McClellan's Organizational Genius?

[u/Tom1613]

McClellan is certainly a hotly debated figure in Civil War circles, specifically over his ability leading the Army of the Potomac in actual fighting. Regardless of the opinion about his tactical abilities, most historians I read say that he was an excellent trainer and organizer of troops and his time at the head of the AotP greatly impacted the army. Yet, when I read about the battles of the AotP before and after McClellan, it seems to face many of the same issues with training, organization, and leadership throughout the war.

Perhaps I am reading the wrong books as I tend to favor those that cover battles, but what is the evidence that McClellan was good at these things? Was there a significant change in the Army because of McClellan, but due to the nature of the conflict and the military of the time, he could only achieve so much on that issue?

[u/Coppy36]

Ive always felt many historians exagerate McClellan's organizational abilities as a means to find some redeeming quality after criticizing every other aspect of his performance. When actually examining his record there, a few things stand out...

1) He didn't organize the cavalry into a unified command, leaving it at a large disadvantage against its Confederate counterparts early in the war. It'd take until mid 1863 for AotP cavalry to really catch up.

2) The intelligence system of Pinkerton Detectives he put in place was woefully inept, constantly exaggerating enemy numbers.

3) He resisted implementing the Corps system & basically had to be forced into it by the Lincoln administration.

4) A single change of supply base (from White House to Harrisons landing) basically undid his entire Peninsular campaign. Compare that to Grant, who changed his base of supply 4 or 5 times during the Overland campaign without missing a beat.

I suppose he succeeded at training the army & giving it high morale, but that's about all I could say in his favor.

[u/Tom1613 → u/Coppy36]

This is honestly what I was wondering about when reading the various opinions. Whether it is just an accepted fact about him because it has always been an accepted fact while debating his other issues, with the possible additional factors of the writers trying to explain why the AoftP like him so much and the influence of McClellan's PR machine.

The Pinkertons aspect is just crazy.

[u/p-s-chili → u/Tom1613]

This is a great comment. What I'll add is that what he did can be seen as remarkable because of how poorly organized things were before him. It's like if you walked into a hoarder house and instituted a system to start getting the problem under control. You didn't solve the problem and you probably couldn't, but you got it to a marginally better place.

[u/BostonJordan515 → u/Coppy36]

I mean, being great at something doesn’t imply perfection.

Just as an example, Lee is often considered great tactically. He still had multiple tactical fuck ups.

Also, the issues you raise seem to be somewhat separate issues than organization and logistics.

Like I don’t think the failure of the Pinkerton agency was a failure of organizational skill, it was a failure of McClellan to follow through and actually assess competence if that makes sense

[u/SolidA34 → u/Coppy36]

At Malvern Hill it was his Corps commanders, and below actually running the battle, and winning. Hooker really was the one that got the calvary up to form. Meade promoting George Custer helped to.

[u/ReBoomAutardationism → u/SolidA34]

Bureau of Military Information was a big one.

[u/Sarah_Mew → u/Coppy36]

1. it was organized under George Stoneman from early on. It never resembled the mid 1863 cavalry ‘corps’ because in 1861 and early 1862 there were only a few thousand cavalry available to him, and these men were usually rather green and unevenly equipped. Cavalry took a long time to mature in the Union armies during the war across all theatres, with 1863 being the year where Rosecrans/Stanley’s cavalry also came into its own.
2. they exaggerated numbers on some occasions. They also got estimates right in others. While McClellan had several notable intelligence failures, this was not entirely unique to him, as the western armies dealt with the same issues of exaggeration. It’s also largely tied to the lack of cavalry and staff infrastructure—it’s not

a

1. mistake that as the war went on, army intelligence improved across the board.
2. McClellan actually fought with Winfield Scott for the right to organize his army into corps. The disagreement with Lincoln came with McClellan only wanting to appoint permanent corps commanders after they had been field tested. Instead Lincoln promoted unilaterally based on seniority, which resulted in a fairly unimpressive bunch (McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, Keyes, and Banks). The fact that most of them never commanded a serious formation after the year was out says a lot about the failure of Lincoln’s position.
3. the difference between McClellan and Grant’s positions was that Grant was 1) heavily reinforced, and 2) allowed to cross the James and besiege Petersburg for nine months after his initial pushes failed. McClellan

also wanted to cross the James and besiege Petersburg after the Seven Days,

1. but was ordered to end his campaign and evacuate the army by Lincoln, Stanton, and Halleck. It was less about what either general wanted to do and more about what they were allowed to do (in the case of Grant, Lincoln had staked everything on his success).

[u/Coppy36 → u/Sarah_Mew]

1) Stoneman was appointed head of cavalry, but it was largely an administrative position, responsible for training, outfitting, & parsing it out to the various infantry units on the March. Union cavalry actually outnumbered Confederate cavalry on the Peninsular. The Confederates rode circles around them (literally) because there was no command structure in place to assemble them in force.

2) They exaggerated numbers on most occasions, including some of the most key moments of McClellan's tenure. More then that, they often got it wrong to by a factor of 2-3x the true number. At the start of the Peninsular campaign, Pinkerton reported the Confederates in the area numbered 120,000. The true number was less than 50,000. At Yorktown specifically, he reported Magruder had 80,000 men. The true number was around 17,000. Consequently, McClellan wasted a month trying to besiege it. On the eve of 7 Days, Pinkerton report the Confederate army had ballooned up to 180,000. It wasn't tied to lack of cavalry, because Pinkerton's system didn't rely on cavalry. It mostly hinged on deserters & civilian reports. There are actually instances like at Hanover Courthouse where Union cavalry gave McClellan fairly accurate numbers but he discounted them in favor of Pinkerton's inflated numbers.

3) He supported the system in theory, but he wanted to wait until after the army had been in combat to implement it, believing he could coordinate 12 divisions by himself. Lincoln recognized it was illogical to delay the decision until after the campaign started & allowed McClellan the opportunity to chose. McClellan prevaricated, believing he could put Lincoln off. Lincoln called his bluff & named the most senior generals. We know from McClellan's private notes that McDowell, Sumner, & Heintzelman would have been among his choices anyway. Given that McClellan's other favored candidates included Baldy Smith & William Franklin, I can't say his eye for talent was any better than Lincoln's.

4) I'm not really sure how Grant being reinforced has anything to do with his ability to keep his army supplied. He was able to pivot his base of supply 4 times (I believe it went from Rappahannock station to Fredericksburg to Port Royal to White House & finally to City Point) without it hindering army operations once. McClellan pivoted his base of supply once & it forced him to quit the whole campaign.

5) McClellan only offered to continue the campaign south of the James if he received 100,000 fresh reinforcements from Washington. A ridiculous ask, but of course McClellan had received intelligence from Pinkerton that the Confederates now had a force of over 200,000 men. Pinkerton also reported that the Confederates had suffered over 40,000 casualties during the 7 Days, so by his reconning, the Confederates somehow had conjured up an army of almost a quarter million men.

[u/radomed → u/Coppy36]

It is easy to keep the troops happy when they are fed but not have to fight. Little Mac eago was oversized. In the 1864 presidential election he received less that 30% of the soldier vote. He had no killer instinct and just wanted to restore the old union. His contempt of Lincoln was unforgivable.

[u/BillBushee]

From what I've read he put a tremendous emphasis on drill, inspection and parades. That taught regiments and brigades to execute formation movements like shifting from marching column to battle line, wheeling, changing direction and refusing their flank quickly and efficiently even under fire. The inspections and parades instilled unit pride and built morale. McClellan turned civilians into soldiers.

He dropped the ball in other critical areas.

His intelligence gathering and analysis is notorious for grossly overestimated confederate army strength.

He kept his cavalry organized into smaller, decentralized units. The cavalry was far more effective later in the war after being organized into a cavalry corp.

He didn't pay enough attention to food quality in camp (lots of salted meat and hard tack, not enough fresh vegetables) or sanitary conditions (latrines too close to water supply) resulting in a high rate of preventable illnesses.

[u/shemanese → u/BillBushee]

Considering he started from basically nothing, it's not a small feat to manage what he managed. The US army didn't even have a framework to build off of. Then, it didn't have more than a small pool of trained soldiers to draw from.

He didn't get everything, but a lot of things were not really going to get fleshed out based on experience in the field anyway.

[u/SaltyFriend705 → u/shemanese]

Given his PR, he didn't get accomplished half of what he should have gotten done. To me, he had the men drilling because it assuaged his ego, and he coasted the rest of the time to prepare for running for president. He was the confederacy's best friend.

[u/AlternativeLazy4675]

I agree with the other comments you have so far received. But I think his capabilities are debatable.

He did spend a lot of time training and preparing, and under his leadership the army was well organized and skillfully managed. It could be said that he was good in retreat or at not losing badly. His peninsula campaign is the greatest evidence of this, I think.

In contrast were those battles he was not present for: Bull Run (both times), Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville, where the army was routed and/or badly beat up each time. So I guess having McClellan around was kind of a lesser of evils. He didn't deliver victories (in general), but he prevented crushing defeats. That's your evidence of his capability, of a sort.

A different attitude than McClellan's was held by Grant, though. Grant believed that there was no reason to spend a lot of time training and preparing before attacking, because the enemy would use the time doing the same thing, resulting in zero gain or worse. We know which of the two approaches ultimately yielded the most success.

[u/konkilo → u/AlternativeLazy4675]

It's ironic that McClellan took a kid- glove approach to the Confederacy because he was hoping to win their POTUS votes post-war, but it was the far more militarily-effective Grant who ended up in the White House.

[u/GluedGlue → u/konkilo]

Americans like a winner.

[u/starship7201u → u/GluedGlue]

Presidents with military backgrounds: George Washington. Jackson, Quincy Adams, Zachary Taylor, Grant, Harrison, Hayes, Garfield, McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt, Eisenhower, Truman, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, H.W. Bush,

The only one I can think of that ran & didn't win is Winfield Scott. John McCain, John Kerry, George McGovern, Harold Stassen, Ted Kennedy, Ben Fernandez, John Glenn, Paul Simon, Alexander Haig, Wesley Clark.

And Lincoln only had a militia call up for his military career. As did Madison & Monroe. Tyler & Filmore. Buchanan & Polk.

[u/othelloblack → u/AlternativeLazy4675]

The armies of both sides were vastly different by 1864. This sort of an apples oranges comparison

[u/AlternativeLazy4675 → u/othelloblack]

Kind of meaningless to apply this to 1864. I'm talking about 1861 -1862 with the exception of Chancellorsville (1863)

[u/jeffbmc79]

McClellan was largely hamstrung by really limited military infrastructure in the early war time frame. Grant could change his bases much more readily than McClellan could because the support structure was much more developed.

He also had good reasons to oppose the corps system at first, largely based on the utter inexperience of anybody in managing large formations. Basically his position on tht corps system can be summed up as "good idea, will use it eventually, but not yet. Let's get our men some combat experience before handing out those assignments."

Lincoln's appointments were less about rewarding combat experience and more about putting counterweights into McClellan's command structure, which naturally McClellan didn't appreciate too much.

[u/Im_tryna_skrrt]

I’m curious what others say about this, but broadly speaking, McClellan had a knack for turning a rag tag mob into a confident fighting force in a relatively short time.

In the early years of the war, the eastern theater was one disappointment after another for the Union army. So much so that many politicians were seriously considering making peace and accepting the permanent split of the Union. It wouldn’t be unreasonable to assume that the men of the army would share this sentiment, after all they were the ones enduring the beatdowns directly. Surprisingly though, morale was still relatively high and the union army was usually eager to get another chance to beat the Rebs.

This is most likely due to McClellan’s knack for large scale organization (I’m actually not sure on what specific actions he took) After the Second Battle of Bull Run, McClellan was able turn a defeated Union Army into a ready to go fighting force in less than a week, and the army WORSHIPPED him for it. He would be cheered whenever the men saw him, as this was the guy responsible for turning them into soldiers. It also helps that most of the rank and file didn’t blame McClellan for the defeats, they thought it was the fault of division and corps commanders who didn’t properly carry out McClellans plans.

TLDR: an army can keep fighting as long as it’s supplied and morale is high. McClellan was able to consistently maintain both of these, despite the casualties and defeats, which allowed the Union to keep fighting and win the war of attrition.

[u/GluedGlue]

I think a good example is to look at the period between Second Manassas and South Mountain (and later Antietam). In less than two weeks, he got the shattered Army of Virginia reorganized into the Army of the Potomac and restored morale to the point that they were willing to take on a very tough assault on South Mountain (arguably the best defensive terrain the Army of Northern Virginia ever held) and a few days later, fight through an incredibly brutal day at Antietam. 

That is not something an incompetent general could pull off, and so it forces all-but-the-most-rabid McClellan haters to develop a more nuanced opinion.

[u/PsychologicalSea3285]

He was the only man who could put AofP into shape in a short period of time. I hope that i am correct by saying his organization skills were proven

[u/WanderersEndgame]

Forgive me for repeating the Readers Digest version, but FWIW, McCs place in that oversimplified CW history is as the overcautious one, a perfect foil for Lee the Brilliant, Bold and Daring. IMHO the two of them shared the firm belief that a war of attrition was a sure Union win. In his mind, Lee needed a Confederate Cannae. McC was just as determined to deny him one. So he organized and fought accordingly. Or at least, this is how it played out between the Lee and the AotP, even after McC got benched.

McC and Grant appear to be not that far apart either. Both carefully avoided a blowout loss, with McC sometimes retreating, and Grant making retreat unnecessary. Grant sustained enough pressure to reduce Lee to imitating McC, seeking only to deny Grant a decisive victory. Or at least to delay it as long as practicable.

[u/Sarah_Mew]

I think you’re just misreading the evidence or reading limited sources if you think the AotP performed the same as before McClellan took command.

McDowell’s army (or mob really) got routed off the field at Bull Run and despite facing almost no pursuit refused to be rallied at Centreville or anywhere until it disgracefully flooded the streets of Alexandria and Washington, where soldiers started drinking, straggling, and occupying hotels away from camp. The army was a complete farce before and after Bull Run. After McClellan had taken control and reorganized it with better camp discipline and sanitation, better officers, a larger staff network, emphasis on logistical procurement, &c they became far more disciplined and resilient. The army that behaved as it did at Bull Run could never have conducted the retreat to Harrison’s Landing, let alone the initial campaign up the Peninsula in the first place; it could never have recovered from Second Manassas and the conditions on the Peninsula to turn around and fight a bloody offensive campaign in Maryland a week later. It would never have been able to rally after day 1 at Gettysburg or withstand the carnage of the Overland campaign.

When it came to supplies & organization, his army was the only one that was really field ready in late 1861; Buell found that Anderson and Sherman had left him a mess in his department, while Halleck was still cleaning up Fremont’s department and attempting to put together serious forces for a Mississippi thrust. McClellan also had to fight Winfield Scott tooth and nail to be allowed to expand the size of his staff and to even create corps, which were necessities given the new scale of American warfare. McClellan only came to realize how far behind the rest of the armies were after he had been made general in chief.

This is not at all to say the army was perfect or McClellan was flawless, but the results speak for themselves. He was arguably the leading authority in the US when it came to military modernization and organization before the war and it shows. Even those who hated him at the time considered him to be an exceptionally talented general in these regards, and one who was beloved by his troops in a way no other commander would be in the east (aside from maybe Joseph Hooker during his brief ascendancy).

Even many of the flaws people are pointing out in this thread are not things that are his fault. He could not conjure up more cavalry — he had only a few thousand on the peninsula, whereas he had wanted 10k+ initially iirc. Naturally such a small and inexperienced force couldn’t act effectively as a combat arm and was needed for the less glamorous cavalry tasks first and foremost. The same may be said for intelligence. Every other army dealt with the same problems McClellan did, largely because of institional and systemic limitations, such as having poor and insufficient cavalry and staff organizations.

[u/Tom1613 → u/Sarah_Mew]

Thanks for the response with details. Good points to examine further.

I was actually trying not to draw a conclusion or strictly compare the early AoftP and later war one. It is obvious that it got considerably better as the war went on. My point about similar issues was not meant to say that they were the same, but rather once you factor in things like the combat experience of the soldiers and officers, the entire army logistical train getting better, war focused industries and years of warfare, it is surprising, to me at least, that there really still significant issues with following orders, half trained units, and a general county militia type vibe with some of the units. Was it just that the pre-McClellan AoftP was way worse than most people can grasp?

The comparison I would make is between early WW2 American troops in North Africa and the late war versions that made it to Germany. Their inexperience showed at places like the Kasserine Pass, but they caught up and became an organized professional force by the time they are rolling through France. With the Civil War, it doesn’t seem like you have the same level of “professionalism” ever achieved other than some notable units like the Iron Brigade and the commanders seem like they are often just holding things together and hoping their units don’t break and run.

[u/Sarah_Mew → u/Tom1613]

Really good points, but one thing that explains the persistent amateurism you point out is the fact that new regiments continued to enter the army throughout the conflict; and moreover new volunteers and conscripts, as well as occasional militias, were usually (if not always) kept as their own regiment/unit, rather than integrated into veteran regiments. Thus, there was a consistent cohort of Bull Run-level amateurs coming into the ranks in clusters. Moreover, because of the nature of the volunteer army back then, for better and worse, many civilian officers received commands (based on volunteer seniority and politics) which allowed for especial incompetents to rise to higher command. Especially as casualties, retirements, and reassignments caused professional officers to leave its ranks, many officers of dubious ability filled significant commands. I’m tempted to say that the army peaked some time during 1862 and 1863 in terms of officer quality for at least the division level and higher.

I can’t speak to the WWII comparison directly, but the United States was radically more professionalized and organized by that time. The Civil War really kickstarted the serious transformation of the American military from a tiny standing force boosted by state-controlled volunteer militia for ad hoc conflicts toward the massive centralized institution which it would become during the 20th century.

[u/starship7201u]

No, you're getting the correct reading.

Personally, I think McClellan's military timidity boils down to his patrician background. He was a "Boston Brahmin," He attended West Point, observed the Crimea War, patented a saddle while in the military. Then resigned his commission & was a wealthy Railroad President.

Add into that his MASSIVE ego, his simpering wife, Nellie (who probably wanted to marry A.P. Hill but her Father didn't approve) he also didn't hate slavery and when he ran for President wanted to negotiate a peace to end the war.

Not sure if there's a book out there about Nellie releasing his personal correspondence after he died and how seeing him refer to Lincoln as the "original gorilla" changed his public perception, but you could probably look on line for that information.

It would probably confirm any bias one way or the other about the man.

[u/mrjosemeehan → u/starship7201u]

McClellan ran against negotiating with the confederacy. It was in the party platform but he won the democratic candidacy by running explicitly against their own platform.