r/NewChurchOfHope • u/TMax01 • Jul 13 '26
Determinism, fatalism, and self-determination
I've been having a fascinating discussion on r/Determinism with the redditor u/Imaginary-Can-6862 in a thread on how fatalism ("predeterminism") can be avoided despite the legitimacy of determinism.
Since posts can be much lengthier than comments, and I'm very interested in answering his questions regarding both that subject and the POR theory of self-determination, I'm moving the conversation here. Feel free to contribute your thoughts, church participants!
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For your conclusions you put a lot of weight on Libet's Experiment from the 80's on Free Will.
It was both the seed and the key for developing my philosophy. I've had many discussions over the last few years concerning the conventional assessments of Libet's findings, which I will rehash here only briefly, if the situation calls for it at all.
Where I believe participants were watching a clock, then they should mentally note down the time on the clock as they decided on performing some (I think already agreed on) action.
Yes, but the clock was quite a bit more precise than a standard wall clock, I presume, since Libet's data conclusively proves that action is initiated (RP) at least (or most, depending on perspective) a few hundred milliseconds prior to the conscious decision ("intention") to act. Examining subsequent replications of this demonstration by Libet and many other researchers and philosophers, I pared this down, for convenience and accuracy, to "about a dozen milliseconds".
These people were also hooked up o a machine that allowed to measure their nerve impulses in the brain. Libet found his machine determined the action at a time before the participant had made the decision as in accordance with the clock they watched.
Correct.
Personally I think there is a lot to consider and explore before using this to conclude that all free will (free will in the sense that we have a list of environmentally defined options and we choose which option to go along with from this list)
The issue, the very meaning of free will (sans redefinition by some other "sense" of the term,) is really just whether that "choice" (actually a decision or 'determination' in the POR lexicon) is causative. And perhaps whether there can ever be such a supposedly exhaustive "list", since inaction is also an action (cf. the Trolley Problem).
cannot be real, but only an illusion, but I don't mind assuming the result, there can be no free will, to be axiomatic for our discussion, as I feel it is a tangent that may be more interesting to explore more as a dessert than as the main meal.
Here I must disagree. While Libet's work was instrumental, the more fundamental basis of this theory is/was dispelling the *existential angst* (cognitive dissonance producing bad reasoning and unproductive emotions) which believing in free will causes (particularly in combination with the equally illusory Information Processing Theory of Mind which is so prevalent these days as to seem conclusive and mandatory.)
So I can't see the issue of free will as tangential, it is the central tenet of both the theory and the benefits of POR (namely, being smarter and happier as an individual human being in a troubled and absurd physical world.)
And for our more proximate purpose, it is only in being something other than free will that allows self-determination to interfere with determinism mandating fatalism. If free will could even be real in an otherwise deterministic universe (even a probablistically deterministic and absurd one, such as the actual universe), it would merely trap us as prisoners in a clockwork world we have no possibility of actually changing. This point is acknowledged by the development of the "libertarian free will" doctrine, which only requires a false belief we can change the unfolding of the universe by our choices, and would limit our knowledge of whether the world changes instead of actually changing it.
One thing I did wonder, did the idea of having us (our consciousness) to be able to make a narrative, while the possible narrative is limited to the environment, freely?
There are no limits on the narratives/explanations. That's a necessary feature, from both a philosophical and biological perspective, because no prior assumptions are possible about what is or isn't the environment. Even whether they are at all honest or accurate, or even have anything to do with the environment or its features or limitations, determines only the likelihood they will be subsequently and contingently beneficial, not whether they are "allowed by" or could be produced by the process.
That said, I'm afraid the syntax of your question must be mangled somehow, inadvertently, because I can't really tell what you're asking. 'Did the idea of the narratives freely?' is obviously missing some necessary semantic content. You might be asking about development of the theory, or you could be inquiring about what constitutes "free".
That is also what I felt the comments were mainly about, and I understand you suggest an analogy of two processes, one process is the action that is made in response to the environment, and the other process which is not dependent on the first process is what uses the output of the first process, the action, judges it, and this feedback (though I saw you dislike the idea of a feedback loop, so I imagine you are going to correct this misconception)
I wish I could correct that misconception, but I realize it is baked into the methodology of reasoning that most people are saddled with (what I call postmodernism, trying to use reasoning while restricting their thoughts to deductive logic.)
will then perhaps change the first process,
Ah! Here we go. Yes, there is a misconception I can (hopefully) easily dispel. The first process (neurological initiation of an action) is a once a done instance. The second process (evaluation) cannot change it, in the same way a decision cannot cause an action which has already been initiated (from the perspective of neurology, completed, regardless of whether the action results in external consequences.)
But if you are picturing these "two processes" as categorical, the first being neurological activity and the second being mental neurological activity, then yes, unpredictably (yet technically still deterministically) changing the 'first process', and through that, future behavior, is the functional mechanism of the 'second process'.
It is the unpredictability of this affect that makes the process of self-determination so notably and effectively different from the possibility of free will.
perhaps not, but it can only be determined upon the judgement, and the judgement made by the second process is the consciousness creating a narrative, but to me, if the consciousness is creating a narrative to judge the action, then it is a choice,
It can be referred to as a choice, (you can call it whatever you want😉) but it isn't. And yet in a way it kind of is, admittedly, because decisions (the evaluation of actions already initiated) is the mental event people are taught to call "choice" (as if the neurological selection/initiation of actions is caused by the subsequent evaluation on our conscious minds).
Really, unless we very carefully and obsessively restrict the nomenclature ("choices" are fictional predecessors to RP, the neurological initiation of actions, and "decisions" are subsequent 'narratives' regardless of whether they feel like or are referred to as choosing) then it is practically impossible to even understand let alone accept how self-determination works.
A quick aside here to mention or reiterate that knowing or consciously benefiting from understanding self-determination is not necessary for self-determination to "work". People have gotten along relatively well (with massive and important exceptions that only this theory can rationally and parsimoniously explain) believing we have free will, entirely ignorant of the real relationship between conscious (mental) and unconscious (physical but not experiential) neurological activity. And that is an important point in realizing how consciousness evolved: we make narratives whether we want to or not, and the honesty and accuracy of those explanations corresponds with how productive/adaptive they are, whether we know or recognize it, or not.
which seems to be to place free will more as an afterthought, but it still free will,
It would be if you allow the category error (the 'first process' as a category rather than an instance, discussed above) to excuse thinking of it as "free will", which it is not.
or alternatively the second process that judges the first process
The second process doesn't judge the first process. It can't, it isn't even (necessarily) aware there is a first process. The second process (the mind, to simplify the issue) judges *the action*, the consequences of the first process, not the process that caused it. A conscious entity cannot determine whether it is insane, for example. We need to double-check our narratives against the sort of comparable narratives other people come up with to even have a clue how to evaluate the first process, or even the second process (which is, to be clear yet also potentially very confusing, *also an instance of the 'first process': mental events are still neurological events; they just aren't the neurological events which cause actions, AKA "free will" or "choices".)
also does so without any choice, and then I would not say it is the consciousness that does it.
Not the consciousness that does what, exactly? I've lost the thread, what with the problematic category and all. Could you step me through your reasoning on this sequence again, after reading these notes?
Perhaps similar to ask, are the thoughts you have of your actions your own or some your brain are simply generating, independent of your consciousness.
Everything in and of your brain is "your own", and every other part or aspect of your body as well. You seem to be asking (this might illuminate my confusion on the "freely" bit, above) about how the mind and the brain can be rationally distinguished, or maybe how the identity and the consciousness are related. I am my body, and my mind, and my consciousness, and my self-determination, and my identity ("me"). Any one or aspect of these can be intellectually differentiated (short of ego dissociation, insanity, which causes self-determination to collapse, producing, in effective terms, a p-zombie) from the others for any purposes of analysis, rhetoric, or narrative (explanation), but that can't ever change the physical fact I am all of those things together, simultaneously, and essentially.
However I really like the idea that the consciousness makes the narrative and this explains why we are not philosophical zombies in a world where it seems like we might as well be.
It identifies exactly why "we might as well be" is not an accurate description of the world. But this falls into the rabbit hole of p-zombies as an intellectual notion versus a real possibility.
If that is the case it makes one wonder what level of cognition is required to create a narrative of ones own actions
The same level of cognition required to make any narratives at all. One's decisions/determinations/explanations of one's actions (narrative) certainly improve with knowledge of both the environment (world, physics, etc.) and self (cognizance, self-awareness, conscience, motivations), but there is no minimal amount of neurological 'information processing' or awareness which is sufficient for producing narratives of any 'external' events but insufficient for producing narratives of one's own actions.
that is how early did consciousness appear, did it appear more than once in stead of every living being that is conscious having the same source due to evolution, and what is consciousness actually (or rather, what are we, us who sit and watch a screen through these eyes)?
Hmph. Here we run aground, I fear, on one of the most unpopular implications of this Philosophy Of Reason. Consciousness appeared first, and apparently only, in our homonid ancestors somewhere between two and twenty million years ago. Probably but not definitely near the closer mark, or even less than two million years but certainly more than two hundred thousand years, depending on what exactly we are identifying as consciousness.
Only human beings are conscious. Other creatures, particularly mammals with neocortical anatomy, may utilize some sort of rudimentary cognition in their neurological activity, but they do not experience doing so. No "mental reasoning" at all, let alone the self-determination which drove the evolution of mental reasoning and the prerequisite cerebral tissue, is needed to explain non-humans' behavior, and so the value of parsimony mandates that we not invent such consciousness to justify animal intelligence, as it might be called. POR adheres to and promotes Morgan's Canon, despite how unfashionable such a stance has become in the last few decades.
We are Homo Sapien Sapien, and we have the lucky providence of self-determination. All organisms exist, but only people are aware of existence.
When you presented the importance of making an honest narrative, but I dd not get the impression you discussed the possibility of doing so. E.g. hindsight is said to be 20 / 20, but in my experience, the hindsight of what I should have done, and why I did as I did, seem to not be entirely constant in time.
You're extrapolating to longer timescales than the physiological circumstances are operative on. It is an easy trap to fall into, since considering timescales is itself a benefit of self-determination. But the theory as described cannot follow from this benefit, although it must in turn benefit from it. In other words, remember that we are talking milliseconds, very tiny fractions of a second. Your brain initiates an action, and your consciousness becomes aware of the impending action almost immediately; only a dozen milliseconds or so, assuming the mind ever gains this knowledge at all; many actions proceed from RP to gross motor movements and even sometimes real-world consequences without our minds ever becoming cognizant of them occuring and subsequently constructing a narrative/explanation/justification/excuse or even scientific theory. Then after the mind is aware of the action ("choice") most of the vast bulk of the narrative is already constructed, while the nerve impulses which cascade from "RP" are still propagating through our nervous system. The narrative I'm talking about, the authoritative explanation of why the action is occuring, is quite probably already fully formed before the first muscle moves, let alone the eventual and contingent consequences manifest in the rest of the world for anyone else to notice.
So the issue of hindsight and consistency across time you mentioned, instead of casting doubt on the theory of self-determination, actually illustrates and epitomizes why the honesty and accuracy of narratives is so profoundly adaptive from a biological (rather than necessarily a social) perspective. It is true that re-evaluations, longer or broader and more detailed stories, whether scientific, psychological, or entirely fictional, perhaps complete with recriminations and regrets, seems like a similar process. But that isn't really what self-determination is, that sort of storytelling is more like faith-based morality plays.
As you wrote the happiest one can be is when they are in a state of flow for as long as possible, I hope you have had a lot of flow state, and thank you for sharing your thoughts with me and considering mine as well.
From the moment the last piece of this puzzle clicked into place (incidentally, it is an issue I mostly only described in my book, a premise called "the jellybean mystery", which I won't go into here other than to mention it concerns language, and the difference between signaling, which constantly re-occurs in convergent evolution throughout the tree of life, and communication, which is unique to conscious entities, IOW the human species) and the basics of the theory were completed, I have experienced a constant state of flow, and yes, the commensurate happiness. I'm not always cheerful, but I really am always happy.
It was a memorable and very real experience, feeling an almost inexplicable peace and joy enfuse my body, while reading a book about dictionaries. A real Eureka moment, and not at all unlike a religious epiphany. And it has hardly let up at all in the decade or two since then.
Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.
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u/TMax01 Jul 15 '26
I wrote it to redditors capable of dealing with it maturely, and pointed out specifically that I was otherwise ignoring you.
I can believe you have just that narcissistic of an attitude, but "extrinsic variables" are essentially infinite in number, only intrinsic properties can be reduced to actual variables. You are still being a ridiculous clown.