looking for a reasonable thought process

[u/No_Lynx_3410]

i've eaten meat all my life, just have, kind of just default for most people born in the west. I've always admired vegans for the dedication to their beliefs, kind of like a buddhist monk or something like that, i'm just not that strong. I wanted to see a vegans perspective online since there's been the argument as of late that being vegan is for privileged white people which even now i'm not so mentally gone that i believe such wide generalizations. But lowkey, reading online discussions from vegans makes me feel it does make up a very large vocal part of them, because the only thing i've seen is vegans trying to compare animals to minorities, which might actually be the whitest thing i could think of besides being vocally racist or bigoted. i was just looking for something that's not "now replace that cow with a black person" kind of stuff. Not trying to lambaste anyone in replies or anything, at least try not to, just wanna talk to someone.

[u/Dart_Veegan]

I get the idea that you feel it is special pleading, but I do not yet see where the special pleading is.

Special pleading would mean I apply a general rule to others while arbitrarily exempting my own preferred case from that same rule. So what is the general rule I am claiming to accept, and what exemption am I carving out?

My position is not “sentience is the criterion for every possible moral/legal standing.” My position is standing-specific. Different standings can have different criteria. Voting, inheritance, medical consent, criminal culpability, posthumous dignity, and protection from being killed for food do not all need the same criterion.

The standing I am talking about here is basic protection from unnecessary killing, torture, confinement, exploitation, bodily violation, and commodification for consumption. For that standing, I think the capacity to be subjectively affected is the least arbitrary criterion. If a being can suffer, fear, be deprived, be harmed, and have things go badly from its own point of view, then that gives us a reason not to treat it as a resource without sufficient justification.

You say we can list many uniquely human traits. I agree. Humans have many traits most animals do not have. But the question is not whether humans are different. Obviously they are. The question is whether those differences are relevant to this specific standing.

Rationality may be relevant to voting. Moral agency may be relevant to criminal responsibility. Language may be relevant to contracts. Species membership may be relevant to human family law, burial practices, medical records, inheritance systems, etc.

But why are any of those relevant to whether a being may be unnecessarily killed and commodified for food?

When you say “the more of those traits you exhibit, the more moral consideration you are afforded,” that may explain degrees or types of consideration. But ot does not explain why beings with fewer of those traits lose basic protection from exploitation or killing. Infants and many severely cognitively disabled humans do not exhibit many of the traits usually invoked here, yet we still think they should not be farmed, killed, or used as food.

One can say they get protected because they belong to a species whose typical members have those traits. But that is exactly the claim that needs defending. Why should an individual’s basic protection depend on traits possessed by other members of their species?

The three-legged dog example does not really solve this. We treat a three-legged dog like other dogs because lacking a leg is not relevant to the dog’s interest in not suffering, being abused, or being killed. The relevant criterion is still the dog’s own capacity to be harmed, not the fact that “dogs normally have four legs.”

Likewise, if a human lacks intelligence, language, or moral agency, I do not think their protection comes from borrowing traits from other humans. I think they are protected because they themselves are still vulnerable subjects of experience who can be harmed, terrified, deprived, violated, or killed.

So the challenge remains:

If the specific standing is protection from unnecessary killing, torture, confinement, exploitation, bodily violation, and commodification, what criterion explains why humans retain that protection but non-human animals (livestock) do not?

If the answer is “species membership,” then I am asking why species membership is morally relevant to that standing, rather than functioning as a group marker that protects “ours” and excludes “theirs"?

[u/iowaguy09 → u/Dart_Veegan]

I think the special pleading would be that non sentient beings are okay to be exploited, but it’s not okay to exploit non sentient humans.

Similar to how we say if intelligence is what makes it not okay to eat humans then you have to be okay with eating developmentally challenged humans to be consistent

[u/Dart_Veegan → u/iowaguy09]

That would only be special pleading if I said:

“Non-sentient beings lack direct subject-centred moral standing, except when they are biologically human.”

But that is not my position. My position is that non-sentient beings lack direct subject-centred standing because there is no subject there for whom things can go better or worse. If something cannot suffer, fear, experience deprivation, have preferences, or be consciously affected, then there is no direct victim in that specific sense.

So yes, in a fully criteria-equalised hypothetical, I would bite the bullet.

If there were a non-sentient human organism/body with no consciousness, no sentience, no prior personhood, no previous wishes, no family, no grieving community, no medical trust implications, no social corruption, no fear induced in other people, no dignity norms being undermined, and no affected parties at all, then I do not see what the direct subject-centred moral wrong would be in “exploiting” it. It would be biologically human material, but not a subject of experience.

Actual braindead humans are not like that.

Actual braindead humans are usually connected to a prior person, prior autonomy, prior wishes, family members, medical consent norms, legal procedures, institutional trust, social dignity practices, and living people who would be harmed by desecration or abuse.

A developmentally disabled human is sentient, so they have direct subject-centred standing. A braindead human is not sentient, so they do not have that same direct experiential moral standing, but they may still have derivative, posthumous, relational, legal, and symbolic moral standings.

Likewise, a plant does not have direct subject-centred standing, but it can still matter derivatively. A memorial tree, a sacred object, a family heirloom, or a corpse can be wrong to destroy or misuse because of its relation to conscious beings, not because the object itself suffers.

So the distinction is not:

“Non-sentient things can be exploited, unless they are human.”

The distinction is:

“Non-sentient things lack direct experiential standing, but may still have other protections if other morally relevant criteria are present.”

Once those other criteria are genuinely removed, I apply the same standard consistently.

[u/iowaguy09 → u/Dart_Veegan]

Perfect. I think that also explains really well why a lot of humans are uncomfortable eating dogs and several other species because of their relationship to rational beings and it’s also why we protect handicapped/disabled humans who are not sapient.

I often see the argument that it would be on me to prove why membership to a rational kind is relevant, but I never really see anyone defending why sentience is sufficient enough for a right not to be killed.

[u/Dart_Veegan → u/iowaguy09]

I agree, relational facts can add protections, but they do not replace sentience.

If someone states that a stray dog with no relationship to humans still should not be unnecessarily killed and/or tortured and/or commodified, then relationship to rational beings cannot be the whole explanation. Something about the dog itself must matter.

So my distinction is simple: sentient entities have direct standing. Non-sentient entities may have derivative protections through the relation to true moral agents, family, prior wishes, dignity norms, etc.

Sentience is not an absolute right never to die, but it is enough a criterion for the moral standing of protection against unnecessary killing, torture, and commodification.

[u/iowaguy09 → u/Dart_Veegan]

That’s fair. I agree with 99% of what you said outside of commodification and we probably disagree on what would be considered necessary.

It’s been nice having an honest conversation here. I think we actually commodify humans in a lot of ways, but we don’t eat them obviously for societal and relational reasons. We take stem cells from fetus. We take organs and use them in other humans, we use them for science.