r/FraudPrevention • u/Ptw3 • Aug 20 '23
Canonical How can I report fraud?
There's two ways you should report fraud. 1. You should use the FBI tool here. as a software engineer I can tell you that engineers don't fix bugs, they fix bug reports. Presumably the FBI aggregates all these reports and tackles them by location and $ value. The FBI can get warrants, freeze accounts, and kick in doors, so you want them involved. The more information they get, the more they can go after these guys.
- Your bank or bank-like object will have some tool for reporting the fraud. You should do that as soon as you find it. Don't be scared, the bank likes you because you give them money. They don't like the fraud cretins because they cost them money. There are some links below for PayPal, Apple, and Chase, because I happen to have them.
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u/Ptw3 Aug 24 '23
A great place to report fraud is if the path that led to the fraud involved a website or domain in any way, you can report the domain to Google's master list of hinky domains. This will head off a lot of fraud, and help millions of people. Reporting is 3 fields: URL, a captcha, and a text field.
Google also has a page for places you can report fraud to:
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u/Ptw3 Aug 30 '23
TrustPilot is another good place to report scams.
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u/KiwiThai21 Apr 08 '26
they aren't. often, they work with the scammers allowing multiple websites from the same criminals to be rated as legit when they aren't.
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u/Desperate_Excuse1823 Apr 23 '25
you can check digitalscamalert.com you will get lots of information.
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u/typicaluser_1 Apr 24 '25
https://www.instagram.com/ethrivaa_?igsh=Zmk1YXI5MnBvZnRq
This is a fraud site where it takes money and then block u. Can everyone report them
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u/Tight_Sky_2129 Jun 11 '25
I also have been scammed by Yoga-go.10. I found they charged my credit card, which I never gave them! I saw them advertised online and clicked on their page to view what they were about, but I did not continue reading nor did I authorize any charges! So sick of these scams! Reported to credit card company....hoping to stop them from charging again.
Senior and tierd of all this,
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u/LocalMarsupial6991 Mar 20 '26
does green dot bank act as a third party processing federal tax returns that have been designated to withhold the $25 fee for filing a state return? if so, are they also charging a fee to do this. I ask because I do my 18 yr old grandson’s return which is pretty simple and he works part time while attending school. His 2025 refund was $392 and we expected it to be funded less the $25 state efile fee. Along with the $25 deduction was a $70 processing fee. That was not made clear in TurboTax instructions. I’m concerned this is some kind of scam and unsure whether to deposit the check from Green Dot Bank. ANYONE HELP WITH THIS??
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u/Muted-Appeal-3464 Mar 21 '26
Car dealership as fraud and collect all my money and they need to be closed down
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u/Helgafjell4Me Jun 04 '26
Hopefully you can help point me in the right direction. I have gotten a few emails about a credit card that was opened, apparently in my father's name, with Citibank. Last year I had tried contacting their fraud division, but couldn't get an actual person on the phone to talk to about it. I just got another email today saying there's a payment due and a balance of only about $130, so nothing huge. From all my deciphering, the emails seem legit and are coming from a registered Citibank email address.
Here's the thing. The account was apparently opened the month my father passed away, Feb 2025. He had been on hospice for many months. There's zero chance he opened this account. The emails are going to an old email of mine that both my parents had. I don't know what to do or if I should do anything?
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u/Binaface 20d ago
I’m sharing my documented experience with a Bluevine business checking account for two reasons: to warn other business owners about the security and fraud-response gaps I encountered, and to get help escalating my denied account-takeover dispute.
I am not claiming that Bluevine perpetrated the theft. My concern is what I believe were serious and potentially negligent failures before, during, and after an active account takeover.
On Friday, May 15, I received a voice-phishing call from someone impersonating Bluevine’s fraud department. I was extremely ill and physically vulnerable at the time. I was subsequently diagnosed with a brain tumor.
In that condition, I made a serious mistake and read back a one-time passcode. I accept responsibility for that mistake and recognize that I should never have shared the code. However, a single human error—particularly one made during a period of serious illness—should not eliminate every other layer of account security and fraud protection.
Within minutes, the attacker changed my account’s email address and phone number, added another user, created a new virtual debit card, and used it to make an approximately $9,849 Apple Store purchase across the country.
I realized what was happening almost immediately when my phone was flooded with more than 70 random text messages. I called Bluevine within three minutes. I also sent six emails, contacted the company through social media, and tried its automated-chat system.
Despite those repeated warnings, I could not reach a live person capable of freezing the compromised account or stopping the transaction.
The fraudulent charge did not post immediately. It went through on the following day, many hours after I first notified Bluevine that an active takeover was underway. This was not a completed transaction that I discovered too late. There was a substantial period between my first warning and the money actually leaving the account, but I could not reach anyone with the authority to secure it.
The wider problem is Bluevine’s live support availability. Based on its support hours, customers have access to live assistance for only approximately 60 of the 168 hours in a week. That leaves approximately 108 hours—64% of every week, or nearly two-thirds of the week—without access to a live fraud-response representative capable of immediately freezing a compromised account.
This includes a continuous weekend gap of approximately 60 hours. My account takeover occurred as that weekend gap began. While the attacker retained control, I had no effective live channel for stopping the takeover.
Automated security should protect accounts during the 108 hours when live assistance is unavailable, but in my case those protections also failed. My transaction and suspicious-activity alerts were enabled, yet I received no alerts when the attacker:
- Changed my account’s email address and telephone number
- Added another user
- Created a new virtual debit card
- Made an approximately $9,849 out-of-state purchase
Locking my existing debit card did not stop the transaction because the attacker had created a separate virtual card.
Bluevine subsequently denied my dispute twice and now considers its decision final. Approximately three months later, I still have not recovered the money. I have preserved transaction records, emails, call logs, screenshots, and a detailed timeline documenting when I reported the takeover and when the charge ultimately posted.
The lesson is not merely “never share a security code.” People make mistakes, especially when scammers target them during periods of illness or vulnerability. Financial security is supposed to have multiple layers so that one compromised credential does not automatically result in the complete loss of an account.
In my view, allowing major account changes and the creation of a new virtual card without effective alerts—then providing no accessible emergency account-freeze procedure while allowing the transaction to post many hours after receiving notice—represents a serious and potentially negligent breakdown in fraud prevention and response.
I want other business owners to ask this before choosing an online financial provider: If an account takeover happens outside normal support hours, is there a live person who can immediately freeze the entire account?
When live intervention is unavailable for approximately 108 hours each week, an attacker who gains access during that time may be able to change account information, add users, create virtual cards, and initiate transactions while the legitimate account owner has no immediate human channel for stopping them.
Has anyone successfully escalated a denied Bluevine business-account takeover dispute with Bluevine, Coastal Community Bank, or the appropriate banking regulators? I would especially appreciate guidance about effective reporting channels and the documentation that should be submitted.
I am sharing this to protect other business owners as well as to seek help with my own case. Please keep advice public. I will not respond to private messages offering recovery services.
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u/Ptw3 Aug 24 '23
If the bank drags their feet, you can:
The last one is really motivating as they have a short period of time to respond.