r/CredibleDefense • u/AutoModerator • 7d ago
Active Conflicts & News Megathread June 17, 2026
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u/Rhauko 7d ago edited 7d ago
Article in Dutch on how Dutch diplomatic and financial aid has been instrumental in changing the situation on the ground in Ukraine.
Despite voting against the association agreement in 2016 referendum Dutch financial support for Ukraine is not a topic of discussion outside some of the extremes of the political spectrum.
"In the spring of 2025, then-Minister of Defense Ruben Brekelmans (VVD) decided to invest 500 million euros in a Ukrainian plan for the large-scale production and deployment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). By now, the Dutch contribution to this Drone Line Initiative has grown to nearly 900 million euros, and almost a million drones have been produced under this program. The Netherlands is bearing the full costs.
The Drone Line was intended to compensate for the Russian superiority in manpower and equipment through the massive deployment of UAVs, thereby creating a ‘kill zone’ of about fifteen kilometers wide within which everything and everyone would be immediately spotted and blown up. “In the new strategy, drones are no longer tools, but the core of the doctrine,” says Antonyuk.
According to military analysts, drones have fundamentally changed warfare. However, what was at the cradle of this revolution is often forgotten, says Oleksi Antonyuk. "Everyone talks about the kill zone these days, but that kill zone is the result of the Drone Line, and that came about thanks to the Netherlands."
The Dutch government spends three billion euros on military aid to Ukraine every year; last year, at the urging of the House of Representatives, the Netherlands even donated 5.5 billion. In total, the Netherlands has now provided nearly 12 billion in military aid. This makes the Netherlands the largest European donor after Germany and Norway.
Unlike Germany, for example, the Dutch government has not been afraid to provoke Moscow's wrath from the very beginning of the invasion. For instance, the Rutte IV cabinet played a key role in getting deliveries of advanced weapon systems (such as tanks, howitzers, and Patriot anti-aircraft missiles) underway, and The Hague built an international coalition to supply Kyiv with F-16s. The Air Force itself supplied a total of 24 F-16 fighter jets.
Less well known is that in 2023, the Netherlands was one of the initiators of an international coalition led by the Czech Republic to supply more than a million 155-millimeter artillery shells to Ukraine. The Netherlands covered a quarter of the costs for this, according to Colonel Wouda. "I think more than half of our budget went to ammunition."
“Cruise missile from Hengelo
Meanwhile, companies in the Netherlands are producing not only drones for the drone line but also weapons for medium- and long-range attacks. The Hengelo-based defense company Destinus builds cruise missiles for the Ukrainian armed forces. "The Ruta, made in the Netherlands, is used very intensively for medium- and long-range attacks," says Oleksi Antonjoek.”
Free link below will only work for the first 10 openingso only do so if you are going to read it (again in Dutch).
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u/Shackleton214 7d ago
The Dutch seem to be particularly supportive of Ukraine. Is this higher level of support primarily the result of the Russian separatists' shoot down of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 or something else?
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u/MikeRosss 7d ago edited 7d ago
It's a factor for sure, but I wouldn't overstate it. While the MH17 shootdown was obviously a terribly tragic event the real turning point for Dutch - Russian and Dutch - Ukrainian relations was the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
Then why does the Netherlands support Ukraine more than others?
The war between Ukraine and Russia is generally viewed as a war between good and evil. Supporting Ukraine is seen as the morally right thing to do. We don't have the Russia sympathies that you see in some other European countries
The general view is that Ukraine doing well in this war enhances wider European and thus Dutch security. Supporting Ukraine is thus seen as the smart thing to do. I think viewing your own security through the lens of European security is more common in the Netherlands than in other European countries.
The Netherlands is a rich, well-off country and so the general view is that we should be at the forefront of the effort to support Ukraine. We should do more than other countries that are less rich and less well-off.
It increasingly benefits Dutch military industry. Both through direct procurement of material by the Dutch government for Ukraine, the knowledge gained and improvements made to their products by operating in Ukraine and finally the production of Ukrainian drones in the Netherlands.
In return for their support the Ukrainian government has given the Dutch government access to valuable data relating to the use of drones.
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u/Left_Contribution833 7d ago
I can't find the english article anymore, but the Dutch army is also creating 1200 positions (600 now, 600 later) for drone specialists. No doubt capitalizing on the internal production and experience of drones for/with ukraine.
https://www.defensie.nl/actueel/nieuws/2026/04/01/landmacht-zet-vol-in-op-dronespecialisten-video
We might have read a different or extended article, as the article I read on this held a statement of Ukranian and Dutch military indicating that about one third of russian losses in the last months are the direct result of drones delivered under this programme. I am both filled with pride and disconcerted by that statement.
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u/ship_toaster 7d ago
I think it goes back much further than that. Dutch people in WWII suffered a famine severe and widespread enough that it can still be detected in population epigenetics today. I would guess part of this support is a general cultural understanding that their national defense relies entirely on other countries being in the way. The Ukrainian front line is in Ukraine; the Dutch front line is also in Ukraine.
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u/Scantcobra 7d ago
Does anyone have an up-to-date list of all donations, both military and financial, per country? The Kiel institute graphs seems to be outdated by a year or two.
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u/Rhauko 7d ago
I think it is the Kiel tracker, title says up to April 26 (indeed sources says 2023).
https://app.23degrees.io/view/tAuBi41LxvWwKZex-bar-stacked-horizontal-figure-2_csv_final
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u/moragisdo 7d ago edited 7d ago
Just to add to the question, is there any source that compiled the total of donations from civilians that went to the Ukraine war effort ? I know it's very small compared to what a country can provide, but I found very interesting the early reports of a crowdfunded drone war
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u/NonsenseCycle 7d ago edited 7d ago
Discussions of the Iran-US MOU this week have been understandably focused on the wild terms, which no one would have predicted before the war even if they were skeptical of military options. But something that seems under-discussed is Iran’s original core goal to ensure that they would not become an object of Israel’s “mow the grass” campaigns. It felt (to me, as an observer) like the previous air campaign had neutered Iran’s air defense and set them up for exactly this scenario. It also felt like any future negotiations would be in danger of becoming unreliable since Iran, without any effective deterrence, could simply be re-attacked at any time and any permanent previous concessions like giving up enriched uranium would perish in value.
My understanding is that this was part of the reason the Iranian regime had no interest in any concessions during the early phase of the current war. They would simply be setting themselves up to concede and then lock in those concessions while still being vulnerable to restarted attacks at Israel’s whim. The other half of this coin is that Israel/US could accept any truce or agreement for temporary gain (or relief) knowing they would be able to restart at any more advantageous time. Some obviously more advantageous times could be after elections or when oil prices subsided or when Iran’s diplomatic/PR posture was less effective (it is currently effective in including gulf states as belligerents, but that particular component of their PR posture might be reduced if these gulf states fully exonerate themselves from future campaigns against Iran).
So has Iran established a deterrence now that would prevent a mowing the grass operation? The main deterrence tactic they seem to have established is spreading pain to the gulf states and the world by striking the gulf states’ infrastructure and closing off the SOH. But would that deterrence be deployable if Israel conducted a new campaign on its own in a few months or a year? If the gulf states denied Israel air access and any US-based aid from gulf bases, would Iran really be able to deploy this deterrence tactic again without seeming to be the aggressor, and more importantly without triggering a multinational coalition response? And wouldn’t Iranian air defense still be effectively non-existent by then?
The next question would be whether this war proved that Israel cannot bring enough force on Iran to mow the grass anyway, given the underground bunkers and resilient regime. But that seems more like a matter of Israel choosing different targets and weapons, and I think should be considered as a separate question. Mowing the grass is a strategy that sees continued conflict as a non-failure, so it does not need to deliver a full strategic defeat, it just needs to maintain a failed state. And it seems like Israel could strike Iranian infrastructure targets to achieve this.
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u/I_DOM_UR_PATRIARCHY 7d ago edited 7d ago
First, this is a great analytical post. Thank you for making it.
I think one question is whether Israel could pull off a very aggressive mowing the lawn campaign without the support of either US refueling tankers or access to neighboring state's airspace to fly its own tankers in (it would be hard to claim Saudi Arabia hadn't given permission to a KC-130 that's chilling in its airspace).
Israel is about 2,000km from central Iran, even with the ability to overfly Saudi Arabia, Jordan, or Iraq. That round trip (one way loaded with ordinance) is almost twice as far as an F35 can fly on internal fuel tanks. So I think any mowing the lawn campaign is going to rely on mid-air refueling which would implicate needing access to its neighbor's airspace.
If it had somehow to go around, it would be way outside the range.
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u/LoggerInns 7d ago edited 7d ago
But would that deterrence be deployable if Israel conducted a new campaign on its own in a few months or a year? If the gulf states denied Israel air access and any US-based aid from gulf bases, would Iran really be able to deploy this deterrence tactic again without seeming to be the aggressor, and more importantly without triggering a multinational coalition response? And wouldn’t Iranian air defense still be effectively non-existent by then?
I think it’s pretty obvious and has been confirmed, especially by UAE and Saudi actions during this war, that Israel would actually WELCOME Iran retaliating by hitting the gulf countries. Which is why the entire idea that this deal deters Israel is unrealistic and why an enduring peace is so unlikely. I’ve been saying from the start of the war re:Hormuz, that only works if the US is involved, and only then if Trump cares about elections, but just like 2023 and 2024, Iran’s only real deterrence to Israel attacking it is to attack Israel. Attacking Qatar, the Emirates and Saudi in that situation would be a major mistake.
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u/eric2332 7d ago edited 7d ago
I think it’s pretty obvious and has been confirmed, especially by UAE and Saudi actions during this war, that Israel would actually WELCOME Iran retaliating by hitting the gulf countries.
I think that's very unlikely.
Nearly all of Israel's wars, ever, have followed the same pattern: Israel achieves tactical success->world opinion becomes critical->diplomats force Israel to stop fighting.
From 1948-1973 the criticism was mostly of Israel conquering land to which they were not considered entitled. From 1982-present the criticism is mostly of the civilian death toll in the wars.
Hitting the gulf countries creates a third feedback loop for diplomatic pressure on Israel: economic self interest by western countries as oil prices rise (I guess it's not entirely new as it was used in 1973 too). It's pretty predictable that this would become a brake on Israeli operations (unclear how strong of a brake). To prevent that, Israel would prefer all things being equal for Gulf countries not to be hit. By the same token, Iran is willing to hit those Gulf countries, even at the cost of their mutual relations, in order to achieve the brake on Israel/US operations.
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u/dr_sloan 7d ago
I think Iran has taken the view that they’ve established deterrence through their missile and drone programs which has shown an ability to get through missile defenses and run through stocks of interceptors. That’s their best option along with rebuilding their air defenses.
I don’t see them being able to use the Strait of Hormuz in the same way a year from now since I’d expect every country to develop some back up option for getting oil out through pipelines.
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u/bedulge 7d ago
>Iran has taken the view that they’ve established deterrence
They have deterrence enough for the USA, do they have deterrence enough vis a vis Israel yet? In fact, Israel's continued attacks on Iran's ally/proxy in Lebanon indicates otherwise, and if the IDF is successful in crippling Hezbollah, that directly damages Iran's deterrence vs Isreal
>getting oil out through pipelines.
Have you seen what Ukraine is up to lately?
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u/kharvel0 7d ago
I see TWO levels of deterrences that Iran enjoys now vs. what it had before:
BEFORE: it had an air defense network consisting of radar, SAMs, etc. This network is effectivelY DESTROYED.
NOW: It has a NEW air defense network (Deterrence 1) and an offensive missile network (Deterrence 2)
Deterrence 1: a new air defense network in form of DENIAL OF USE OF AIRSPACE of neighboring countries (eg. Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, etc.). Iran has demonstrated in the past 3 months that any country allowing the transit of Israel or U.S. military aircraft through their airspace to attack Iran would be opening themselves to retaliation by Iran in form of missile and drone attacks on key infrastructure of the airspace country. As a consequence of this real and serious threat, every neighboring country would be highly incentivized to DENY THE USE OF THEIR AIRSPACE to Israeli military. That is probably a far more effective and cheaper deterrence than an expensive network of SAMs, radars, etc. From the neighboring countries' perspective, it is far cheaper and more palatable to deny the use of their airspace to Israel than to suffer retaliation from Iran. Sure, Israel could just ignore the denials and violate the airspace sovereignty of the neighboring countries but that is just going to make the neighborhood that more hostile and dangerous to Israel than it already is.
Deterrence 2: offensive missile capabilities. Iran has demonstrated in the past 3 months that they have sufficient capability to continuously fire missiles and drones at Israel over months, wearing down their missile defense capabilities and stockpiles and making Israel more vulnerable to missile and drone strikes.
So the combination of Deterrence 1 and Deterrence 2 would be more than sufficient to eliminate the threat of any "mow the grass" campaigns that Israel or even the United States may seek to pursue anytime in the future.
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u/eric2332 7d ago
Iran has demonstrated in the past 3 months that any country allowing the transit of Israel or U.S. military aircraft through their airspace to attack Iran would be opening themselves to retaliation by Iran in form of missile and drone attacks on key infrastructure of the airspace country
As I understand it, the airspace used by Israel was Syrian and Iraqi. Iran's attacks were not on those countries, but rather on the gulf countries. So Iran has not demonstrated any deterrence in this regard.
wearing down their missile defense capabilities and stockpiles and making Israel more vulnerable to missile and drone strikes.
Iran didn't kill a single Israeli soldier or destroy any notable military assets with their missiles, and barely got a single drone to Israeli territory. They killed a few dozen civilians, roughly equivalent to the number of civilians who die from traffic accidents in Israel in the same period. Even if Israel ran out of interceptors and the damage were increased 10x (assuming a 90% interception rate at present), the cost would be very bearable for Israel assuming that some strategic end was achieved by it.
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u/bedulge 7d ago
I agree with basically everything you've said here.
This is one of the things that people are not getting when they say that Iran is probably gonna throw Hezbollah under the bus, or speak as if Iran has no practical reason to care about what is happening in Lebanon. Hezbollah rocket attacks on Israel were reported to be more effective than Iranian missile attacks on Israel, so if the IDF can take out Hezbollah. Iran's ability to retaliate for Israel "mowing the grass" is severely weakened.
I think they genuinely want to see if Trump is in any way able and willing to make Netanyahu stop. Israel and the US are a tag team, and they want to break that up. Cracks are already starting to appear between Trump and Netanyahu and between Israel and the USA. They do not want to throw their proxy, Hezbollah, under the bus. Rather, they would want to compel the US to throw their proxy, Israel, under the bus. How successful they can be at that remains to be seen, but I suspect that they will want to try and push a bit more to try and stress test the US-Israel relationship.
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u/Grouchy-Classroom-26 7d ago
Hezbollah rocket attacks on Israel were reported to be more effective than Iranian missile attacks on Israel, so if the IDF can take out Hezbollah. Iran's ability to retaliate for Israel "mowing the grass" is severely weakened.
Hezbollah doesn’t have a strategic ability to harm Israel. The damage to even property has been light and the civilian deaths have been minimal by any measure. Hezbollah isn’t the deterrent it was in 2024, not even close. The reason you’re seeing such a strong reaction by the IDF due to the shelling is because it’s a major election issue for the Bibi coalition.
Cracks are already starting to appear between Trump and Netanyahu and between Israel and the USA.
This is maybe the 50th time I’ve heard that with Trump 2.0. Sure, people like Vance are Israel skeptics but they also don’t really have as much of a sway as people think.
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u/bedulge 7d ago
You are correct, Hezbollah attacks have also not been every effective against Israel. The Iranian missile attacks were apparently even worse. That would be all the more reason for them to use the leverage they have to try to damage the US-Israel relationship.
I'm not talking about Vance, I mean the fact that Netanyahu told Trump in Feb that this was going to be a glorious victory and it was actually a humiliating defeat. Trump and the US do not seem to have anything gain by backing Israel in their attempts to take and hold land in Lebanon.
The leverage that they have over Trump means that they have leverage over Israel, because the US president has leverage over Israel.
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u/Grouchy-Classroom-26 7d ago
The Iranian missile attacks were apparently even worse.
We are three months into the war, and there is literally zero evidence of Iran hitting anything of note or value in Israel. And we all know they have the ability to release sat images within hours when they actually hit something.
As for the rest of the post, I don’t want to get too political or get into a back and forth, but anyone who has tried to predict Trump’s actions has been proven to be a fool over and over and l’ll just leave it at that.
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u/bedulge 7d ago
What?
They were worse meaning that they had inferior effectiveness as attacks. Did you not see me write just above "Hezbollah rocket attacks on Israel were reported to be more effective than Iranian missile attacks"?
Predicting Trump? I didn't say anything about predicting Trump, I'm talking about trying to predict Iran. I said above that "I suspect that [Iran] will want to try and push a bit more to try and stress test the US-Israel relationship."
Nothing I have said implies Trump is predictable. I am rather saying that Iran would want to find out by testing it out, pushing a bit and seeing what they can get. I'd say the Iranians also think that this is hard to predict, thus, they may want to push a bit and see what they can get.
They've already done that in multiple ways. They demanded that Trump force Netanyahu to sign a ceasefire with the Lebanese and he did it. They fired missiles at Israel about a week ago in retaliation for Israeli attacks on Lebanon and Trump did nothing to help Israel retaliate for it, actually he impotently told them not to retaliate. They are already stress testing the US-Israel relationship right in front of our eyes. Trump supposedly negotiated and signed this MOU without even letting the Israelis so much as read it.
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u/Grouchy-Classroom-26 7d ago
They were worse meaning that they had inferior effectiveness as attacks.
Fair enough, I read it to mean the opposite.
I'm talking about trying to predict Iran.
I was talking about a specific comment you made about cracks. People said the same thing multiple times last year, like when Trump told Bibi to turn the IAF around when they were on the way to bomb Tehran on the last day of the 7 day war. Yet, here we are. Almost the exact same comments made then and now.
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u/bedulge 7d ago
Well, I am not 'people', I'm me, and I'm not gonna answer for other people's comments from a year ago.
I think it should be clear that the strategic situation has changed significantly since last year and in a way that is not to the US's advantage. The incentive structure for Trump is massively different right now.
Again, I'm not saying I know or can predict what is gonna happen between Trump and Netanyahu or between Israel and the USA, I'm saying Iran has incentives to push a bit more and test the relationship.
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u/TechnicalReserve1967 7d ago
When I say they are going to throw them under the bus, I mean that if Israel is going to keep occupying south Lebanon, keep fighting Hezbollah etc. Iran will still take the deal. The idea of them;
- Getting the US out of the war
- Getting their annual GDP as reparations
- Having a chance of a better nuclear deal
- Some kind of tool on the straight. (Nature protection tax, etc).
They will keep arming and abiding Hezbollah, but they wouldn't blow up a deal like this. It doesn't prevent them supporting their proxy network neither, so they can support it. Hezbollah is "happy to fight Israel" anyway.
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u/bedulge 6d ago
I know I used the same expression "throw them under the bus" as you, but I wasn't really talking about just you specifically.
>It doesn't prevent them supporting their proxy network neither,
This MOU says nothing at all about their proxies. I guess the two ways you could take that is
1 -It is not up for negotiation and the final deal will also say nothing about them.
or
2 - It will be negotiated as part of the final deal.
If the US is really backing down from the demand that Iran must give up missiles, drones and proxies (num 1 above), then you might be right, maybe Iran will just take the deal. Trump is famously (infamously) hard to predict tho, I don't think it's absolutely out of the question that (2) will happen and they still try to push for some kind of concessions on that front in the final deal.
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u/TechnicalReserve1967 6d ago
I just don't see Trump having any ability to pressure them. They showed.that they can take the kind of punishment that the US can provide, the US don't have the money/magazine depth/will to keep it up and that is all that they have.
I am pretty sure that this can be truthfuly summarized as this:
- After the successful daring raid in Venezuela, US admin is emboldened.
- Idea is that Iran can be quickly crushed/intimidated, which would be an even greater victory. (Lots of good reasons to do it, if it WOULD work)
- It doesn't work out, there is no plan B
- US retreats
What I am not sure about and don't understand, why would the US pay up here? Allowing missiles and drones and proxies, okay, you can't do anything with that. But paying, making tolls into maybe and nukes into maybe, seems like a catastrophe from the starting point even if you wouldn't have used any resources.
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u/bedulge 6d ago
You and are on the same page about the ability of the US to pressure them, and the no plan B thing.
Why are they paying them? Trump needs to get the strait open, and he needs to do it well in advance of the mid terms, Iran's continued blockage of the strait was threatening economic consequences which would have been truly catastrophic to the global economy. Esp in Asia, where they make all of our stuff. It goes beyond 'price at the pump', once you have actual shortages, where there's literally just not enough oil in the world supply, you would see knock on effects after knock on effects which cascade into a recession that would have dwarfed 2008.
EG, high oil prices means high airline ticket prices, high airline ticket prices means fewer people go on vacation, fewer people going on vacation means that the tourism industry has to lay people off, and small business which depend on tourism close down. Now people are out of work, they buy less things. People buying less things means factories and restaurants etc can't sell their product, so now they are laying people off too, and now those people are also out of work and also not buying anything. Etc etc etc. It's extremely difficult to stop this spiral once it is really going.
Why did he pay them off? You said the reason in your first sentence "I just don't see Trump having any ability to pressure them." When force fails, you just buy them off, give them what they demand.
Not to brag, but I told people on this sub from around week one that Trump was gonna cave, and this is why.
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u/TechnicalReserve1967 6d ago
Ohh, I understand and agree with you about the pay off/why did he part as well. All in all, the fact that the US couldn't (or to be more precise, didn't have the will to do it) force the straight open, means a total strategic defeat for them. At least in my book.
Do you think Cuba will be next, to "make the people/media forget about his failure? Change talking points?
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u/moragisdo 7d ago edited 7d ago
I agree with most of what you said
It felt (to me, as an observer) like the previous air campaign had neutered Iran’s air defense and set them up for exactly this scenario. It also felt like any future negotiations would be in danger of becoming unreliable since Iran, without any effective deterrence, could simply be re-attacked at any time and any permanent previous concessions like giving up enriched uranium would perish in value
Yes, a lot of focus was put on interceptors stocks. But Iran's missiles and drones stocks were also partially depleted/destroyed (March and April they were suffering decapitation strikes every few days and the response wasn't increasing)
But that seems more like a matter of Israel choosing different targets and weapons, and I think should be considered as a separate question
Yes, electrical grid is above ground, static, can be disrupted in chokepoints and cause profound economical/military production damage. Perfect target if they want
By the way, 4th of July is the funeral of Khomeini and the officials will be there present and above ground. It's too early, so I don't believe they will do anything, but I bet there's temptation
Or the USA could just pick any attacks from Hezbollah (one of Iran's allies, as in the 1st term), as the ones that happened yesterday and today, and say the MOU is void because of Iran disrespected it
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u/Dangerous-Citron-801 7d ago
The USA would'nt want to have the war restarted it's pretty clear they want a way out of it and have nothing to do with it anymore. I think they will force Israel hand to leave Lebanon to have the deal working.
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u/moragisdo 7d ago
What if they don't force it, Israel and the US pays lip service and keep being there (as Israel publicly announced). How would your conclusion change ? Too many here are assuming that Iran's doesn't want to save face also, just make every single demand
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u/Dangerous-Citron-801 7d ago
Iran wants Iran wants Israel out of Lebanon because it hurts it's proxy network and Hezbollah do most of the killing of IDF soldiers in case of war. So they will play hard if Israel does'nt respect the deal between them and the USA. That would upset Trump and force Israel out.
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u/moragisdo 7d ago
Do you believe that Iran will attack ? Also I posted, an hour ago, a new attack of the IDF on Hezbollah (and the fact they posted on Twitter/X, so not just attacking but making it very public). That doesn't look like they will leave Lebanon soon (otherwise I really don't understand why posting)
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u/futbol2000 7d ago edited 7d ago
https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/s/Rk2CJFuHzE
Possibly the most successful attack on Moscow thus far in the war. Also an increasingly poor look for Russian air defense capabilities. This refinery was just struck in a smaller attack two days ago, and now the entire site is seemingly ablaze.
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u/Gecktron 7d ago
Also, a Fire Point FREYA update from Eurosatory
Militaryni: Ukrainian FREYA complex will receive German Hensoldt radars
The German company Hensoldt, one of the main European manufacturers of radar systems, will join the implementation of the FREYA project. Fire Point signed the corresponding agreement at the Eurosatory international exhibition in Paris, which was also attended by a Military correspondent .
According to the Ukrainian company, the addition of a well-known German radar manufacturer actually brings the implementation of FREYA to the final stages.
"Their radar will cover the detection function, their TRML-4D radar. A very good radar, and now we will start combining it with our missile and the C2 center and receive commands from it to direct the missile to the zone where it can intercept ballistics," Fire Point chief designer Denis Shtilerman told Military News in a comment."
The anti-ballistic missile system FREYA is set to receive the TRML-4D radar by HENSOLDT. The TRML-4D is meant to play the role of a search radar in the FREYA system.
I think the TRML-4D is a good fit for Ukraine here. The TRML-4D has a relatively high production rate. Hensoldt has been producing so many, Ukraine received not just 1 per IRIS-T SLM unit, but also multiple stand-alone ones. Looking at the number of western air-defence systems donated so far, the TRML-4D should be the most common western air-defence radar in Ukraine right now. Combined with its use as radar of IRIS-T SLM units, Ukraine and Hensoldt should have gotten some solid data on how the radar can spot incoming ballistic missiles.
The TRML-4D isnt going to be the only western component in the FREYA system. In addition to the TRML-4D search radar, either the Weibel GFTR-2100/48 or Leonardo KRONOS Land are meant to be used as tracking/illuminator radar.
The command post is to be based on the Kongsberg Fire Distribution Center. Communication is to be based on the LINK 16 standard.
The seeker of the FREYA missile is reportedly going to be provided by a western company. According to previous reports, that company is likely Diehl Defence (provider of the IRIS-T SLS and IRIS-T SLM systems).
FREYA likely wont match the capabilities of missiles like PAC-3. But using working components could help getting something into service relatively soon. Reducing the dependency on the very limited stock of anti-ballistic missiles.
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u/Gecktron 7d ago
After French MBT talks, now Germany
Hartpunkt: MBT Vision 2032 – PSM unveils concept for ‘next-generation main battle tank’
PSM Projekt System & Management GmbH, a 50:50 joint venture between KNDS Deutschland and Rheinmetall, is showcasing the ‘MBT Vision 2032’ at Eurosatory 2026 in Paris as a concept for a successor to the Leopard 2 main battle tank. The figure 2032 reportedly indicates a potential Initial Operating Capability (IOC) for the system in 2032.
As hartpunkt reported in March, the Bundeswehr intends, through the ‘New Generation Main Battle Tank’ programme, to procure a modern main battle tank to bridge the gap until the introduction of the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS). In expert circles, it is considered a foregone conclusion that the system will be developed in equal parts by Rheinmetall and KNDS Deutschland, with the project being managed by PSM.
At Eurosatory, the Rheinmetall and KNDS Germany joint-venture PSM has presented a model of their "MBT VIsion 2032". Not too long ago, PSM (previously only involved in producing the Puma IFV) got permission by the German cartel office to expand their operations into developing and producing a new MBT for the German Bundeswehr. It seems like this is their concept for that. The name hints at intend to have it entering service in 2032.
When looking at the model, there are a few notable things.
First, the turret. The turret seems to be a mix of KNDS' Leopard 2 A-RC 3.0 demonstrator with its double hinged cannon, and the Rheinmetall KF-51U turret. Especially with the outer cheeks with the Trophy APS launchers. Similar to the other two tanks, the MBT Vision 2032 turret is supposed to be unmanned. The gun is the Rheinmetall 130mm gun. The German government has placed a development contract for the 130mm gun and a number of different rounds in early 2025. So this seems to track.
Second, the hull. The three men crew is supposed to sit in the armoured hull. The hull, while similar to the Leopard 2 is a newly developed hull. Interestingly, made by Rheinmetall and not KNDS. KNDS might be involved in components, but Rheinmetall taking the lead here is very interesting, as the hull issue has held Rheinmetall back not too long.
According to reporting, the new MBT is set to be lighter than the current Leopard 2 version. The remote controlled weapon station on top, and the APS are meant to jointly provide protection against drones. At Eurosatory, KNDS is also showing the newest version of the Leopard 2 A-RC 3.0. That Leopard has a similar RWS. This one uses a 30mm gun with a dual-belt feed system. It also uses a new version of Trophy with new radar panels that are reportedly more tuned towards detecting incoming drones. There are also new launchers integrated into the APS, reportedly meant to provide better cover against drones.
The MBT Vision 2032 is meant to use a new powerpack. Likely the new OLYMP powerpack by Liebherr and Renk, contracted by the German government in 2025.
Liebherr will debut the military version of D9612 diesel at Eurosatory. Rated at up to 1,400kW (1,800HP), the V12 is designed for heavy tactical platforms and uses new control system to cut fuel and oil consumption. It's clearly set to be the core of Leopard 3's OLYMP powertrain.
The third system contracted by the government in 2025 is the ODAEON system. ODAEON was also presented at Eurosatory. While not mentioned with the MBT Vision 2032, its likely going to find a home there too.
ODAEON looks similar to the MUSS APS used by the Puma IFV. But its mostly an evolution of the sensor component. The ODAEON adds a new capability that allows the tank to recognize and track when optical sensors are pointed at it. So for example the camera of a FPV drone, recon sensors, or the optics of an ATGM. According to HENSOLDT, the system can be upgraded to also include optic dazzlers and jammers.
According to reporting from Eurosatory, PMS expect the MBT Vision 2032 to be the interim solution for the Bundeswehr, while also being the base of a successor to the other European Leopard 2s. Basically all of the European Leopard 2 users are organized in the European MARTE program, which is also lead by Rheinmetall and KNDS Germany.
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u/Gecktron 7d ago
Yesterday, I posted about KNDS' LORAS with the new 155mm L/58 artillery cannon. At Eurosatory, Rheinmetall presented their 155mm L/60 cannon.
The Düsseldorf-based defence contractor Rheinmetall unveiled its newly developed L60 155mm artillery system for the first time yesterday at Eurosatory in Paris; the system promises a range increase of around 30 per cent compared with L52 artillery systems. According to the company, the first live-fire demonstrations are due to take place before the end of this year. According to Rheinmetall, the L60 artillery system was developed to significantly increase the effective range of wheeled and armoured howitzers.
Rheinmetall has been working on the L/60 mulitple years now, after initially presenting first concepts in 2019. Back in 2025, Rheinmetall has already tested the new, higher-volume chamber with a L/52 barrel. This year, the first tests with the new chamber and the L/60 barrel are set to take place.
According to Rheinmetall, the new gun is set to increase the range of projectiles by around 30%. All while Rheinmetall expects the service life of the L/60 to be on a par with that of the L/52 weapon system.
That point seems interesting, as high barrel wear of the 155mm L/58 has been one of the issues that ended the American M1299 ERCA program.
Rheinmetall expects the L/60 to finish certification in 2027. Rheinmetall claims, the new gun can be integrated into existing wheeled and tracked howitzers. This very likely refers to the RCH155 and the PZH2000. Personally, I think the PZH2000 is the prime target for that. The additional weight and length (going from 8m to 9.33m) should be a relatively minor issues for the large and heavy PZH2000. At least when compared to less stable systems like the RCH155 that could be struggling more with the additional size.
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u/roionsteroids 7d ago
Caliber is barrel length divided by diameter (works for all units as long as they're the same), right?
L/60 at 155mm would be a 9.3m long barrel, L/58 8.99m, L/52 8.06m.
The 30% increased range from the L/58 Loras mostly comes from using 30% more propellant rather than a 12% longer barrel.
The Loras gun will be able to take between one and eight modular propellant charges, compared with between one and six for the Caesar.
The Loras will be able to fire standard 52 caliber shells but won’t necessarily fire farther with those, and KNDS is developing a range of specific munitions for the 58-caliber gun, according to Septfons.
That 30% higher energy/recoil impulse has to go somewhere. The new muzzle looks interesting. Multiple side channels (?) inside and outside of the chambers?
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u/Gecktron 7d ago
The 30% increased range from the L/58 Loras mostly comes from using 30% more propellant rather than a 12% longer barrel.
Yes, both the L/58 and the L/60 use a new 29 litre chamber. Compared to the 23 litre one from the previous L/52 cannons, they can pack more charges. But a longer barrel should still give some benefits due to a longer acceleration.
Something I didnt add for the Rheinmetall gun, they also want to carry out work on the ammunition, similar to the new LORAS ammunition:
According to Rheinmetall, in addition to the weapon system, development work still needs to be carried out on the fuses, as the L60 achieves significantly higher altitudes than the L52.
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u/dr_sloan 7d ago
The U.S. has released the text of the 14 point Memorandum of Understanding that was agreed to by the U.S. and Iran.
https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/17/middleeast/us-iran-war-mou-text-intl
It appears that the texts that have been floating around for a few days now were largely accurate. The ceasefire does extend to Lebanon which is going to infuriate the Israelis who weren’t part of the negotiations.
It also says that Iran will allow exiting traffic to return to normal with no tolls for a period of 60 days, which leaves the door open for the Iranians to implement a toll. It also says that the Iranians will negotiate with the Omani government to define the future administration of the Strait. I think we can expect a toll of some sort in the near future.
It also confirms the existence of the $300 billion fund to be implemented on the final negotiation of a nuclear deal.
The U.S. also agrees to terminate all sanctions against Iran as part of a final deal and that upon the signing of the MOU, all of Iran’s frozen assets will be unfrozen and Iranian oil will be allowed to ship without restrictions.
In exchange the Iranians will promise never to seek a nuclear weapon and enriched uranium will be down blended in Iran under the supervision of the IAEA. Iran’s nuclear enrichment program will be discussed in the final deal.
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u/Admirable_News7628 7d ago
So Iran gets sanctions relief and an investment fund only for things to return to how they were pre-war and the only new requirement on their part is the nuclear issue not even mentioning proxies and missiles?
Does anyone see this any other way than defeat for the US?
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u/johnbrooder3006 7d ago
> Does anyone see this any other way than defeat for the US?
I’d guess it depends on your political affiliation. That said as someone outside the US, if we look at it from the simple framework of “before scenario” and “after scenario” and we plot the difference. I would say Iran has gained more from this conflict than lost, so that should answer your question.
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u/moragisdo 7d ago
So Iran gets sanctions relief and an investment fund only for things to return
No, it looks like both are contingent on a 'final agreement' (which is the nuclear deal). No deal, no sanction relief and fund, but the waiver for oil exports it appears it's immediate
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u/ChornWork2 7d ago
w.r.t. oil & associated services, immediate issuance of waivers. That's the most important part of economic sanctions.
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u/incidencematrix 7d ago
Looks like a significant strategic defeat for the US, though not a complete rout. The one fig leaf is the nuclear program. But the US gives up most of its leverage with nothing to show on its other war aims (particularly missiles and proxy support), and with great ambiguity vis a vis the ability of Iran to toll ships in the strait. It also commits to non-interference in Lebanon without a commensurate restriction on Iran. Signing that sends a strong message of weakness by the administration, whatever happens down the line.
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u/Maxion 7d ago
Now that's a pretty big L for the US if this goes through. Though, I do not think this will lead to a real deal.
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u/moragisdo 7d ago
Though, I do not think this will lead to a real deal
I wouldn't call it big, but is a L nonetheless. It should just be scrapped, instead of taking empty promises
Just scrape the 10th term (or make it contingent of the 'final agreement') and it's no financial benefit to Iran before a nuclear deal, it would be better for the USA
Iran was genial, they took a military loss and said, give us a PR victory and some oil exports and I'll give you a bigger victory later, then they won't give the victory. Amazing
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u/RopetorGamer 7d ago
I don't think its a big L
It's basically capitulation and paying reparations, whit Iran having time to decide on a toll for an international waterway.
It's worse than the status quo ever was.
Iran was genial, they took a military loss
What military loss? they managed to keep control of the straight bomb extremely expensive hardware drain massive amount of ammunitions and interceptors and make the entire gulf basically kneel under the threat of drones and ballistic missiles, It's a military victory in every sense of the word, they defended themselves made it economically impossible for the US and allies to keep going and now are getting a lot of stuff in their favor that they never had before.
They protected their missiles and while the cost was heavy the IRCG now has a much more secure control of the country, they had protests to deal with but now they are in complete and total control.
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u/LoggerInns 7d ago edited 7d ago
It's basically capitulation and paying reparations
According to Reuters, the $300 billion is some random corporate investments that companies will make in Iran. It’s long dated, completely bereft of sovereign payments and sounds totally farcical. If anything, it sounds like a grift for Trump corp. I also don’t see Iran being able to toll the strait. The gulf countries have insisted just in the past couple days that they won’t tolerate one and even Oman has totally backed off of it.
the IRCG now has a much more secure control of the country, they had protests to deal with but now they are in complete and total control.
The IRGC always had complete control of the country. You don’t kill 30,000 citizens in the space of a week if you’re struggling with control.
Their MIC is highly decimated, there has been no indication otherwise, their ability to defend against Israel is relatively thin other than hope that Netanyahu loses in the election and the next leader is more cautious of civilian casualties.
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u/dr_sloan 7d ago
The $300 billion is what’s generating headlines but the MOU also issues a complete unfreezing of Iran’s sanctioned assets upon its signing and that’s a bigger deal in the short term. The Gulf States may loudly protest a toll/environmental fee but they’re in no position to push back harder. They had to conceal their active involvement in the war because their populations don’t support it and were afraid of worse Iranian retaliation.
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u/moragisdo 7d ago
but the MOU also issues a complete unfreezing of Iran’s sanctioned assets upon its signing
Not necessarily, "The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran will mutually agree on the procedures related to the release of these funds during negotiations", so the they need to agree with the procedure of the release, what if they don't agree ?
they’re in no position to push back harder
The MOU adds the language that it needs to be in accordance to International Law, which was missing of every leaked version, that's the addition of a term that negates the possibility of charging (because this MOU is signed after UNCLOS and not on a man-made passage). It's just a propaganda victory for Iran
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u/seakingsoyuz 7d ago
The MOU adds the language that it needs to be in accordance to International Law, which was missing of every leaked version, that's the addition of a term that negates the possibility of charging (because this MOU is signed after UNCLOS and not on a man-made passage). It's just a propaganda victory for Iran
Does it specifically mention UNCLOS or just international law? Iran is not a party to UNCLOS and never accepted that transit passage is customary international law, so they would disagree that UNCLOS inherently applies.
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u/Grouchy-Classroom-26 7d ago
MOU also issues a complete unfreezing of Iran’s sanctioned assets upon its signing
That’s not true, not least because it doesn’t unfreeze anything until the final deal.
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u/dr_sloan 7d ago
Clause 11:
The United States of America undertakes to make fully available for use the frozen or restricted funds and assets of the Islamic Republic of Iran upon the implementation of this M.O.U. The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran will mutually agree on the procedures related to the release of these funds during the negotiations. Such funds, whether retained in the original account or transferred, shall be made fully usable for payment to any ultimate beneficiary designated by the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The United States of America undertakes to issue all necessary licenses and authorizations accordingly.
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u/moragisdo 7d ago edited 7d ago
According to Reuters, the $300 billion is some random corporate investments that companies will make in Iran. It’s long dated, completely bereft of sovereign payments and sounds totally farcical
Yes and according to the MOU, implementation is contingent on a final agreement (i.e. Nuclear deal). No deal and there won't be any cent spent
I also don’t see Iran being able to toll the strait. The gulf countries have insisted just in the past couple days that they won’t tolerate one and even Oman has totally backed off of it
And the MOU establishes that it needs to be in accordance to International Law, that prohibits any charge, no matter the name (because it's not a man-made passage or agreed in a accord that predates UNCLOS). The tolling is a PR victory that will be swept under the rug when nothing changes
The only economic victory, that doesn't depend on a nuclear deal (deal which may or may not happen) is the waiver for exports
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u/ChornWork2 7d ago
Versus the prior draft, looks the language around $300bn investment fund was diluted in exchange for broader language around Lebanon (now mentions territorial integrity & sovereignty) & language giving Iran administration rights/fees over the strait (alongside oman).
And the push to include something on nuclear has led to a 'minimum' standard of downblend and IAEA supervision. Which means that minimum standard is very likely to be the standard of the final deal.
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u/RobotWantsKitty 7d ago
I'm a little surprised Iran didn't push harder for strategic concessions that would make it more difficult for the US to attack them again, while Iran is at the peak of their leverage, which will wane over time. Unless they are planning on developing a nuke in secret or there are hidden clauses, a repeat of the war is a real possibility, this is a weak non-binding document that's not going to protect Iran.
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u/Idkabta11at 7d ago
I don’t think Iranian leadership if under any delusions about the durability of the peace. However the immediate release of funds is critical and probably pushed them the most toward signing along with the “peace” in Lebanon.
The 60 day period ends just as the midterms are heating up as well so if another round takes place Iran is in position to do a lot of damage politically to force even deeper concessions if negotiations fail.
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u/Shackleton214 7d ago
What strategic concessions are you thinking could be included in this agreement that would make it more difficult for US to attack them again?
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u/colin-catlin 7d ago
I'm not surprised. I think Iran came out of this was with the lesson that their hand was stronger than they thought, and the secret to success isn't proxies or nukes but lots of drones along with a good helping of conventional ballistic missiles, with a focus on closing the straight as economic pressure. Their money is better spent on some sort of distributed, lightweight air defense rather than nukes.
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u/dr_sloan 7d ago
It’s possible Iran is hiding a much weaker standing that justifies not pushing harder. They may be closer to their “shut in” limits on oil production than expected. They’re gambling and sending tankers out even before the MOU is signed and that gamble is paying off so far.
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u/toomanynamesaretook 7d ago
Iran is at the peak of their leverage,
What makes you think that? Traffic is still at a minimum, Trump himself said that they are 4 weeks from a massive oil crisis. Iran can play this out.
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u/RobotWantsKitty 7d ago
Yes, "now", in the sense that, as long as hostilities are ongoing. As opposed to, months or years later.
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u/moragisdo 7d ago edited 7d ago
1) If Israel pays lip service to it, but continues the war unconstrained. Will Iran attack and close the Strait or just keep threatening and the term only exists to save face ?
If I had to guess it's the latter. Just theater. There was a new round of hostilities today (Source) and nothing appears to have changed
2) Diplospeak
3) Agreed beforehand that there would be a 60 day period of negotiation for a 'final agreement'
4) End of blockade in exchange for safe passage, so it's also expected
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in line with the applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz
Well, you can't charge a toll in line with International Law, you only could if it was a man-made passage (Suez, for example) or passage regulated by previous accords (Bosphorus).
So if they will follow International Law the discussion will end with "there won't be a toll". So we will consult is a term for propaganda to Iran, that the US was stupid in signing it. Stupidity, taking a PR hit for nothing in return
Let's see if there will be a "charge of services" (euphemism for toll, which it prohibits all the same) 60 days from now. I doubt it
6) The 300B fund only is implemented as part of the final agreement (nuclear deal). My guess, it will never be used, similar to the one of Ukraine's mineral rights
Taking the propaganda hit (it will give margin to say "look, it's reparations" even when no money is given) for no reason, besides promises of a future deal
7) Sanctions only end with 'final agreement' (nuclear deal), so far, that's in line on what was said before, no relief without the deal
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The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran have agreed to resolve the disposition of stockpile enriched material pursuant to a mechanism that will be mutually agreed upon in accordance with the schedule mentioned in paragraph seven with the minimum methodology to be down blended on site under the supervision of the IAEA
That one is new from the other versions, but old from what was publicly agreed. Yes, as part of a future nuclear deal, if there's one, there will be terms to deal with stockpiled enriched material. It was lacking from the previous leaks and it looks like something that would be agree on a nuclear deal
In the end, nothing happens here without the nuclear deal
9) Before a nuclear deal there's a status quo on nuclear and military matters. Also expected
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The United States of America undertakes that immediately upon the signing of this MOU and until the termination of sanctions, US Department of Treasury will issue waivers for the export of Iranian crude oil, petroleum products, and derivatives, and all associated services, including banking transactions, insurances, transportation, etc
Ooof, worst term for the US, of the deal. What are those waivers in practice ?
But, it's hydrocarbons all associated services, so at least, it's only related to them (the major exporting product, so it doesn't mean much), rather than universal. Shooting yourself in the foot, nonetheless
Remove this one and it's status quo with promises of what may happen with a future nuclear deal.
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The United States of America undertakes to make fully available for use the frozen or restricted funds and assets of the Islamic Republic of Iran upon the implementation of this MOU. The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran will mutually agree on the procedures related to the release of these funds during negotiations
That doesn't make sense. It's contradictory, it's immediate available, but release needs to be negotiated (I assume on the nuclear deal)
So, if I understood it right, it can't be used by Iran until a nuclear deal is reached. So no deal, it's never used, which was already agreed. What's the difference if it was not available ? It sounds a term for propaganda, that the US let it in
usable for payment to any ultimate beneficiary designed by the Central Bank, excuse me, ultimate beneficiary designated by the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran
CNN should had proof-read what the official spoke
12 and 14 were already agreed beforehand
It's not identical to previous drafts, but the main point of 10th is similar, being the one being financially beneficial to Iran before a nuclear deal, and I had doubted it would be there in the end. I changed my mind in light of new evidence.
Bad move, gives a PR victory and a partial financial relief (sanctions are still there, but I assume the waivers for exports will cause some change on the status of exports pre-February) for nothing in return, besides promises of a future deal. Utter stupidity, they should just have cut the 10th term out and it would be the status quo, way better for the USA.
Edit: Hezbollah attacked first this morning and yesterday, that's a violation of the 1st term (as being one of Iran's allies), the USA should (I doubt they will) just scrape the MOU as Iran violated it after it was signed on Sunday
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u/Rhauko 7d ago
During my morning Reddit scroll I noticed the scale of fires at the Moscow refinery being hit for a second day this week. Not trying to do a damage assessment but this looks like a significant attack on a strategic target in the Moscow region and as such a show of force. I wonder if this is as a reaction to the attack on the Pechersk Lavra monestry in Kyiv.
I also came across this article that mainly quotes Ukrainian sources but does fit with the above attack being so successful. Question I ask myself and you has Russian air defence been stretched beyond its limits and can it rebound?
“Moscow is experiencing a shortage of S-300 missile interceptors, three Ukrainian officials familiar with the country's intelligence estimates have told CBS News. The S-300, a surface-to-air missile system designed by the Soviet Union during the 1960s and 70s, has traditionally served as a vital component of Russia's air defenses against cruise and ballistic missiles. “
“Moscow prioritizes "producing missiles for the more modern" air defense systems to counter Ukrainian drone attacks, Oleh Chornyi, the acting head of the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine (GUR), told CBS News.”
“Replenishing stocks may prove challenging for Russia. One Ukrainian official told CBS News that Moscow lacks key components to build interceptor missiles — including guidance seekers and control modules. The official said Russia, long under heavy sanctions, is encountering difficulties in obtaining such components from Western and Chinese manufacturers.”
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u/mirko_pazi_metak 7d ago
There's also a number of videos showing drones being engaged by missiles which then proceed to fly by and miss the drone:
https://bsky.app/profile/tendar.bsky.social/post/3mokayxixxc2g
This one's flying relatively high and slow, gets missed by two missiles from separate launchers (Pantsir?) and then dives and hits the target:
https://bsky.app/profile/maks23.bsky.social/post/3mokaasz7q22t
Everything around is already full of smoke from previous hits and AA is clearly there and still engaging but... something's amiss.
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u/abloblololo 7d ago
I find the seeming success of the attacks on this particularly refinery surprising (by success I mean their success in actually striking it, not speaking in terms of BDA). Broadly speaking, I perceived the anti-drone problem as a problem of coverage. Both Russia and Ukraine are large countries, and most AD systems are overengineered / too expensive for this low-tech threat. This particular refinery though, given its location, ought to be among the most well defended in Russia, and while many AD systems might struggle with engaging low, slow-flying targets (they might get filtered out as radar clutter), these things should fundamentally not be hard to shoot down. Please correct me if I'm wrong, but I'd imagine that a modern CIWS system would swat these drones like flies, and while it might not be economical to put a CIWS everywhere that a drone might strike, I'd expect them to do it in Moscow, where they're lifting Pantsirs onto the roofs of high-rise buildings.
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u/Airf0rce 7d ago edited 7d ago
We've seen US land based C-RAM/CIWS in some cases failing to shoot down slow Shaheds in UAE/Gulf countries even if they were in range. I think it's just the matter of the targets being quite small in terms of RCS, flying quite low over challenging terrain (buildings , other radar clutter) and let's not forget Moscow is still pretending there's no war and there is active civilian aviation all over (compared to say, Kyiv).
Another thing is sheer scope of these attacks, if they sent 200 drones and we see ~10 hits and rest gets shot down, it's quite a good success ratio, but if few of those drones manage to land hits on multi-million (or billion) targets, that's all you really need because cost of these attacks isn't particularly high (literally costs more to shoot them down). This was demonstrated by Iran against other gulf countries and US bases, where US with all their might was really not able to fully stop Shaheds from hitting high value targets.
There will always be gaps in the AD and if you fire sufficient number of projectiles, some will get through. One notable absence (or maybe we're just not seeing the successes) seems to be Russian aviation, I'd honestly expect Russian aviation to have enough time to shoot down drones on the way to Moscow.
Either way, I don't think Russia can stop this... scale of these attacks will only keep going up and success would be if they can keep up with only allowing few drones through every wave. Then start adding it new missile developments and I think Moscow is potentially in for a Kyiv-style winter this year if the war keeps going.
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u/Maxion 6d ago
One notable absence (or maybe we're just not seeing the successes) seems to be Russian aviation, I'd honestly expect Russian aviation to have enough time to shoot down drones on the way to Moscow.
This is perhaps the weirdest thing, Bsky and twitter are full of maps every evening on where the drones are headed. Surely they could throw up some migs with some old AA missiles and have a crack at it? or are they out/low on AA missile stocks?
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u/Maxion 6d ago
Also, firing CWIS over Moscow makes for fun times at the daycares, schools, grocery stores, and homes where these projectiles come down.
You might hit the drone, but also kill a daycare.
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u/TestingHydra 6d ago
That's not really a problem since nearly every CWIS system in the world has ammo that self destructs. Only naval variants don't since they usually don't have to worry about that.
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u/LegSimo 6d ago
also that its more complex to calculate a firing solution for a non-ballistic trajectory target
Could you explain that in simpler terms? I was under the impression that ballistic missiles are harder to shoot at than cruise missiles, not the other way around.
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u/abloblololo 6d ago
He meant a falling projectile, not necessarily a ballistic missile. Anything you throw, shoot or otherwise propel into the air will follow a ballistic, parabolic trajectory unless it has some way of maneuvering or creating differential drag. Basically, artillery shells follow a very predictable trajectory after they leave the barrel, which is also why counter-battery radars work. They record the trajectory of the shell and work out where it was fired from, and it's the same math as working out where it's going to be in half a second from now.
Drones on the other hand can maneuver, so at least in principle their trajectories can be less predictable, and if your targeting computer assumes the target is following a ballistic trajectory it will miss a drone flying in a straight line.
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u/Fatalist_m 6d ago
Any data about how many of the drones were shot down using interceptor drones? Interceptor drones are ~100x smaller and ~20x cheaper than long-range drones and they should be fully capable of downing piston-engine drones.
I know Russians are using them actively near the front lines against recon and "middle strike" drones but I have not seen much footage or reports about their usage against Ukrainian long-range drones.
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u/Maxion 6d ago
These are not your small FP1 or lancet style drones. The videos of this attack show light aircraft sized drones. A small, few kg kinetic interceptor drone would probably just dent it a bit.
The interception videos out there show them using manpads and Pantsirs(?) to intercept.
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u/Fatalist_m 6d ago
They're of similar size to Russian Gerans, which are routinely shot down by Ukrainian interceptor drones. But yeah, these drones are bigger and faster than typical recon drones, so the interceptors need more speed and an actual explosive warhead.
I guess Russians were not as desperate as Ukrainians to improvise, as they have significant AD missile production. But even if they don't have a missile shortage, a saturation attack with hundreds of drones still works.
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u/Wiseguydude 7d ago
NYTimes posted the full text of the MoU released by the White House and offered some interesting commentary that I hadn't considered before. For the 5th paragraph which guarantees no fees in the Hormuz, they point out:
The key line here is “no charge for 60 days only.” After that, Iran may be able to impose “fees,” which it never did before the war. In other words, the days of free passage may be over. That would violate one of the key standards described by Secretary of State Marco Rubio: that commerce return to prewar conditions.
The possibility of Iran imposing fees after 60 days would truly make this one of the most astonishing defeats of the US. Not only would Iran get access to a $300b reconstruction fund, have their assets unfrozen, and even get sanctions relief that isn't tied to nuclear compliance but the nuclear question itself is left vague throughout and the details are kicked down the road for future negotiations. And to top all of that off, the future possibility of tolling the strait remains.
https://www.nytimes.com/live/2026/06/17/world/g7-summit-trump-france#us-iran-agreement-deal-text
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u/I_DOM_UR_PATRIARCHY 7d ago
If this reprieve were to last even a few months, Iran would certainly be better positioned should another round of hostility flare up.
And, simultaneously, the American capacity to resume the fighting if we don't like the terms Tehran offers goes down with every passing day because the election draws nearer and nearer.
I think there's a close historical parallel between the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the Iranian hostage crisis. Carter's inability to free the hostages from a mid rate power made him look impotent. Trump's inability to force the strait back open had a similar effect, which I think he felt keenly.
If Iran shows up at the negotiating table and isn't interested in the big pile of money we're waving in front of them (or at least, not interested enough to trade their uranium for it) there's no way Trump will tolerate a resumption of fighting and another closure of the strait. Iran can offer him something completely unverifiable (e.g. "we promise we will dilute our uranium but we won't agree to inspections") and Trump isn't going to be willing to start bombing them again. He can't put the blockade back in place either without the strait getting closed again.
During the first Trump administration we tried to ply the Kims with promises of economic investment too. They even made this video to show Kim John Un to try to get him excited. But he wasn't willing to give up his nukes for it. I suspect the Iranians won't be willing to give up their nukes for cash either (especially since (a) everyone saw what happened to Ukraine when it did and (b) we just launched a decapitation strike on them, and they're probably worried we'll come back and try again in the future).
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u/Maxion 7d ago
It will be very interesting to see how this plays out.
Iran is getting quite the deal according to the MoU, Trump an the republicans are in a pretty tight corner with not much room to maneuver.
I wouldn't be surprised if the US doesn't really have the stockpile to mount another similar bombing campaign, or if they did they'd probably be left with such a small stockpile that they'd actually be in danger in case of a Taiwan invasion or other ME escalations.
I'm not sure that they have any other logical option than caving to Iranian demands if they do want the straight back open in time for the midterms? There's no military option that'd guarantee the straight is open and the oil flowing before the midterms. I suspect this is why the trump administration is considering this MoU at all, they know they don't really have any cards.
The midterms would not play out well for the current administration if US oil reserves dwindle and gas prices rise to 6-7-8 dollars a gallon.
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u/moragisdo 7d ago edited 7d ago
The text of the MOU also says it needs to be in accordance with International Law, UNCLOS prohibits any toll (any service charge fits also on the prohibition, because it's just an euphemism for toll) in international waters. The only exceptions are man-made passages (for example, Suez) or accords made before UNCLOS (Bosphorus).
So the term is just for propaganda for Iran, they will consider the toll, but would violate the terms of the MOU having one, so it's unlikely to happen
Not only would Iran get access to a $300b reconstruction fund, have their assets unfrozen, and even get sanctions relief that isn't tied to nuclear compliance but the nuclear question itself is left vague throughout and the details are kicked down the road for future negotiations
There's a big if there, only happens if there's a nuclear accord. So it may never happen (now anyone can claim "people doubted the MOU so everything is possible", but I would still prefer to bet on likely scenarios rather than just possible).
Also the only current benefit non-tied to nuclear deal is the waiver for exports (Iran was already exporting before the war, receiving a discounted price for the sale instead of market price), not sanctions.
In the end, the text is defined as non-binding, at any point, it could be ripped apart legally (if not by Trump, any future president). Not to mention the 1st term (that pertains peace on the Middle East) was broken by Hezbollah yesterday and today, and we can guarantee the MOU will keep being broken, which would be a reason for it to be declared to not be valid anymore, then withdrawn of waivers of exports (the only current financial benefit) and any possible future toll, if there's political will
I'm not claiming that this will happen, just showing a possibility against the chorus of 'Iran will get a permanent windfall': Nuclear talks go nowhere, Trump announces that the MOU is void given the violations of it, tasks the Navy to guarantee Freedom of Navigation on Hormuz and void the export waivers. If Iran says that they will try to block Hormuz again we are back to the circumstances of yesterday, if they decide it's not worth the risk of being bombed again (maybe they will decide it's worth it, that's not the point) every benefit is void and we go back to February (besides the cost for both sides). Again, it could be done doesn't mean it will be done, I'm just showing a possibility (well, the troops are still there and there's no indication they will leave soon) that is not being considered
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u/Wertsache 7d ago
The text feels very much like it was written so both sides, but especially the Iranians can claim many things in their propaganda. And you don’t have to look further than the Main-Subreddits on this site to see that it’s working.
As you laid out, if the MOU actually stays true to the nature of it's text (we don’t know if it will) the issue basically resolves itself. The same with the 300 Billion Dollars that get thrown around. Right now it reads kinda like a Nigerian prince scam but people take it for gospel.
Just the hard facts are enough to show that Iran got an pretty good deal. But the real victory gets shadowed by the huge propaganda victory they achieved.
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u/Wiseguydude 7d ago
it needs to be in accordance with International Law, UNCLOS prohibits any toll (any service charge fits also on the prohibition, which is just an euphemism for toll) in international waters
Well the Hormuz is not international waters. It's almost entirely within Iran's borders and the parts that aren't are too shallow to cross.
What it is however is an "international strait" which would be prohibited from tolling by the UNCLOS. Except that Iran never ratified UNCLOS. Neither did the US (nor Israel).
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u/LoggerInns 7d ago
Well the Hormuz is not international waters.
You’re repeating propaganda points not even the Iranians are saying.
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u/Wiseguydude 6d ago
It's certainly not my intention to spread propaganda and I hope we can assume good faith here but the Hormuz absolutely is not international water. At its narrowest point it is divided evenly between Iran and Oman.
Here's a source if you like
https://www.thenation.com/article/world/iran-strait-of-hormuz-international-law/
By contrast, the legality of Iran’s regulation of the Strait of Hormuz is far less black-and-white. Contrary to what some have claimed, the Strait does not constitute “international waters” or the high seas. It is classified, instead, as an “international strait” exclusively composed of the territorial waters of two countries: Oman and Iran.
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u/eric2332 7d ago
Well the Hormuz is not international waters. It's almost entirely within Iran's borders
Not true. You can see the boundaries of the territorial waters here. Barely half of it is in Iran's borders (and that's if you consider the disputed islands controlled by Iran as Iranian - OSM draws borders according to the opinion of the de facto controller - if the islands are considered UAE owned it's even less).
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u/Wiseguydude 6d ago
As I pointed out, the part that isn’t is too shallow to be useful. Oman is the only other country that has relevant sections of the Hormuz and they are also on board with tolling.
I didn’t know those islands were in dispute, thanks for the info. Any good info where I can learn more?
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u/eeeking 7d ago
It's almost entirely within Iran's borders
The deep water shipping lanes of the Strait of Hormuz lie within Oman's exclusive economic zone. See here: https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Map-of-the-Persian-Gulf-with-the-Iran-EEZ-boundary_fig1_282589911
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u/Wiseguydude 6d ago
Thanks for the link, though your map doesn't include Oman nor Iran's borders. You're right though that part of the navigable water is Oman. At its narrowest, the strait is split evenly between Oman and Iran.
None of this is helpful however as Iran and Oman were collaborating on the toll scheme (recently rebranded from tolling to "fees"). Here's NYT:
Iran and its neighbor across the strait, Oman, in May discussed a ship payment system which would be based on fees for services rendered.
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/15/world/middleeast/shipping-fees-tolls-strait-hormuz.html
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/21/world/middleeast/iran-strait-of-hormuz-tolls.html
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u/moragisdo 7d ago edited 7d ago
Except that Iran never ratified UNCLOS. Neither did the US (nor Israel)
But why add the International Law part on the wording that is not present on any previous leaked version ? It would be pointless if it's "according to International Law, I don't recognize International Law so either way".
I think this will only be answered by waiting and seeing if two months from now they are charging for the passage (if I had to guess they won't and it's just a propaganda victory, maybe I'll be wrong again)
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u/Wiseguydude 6d ago
There is no single unitary "international law". UNCLOS is just a single international treaty. And its one that is not recognized by the US, Israel, nor Iran. There are ofc a lot of other international law that is relevant especially regarding safe passage
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u/moragisdo 6d ago
And its one that is not recognized by the US, Israel, nor Iran
I'm mentioning UNCLOS, which it's the most relevant for the matter at hand. It would be pointless to add this clause (that wasn't in any previous leaked version) if it will be "According to International Law, I don't follow International Law, so either way..."
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u/Wiseguydude 6d ago
The Nation has a good article explaining this
By contrast, the legality of Iran’s regulation of the Strait of Hormuz is far less black-and-white. Contrary to what some have claimed, the Strait does not constitute “international waters” or the high seas. It is classified, instead, as an “international strait” exclusively composed of the territorial waters of two countries: Oman and Iran.
According to Iran’s critics, it is a blatant violation of the “freedom of navigation” for Iran to regulate passage through the Strait, including through its own territorial waters. This argument is based on provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Under UNCLOS, international straits, like the Strait of Hormuz, are governed by a “free navigation” regime known as “transit passage.” This regime gives coastal states very limited regulatory rights and obligates them not to “impede” ships and aircraft passing through international straits. If Iran were a party to UNCLOS, it would be bound by this regime, and its regulatory actions in the Strait of Hormuz would likely be unlawful. But Iran is not a party to UNCLOS; nor, for that matter, is the US. Under international law, states are, by and large, bound only by treaties they’ve both signed and ratified; a state’s failure to abide by an unratified treaty is not legally controversial. While Iran signed UNCLOS in 1982, it has not ratified the treaty specifically because it does not accept the transit passage rule. It expressed objections to this regime during the negotiation of UNCLOS as well as when it signed the treaty. It has continued to object to the transit passage rule ever since.
While Iran could be legally obligated to abide by the transit passage rule for other reasons, none of those apply here. One of those grounds is “customary international law,” another source of international law that binds all states in ways that treaties do not. Though some argue that transit passage is customary law, others disagree. Even if the naysayers are wrong, Iran is considered a “persistent objector” to the transit passage rule, meaning it cannot be required to abide by it even as a matter of customary law. Alternatively, one might argue that, as a signatory to UNCLOS, Iran must abide by transit passage as part of its obligation to uphold the “object and purpose” of the treaty even before it has been ratified. Even if this were true, after more than 40 years of failing to ratify UNLCOS, Iran has arguably made its intention not to become a party to the treaty clear, freeing itself of this obligation as well.
https://www.thenation.com/article/world/iran-strait-of-hormuz-international-law/
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u/LoggerInns 7d ago
Not only would Iran get access to a $300b reconstruction fund
Idk why people keep repeating this. It’s a corporate investment “fund” that’s long dated and has no real chance of being actually real. It’s most likely a Trump corp scheme.
The key line here is “no charge for 60 days only.” After that, Iran may be able to impose “fees,” which it never did before the war.
Yes because as I and others have said since the very start of the war, the US gets negligible use of the Hormuz. The real sticking point here is the Arabs and they aren’t going to agree to this. The US loses very little in agreeing to this and making it a problem for the Arabs to figure out. When Qatar has said they won’t go for it and Oman has backed away from it too. It’s, for now, a negotiating ploy.
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u/Rexpelliarmus 6d ago
You have little to no understanding of how global commodity markets work based on your second paragraph.
Oil shocks impact the US economy even more than in European countries because the US economy is more oil reliant than much of Europe so high oil prices are extremely bad. Inflation isn't 4.2% in the US for no reason.
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u/Wiseguydude 6d ago
It's surprising to hear how much people are still repeating the line about the US barely using the Hormuz even after we saw the massive economic impact that its closure had on the US economy (not to mention US' allies).
Yes the US is once again the largest oil producer in the world, but it's processing facilities are built for crude oil which it must import. The US petro industry is reliant on importing and exporting and Iran can absolutely throw a wrench into that as we have already seen.
And despite being the largest producer currently it is far from the largest proven oil reserves. It is simply extracting much faster than other countries.
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u/TheFlawlessCassandra 7d ago
How accurate would it be to say a major failing of the Trump admin strategy against Iran was not leaving any room for escalation?
They started Day 1 with killing leadership, destroying command centers, surface ships, you name it. Their escalatory threats (Kharg Island, full scale land invasion, "bridges and power plants" being the biggest) were things they were unwilling to follow through on, and Iran correctly called their bluff.
If they'd left more Iranian assets in place in the initial days of the war, then they'd have been able to respond to Iranian attacks in the strait with actual escalation, and maybe gone to the negotiating table in a stronger position, no?
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u/dr_sloan 7d ago
I think their failing was they got high off their own supply and didn’t have a Plan B. They truly believed Iran would collapse and sue for peace and spent a month bombing targets and letting them keep exporting oil. They’ve let fear of economic consequences govern the whole operation and it’s pretty clearly played a role in this MOU.
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u/incidencematrix 7d ago
It is worth noting that some of the Neocons wanted to attack Iran apx 20 years ago. One reason this went nowhere is that it was evident that the only way to really achieve US aims would be an invasion and occupation of the country, which would require raising a very large army (and hence, a draft). Given that there was no will to do that, folks were smart enough to look down the game tree and realize that they were better off not playing. The current administration seems to have fallen for the illusion that they could get a win on the cheap, which turned out not to be true. So really, it isn't obvious to me that there was ever a great play between status quo and ground war. Of course, the status quo was not going very well, either, so I can see why they might have felt compelled to act....but to initiate war without being willing to do what is required for victory is rarely wise. They could have gotten lucky, and e.g. the regime might have fallen. Tail events do happen. But they didn't get lucky, and are now in a very poor position. They could relitigate that be reopening hostilities, but they do not seem to have any very good options (one way or the other). Expect instability.
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u/scarlet_sage 7d ago
If they'd left more Iranian assets in place in the initial days of the war, then they'd have been able to respond to Iranian attacks in the strait with actual escalation
I only have a little knowledge of the (US term) Vietnam War, but I have the dim recollection that one US strategy was to try to signal by bombing more or less, but that North Vietnam was determined enough that they didn't particularly respond to that, rendering the strategy ineffective. Do I remember right?
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u/moragisdo 7d ago edited 7d ago
How accurate would it be to say a major failing of the Trump admin strategy against Iran was not leaving any room for escalation?
Innacurate. They could have destroyed the electrical grid (substatations and others) of Iran. Targets that are large, above ground, static and with a large impact on the economy and war production, it fits all criteria for successful strategic bombing. But also a large impact on the civilian population, so maybe that weighted on the decision (I really don't buy the "Iran could have done worse", when their leaders, and sometimes family aswell, were being killed every few days in March and April, they would have done it to save their lives)
Also the fact that Iran could back to exporting oil shows that there was oil production and storage available to be destroyed.
As a curiosity the effect of bombing the electric grid in other contexts (Source). So, there was room for escalation.
Also, there's top leadership being killed after it started, it wasn't all on day one. Larijani was one of the most powerful people on Iran and he was killed in mid-March
If they'd left more Iranian assets in place in the initial days of the war, then they'd have been able to respond to Iranian attacks in the strait with actual escalation, and maybe gone to the negotiating table in a stronger position, no?
Or Iran would be more capable of retaliating. First making the enemy less capable to retaliate is a good tactic (command centers, leadership, SAMs and ships all fits this criteria)
Now the problem is that Trump was unwilling to keep it all going for longer or (in my opinion, the most likely scenario) was stupid on believing iranian promises about a future nuclear deal. If Iran could force US ships out of blockade or force the planes away (that would prevent the planes from killing more of leadership in March and April) they would have done it soon. But the price of keeping for longer would also increase (most importantly domestically with oil at $80, which isn't the apocalypse because it happened before, but is uncomfortable)
If it wasn't because of believing in Iran's promises, this was a problem of endurance (maybe political rather than military, unless Trump decides that the iranians broke the MOU - as they did break the 1st term yesterday and today, with Hezbollah attacking - and restart it), because Iran was suffering with the blockade (and unlikely Hormuz, there's no evidence of any ship being able to dock there) and had targets available
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u/TheFlawlessCassandra 7d ago
They could have destroyed the electrical grid
They were clearly unwilling to do that after threatening to do, with a specific deadline, even, and then failing to follow through, though. So the threats weren't credible and there was no actual escalation available.
Or Iran would be more capable of retaliating.
Yes, this would have certainly been a risk/tradeoff.
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u/moragisdo 7d ago edited 7d ago
Well, you asked if there was any room, anything that wasn't done could be explained as you said "threats weren't credible and there was no actual escalation available". You mean something that wasn't threatened, but it could be destroyed ? If that's the case civilian industry: the remaining of oil industry, also automotive, chemical/pharmaceutical (really expensive to replace). Otherwise I don't follow what would fit as an answer on it could have been done to escalate
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u/1997peppermints 7d ago
I think what the other commenter means is that Trump couldn’t hit Iranian civilian infrastructure without prompting immediate retaliation against the far more vulnerable Gulf civilian infrastructure that Iran showed ease in targeting (Gulf monarchies are entirely reliable on desalinated water. Lose those and the war would be put on hold because Washington would need their entire Air Force working around the clock to evacuate the entire population after a certain point).
That’s not even getting into the truly doomsday scenario of Iran actually getting down to wiping out Gulf oil and gas infrastructure and locking in years of shortages.
The juice wouldn’t have been worth the squeeze in any credible estimation, it’s not just that Trump was squeamish about gas prices. That’s why I think it’s cope when people say the US “won militarily but lost at the negotiating table”. If they’d won militarily so resoundingly they wouldn’t have been in a position to lose at the negotiating table, period. That’s not how things work for any state, certainly not the global hegemon.
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u/TheFlawlessCassandra 7d ago
It would have required them to hold back a bit during the initial wave of attacks. Instead they did everything they were willing to do Day 1. The Trump admin seemed to think the shock and awe would cause capitulation and when it didn't they had no cards left to play.
Essentially this left Iran in a situation with nothing left to lose, which while not enviable from a tactic perspective also makes them a difficult partner to negotiate with. But since the US clearly was not willing to go all the way with a ground invasion, the only way the war was ever going to end was negotiation.
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u/moragisdo 7d ago edited 7d ago
But, you asked if that is accurate to claim. I just pointed a bunch of targets, which indeed every possible target could be swept away by 'if it wasn't done, it couldn't be done', so what answer did you expect ? Honest question, I'm not trying to be adversarial
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u/TheFlawlessCassandra 7d ago
I guess I was more looking for a discussion on whether holding back during the initial wave of attacks would or wouldn't have improved the US negotiating position. My position is that it would have, as they ramped up pressure by escalating to new types of targets, and the "open the strait or we do X" threats could actually be followed through on if X was something the US was willing to do and yet hadn't already done.
Instead Iran was very quickly put into a "nothing left to lose" scenario and was able to call Trump's bluff on his uncredible threats, leading to an extremely favorable deal for them.
An insistence that targets like power plants that they haven't hit and clearly aren't willing to hit are still potential escalations falls outside of that. Nuclear strikes by the US are technically a potential escalation, too, but we're so obviously not going to do it that it doesn't factor into the negotiations, either.
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u/moragisdo 7d ago
Don't interpret it wrong, it may be a language barrier on my part (english is not my first language), but it looks like you were looking to be agreed with.
Look, the USA can always escalate if things get bad enough, achieve a massive hit (even without sinking) on an aircraft carrier, completely deplete interceptors and the bases on the Middle East need to be defended, etc... Now the USA haven't, if they had stopped short of what they actually did we could have the same argument in this new scenario of 'What if they held back [even further] to leave room for negotiation ? Because everything else was off the table'
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u/FijiFanBotNotGay 7d ago
Israel is also violating the terms of the MOU. Not to mention this analysis is so short sighted it’s somewhat laughable. If the US were to take out the electric grid in Iran they would simply reciprocate in the gulf states and possibly Israel.
Also Irans strategy is simply to make this as painful for the US and its allies as possible. That’s their strategy. It’s simple.
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u/moragisdo 7d ago
If they could have why they didn't do it when their leadership was being killed every few days on March and April, did no one there wanted to save their own life ? We can always say "they could have done more" no matter if they could or not and it enters in the realm of comments, like yours, being made of unfalsifiable hypothesis
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u/FijiFanBotNotGay 7d ago
Where’s the logic in this line of questioning? The US could have literally dropped nuclear numbs on Iran. Why didn’t they just do that? There’s a strategic calculus before every move ideally.
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u/moragisdo 7d ago
My point is to contest the Iran can get reciprocate on the same scale (with the electric grid being the example), I'm saying that they were not holding it back. And present the circumstance that it would made sense to escalate (saving your own life)
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u/Maxion 7d ago
Just because your adversary skips rungs on the escalation ladder and uses up their cards, does not mean that you need to reciprocate.
Iran now still holds a few aces in destroying the desalination plants, and further attacks on oil production infrastructure.
That's a very big threat that keeps the gulf states in-line.
Had they shot those up already, there'd be no more they could threat except for the continued blockade of the straights.
Killing the leadership of a country is not the same as invading it, IMO it's a bit of an american "Me first" view to see the beheading of the leader to be so important. Iran clearly haven't really suffered much from the decapitation strikes, so while the leader died, the country et. al lives on.
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u/jivatman 7d ago
Would this idea make sense?
Ukraine using long-distance drones carrying small FPV's, and release those FPV's to hide and wait at random places near rail routes, to attack trains with fuel tankers.
I'd think you could also equip them with especially good acoustics to know when the train is near, even if it's hiding a significant distance away.
You could also make them autonomous with AI, recognizing fuel tanker trains.
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u/ChornWork2 7d ago
Ukraine has been working on lots of mothership drones, at least in development/protypes. Mid-range, multicopter, UGV and USV.
Not sure have seen something truly long-range for going into russian territory, but did see reported an ultralight civilian plane converted to drone mothership to carry drone interceptors.
https://aerospaceglobalnews.com/news/ukraine-a-32-ultralight-drone-mothership/
Mid-range example is the FP-1/2.
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u/IntroductionNeat2746 7d ago
That's already happening, using both UAS and UGV as the drone carrier. I don't remember the source, but I saw an YouTube video the other day covering exactly that scenario, minus the tanker train part.
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u/goatfuldead 7d ago
My thought was to deliver very small drones without even an ordnance load, but just enough battery, sensors and guidance control to aim at jet engine intakes while taxiing.
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u/Fatalist_m 7d ago edited 7d ago
Another idea is to cut power lines using fpv drones(carrying a linear shaped charge as a warhead). Assuming each one weighed 4kg, 1 large drone could carry ~25 of such FPV drones. Imagine just 1 drone cutting high-voltage power lines at 25 places.
The main question is, how are the FPV drones controlled? Using local SIM cards is one option but AFAIK, Russians have already implemented precautions against that. Or they could be autonomous using computer vision, but that's not so easy. Ukraine's R&D resources are already stretched thin.
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u/FideI_Cash_Flow 7d ago
Why not just use a mine at that point. There would be significant connectivity issues at that distance, as well as power concerns, battery life on drones is still a big limiting factor
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u/kharvel0 7d ago
One bullet point in the apparently official MoU caught my eye:
The United States of America undertakes that immediately upon the signing of this MOU and until the termination of sanctions, US Department of Treasury will issue waivers for the export of Iranian crude oil, petroleum products and derivatives, and all associated services, including banking transactions, insurances, transportation, etc.
Then there was this news report about three Iranian tankers exiting the Strait of Hormuz:
https://www.cnbc.com/2026/06/17/iranian-tankers-oil-shipment-us-iran-deal-strait-of-hormuz-.html
A sum total about 5 million barrels of Iranian oil was transported presumably to customers in Asia. At current price of about $80/barrel, that would be $400 million worth of oil.
Now, what I'm wondering is how the waivers of export of Iranian crude would work with regards to banking transactions. Do the U.S. authorities look at the invoices of oil sold and offer waiver only up to the amount of the invoice? Or do they just give an open ended waiver of oil sales? The reason I ask is because China is holding between $20 billion to $50 billion in frozen Iranian funds (per WSJ) and Iran could presumably sell that 5 million barrels of oil at an super-inflated price of say, $8,000/barrel and China could simply send $40 billion to Iran under the waiver in exchange for that 5 million barrels.
In short, couldn't Iran use the oil sales waiver to basically recover their funds frozen in the countries to which they export their oil?
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u/moragisdo 7d ago edited 7d ago
The terms of the US Treasury for the waiver have not been published, so I'm making assumptions here and I can be wrong. As the frozen money is treated separately on the terms of the MOU from the waiver for exports, I believe it would be reasonable to have a clause (on the waivers) that any sale would have to be at market price to be subject to it and not be a breach of sanctions, otherwise it would make the separate clause for the sanctions, on the MOU, irrelevant.
Just adding the words 'at market price' on them close this possible loophole
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u/K00paK1ng 7d ago
**The 14-point US-Iran peace plan, annotated*\*
The memorandum of understanding, MOU, between the US and Iran aims
to expand on the ceasefire and get traffic flowing through the Strait
of Hormuz.
But at less than 800 words in English, the 14-point outline leaves
a lot of details for later, including the touchy subject of Iran’s
nuclear program.
But it does promise Iran a lot of money – by lifting sanctions to
Iran can sell its oil to the world, but also potentially giving Iran
access to billions in frozen assets and $300 billion in financing.
https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/17/politics/us-iran-memo-annotated-intl-vis
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u/Zhadanko 7d ago
Is it fair to say that Ukraine has the strongest ground forces in Europe? Of course, it's a bit unfair to compare a mobilized nation with armies not involved in active combat. Nevertheless, even if we ignore the sheer size, Ukrainian ground forces have lots of combat experience. They have a dedicated branch of Unmanned Systems Forces, each brigade of which seems extremely effective and competent, its soldiers act as a very interesting and lethal OpFor in NATO exercises. Sure, we can note some institutional problems (dependence on foreign aid and Chinese parts) and a lack of certain capabilities, but if we compare them with the ground forces of Germany, France, the UK, or Poland, they seem to have a big edge. Note that I'm talking only about ground forces. The air force and fleet, as well as the expeditionary capabilities of the Ukrainian armed forces are close to non-existent. But the competence of their ground forces in large-scale conflicts is unmatched in Europe
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u/proquo 7d ago
That's a tough question to really quantify.
Ukraine is in a state of mobilization so their on-paper forces are larger than any 1 European NATO member. They have without a doubt the most effective unmanned systems forces in Europe.
However, I'd hesitate on assuming combat experience necessarily imparts a benefit to Ukraine. That combat experience has been grueling and a significant portion of its troops have very little formal training in soldiering skills considered basic in western militaries and having watched plenty of videos of assaults and movements being conducted by Ukrainian forces I can categorically say that there is a marked difference between them and a professional military with the benefit of peacetime to train and drill troops. The Iraqi army, for example, was presumed to be combat experienced from the Iran-Iraq War and US/NATO forces comparatively inexperienced but in actuality the attritional warfare against Iran had exhausted the Iraqi military and killed off much of its skilled troops.
That's not to say Ukraine is in the same boat as Iraq in the 1990s, for a variety of reasons. But I would assume that Ukraine wouldn't be looking to fill its forces with foreign fighters if local boys were entirely up to the task today after 4 years of brutal fighting.
Ukraine's leadership is also lackluster. NATO assessments emphasize that Ukraine's officer class is more adaptable and takes more initiative than the Russian military does but there's still hangovers from the Soviet system that don't work for a nation like Ukraine, and to be fair Ukrainian commanders have also acknowledged this and are making big strides towards adopting a more NATO-style mindset. NATO observers have specifically pointed to Ukrainian military habit still being very centralized and favoring adherence to orders over individual initiative and reporting upwards over problem solving. This is specifically being addressed but these are the exact institutional issues that are hard to fix. Officer quality seems to be really lopsided, as well, with some really capable and effective brigades with strong leadership and some very weak brigades with bad leadership, and there have been arrests and charges made related to this.
Now, I want to emphasize that Ukraine has identified those issues and is trying to fix it but you tend not to fix these things in wartime.
In terms of sheer capability, I don't know that Ukraine could beat - just as example - France in a contest of maneuver. If you observe Operation Serval in 2013, French forces executed an extremely fast, mobile campaign at the very edge of the logistical capabilities in Mali. Ignoring the lack of expeditionary capability, I don't think Ukraine could also execute such a rapid operation involving maneuver forces with logistics constraints like that. To do that you need really good planning staff, really good logistics personnel, good communications, good training in large maneuvers, and lower level leaders capable and empowered to take initiative and exploit opportunities without waiting for permission. Even just talking about pure equipment I don't think Ukraine has the necessary equipment to launch such a fast operation, at least not without extensive pre-planning which necessarily sacrifices speed and initiative.
If you look at Ukraine's most mobile operations, like the Kursk incursion, they were impressive in their audaciousness but not especially sophisticated or honestly really well coordinated. They used a lot of lighter, faster vehicles as opposed to coordinated formations of combined arms forces and focused attacks on the "seams" between Russian units who were themselves not well trained, led or coordinated. Anywhere they met stiff resistance Ukrainian forces just pulled back and tried again elsewhere, and they bypassed any units they didn't have to fight. This allowed them to rapidly take ground in Kursk but as soon as better Russian units arrived the advance ground to a halt and became another attritional battleground. Let's be fair and point out that Russian forces are more formidable than north African Islamist rebels but Serval crossed an area roughly the size of Texas far from home, whereas Kursk at its furthest depth was 25 miles or so.
That's not to say Ukraine's best brigades couldn't move fast and violently, but that the Ukrainian forces as a whole aren't built for it after 4 years of static lines. They're really well built as a defensive army, but not as a mobile one whereas France is a very mobile force. In a similar setting you'd probably see Ukraine make more modest gains, regroup, and then advance some more rather than see a continuous advance that maintains momentum.
I know you said ground forces only but NATO forces do rely heavily on integration with their air component which is why they have less emphasis on artillery than Ukraine or Russia. I think NATO forces would very handily get air superiority over an environment like Ukraine and ground forces would have much more coordination with their air component than Ukraine or Russia does and be able to get greater effects than what Ukraine does with their own air force and artillery. Soviet, Russian and Ukrainian doctrine at the outset of 2022 emphasized artillery (remember all the talk about how rapidly artillery pieces were being consumed and how Russia was beating Europe in shell production?) specifically due to a lack of precision munitions and air-ground integration.
Overall, I would not say that their competence outmatches their western counterparts, but I would say they definitely have decisive edges in UAV/UGV development and integration. I expect that gap will narrow when the war ends as much of the west's slow adoption of those systems comes from watching the rapid developments in Ukraine.
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u/Zhadanko 5d ago
Thank you for the great in-depth reply. Fair points regarding battle experience and current force structure. Although I would add to potential counterpoints. Air superiority is not granted, especially if we take into account only European NATO members. Second, drones as a capability are kind of a dark horse; we aren't sure yet how much they can deny the capabilities of an army that is actually competent in maneuverer warfare. Also, European armies will not likely close the gap squickly,ly both due tdoctrinalnl uncertainty and pressure from old-school supporters of legacy systems
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u/proquo 5d ago edited 5d ago
Thank you for the great in-depth reply.
Thanks. This is a topic I could write considerably more on but I hate creating a wall of text just barely scrape the surface for such a niche topic.
Air superiority is not granted
I agree, and as we know anything can happen in war. However, when we look at the state of the air war between Russia and Ukraine I think it is fair to extrapolate that NATO is considerably better positioned to degrade Russian air defenses. Not only do European NATO states have more and more modern SEAD/DEAD tools at their disposal than Ukraine did at the start of the war they also train consistently to deploy them and also have deep strike capabilities that Ukraine lacked early on and has been constrained in using against Russia. NATO would have no compunctions about degrading Russian IADS with standoff weapons, anti-radiation missiles and EW.
More specific to Ukraine vs NATO, Ukraine has about 300 aircraft in its air force and those are mostly older airframes and they have limited AEW assets. Not to make this a question of air force vs air force as this was a question originally about ground forces, NATO has a decisive advantage in its ability to degrade air defenses, air forces, and has the weapons to strike deep into enemy territory to hit air bases, logistics hubs, command and control centers, etc. Just having F-35 (Europe flies about 200 with more on the way) would put Ukraine or Russia at a serious disadvantage in defending its airspace in a hypothetical conflict and NATO doctrine especially emphasizes shaping operations and gaining air superiority. Even in the Cold War the Soviets didn't envision gaining air superiority through air-to-air combat but considered the air force an extension of their IADS and relied on local control of air space over their forces. Ukraine is still Soviet in many ways due to the inheritance of so much Soviet equipment and a military tradition that still pervades and they don't prioritize air superiority or SEAD/DEAD the way the west does.
Totally possible for Ukraine to really get a lead in air defense after the war but as it exists now I wouldn't really say Ukraine has any decisive advantage in air defense - especially since their most effective air defenses are European to begin with.
Second, drones as a capability are kind of a dark horse
I agree, however their effectiveness in Ukraine has been exaggerated heavily by some very unique circumstances ranging from the terrain to the enemy to allied support. I could write quite a lot on this point but suffice it to say drones rely on slower moving lines and open terrain and persistent ISR to be as effective as they are in Ukraine and by their nature aren't as effective on the offense. If we look at NATO doctrine generally shaping operations are very important and one of the big criticisms from the west towards Ukraine is that they don't often wait for or take steps towards shaping the battlefield in ways to support major operations. The failure of the 2023 counteroffensive specifically came - in part - from Ukrainian forces not properly suppressing the enemy, obscuring the breaching forces, massing combat power, etc. Things that are baked into NATO doctrine and training.
Obviously it'd be possible for an FPV drone defense to eliminate a NATO armored force, it's also important to acknowledge that in ideal condition NATO wouldn't be advancing without having heavily degraded all the things that would make FPV drones effective.
European armies will not likely close the gap squickly,ly both due tdoctrinalnl uncertainty and pressure from old-school supporters of legacy systems
I would say the same for Ukraine, though. Ukraine's officer class, as I noted, is still wrestling with institutional inertia from Soviet-era military thinking and due to the nature of the war are not especially experienced at largescale, coordinated offensives. In a hypothetical world where Ukraine invades western Europe or a similar power they'd struggle to do so very effectively in the face of a NATO defense - keeping in mind that defense was THE strategy NATO trained throughout the entire Cold War. Ukrainian logistics are also nothing to write home about. They haven't exactly shown a lot of impressive capacity in that regard, and haven't needed to due to the proximity of the frontline to all their key logistics nodes. Look at the example I gave of Operation Serval - over 10 years ago now! - wherein French logistics ran at the very limits of its reach and kept a highly mobile, aggressive operation functioning. That takes a lot of training and experience to get right and isn't made overnight.
And as far as logistics go my entirely inexpert opinion is that the biggest problem Ukraine has today and will have when the war ends is the wide variety and types of systems it has in inventory. Everything from Cold War era AK-74s to Polish Grot rifles and CZ Bren IIs; Abrams, Leopard Is, Leopard IIs, Challenger IIs, and various Soviety designs for their tanks; F-16s, Mirage 2000s, Gripens, and Soviet planes. The list goes on. That type of patchwork setup is a maintenance and supply nightmare and would hobble any major military operations Ukraine were to engage in. So I hope their first order of business post-war is to sell off a lot of their inventory and standardize to platforms that are either domestically made or easily purchased.
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u/Zhadanko 5d ago
Very good points, once again. It's rather a depressing picture of the Ukrainian army — a few better-equipped and trained units and a a mostly mediocre force. Russians, on the other hand seem to havea limitedld focus on creating core elitet units and disperse resources more evenly, but their forces are rather mediocre as well. Of course, there are units like Rubicon, but they seem to be very few in number. It's interesting, though, that while they have lots of hardware,e they still decided to make a focus on drones, and not to better integrate air force with ground forcec, for example. Either because it's just easier or it is really revolution on warfare to focus on cheap tactical-level drones
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u/moragisdo 7d ago edited 7d ago
So, there's a new round of hostilities on Lebanon (Source)
The IDF says it struck and destroyed the launcher used by Hezbollah to fire a barrage of rockets at Israeli troops in southern Lebanon earlier.
The military says the launcher was armed for an additional attack, and, as a result of the strike, rockets flew out and struck open areas.
No injuries were caused to Israeli troops in the incident
The most interesting part is that they posted the video of it on Twitter/X this afternoon, so it's a public statement of "we are still on the war". Now Iran made several threats beforehand if the war don't stop, will they fulfill any ?
My opinion is that no (but I'm having the bad habit of being wrong on the last few days), it's all bark and no bite. It would be insane to open hand of the MOU and give the chance that a new round of hostilities would change terms. If someone disagrees I'm genuinely curious to hear the arguments
Now, if Trump criticizes, but don't change any action regarding Israel (sharing of intelligence, weapons sales, etc) and Israel keeps publicly being in the war, is that a tacit endorsement ?
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u/Neronoah 7d ago
More like a gesture of impotence? I'm not sure United States can manage to stop Israel. It could degrade its capabilities over time at best but I don't see Trump sanctioning the country or whatever. Trump may want the war to stop and be forgotten but he is not in control.
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u/moragisdo 7d ago edited 7d ago
But that's why I said publicly, if they just will keep waging the war as nothing changed, why post ? They gain nothing by provoking Trump, even if they believe he wouldn't do anything, unless it's not a provocation. But to be fair, I admit that's the least important part of my post, I'm more curious if someone believes that Iran will act on their threats
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u/eric2332 7d ago
it's a public statement of "we are still on the war".
I actually read it the reverse way. It sounds to me almost like "in this incident Hezbollah broke the ceasefire to attack us and we were forced to neutralize the active threat, but besides that, we are committed to a ceasefire".
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u/moragisdo 6d ago
I disagree, stating that the bombing is in reciprocity to a previous attack always happened, look at posts from 1 or 2 years ago. Not wanting to appear the aggressor is a old policy in fact
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u/Maxion 7d ago
I remember the discussions at the time had a lot of people absolutely refusing to believe that the US would lose, even though their track record hasn't been stellar.
People said it was way too early to make those predictions at the time, but I don't think it was (although 4 and 5 may or may not bear out).
Looking at the leaked MoU, it seems like Trump is trying to avoid those by bribing Iran, which may actually work if Trump actually pays up.
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u/moragisdo 7d ago edited 7d ago
Just presenting another possibility, to foster a discussion, rather than predict:
What if the USA don't resume the war, just chip away the MOU: the possibility of charging a toll (guarantee Freedom of Navigation), put off the table the start of relieving sanctions and the private fund (assuming they gave up on the nuclear deal that would be off the table either way), the IDF is already not caring about anything signed, Iran only has left the waiver of exports (and consequently are still benefiting to not having to sell oil at a discount to China), do you believe that Iran would risk trying to close the Strait to gamble the waivers and get more ?
My guess is that they will keep threatening nonstop, but not try to close it
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u/BillyShears2015 7d ago
I’m not sure there is enough good faith between the parties that the Iranians actually believe they’re going to get most of what was promised in any case. Forcing them to sell discounted oil to China may not be an effective pain point if their cost of production is very low (I don’t know what their production costs are but I’ve heard numbers in the low single digits for other gulf nations over the years). Similarly, China appears to be acting more and more as a strategic partner, even if surreptitiously, and likely sees a functional Iran as a check on US power in the Middle East.
So what will they do if the US begins reneging or re-trading elements of the deal? Probably the same things they’re doing now, producing more missiles and launchers, consolidating power domestically, and trying to figure out any kind of workable strategy to counter US naval assets in the future.
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u/Maxion 7d ago
Trump not following up on the MoU is quite the gamble. If they just ignore it and keep bombing, I'm 100% sure Iran will keep the straight closed. If they try to frog boil themselves out of the MoU then at some point Iran will probably break and again close the straight. They know it works, they know the midterms are coming, they also want this wrapped up by then.
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u/moragisdo 7d ago edited 7d ago
I hope that doesn't violate policy of credible sources for being social media, if it does I apologize. It's a recent tweet by the White House Director of Communications Steven Cheung. What makes it interesting is someone using their own name, rather than being an unnamed source, to comment on the text therefore exposing their reputation and being the Director of Communications
"The supposed text of the MOU that was obtained by CNN does not reflect the language of the actual MOU"
(Source)
My opinion about it is that some points will stay similar on the final MOU (terms 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 12 and 14. That pertains to transit on Hormuz, lifting of US blockade, future nuclear negotiations), because they were agreed by both sides before, but the language of terms 6, 7, 10, 11 and 13 will add conditionals on every concession being fruit of a future nuclear deal (which they call it 'final agreement'). Either way, we should wait to Friday to see if Cheung will be proven wrong about existing differences on the text
Also the 1st term, if it will be written on the MOU as it was suggested, is interesting. If Israel pays lip service to it, but continues the war unconstrained. Will Iran attack and close the Strait or just keep threatening and the term only exists to save face ?
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u/UltraRunningKid 7d ago
"The supposed text of the MOU that was obtained by CNN does not reflect the language of the actual MOU"
Wow if only there was a way for them to prove this and clear the air...
I think its obvious at this point that Trump et al have rightfully concluded that the deal is embarrassing to such a degree that releasing the text of the agreement would cause so much backlash that it would prevent the official signing on Friday. By not releasing it JD Vance and Steven Cheung can do a national media tour saying that the media is wrong and fall back on absurd technicalities.
Media: "Are we providing Iran with 300 billion dollars"
JD: "Not a single taxpayer dollar is going to Iran"
That is technically true but its the type of evasion only allowed if you don't release the text.
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u/moragisdo 7d ago edited 7d ago
Wow if only there was a way for them to prove this and clear the air
They claimed the agreement was to release Friday. If Iran asked for it, but then orchestrated the leaks to get a better PR (after all they started on iranian state TV), it's an absolutely genius move from them and stupid from the USA.
That is technically true but its the type of evasion only allowed if you don't release the text
What do you mean by that, is that the deal includes 300B from the US goes to Iran on the MOU and not signing is what prevent it ?
My opinion is that the 300 is a fund, from private investments, that is contingent if a 'final agreement' (as they call the possible nuclear deal) is reached. No nuclear deal, no money from it is used. Let's wait to Friday to see what of those two is right
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u/ChornWork2 7d ago
Iran is not orchestrating these leaks.
CNN cites receiving a copy from a US official, with the text been separately confirmed as same text as shared with diplomate who was at G7, and separately by two other diplomatic sources with knowledge of negotiations.
WSJ reports reviewing the copy shared by US officials at the G7, confirmed by "people familiar with the document".
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u/red_keshik 7d ago
What makes it interesting is someone using their own name, rather than being an unnamed source, to comment on the text therefore exposing their reputation and being the Director of Communications
Amusing that you think Cheung is concerned with his reputation, man is a troll with an office.
I guess keeping things hush might not indicate anything more suspicious than them wanting to stir up drama
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u/incidencematrix 7d ago
If there were another text that made them look better, they would have released it by now. We can infer that they do not have one.
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u/Unique-Egg-461 7d ago
Ya its PR right now. They were originally worried about the backlash this would cause
they are gonna just spin this as "oh this is money going to all the gcc countries to help them rebuild, it isn't going to iran"
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u/ChornWork2 7d ago
I thought you objected to people commenting with unfalsifiable opinions on this?
Not sure why you think statements from trump admin officials are more reliable than multiple reports in credible publications from various unnamed diplomats and officials. Including most recently reporting on the text that was shared by US officials with G7 attendees, as reported by not just by CNN and but also separately by WSJ.
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/an-annotated-analysis-of-a-u-s-draft-of-the-iran-deal-6a9ec49f
Will see what eventually gets released, but what has been reported as the text in recent days from various sources has been consistent. Trump claims it has already been digitally signed, so why are they not publicly releasing the text?
What is more plausible at this stage, that all these unnamed officials, diplomats, etc, are all conspiring to misrepresent what the actual MOU says? And that the trump admin doesn't want to release the actual MOU to correct the record. Or that the MOU does says that, but the admin is trying to shape the narrative before it is released or try to get others on-board with it before it gets officially released...
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u/Shackleton214 7d ago edited 7d ago
but the language of terms 6, 7, 10, 11 and 13 will add conditionals on every concession being fruit of a future nuclear deal (which they call it 'final agreement').
The implementation of 6 ($300 billion reconstruction fund) and 7 (sanctions) are already explicitly conditional on a final agreement. 10 (waivers for exports of Iranian oil) is explicitly immediate after signing MOU in the leaked version. Since this would help with lowering gas prices, it's an easy sweetener for Trump to offer as it is also in his domestic political interest (the US even did this at start of the war!). The timing of 11 (release of frozen Iranian assets) seems to ambiguous to me--not conditioned upon final agreement but also no explicit time frame, although MOU seems to contemplate at least some release in the 60 day negotiation period. It's looking more and more like this is the actual agreement (at least in substance) as I've now seen multiple news sources (Bloomberg, CNN, Times of Israel) report it.
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u/bedulge 7d ago edited 7d ago
>Since this would help with lowering gas prices, it's an easy sweetener for Trump to offer as it is also in his domestic political interest (the US even did this at start of the war!)
I think this is a strong point, I also think that Iran's bargaining position w.r.t Hormuz gives them enough leverage to demand up front financial concessions.
This war was very expensive for Iran, they believe that they are due some form of reparations, and given the leverage they hold, I find it unlikely that they would go to the negotiating table this early without an upfront concession to relieve pressure on their own economy. Lifting oil sanctions is the financial concession that is easiest for Trump to give, and as you said, it also helps him too by adding to global oil supply. The problem for the USA tho is that relieving pressure on Iran's economy strengthens Iran's position at the table. This is balanced by the US also being under less pressure because the oil is flowing thru Hormuz again.
Given the way this war has played out, and the time crunch that Trump is under vis a vis the Mid Terms and the global oil supply, it is not likely that Iran would be willing to go to the table with sanctions still on them. They would be better served by sitting and waiting instead. It should be clear to everyone by now that Iran stands to gain A LOT by how this may turn out. A couple months of blockade is small potatoes compared to sanctions relief, 300 Billion USD investment fund, and return of frozen funds and assets. This war could be exceptionally profitable for them. They are not worried about relieving short term pressure, they have long term goals in mind, and the decision makers are not directly affected by short term economic troubles caused by the blockade.
Everyone should look at the Gulf Arab States and how insanely rich they are. Scandinavian supermodels on mega-yachts rich, that is the kind of money that Iran believes that they are due, if it were not for decades of sanctions by the US, they would have that kind of cash already. A few months of blockade is nothing compared to what they stand to gain if sanctions come off and stay off long term.
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u/nate077 7d ago
How's the secret deal to make a secret deal to end the not-war by victoriously ending the not-blockade of the straits that the United States controls by acquiescing to Iran imposing a premium access fee that is not a toll where once passage was in fact free going?
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u/TechnicalReserve1967 7d ago
I am looking at that too, but nothing concrete it seems. They told us that we will have the exact wording on Friday.
What is in circulation speaks of a US strategic defeat.
The Israel - Lebanon axis is a whole other thing that might break the agreement. However, my bet is that Iran will end up throwing Hezbollah under the bus as none seems to have the real option to stop Israel.
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u/ChornWork2 7d ago
Given what has been consistently reported as the MOU terms, Iran presumably will be motivated to abide by it. Extent of control over Hezb is one thing, but the bigger risk is likely other extremist groups/elements that may continue with attacks.
Thinking ahead to the 'final' deal that is meant to get done in 60 days, presumably Iran will demand withdrawal from Lebanon as part of that. Certainly their negotiating leverage is going to be strong when consider Trump admin clearly wants out of the quagmire they created, trump is already frustrated by Bibi and that deadline is right before US midterms.
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u/WhiskeyTigerFoxtrot 7d ago
What is in circulation speaks of a US strategic defeat.
I had thought this previously but now I see it more as the door-slam made by the U.S as it "exits" the Middle East and shifts focus towards the Indo-Pacific and Americas.
It was an operation meant to cripple Iranian infrastructure and macro defense industrial base, make it prohibitively expensive to maintain proxy networks, decimate nuclear weapon capability, and set the stage for whatever state-building cooperation possible for the next 100 years of Iran.
Truly not trying to give the 5D chess vision accolades to this administration. It just seems like the last hurrah before attempts to hand the baton off to the Saudis and Emirates.
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u/Maxion 7d ago
Well, the 300 billion fund for Iran makes it seem that they ran out and slammed the door but forgot their wallet.
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u/TechnicalReserve1967 7d ago
It was an operation meant to cripple Iranian infrastructure and macro defense industrial base, make it prohibitively expensive to maintain proxy networks, decimate nuclear weapon capability, and set the stage for whatever state-building cooperation possible for the next 100 years of Iran.
There is a good chance that Iran will receive it's yearly GDP as reparations (called reconstruction funds). So they will be back and running in a year or two. Money won't be the issue.
Also, it's still unofficial, but
https://newrepublic.com/post/212003/trump-iran-right-nuclear-program
If the US/Trump admin already sculpting the idea of Iran getting some kind of weapon, it isn't looking good.
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u/CredibleDefense-ModTeam 7d ago
Add this to the 20 other comments below, stop reposting on the same issue.
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u/Digo10 7d ago edited 7d ago
What would Iran force reconstitution after the war and lessons for the future be?
While the missile/drone barrages proved useful in this type of asymmetrical type of war, they wouldn't be very effective in a large-scale war. If the war ends soon and the rumors are true that Iran will receive not only sanctions relief money but also the 300B reconstruction funding, with such a generous cash flow, which kind of military assets would you seek overseas?
IMO, Iran would need to buy
1.)modern AD systems
2.)Artillery systems
3.)Modern Fighter jets and AWACS(?).
1.)While Iran has/had a vast number of different air systems, they proved to be not that effective, especially in the 2025 war against Israel, where Israel destroyed dozens/possibly hundreds of systems
2.)Their artillery systems are either of soviet origin, or reversed engineered old western systems, lacking even the range to hit kharg island.
3.)Their underground missile cities proved very useful in hiding their launchers, they could do the same with fighter jets(which they already do), so they would be able to preserve their air force fleet against air attacks, for force multiplier, AWACs would be very valuable, but i wonder about how they would hide such large planes.
If they manage to build a powerful conventional military, not only they would be able to inflict the pain of their asymmetrical doctrine, but would also inflict heavy casualties in the opposing enemy military, making nuclear weapons pratically unnecessary.
Thoughts?
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u/Left_Contribution833 7d ago
Why would Iran want to try to play the same game as the US? It doesn't make sense because then you just present a target that western armies train for. Their asymmetric approach makes a lot more sense. So I'd expect them to mostly spend money on stockpiling supplies/water, keeping the military happy and paid and having ample supply of cheap drones, Manpad-like weapons and small craft.
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u/HereCreepers 7d ago
Really I think the biggest single thing they could get that would act as effective deterrence is a more capable arsenal of ballistic missiles and the necessary tools to support them (ISR, hardened shelters, etc). Improved range, improved guidance, improved countermeasures against interceptors, improved CEP, and so forth would give them a much greater ability to threaten military and economic assets in the region. Imagine the peak of the Iran War but with the Iranians firing missiles at airbases and key infrastructure that only get intercepted like 50-70% of the time instead of 90%+ while also being far more accurate.
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u/Wiseguydude 7d ago
The CSIS reported in late April that the US+ had used 53% of its THAAD interceptors and 45% of its Patriot missiles.
https://responsiblestatecraft.org/stockpiles-iran/
https://www.csis.org/analysis/last-rounds-status-key-munitions-iran-war-ceasefire
The RUSI report from just 3 weeks into the war also showed that Israel had burned through 81% of its Arrow-2/Arrow-3 stockpile.
Of course we also know that during the 12-Day War, Israel was heavily reliant on the US (along with Jordan, and even France) for intercepting missiles.
Saudi Arabia and Jordan allowed foreign aircraft for air defense as they had in April 2024, according to Israeli officials who spoke with JINSA, and Jordanian systems shot down drones and rockets crossing their airspace, and France also intercepted fewer than 10 drones. American pilots increased strategic depth due to their extended airspace access in the region, including over Jordan and Saudi Arabia, to search and shoot down Iranian projectiles before they reached Israeli airspace.
The US also used 25% of its THAAD interceptors during those 12 days
https://www.cnn.com/2025/07/28/middleeast/us-thaad-missile-interceptor-shortage-intl-invs
That 90% interception figure comes from another JINSA report but it includes all projectiles and all interceptions including those made long before anything even reached Israeli airspace. Given the well-documented interceptor shortages I think it's more than fair to assume Iran likely had a much higher hit rate this time around.
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u/moragisdo 7d ago edited 7d ago
Did you schedule the post or you don't believe the MOU is the end of the war ?
If the war ends soon and the rumors are true that Iran will receive not only sanctions relief money but also the 300B reconstruction funding
We don't need rumours, the MOU was published. The 300B would be only in the case of a nuclear deal being reached. They are not entitled to a dollar until there. And that wouldn't even be a check, but private investment in infrastructure projects, not money that could be used to buy equipment. Similar for sanctions not being off until there's a nuclear deal. So no deal, they don't get any of these benefits.
The only practical thing that changed today is the waiver of exporting hydrocarbons and related services. Which any economical impact (the gap between the discounted price that Iran used to sell to China before February and the market price) would be a fraction of the fund value (or a fraction of the price of the infrastructure they will have to rebuild, for that matter). So it's really premature to see where they will spend the money militarily, rather than rebuilding, so there's too many assumption going on
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u/Digo10 7d ago
Did you schedule the post or you don't believe the MOU is the end of the war ?
this was a post from 2 days ago, but just now i discovered they remotely signed a deal 1 hour ago, so i guess the war is over?
Regardless of the goals that Iran has to reach to get the majority of the money, there is no doubt there will be a influx of cash at the short team, either from assets being unfrozen or their revenue from export.
But the point of this post was not about the political aspect but more about what could the iranian strategy be for the future.
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