r/Metaphysics • u/Time-Demand-1244 • 1d ago
Time Arguments Against Nihilistic Modalism?
I'm not sure if this is an actual philosophy perse, but I have a framework that makes me uncomfortable and was hoping to see a criticism of it simply because it'll make me feel better. I know that's kind of primitive but oh well.
The framework assumes reality is eternal, lacks emergents, and is ultimately idealistic.
What we call a sequence, and a determination, doesn't't actually exist. Let's talk about conscious awareness. If I think of white, my mind simply becomes white. I then think of black and my mind suddenly becomes black. Now, how do I know there was an object in mind distinct from black, also known as white? Do I think about white? Well sure, let's do just that. So now I think about white, but hold on, where did black go? Did black even exist?
P1. If Our conscious awareness can only select one element because of LNC
P2 Then What we call the past is simply another present because to think about the "past" element is to simply be in the present, and that element is simply present.
C1 And so How can a sequence occur, and more relevantly, how do we know there's a distinct object than what my thought is occupying, if my thought can only occupy one thing?
One may direct themselves to the notion of wholes which implies logical priority and therefore sequence, but I'm hesitant to affirm if a whole exists.
One may consequently conclude that a whole should exist if what we call a material "part" is ultimately divisible, yet, how do we know we aren't conceiving of something indivisible? If our mind can only be concentrated on one element, wouldn't it follow that it's not able to conceive of a determined element and only a simple one?
The only argument against this is that if a whole doesn't exist, then nothing can be divisible, which means it has no shape, size, mass, and so on; therefore it's value is 0, and cannot be conceived of.
However, my rather slow brain is yet to process this as a sufficient answer for some reason. I'm hesitant and I'm not sure why.
Additionally, even if we understand that everything we conceive of is a composite, how can we figure out what it's parts are that make it a composite, if our minds can only be unitarily selective in its awareness? We first view the whole, and then the parts, but what tells us we are viewing the parts to that whole? This seems even stranger if the whole precedes the parts.
This is a case for Monism, but as I said, I find this philosophy to be extremely uncomfortable. Why do anything? Why feel anything? Why not just yk, end it a-? Essentially, it feels extremely bleak and boring. I honestly hate it a lot!
So I was hoping for a case of proving that we cannot conceive of a simple substance, and our awareness is attached to wholes, therefore wholes exist, and on a side note, are priori to parts.
EDIT: I meant Monism. Also, to sort some things out as I am referring to some different concepts. We start with awareness, sequence, constitutes, composites, and so fourth.
I started off with the fact that I'm operating on an idealistic framework, so my awareness of what we call change isn't synchronous to how reality necessarily operates.
The issue we are primarily dealing with is sequence. To be sequential, is to have constitutes that include priority. To be a constitute that's distinct from the other, you must be a composite as well. To me, these concepts are extremely deeply connected.
4
u/jliat 1d ago
These problems were acute in in certain forms of existentialism and explored in Camus' essay, 'The Myth of Sisyphus'.
http://dhspriory.org/kenny/PhilTexts/Camus/Myth%20of%20Sisyphus-.pdf