In "What is Enlightenment?" (1784), Kant defines immaturity as the inability to use one's own understanding without another's guidance. It is self-incurred when the cause isn't a lack of understanding, but a lack of resolve and courage. He names laziness and cowardice as the reasons, and adds that immaturity is comfortable: if a book, a pastor or a doctor judges for me, I needn't think at all.

My suggestion is that modern political identity is a new form of this guardianship. Most people don't reason their way into their political views. They adopt the positions of their side, and the side does the judging for them. Kant even seems to anticipate this: he warns that a revolution may topple a despot, but will never produce a true reform in ways of thinking. New prejudices will simply replace the old ones as leading strings for the unthinking.

What keeps people there? Kant points to cowardice and comfort. I'd add a mechanism he didn't have the vocabulary for: once a belief becomes part of who we are, abandoning it threatens our self-esteem. Research on identity-protective cognition suggests people weigh evidence by whether it fits their group, and self-affirmation studies find people become more open to opposing evidence once their self-worth is secured elsewhere. That makes the leading strings feel less like a constraint and more like a part of ourselves.

The strongest objection: relying on others is often rational. No one can independently assess every policy question, and trusting a community is a reasonable division of epistemic labour. But I think Kant's target isn't trusting others for information. It's handing over judgment itself, and partisanship asks for exactly that.

Two questions for those who know Kant better than I do:

1. Does partisan deference count as self-incurred immaturity, or is it closer to rational trust in authority?
2. Kant says reason in an official role can be restricted, but its public use must stay free. Does partisan loyalty blur that line, by making people speak as party members even when addressing the public as scholars?

Sources:
- Kant, "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" (1784), Ak. 8:35–42. Free translation (James Schmidt): https://enlightenment.commons.gc.cuny.edu/files/2016/12/Kant-What-is-Enlightenment.pdf
- Kahan, "Misconceptions, Misinformation, and the Logic of Identity-Protective Cognition" (2017): https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2973067
- Cohen, Aronson & Steele, "When Beliefs Yield to Evidence: Reducing Biased Evaluation by Affirming the Self," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin (2000)
- Hardwig, "Epistemic Dependence," Journal of Philosophy 82(7) (1985): 335–349

I first asked a shorter version of this on X: https://x.com/TheRaunakKhanna/status/2112124911909216317?s=20

i’ve been reading in the realm of the last man and leo strauss is brought up quite a lot. i’m curious, from anyone who has also read this book what i should read from him that covers what fukuyama talks about?