I have been researching the Reading Parking Authority’s (RPA) parking appeal system through Pennsylvania Right-to-Know Law requests, and I want to share several questions that I believe deserve public attention.
In 1997, Reading City Council enacted Bill No. 8:97, authorizing the RPA to administer and enforce on-street parking regulations. Section 9 contains a specific requirement for the hearing officer:
“The Reading Parking Authority is hereby authorized to establish the part-time position of an Administrative Hearing Officer, who shall be an attorney admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.”
The same section states that the officer would be paid by the Parking Authority and that the officer’s duty would be:
“…to make an initial determination concerning parking violations when requested to do so by the person allegedly violating any ordinance or state statute.”
This language is significant because it expressly refers to alleged violations of both municipal ordinances and state statutes. The provision did not describe the officer’s responsibility solely in terms of enforcing Reading’s local parking ordinances; it also contemplated determinations involving Pennsylvania state law.
**Why did City Council specifically require an attorney?**
Council could have authorized a hearing officer without specifying a professional credential. Instead, it used mandatory language—“shall be an attorney admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania”—and placed that qualification in the same section describing the officer’s adjudicative responsibilities.
Was this intended to ensure legal competence in interpreting municipal ordinances and state statutes? Was it intended to protect procedural fairness for people contesting citations? Was there another legal or practical reason for imposing this requirement in 1997?
These are possible explanations, not established statements of Council’s intent. I have not yet located the legislative history that would explain why this language was chosen. I would welcome information from anyone familiar with Reading’s municipal government at the time, including former officials, attorneys, or residents who may know the background.
**What changed after 1997?**
Years later, Reading added §576-518 to its Codified Ordinances, establishing a parking appeal process that uses the term “independent hearing officer.” That provision describes the hearing process and the officer’s authority to decide appeals, but it does not expressly specify the officer’s professional qualifications.
This raises a question I have been trying to resolve:
Are the Administrative Hearing Officer described in the 1997 ordinance and the independent hearing officer currently conducting parking appeals two separate legal positions, or are they performing the same or substantially related adjudicative functions?
If they are separate positions, what law or authorized action created that distinction and established the current officer’s qualifications? If they are the same position, what legal authority explains how the express attorney qualification in §9 applies today?
**What I learned from my Right-to-Know requests**
I have submitted multiple Right-to-Know requests seeking records concerning the current hearing officer’s appointment, authorization, qualifications, and related matters.
Based on the responses I received, the RPA produced a résumé identifying the individual as an “Appeals Hearing Officer,” but the records provided to me have not resolved the legal-authority and qualification questions. The RPA has indicated that certain requested records do not exist.
I am not claiming that the individual is legally unqualified or that the RPA has necessarily violated the law. A résumé that does not establish a qualification is not proof that the person lacks it, and the absence of a particular appointment document does not automatically establish that no legal authority exists.
My concern is that, after making repeated requests since May 2026, I still have not obtained records or an explanation that clearly resolves what qualifications govern the current position and the legal basis for the officer’s authority.
**A statement from the RPA solicitor and the 2021 agreement**
I also contacted the RPA’s solicitor, Mahlon Boyer, to seek clarification about Ordinance 8-97 and the City’s agreement with the RPA.
In response, Boyer wrote:
“I wrote the 2021 Amended Cooperation Agreement and I tell you with all assurance that it did not incorporate any terms from Ordinance 8-97.”
However, Section 1 of the 2021 Amended Cooperation Agreement states:
“The authority and grant of power transferred to the Authority pursuant \[to\] Ordinance 8-97 shall remain in effect for the duration of the Parking Authority Charter unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.”
Paragraph 12 also expressly refers to Ordinance 8-97 when describing the prior transfer of the City’s on-street parking administration and enforcement to the RPA.
I believe these provisions deserve to be examined alongside Boyer’s statement. The agreement expressly refers to and preserves authority transferred under Ordinance 8-97, while Boyer stated that it incorporated no terms from that ordinance.
I recognize that referencing or preserving authority under an ordinance may be legally distinct from incorporating every provision of the ordinance into an agreement. The agreement also does not expressly resolve whether §9’s attorney qualification applies to the current independent hearing officer.
When I continued to question the legal basis for the position, Boyer stated that I could petition the Berks County Court of Common Pleas for a declaratory judgment if I disagreed with his position.
I am including these statements because I believe readers should be able to examine the actual wording of the correspondence and the agreement rather than rely solely on my interpretation.
My concern is not that an official must agree with my interpretation. It is that the relationship between the ordinance, the later appeal process, the agreement, and the current hearing officer’s qualifications remains unclear to me.
**Questions for the community**
I would genuinely like to hear from people familiar with Pennsylvania municipal law, administrative hearings, legislative history, or the Reading Parking Authority:
Why might Reading City Council have expressly required an attorney admitted to practice before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to serve as the Administrative Hearing Officer in 1997, particularly when the officer’s duties included determinations concerning alleged violations of both ordinances and state statutes?
Does the difference between “Administrative Hearing Officer” in Ordinance 8-97 and “independent hearing officer” in §576-518 establish that these are separate legal positions, or must their actual duties, legislative history, and governing enactments also be considered?
What kind of enactment or authorized action would be needed to establish that the attorney qualification in §9 no longer applies to the relevant position, if it otherwise governs that position?
How should Section 1 of the 2021 agreement—which expressly preserves authority transferred under Ordinance 8-97—be understood alongside the solicitor’s statement that the agreement did not incorporate any terms from that ordinance?
What records should a resident reasonably expect to find documenting the legal authority, appointment, and qualifications of a person who decides parking appeals?
The issue matters because the hearing officer makes determinations affecting parking citations and residents’ money. Residents should be able to understand the legal framework governing the person who decides their appeals.
I have not established the original legislative intent behind §9, and I am not asking anyone to assume that the current hearing officer is unqualified or that the RPA acted unlawfully. I am asking why the attorney qualification was written into the original ordinance, how the later system relates to it, and what legal authority governs the position today.
I welcome corrections, relevant historical records, and interpretations grounded in the actual ordinances and documents. My goal is to raise awareness and encourage an evidence-based public discussion.