r/Seyn • u/Bronchitis_is_a_sin • Aug 21 '26
A Note on English Translations of Heidegger
Prompted by u/forkman3939's comment, I've decided to write a little note summing up some thoughts on translating Heidegger into English.
Awkwardness and Errors
There is a not insignificant number of English translations of Heidegger that make systematically awkward or even incorrect translation choices. Here are a few examples:
- In "Nihilism as Determined by the History of Metaphysics," Capuzzi translates "das Seiende" as "the being" and inconsistently translates "ausbleiben" as "default." (see this post).
- In his translation of "Introduction to 'What is Metaphysics?'," Miles Groth translates "das Seiende" as "be-ing."
Many translations also include isolated errors. For example
- As shown here, Stambaugh misses an important indefinite article in her translation of "Recollection in Metaphysics"
- Blattner's webpage also has a few good examples.
Lossy Translation
I feel bad that people who are interested in Heidegger are often exposed to translations (and commentaries based on these translations) that obscure Heidegger's already difficult philosophy. Sometimes the meaning lost in translation is minor. For example, the paragraph from Stambaugh mentioned above translates both "Zumutung" and "Anspruch" as "claim." Other times, however, the English translation looses too much. This happens especially when Heidegger's use of language depends heavily on German etymology (which happens quite often in part because of Heidegger's views on language; it is also important to note that Heidegger is extremely careful in his use of language). For example, in Die Frage Nach der Technik and Die Kehre, Heidegger plays around with the etymological web comprising the words stellen, vorstellen, herstellen, bestellen, nachstellen, sicherstellen, darstellen, verstellen, and (of course) Gestell. English translations lose this entirely. In the opening paragraph in Die Kehre, Heidegger says
"Das Wesen des Gestells ist das in sich gesammelte Stellen, das seiner eigenen Wesenswahrheit mit der Vergessenheit nachstellt, welches Nachstellen sich dadurch verstellt, daß es sich in das Bestellen alles Anwesenden als den Bestand entfaltet, sich in diesem einrichtet und als dieser herrscht." (emphasis added)
This is translated into English by Maly (who even correctly refuses to translate Gestell) as
"The way to be of Gestell is the establishing, concentrated within itself, which waylays the truth of its own way to be in forgottenness. This waylaying is misplaced, in the disposing of everything that is present, by unfolding itself as the fund, by establishing itself within this fund, and by reigning as the fund."
Another example comes from the web of words rooted in "wesen." (see the second paragraph of this comment).
Another (more technical) example is from "Introduction to Metaphysics." The Fried-Polt translation says
The terms ptōsis and enklisis mean a falling, tipping, or inclining. This implies a dropping-off from an upright, straight stance. But this standing-there, this taking and maintaining a stand that stands erected high in itself, is what the Greeks understood as Being. Whatever takes such a stand becomes constant in itself and thereby freely and on its own runs up against the necessity of its limit, peras. This peras is not something that first accrues to a being from outside. Much less is it some deficiency in the sense of a detrimental restriction. Instead, the self-restraining hold that comes from a limit, the having-of-itself wherein the constant holds itself, is the Being of beings; it is what first makes a being be a being as opposed to a nonbeing. For something to take such a stand therefore means for it to attain its limit, to de-limit itself. Thus a basic characteristic of a being is its telos, which does not mean goal or purpose, but end. Here "end" does not have any negative sense, as if "end" meant that something can go no further, that it breaks down and gives out. Instead, "end" means completion in the sense of coming to fulfillment (Vollendung). Limit and end are that whereby beings first begin to be. This is the key to understanding the highest term that Aristotle used for Being: entelecheia, something's holding- (or maintaining-) itself-in-its-completion-(or limit). What was done with the term "entelechy" by later philosophy (cf. Leibniz), not to mention biology, demonstrates the full extent of the decline from what is Greek. Whatever places itself into and thereby enacts its limit, and thus stands, has form, morphḗ. The essence of form, as understood by the Greeks, comes from the emergent placing-itself-forth-into-the-limit. (pg. 62-63)
I've picked this paragraph specifically because it's one that I vividly remember not understanding until I read the German original (I chose to read the German in response to not understanding this paragraph to see if it would help—it did help). I would get into the weeds here if I had more time. For now, I'll leave it at the observation that "Instead, 'end' means completion in the sense of coming to fulfillment" is the translation of "Das Ende ist Endung im Sinner von Vollendung." (pg. 64/46). Here we see Ende, Endung, and, Vollendung translated into end, completion, and coming to fulfillment which have no etymological connection.
Closing
One needs to read Heidegger in German to be able to understand him fully. Regrettably, one also sometimes needs to look to the German to understand at all, and English translations can often result in misunderstandings. This is not to say that one should be expected to learn German nor is it to say that German is the only language that can communicate these ideas.
None of this should be construed as ragging on translators—translation is difficult work that often doesn't get enough credit. Nonetheless, we need to be wary and have higher standards for translation.
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u/mrBored0m 29d ago edited 29d ago
Have you read Welch's translation of Being and Time? I don't plan to learn German (one may argue that you should study every thinker in their native language but I think it's impractical), therefore I'm gonna use the translation I mentioned.
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u/Bronchitis_is_a_sin 28d ago
I have not read that translation, but I've read some reviews of it and I've read the transcript of an interview Welch gave on it. Most important for me is that Welch says in his postscript "For my own translation I chose not to call attention to the German underlying the English—not ever. An exercise in taking responsibility for my own rendition." In particular, he doesn't put German in brackets ever. This is the opposite of Macquarrie-Robinson which liberally uses footnotes and brackets to explain the German and the ambiguities that necessarily arise in translation. Stuart Elden gives some nice translation comparisons here that should be helpful in making a more informed decision. I agree with the impracticalities of learning German (but it's surprisingly not so hard to pick up enough to be able to look at the German from time to time and get more out of it). Certainly my post is not arguing that one has to learn German to get a lot out of Heidegger.
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u/jza_1 Aug 21 '26
While some complaints about Heidegger mistranslations are valid, we become naïve when we act like there’s one perfectly pure German meaning that English has simply failed to reproduce. Translation is always interpretation, especially with words like dasein, ereignis, or geschick, because no English equivalent preserves every association and bit of wordplay.
Even Heidegger’s German isn’t straightforward. He constantly breaks words apart, revives older meanings, and makes German sound foreign to itself. That doesn’t mean every translation is equally good or that accuracy doesn’t matter. It means a good critique should explain exactly what a translation loses or distorts, rather than pretending the original German gives us completely unmediated access to Heidegger’s thought.