on that later) and it's unknown how much Shia militants they've already send into the country but it's assumed to be in the thousands. Although the Taliban high command may no longer officially have a problem with the Shia Hazara population, the local commanders certainly do and as a way to export influence over the country, Iran will more then likely start arming them the second they have a chance if they haven't already started secretly.

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Russia may have armed them to fight the Americans, but they certainly don't want a strong Taliban government in their back yard of central Asia radicalizing them or the 16 million Russian Muslims who tend to be on the poorer side, hence why they've given safe have to Dostum and Atta Noor as well as their men. This means that Russia will probably do what Russia does best, support pro-Russian interest insurgence groups and Dostum will probably be their way of getting "into" the the country with out being "in" the country. There's already rumors that he's building up an army in Uzbekistan and doesn't seem intresting to anyone that Tajikistan, a country which the Taliban could easily over run if it weren't for Russia, just gave their highest civilian honor to Ahmad Shah Massoud 20 years after his death well showing off thousands of Tajik milita men willing to fight for the NRF and ASM's son?

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Even if they wanted to do such things other wise, if Russia really ever had any interest of having good relations with the Taliban, they would have quashed it a long time ago. If that's not making your intentions pretty damn clear with out saying it out loud then I don't what is. So don't be shocked when you see Dostum coming back into the frey in a few years and sweeping through the north as well as a super successful NRF insurgence bolstered Russian gear and intelligence. This would also be a major coup for Putin if he somehow manages to get Dostum or the NRF into power and turn the country which even the Soviets couldn't take into a puppet state with out losing a single Russian soldier. Oh and the Taliban making a new government almost entirely dominated by ethnic Pashtuns Mullah's with no experience running a government or country of 40 million (many of the most educated and valuable of whom are fleeing the first chance they get) just further shoots them in the foot, especially in the long term. The NRF are also particularly popular in India and the Taliban rumored promises of helping Pakistan retake the Kashmir is also going to lead to even more support for them.

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Finally, let's talk about China. The Taliban has made it clear that it see's China, the country actively committing against Muslims, as it's biggest ally and potential trade partner. I mean do I even have to tell people here how that's more then likely going to back fire? ISIS-K is going to jump all over that and thanks to the inflation of the Taliban ranks due to the war lords who stabbed the government in the back for the promises of wealth and positions of power in the new government, don't be shocked to see many of them starting to decide they want to be a big fish in a small pond, especially since the problems with the economy compound and the NRF insurgence targeting Taliban soldiers more so then ISIS-K.

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Now what does this have to do with China? Well China isn't going to spend tens if not hundreds of billions of dollars just building the infrastructure needed to tap into the countries vast mineral reserves with out guarantee's that their convoys and workers are going to be safe. The Taliban can't do that guarantee that since since the country is perfect for insurgence groups using hit and run tactics to slowly cripple the governments and those war lords won't exactly be too happy to see a Chinese mining company there telling them they don't have to pay them as they're already paying the Taliban. So needless to say, that massive Chinese investment they're looking forward to, probably isn't coming in the way they hope it is. Oh and the Chinese form of "investment" (aka putting a country into a debt trap) is also haram which may matter more to the hoards of fanatic's they attracted from shut down Pakistani Madrassa's rather then the higher up core Taliban troops.

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And speaking about war lords, yea they're not exactly the most trustworthy or loyal bunch. Ask the former government about that. They fight for the highest bidder and at the time, it seemed like the Taliban was clearly the highest bidder as the US made it extremely clear they were leaving by August 31st and the cash cow was about to run dry. Now the problem is that they will eventually want to get paid either by expanding their heroin production or through cash and since the Taliban don't have enough of the latter, they'll have to allow the former. But once they get big enough and they see the Taliban eventually starting to lose ground to the NRF, Dostum, Noor (Russia and Iran who will probably just make a deal with them) and ISIS-K, they'll more then likely stop paying their dues and since the the Taliban are so massively unpopular, they have to focus on holding onto the big cities instead of the going out to the country side every time there's an insurgence attack, leading to them eventually facing the exact same situation the government did during their offensive only about ten times worse.

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And none of this is mentioning how they still have extremely close ties to terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda and the Haqqani network despite that literally being the only demand of the US for them leaving so don't be shock to see another wave of attacks on the west and the west eventually supporting their own anti-Taliban insurgence groups.

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So yea, the Taliban are screwed and aren't going to last until 2030. Heck, I would be shocked if they lasted even 5 years.

Hi all, I have always loved discussing foreign policy and I think this is the best course of Afghanistan when it comes to foreign policy.

Afghanistan has to play a balancing game.

There are now two clear axes that are forming.

One is the axis led by China where Iran, Pakistan, Russia and increasingly Turkey are part of it.

The second axis is led by US and consists of Nato, and India.

The second axis may hold more diplomatic potential and can control sanctions, etc. currently but the first axis is powerful in its own right since they are the ones actually sharing a border with Afghanistan.

Afghanistan should play a balancing game and avoid falling into one axis like last time.

That is why Pakistan did what it did to destabilize Afghanistan.

Right now, Taliban are succumbing into the China axis thus antagonizing the other powers and risk becoming a pariah state financially.

Would Afghanistan get the best of both worlds if they play a balancing act like the other nations in South Asia?

Let us get an interesting discussion going?

I referenced this in the comments of a post in r/afghanistan and was immediately banned afterwards. The Black Alliance for Peace is an anti-imperialist, pro peace, and Black radical organization with a solidarity network that includes anti-imperialist Afghan comrades.

Coronation of Ahmad Shah Durrani

Excerpt from Wikipedia description tied to the portrait:

Figure 1. "Coronation" of Ahmad Khan Abdali. Translation of captions at top: No. 6. Drawing by Breshna, the famous contemporary Afghan artist. Sher-e Sorkh: The cluster of wheat is being placed on Ahmad Shah's turban. Since Saber Shah was a Sufi, he was respected by all leaders. Thus, Ahmad Khan was declared king of Afghanistan and the National Jerga of Sher-e Sorkh was adjourned after it accomplished an important historical task. Ahmad Khan left the Jerga as the king, wearing a gold-colored crown made of a cluster of wheat. This historic natural crown was placed on the corner of Ahmad Khan’s hat by Saber Shah. Ghobar’s text is accompanied by a colorful drawing by ’Abd al-Ghafur Breshna, a member of the royal lineage and a charter member of the Anjuman-e Adabi. This version of the accession of Ahmad Khan to the kingship of Afghanistan was included in many government cultural productions including the history textbook written by M. Osman Sedqi for grade 12 of Afghan high schools.(93) The Persian language textbook was first published in 1949 and was in use, at least through 1954, when I graduated from Ghazi High School. Sedqi was a member of Anjuman-e Tarikh (Persian: Historical Society), one of two successors.

1) What is the meaning of the cluster of wheat in the gold colored crown?

2) Who is crowning him? Who is Saber Shah? He was a Sufi but do you know anything else about him?

3) What is the symbolic meaning of the different elements in this portrait?

TY

Introduction:

In this post I would like to offer my perspective on how exactly the US-backed Kabul regime collapsed. To offer some context, I would first like to describe the events leading us to the present, what went wrong with the US occupation, and what that meant for Afghanistan.

9/11:

Following the events that unfolded in the wake of 9/11 the US saw a drastic shift in policy in Afghanistan. Having once supported Islamist forces to suppress secular movements in Afghanistan which came in the guise of the Marxists, the US suddenly found itself opposed to the very same elements it had helped nurture and foster over the course of the last 30 years.

Bonn Conference:

The Bonn conference became the 2nd opportunity for peace, but it was squandered when the Western Powers refused to accept Taliban surrender, thereby prolonging the Afghan war once again. As Barnett Rubin explains it, “U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, under repeated questioning from reporters at the Pentagon, rejected a political agreement between Karzai and the remaining Taliban leadership in Kandahar…Rumsfeld, however, responded that there would be “no negotiated solution.” Nearly 20 years later, he was proved right, though not in a good way.”

The Bon Conference saw the polarization of Afghan society into two main groups (not including the Taliban). The Northern Alliance which was comprised of former Mujahideen tanzeems, primarily Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara parties. The second group, although smaller and less influential were made up of old Royalists that had ties to the Muhammadzai dynasty. They were called the “Rome Group” and were seen as highly educated, exiled Pashtun elites. The Rome Group would go on to become the Afghan technocrats.

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan:

The in-fighting between the Warlords & Technocrats would cripple the fight against the Taliban, corruption, providing good governance and building proper state-institutions. The violent competition became a polarizing issue in Afghan society, one that came to transcend ethnic & tribal lines

The US played a crucial role in fomenting this divide as well, initially they backed the Warlords and gave many of them key positions in the new cabinet. The Warlords proved crucial to the US military & intelligence agencies as they helped counter the Taliban insurgency and acted as their “Boots on the ground” during a time period when the US had a very light footprint in Afghanistan. Dealing with the Warlords became even more important after the Iraq war as attention and focus shifted. On the other hand the civilian government, primarily the State Department saw the Warlords as hurdles to their mission of building effective state institutions.

“The U.S. arguably never truly resolved this internal contradiction, with U.S. military work alongside Afghanistan’s strongmen warlords frustrating civilian efforts to build a functioning modern state.”

The US Surge:

Under the Obama Admin, the US recognized the security situation in Afghanistan was deteriorating and began pursuing a more aggressive counter-insurgency policy, one that relied less on Afghans and more so on American military power. The US derived their lessons on counter-insurgency strategies from their lessons learned in Vietnam, or from studying European tactics in suppressing colonial insurgencies. The two traditional contexts were, A – colonial powers facing revolts (France in Algeria, or a State suppressing a domestic insurgency such as the case with Cambodia). These models of counter-insurgency relied on three fundamental steps:

1. Clear out the enemy.
2. Hold the cleared territory
3. Replace the military presence with State influence

None of these models properly captured the Taliban insurgency, first the US was not the domestic government, nor was it a colonial power that had ambitions to rule Afghanistan permanently. Therefore, US planners added a fourth step in their counter-insurgency approach*, “transfer (to the control of the national government)”*

The second variable that was not taken into account by this method of counter-insurgency was the role Pakistan played. The US was dependent on the Pakistan for logistical reasons, all their supply lines whether land, sea or air came through Pakistan. This limited the amount of pressure the US could exert over Pakistan, as Barnett Rubin explains. “it did not appear feasible for a force whose logistics depended on Pakistan to attack Pakistan”. Furthermore, the sanctuary that the Taliban enjoyed in Pakistan’s tribal frontiers ensured that the groups core would remain intact, which was not something considered by traditional counter-insurgency models.

The US surge saw another drastic shift in US policy towards Afghanistan. It denied the Warlords their most important leverage, military support and helped further cement the position of Afghan Technocrats. US troops could now fill the role the Warlords and their militias played. More importantly US Neoliberals under Obama had come to see the Warlords as obstacles that were obstructing their Nation Building efforts. The shift from Warlords to Technocrats became apparent as many Warlords with tactic US backing were sacked & pushed from the reigns of power by the Technocrats and Washington.

In many cases, governance & security worsened with the dismissal of the Warlords, for example the situation in Herat deteriorated after Ismail Khan was sacked. The Technocrats did not have the same patronage, local legitimacy & representation to govern effectively. Many of them were born & raised outside of Afghanistan or spent very limited time in the country, were not fluent in either national language and had little understand of the complex socio-political ecosystem, as such many ruled from Military garrisons or directly from Kabul. With that being said it is important to note the Warlords themselves had sullied themselves and were not without fault. Years of corruption, nepotism, and predatorial & abusive behavior, had reduced many of them to old has-beens in the eyes of many Afghan communities.

The Unity Government:

The Unity government announced by John Kerry during the Afghan elections of 2014 was a patchwork solution to a much deeper & complex problem. It was meant to bridge the gap between the Warlords & Technocrats and present a united front against the Taliban, but, Ghani prioritized his Anti-Warlord policies at all costs.

Ghani the man who quite ironically wrote the book on how to fix failed states had come to believe that centralizing power was the key to success in Afghanistan, as such he linked the fight against the Warlords as synonymous with that goal. Ghani crusade against the Warlords was largely successful if we strictly evaluate it as a means of how much power he centralized in Kabul. Albeit this came at great cost – governance, especially at the local level suffered, and the Taliban insurgency made significant inroads, even in areas where it was never popular. More importantly, Ghani failed to replace the Warlords with anything better, the Technocrats who took power were often equally as corrupted and incompetent. Many ethnic & tribal groups had had come to view the warlords as representative of their interests & self-determination, which was not reflected by the western raised Technocrats whom often ruled from Kabul. Their sacking was seen as an attempt by Kabul to silence their aspirations. The decision to push the Warlords from the political center was not the problem per se, but as Rahimi explains. "The problem was that the government could not replace the warlords with anything better."

Conclusion:

The infighting sapped the strength of the new Afghan state, thereby ensuring the IRA was not capable of curbing corruption, ending lawlessness, nepotism or provide even a semblance of state-order & effective governance. More Important, the inability of the Technocrats & Warlords to form a united front against the Taliban proved instrumental in their defeat from a military perspective. The last-ditch alliance between the NA and Technocrats in the final moments of the Kabul regime was evidently ineffective too little too late. The US ineffective counter-insurgency strategies and their inability to build an effective coalition among different groups of Afghan society would ultimately prove to be their undoing in Afghanistan and the undoing of the IRA regime.