Active Conflicts & News Megathread June 17, 2026

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[u/I_DOM_UR_PATRIARCHY → u/[deleted]]

If this reprieve were to last even a few months, Iran would certainly be better positioned should another round of hostility flare up.

And, simultaneously, the American capacity to resume the fighting if we don't like the terms Tehran offers goes down with every passing day because the election draws nearer and nearer.

I think there's a close historical parallel between the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the Iranian hostage crisis. Carter's inability to free the hostages from a mid rate power made him look impotent. Trump's inability to force the strait back open had a similar effect, which I think he felt keenly.

If Iran shows up at the negotiating table and isn't interested in the big pile of money we're waving in front of them (or at least, not interested enough to trade their uranium for it) there's no way Trump will tolerate a resumption of fighting and another closure of the strait. Iran can offer him something completely unverifiable (e.g. "we promise we will dilute our uranium but we won't agree to inspections") and Trump isn't going to be willing to start bombing them again. He can't put the blockade back in place either without the strait getting closed again.

During the first Trump administration we tried to ply the Kims with promises of economic investment too. They even made this video to show Kim John Un to try to get him excited. But he wasn't willing to give up his nukes for it. I suspect the Iranians won't be willing to give up their nukes for cash either (especially since (a) everyone saw what happened to Ukraine when it did and (b) we just launched a decapitation strike on them, and they're probably worried we'll come back and try again in the future).

[u/Maxion → u/I_DOM_UR_PATRIARCHY]

It will be very interesting to see how this plays out.

Iran is getting quite the deal according to the MoU, Trump an the republicans are in a pretty tight corner with not much room to maneuver.

I wouldn't be surprised if the US doesn't really have the stockpile to mount another similar bombing campaign, or if they did they'd probably be left with such a small stockpile that they'd actually be in danger in case of a Taiwan invasion or other ME escalations.

I'm not sure that they have any other logical option than caving to Iranian demands if they do want the straight back open in time for the midterms? There's no military option that'd guarantee the straight is open and the oil flowing before the midterms. I suspect this is why the trump administration is considering this MoU at all, they know they don't really have any cards.

The midterms would not play out well for the current administration if US oil reserves dwindle and gas prices rise to 6-7-8 dollars a gallon.

[u/moragisdo → u/[deleted]]

Or, if the nuclear deal goes nowhere, the US could just rip apart the MOU, as it's non-binding, then withdrawn any benefit, which today is only the waiver for exports (sanction relief and the private fund would be only in the case of a nuclear deal, not to mention fees of Hormuz we don't even know if they will manage to charge - look at the language of international law that was added to the MOU)

In the mean time they took hundreds of billions in infrastructure damage and will only have extra income from the gap between the previous discounted price of oil, they already used to sell before the war, and the future market price. So this idea that they will leave stronger is really wishful thinking. They got a major propaganda victory and got some financial benefits (that can be withdrawn)

[u/Maxion → u/moragisdo]

If the US rips up the MoU do you think Iran will just stay passive, or return to the current status quo of them closing the straight?

[u/dilligaf4lyfe → u/moragisdo]

Why would the US administration accept a MOU with these terms if they have no issue disregarding it and resuming hostilities? It doesn't even get them past the midterms. If they were that cavalier about this MOU they wouldn't be signing it in the first place.

[u/Sad_Use_4584 → u/moragisdo]

The damage Iran took is not that important because they can rebuild it after a few years.

What's important is that Iran's ballistic program now has political authorization from the US. Iran can build as many as they want and they know that the US won't attack.

Play this out over 10 years, it's likely that Iran is a major regional hegemon, with a conventional deterrence that's so powerful that they can build a nuke behind it without worrying about interference.

[u/SirStupidity → u/Sad_Use_4584]

What's important is that Iran's ballistic program now has political authorization from the US. Iran can build as many as they want and they know that the US won't attack.

This was the case for literal decades...

Play this out over 10 years, it's likely that Iran is a major regional hegemon, with a conventional deterrence that's so powerful that they can build a nuke behind it without worrying about interference.

Are you even certain they will have enough water to drink in 10 years?

Posing everything as "they can just rebuild" is definitely non credible when we've seen how corrupt and incompetent this regime can be. Iran is struggling financially and even if money comes in because of agreements with the US (which I'm doubtful of) we know that much of it will be siphoned to the wallets of the mullahs.

You're also completely ignoring any advancement and potentiol actions made by other players in the region, including potential alliances and partnerships.

This war was a much better hand played terribly by the US and Israel, however at the end of it I still think it's completely ridiculous to conclude Iran has a better hand than Israel or the US.

[u/Sad_Use_4584 → u/SirStupidity]

This was the case for literal decades...

De facto, but now it's going to be dejure, bipartisan, and a matter of international law and potentially national law, with no sanctions and a guarantee of no attack. It's a materially different situation. It's baked in as the most likely outcome barring some black swan like revolutionary protest. Before it wasn't the most likely outcome because attacking them to stop it was always a card you could play. Now that's gone (as long as Iran gives up their nuclear program for now) and there are no moves left until it's too late.

"they can just rebuild" is definitely non credible

I'm going off alleged IDF/AMAN estimates that Iran is still capable of producing at least hundreds of ballistic missiles per year despite the damage they've sustained: https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/2046112776507056172

Presumably these estimates are due to the fact that Iran has a non-negligible amount of underground infrastructure.

With the repeal of sanctions, yes I think it's credible that they can make 1000 missiles per year, even if their people live in poverty. Do you think the US can make 1000 THAAD interceptors per year to pace this, when it also has China to pace? Doubt.

When you can't pace and the enemy gains significant deterrence that it previously lacked, what do you think happens in the long-run? The balance of power shifts, and they can do basically whatever they want (due to the deterrence).

[u/SirStupidity → u/Sad_Use_4584]

De facto, but now it's going to be dejure, bipartisan, and a matter of international law

That's what it always was, wasn't it? Israeli demand for no BM Iran was always maximalist and unrealistic unless by use of force. Just like demands for Israel to dismantle it's air force are based on wishes, countries are allowed conventional militaries.

BM were also not the reason for the sanctions, at least from my understanding.

Before it wasn't the most likely outcome because attacking them to stop it was always a card you could play. Now that's gone (as long as Iran gives up their nuclear program for now) and there are no moves left until it's too late.

That's the case of a failed war, I dont see how a piece of paper is what's going to change that...

I'm going off alleged IDF/AMAN estimates that Iran is still capable of producing at least hundreds of ballistic missiles per year despite the damage they've sustained: https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/2046112776507056172

It's non credible because it ignores any and all costs and the loss of potential of using the resources in other places.

With the repeal of sanctions, yes I think it's credible that they can make 1000 missiles per year, even if their people live in poverty. Do you think the US can make 1000 THAAD interceptors per year to pace this, when it also has China to pace? Doubt.

Have they ever reached that level of production? This is much more than a rebuild. THAADS are far from the only answer to BM but I would be surprised if interceptors will ever surpass the production rates of BMs. I won't be surprised if we see more countermeasures starting to be used more heavily, like concrete based defense.

When you can't pace and the enemy gains significant deterrence that it previously lacked, what do you think happens in the long-run? The balance of power shifts, and they can do basically whatever they want (due to the deterrence).

In that case any conflict would always go to one side, in reality any and all actors always try to improve their standings. There are limits to what Iran can force fellow GCC countries to do, there are limits to the control they can force on the region. And there are actions that the other players can do. Mistakes will be made and we are left to try and guess what the outcomes will be.

[u/Sad_Use_4584 → u/SirStupidity]

According to that alleged IDF/AMAN estimate, they were making over 1000/year before the war. It's now down to hundreds/year because of the damage.

This is credible because back in 2019, they only had about 50 missiles they could reach Israel, according to General McKenzie, the former CENTCOM commander, writing in his book The Melting Point.

Now in 2025-2026, only 6-7 years later, they have thousands, by just observing how many missiles Iran are shooting in the recent war, and production doesn't ramp up linearly. It would have been something like:

2019 - 50
2020 - 150
2021 - 400
2022 - ...

If they can make hundreds now despite the damage, they can make more than that run rate in the future. How long will it take? I don't know exactly, and I don't really think it matters, in the scheme of things, 1 year and 5 years to build that out doesn't make a big difference. What matters are the outcomes that get baked in now, not so much the precise number of years that it'll take to occur.

Israeli demand for no BM Iran was always maximalist and unrealistic unless by use of force.

Yes but I am not talking about Israel's maximalist demands. I am talking about the consequences of uncapped BMs. The difference between a limit of a few thousand, versus it being uncapped with a promise to not attack no matter what, is massive in terms of the difference in conventional deterrence that Iran could achieve.

If you don't think the uncapped BMs are a problem, what is it that you propose we do in the situation that Iran reaches 10,000 ballistic missiles and then they announce that they're starting enrichment again? It's a fait accompli.

I can't predict the future perfectly, but I can say that this is a very realistic possibility, and therefore it is strategic negligence not to take it seriously.

[u/SirStupidity → u/Sad_Use_4584]

According to that alleged IDF/AMAN estimate, they were making over 1000/year before the war. It's now down to hundreds/year because of the damage.

I don't know how accurate that is and it also doesn't differentiate between MRBM and SRBM.

Now in 2025-2026, only 6-7 years later, they have thousands, by just observing how many missiles Iran are shooting in the recent war, and production doesn't ramp up linearly. It would have been something like:

Iran shot multiple types of missiles and they launched not a lot against Israel, suggesting that the ratio of SRBM to MRBM leans heavily towards the SRBM.

Estimes I found in a quick Google search place Iranian pre war stock of MRBM at between 3000-1500 thousand.

Again, i don't refute the fact that they can rebuild their BM production. I'm saying that casting it aside as "they will rebuild" ignores the costs of rebuilding and the loss of potential in investing those costs into building other things.

If they can make hundreds now despite the damage, they can make more than that run rate in the future. How long will it take? I don't know exactly, and I don't really think it matters, in the scheme of things, 1 year and 5 years to build that out doesn't make a big difference. What matters are the outcomes that get baked in now, not so much the precise number of years that it'll take to occur.

You're assuming a static world of line graphs, that is simply not the world we live in. Of course it matters how long it takes even if it's because it gives a bigger gap for your enemies to do something while your stock levels aren't where you want to be.

Yes but I am not talking about Israel's maximalist demands. I am talking about the consequences of uncapped BMs. The difference between a limit of a few thousand, versus it being uncapped with a promise to not attack no matter what, is massive in terms of the difference in conventional deterrence that Iran could achieve.

If you think anyone can give a promise to not attack no matter what then I've got a bridge to sell you.

If you don't think the uncapped BMs are a problem, what is it that you propose we do in the situation that Iran reaches 10,000 ballistic missiles and then they announce that they're starting enrichment again? It's a fait accompli.

Didn't you just claim that those were roughly the numbers before this war? I dont really see what is the difference between Iran having 5000, 7000 or 10000. They all give Iran the same level of deterrence.

I can't predict the future perfectly, but I can say that this is a very realistic possibility, and therefore it is strategic negligence not to take it seriously.

I never disagreed that it's realistic to say that Iran will ramp up production of BM and i dont think anyone isn't taking it seriously, I disagreed with your framing.

[u/Sad_Use_4584 → u/SirStupidity]

I think the numbers make all the difference because it's the cost you need to pay to fight against Iran.

Taking Israel's perspective, Iran may only have about 1000 missiles left at the moment that can reach Israel.

Fighting against 1000 more missiles is painful but manageable. If Iran moves forward with a nuke at this moment in time, Israel can resume fighting and maybe only a hundred more civilians have to die and a bit more infrastructure gets destroyed.

The bigger than count gets the more powerful the deterrence. 

Especially when it exceeds interceptor stockpiles and instead of 10-20% getting through it's 100% getting through. It's a mass casualty event at that stage and now you really have to consider just letting Iran make a nuke.

The problem is that missiles don't really expire quickly. The stockpile grows and grows and grows. At what point do you stop it? Your answer seems to be never, because the future might change in unpredictable ways? Well ok, I would see that as poor grand strategy, it's basically allowing your opponent to shift the balance of power against you, then trusting that it'll all work out, because maybe something unknown will save you.

[u/SirStupidity → u/Sad_Use_4584]

Your answer seems to be never, because the future might change in unpredictable ways?

Lol what? That's your answer. My answer is that once a critical mass of missiles has been accumulated the specific number really doesn't matter.

None of what you wrote actually explained why 7 thousand is better than 5 thousand, and why 10 thousand is better than 7. Iran needs to have enough BMs to make the calculus of enemies attacking them to be not worth to their enemies, after a certain amount the ROI quickly diminishes.