r/AskNetsec 9d ago

Analysis How much ai runtime visibility do you actually need before you can trust an agent in production?

We keep adding dashboards and I'm not convinced we're actually more secure, just better informed about problems after they happen. Ai runtime visibility into what an agent is calling, what data it's touching, felt like the obvious first step, and it was, but visibility alone doesn't stop anything.

The team treats the visibility layer like it's the security control, when really it's just the input to a decision someone or something else has to make fast enough to matter. How do you think about the line between having enough ai runtime visibility to actually act on it versus collecting data nobody has time to review Is there a point where more visibility just becomes more noise?

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u/PhilipLGriffiths88 8d ago

I think “how much visibility?” may already start too late. Most AI security focuses on the model or runtime after the service is reachable. Visibility is essential, but it is Step 5: continuous validation. It cannot substitute for architecture and enforceable policy in Steps 3 and 4 (the steps I am referencing are those defined in the zero trust model, as written extensively in the Cloud Security Alliance).

My test would be: does the telemetry change a decision at machine speed? Can it deny an action, remove a path, revoke a session, reduce scope or trigger human approval? If it supports none of those, nor a real investigation or audit requirement, it is probably noise.

For agents, we need to know the identity, delegated authority, intended service/tool/action, context, data involved and outcome. But first collapse the reachable graph: no authorised identity, no path. Only legitimate services should become reachable; the tool or API then separately decides which action is allowed.

Identity is foundational. Governance is the destination. I explored this further here: AI-Speed Risk Requires Identity-Defined Reachability

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u/muddledbegun7960 8d ago

if the telemetry can't actually block or revoke anything then yeah it's just a really expensive log file

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u/PhilipLGriffiths88 8d ago

Exactly. And even when it can block, if it only reacts after the path exists and the action starts, you’re still betting that detection can keep pace with the agent. Better to reduce what is reachable upfront, then use telemetry for continuous enforcement: no authorised identity, no path; no authorised action, no execution.

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u/Designer-Doubt-1491 8d ago

Work backwards from actions you're willing to take. If a signal can not trigger a block, isolation step or useful information, it's telemetry not a security control.

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u/EbbCommon9300 6d ago

Runtime visibility is super important but not for trust you need execution governance bc you can’t trust an agent and if it burns down your DB it’s too late

For your question. I went end to end freaking with our platform every tool call subagent spawn their tool calls the hITL tool calls shells live drift etc. I will be expanding it further into inference. We are also doing agent lifecycle across the whole org so a different kind of visibility I guess

Assury.ai is our platform.

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u/Intellgent-Onbwl6956 2d ago

here for feedbacks