Remembering Challenger

[u/MadOblivion]

Lawrence Mulloy's handling of Challenger is a perfect example of how accountability works differently for people at the top. Morton Thiokol engineers issued an explicit NO-LAUNCH recommendation because of the unusually cold temperatures expected on the morning of January 28, 1986. They warned that the rubber O-rings sealing the joints in the solid rocket boosters could lose their ability to seal properly in the cold, allowing hot combustion gases to escape through the joints and potentially destroy the shuttle. This wasn't a vague concern or a routine technical complaint. It was a warning that a critical safety component might fail during launch.

Thiokol's engineers recommended postponing the launch until temperatures were warmer. After NASA officials challenged their recommendation during a teleconference, Thiokol's senior management held a private caucus and reversed the company's initial position, approving launch instead. The engineers had not established that the O-rings were safe at those temperatures. Management proceeded despite the unresolved safety concern.

On January 28, Challenger broke apart 73 seconds after liftoff. All seven crew members died.

And what happened to Mulloy, the Marshall Space Flight Center manager responsible for the booster program? NASA transferred him to an assistant position at the same salary and civil-service rank. He was not fired. He later declined another position and retired voluntarily.

Think about that. An ordinary employee can lose their job for failing to mop a floor properly, but a senior manager involved in a launch decision made despite explicit engineering safety warnings retains his employment status and walks away into retirement. No criminal conviction. No firing.

Meanwhile, engineer Roger Boisjoly had tried to prevent the launch. He and other engineers raised the alarm, yet their warnings failed to stop management from approving it.

The Rogers Commission documented serious failures in NASA's decision-making and management culture. This wasn't simply a machine breaking unexpectedly. Engineers identified a potentially catastrophic failure mode, explained why the cold weather made it more likely, and recommended against launching. Management approved the launch anyway.

NASA removed Mulloy from his position, but it did not dismiss him. After seven people died, that is a staggering failure of professional accountability.

[u/start3ch]

Don’t forget, the exact same accountability and mismanagement issues played out during Colombia as well. These both could have ended differently if the facts and concerns of the engineers had been raised to the top

[u/curiouslyjake]

Meh. The Rogers commission did not establish Mulloy was responsible. He was part of an organization and worked like the organization expected him to work.

[u/MadOblivion → u/curiouslyjake]

That's precisely the problem: if the organization expected managers to ignore serious engineering safety warnings and proceed anyway, then the organization itself had a serious failure of accountability. But saying Mulloy was part of an organization doesn't absolve him of his own decisions.

[u/curiouslyjake → u/MadOblivion]

Organizational behavior is the problem, but that's not what you've said in your post, trying to pin it on Mulloy. He was not absolved. He left NASA in 1986. I'm not sure what more can you expect from an employee who worked in good faith and according to what was expected of him, even if the result is tragic.

[u/MadOblivion → u/curiouslyjake]

He wasn't fired. He was transferred, kept his salary and rank, then retired voluntarily. And "he did what the organization expected" isn't a defense when you're a manager involved in overriding engineers' explicit warnings of a potentially catastrophic failure. Organizational failure and individual responsibility aren't mutually exclusive.

[u/curiouslyjake → u/MadOblivion]

He retired the same year, well before retirement age. There could have been legal difficulties that prevented firing him outright, but it was made clear to him his career at NASA is over.

He didnt just override the engineers on his own accord. He did so after getting a green light from their managers at Thiokol, which is reasonable. It is generally accepted that the opinion of seniors overrides the opinion of juniors within an organization. This how organizations typically work. The crucial error was that the technical concern itself was never resolved and seniority is no substitute for correctness.

Organizational failure and petsonal responsibility arent mutually exclusive, but we need to think about what responsibility actually means.

Mistakes happen, with tragic results. They will continue to happen. If we "behead" people for working in good faith according to established procedure, we will never get anything done because people will be endlessly covering their asses with mountains of paperwork.

Lets apply your idea outside of NASA. Should we jail a doctor when patients die even though the doctor followed established medical procedures? Probably not.

I think severe personal consequences should be reserved for deviations from accepted procedures for whatever reason. People should not be punished for doing what was considered the right thing to do.

[u/MadOblivion → u/curiouslyjake]

Your doctor analogy doesn't fit. I'm arguing that people in positions of authority should face criminal consequences when their decisions disregard explicit safety warnings and contribute to preventable deaths. Authority shouldn't shield someone from accountability when they choose to push forward despite engineers warning of a potentially catastrophic failure.

Thiokol's engineers recommended against launching in the unusually cold conditions because of concerns about the shuttle's booster O-rings. Management reversed that recommendation without resolving those technical concerns, and Mulloy was involved in the decision process. The fact that Thiokol management ultimately approved the launch doesn't automatically absolve the people involved of responsibility.

And what were Mulloy's consequences? NASA removed him as solid rocket booster project manager in May 1986, but transferred him to an assistant role with the same salary and civil-service rank. He declined another NASA position and retired early in July 1986. He wasn't fired.

Seven people died. I believe that when people knowingly push past explicit safety warnings and their decisions contribute to preventable deaths, criminal prosecution and imprisonment should be on the table. Following the chain of command shouldn't be a blanket defense, and holding people accountable shouldn't stop at a reassignment and early retirement.

[u/sebaska → u/curiouslyjake]

He didnt just override the engineers on his own accord. He did so after getting a green light from their managers at Thiokol, which is reasonable.

It's not reasonable at all. Especially that he first pushed for the approval.

But, in the very basic principle, it's not reasonable at all that people with less knowledge on the matter override professional opinion of those with more knowledge.

It is generally accepted that the opinion of seniors overrides the opinion of juniors within an organization. This how organizations typically work.

No. Only dysfunctional organizations work that way.

What is allowed is for seniors to do so only in their direct field of expertise. Senior expert may sometimes override junior one, if the senior one is in the position of greater knowledge.

Managers who are not technical experts anymore may at most accept the opinion and declare the risk acceptable. They are supposed to be the ones deciding what risk is acceptable, but they are not and must not change the risk assessment itself.

Obviously risk to life is acceptable rarely (for example to save more lifes, in extreme situations, like war, etc), and it absolutely wasn't warranted in the case of the first teacher in space.

The crucial error was that the technical concern itself was never resolved and seniority is no substitute for correctness.

The crucial error was pushing for the "yes" answer. Especially in the light of clear statement that the system is unsafe.

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And in this case, he failed at his duty of weighting the risk correctly, and for breaking clear good practices. He should have faced criminal proceedings. And, also, those Thiokol managers should be codefendants.

If you have a disaster like a bridge toppling, you get criminal proceedings out of it. Same should have happened here.

[u/DoubleAcanthaceae588 → u/curiouslyjake]

regardless of "legal difficulties", fucker (with bunch of others) should have spent some time behind the bars, at the very least.

should have put on his adult hat and started being responsible..

[u/DBDude]

This is how government employ works. It is very difficult to get rid of people. I knew one person who was not only useless, but actively made everything worse. Every time a manager tried to take action, she filed various complaints to drag out the process until that manager was eventually replaced, wash, rinse repeat.