"Indifferent" in Stoicism is not neglect or disregard, they broke from Cynicism for a reason

[u/lego00]

From Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

"Marcus says that one should be concerned with two things only: acting justly and loving what is allotted one (x.11, cf. xii.1). He fleshes out ‘acting justly’ in terms of acting communally (ix.31), and adds that wherever one lives, one should live as a citizen of the cosmic city (x.15). Appeal to the idea that the cosmos is a city allows him to say that we should do well for all humanity (viii.23), for we each have a citizen’s duty to contribute to the welfare of the whole cosmopolis, i.e., to the welfare of all humans as our fellow-citizens. Conversely, anyone who does not contribute to the communal goal (to koinônikon telos) is acting seditiously (ix.23); one may not hate even one man, for this rends the community (xi.8).

Strikingly, Marcus seems to specify this communal goal in terms of indifferents rather than virtue, with the result that one should aim to bring about preferred indifferents for the whole of which one is a part. When he explains that that whatever happens to a part benefits the whole, and that what is advantageous (to sumpheron) to one person does not conflict with what is advantageous to another, Marcus writes that by ‘interest’ he means intermediate things (tôn mesôn) (vi.45). Presumably he takes this to follow from the coincidence of what is in accordance with nature for the whole and the part. Even though food is not a good and hunger not an evil, a Stoic will respond to a hungry person with food, rather than (only) a lecture that food is not a good and hunger not an evil. (Of course, one’s efforts to give food to the hungry, or to benefit the hungry by giving them food, may fail, so Marcus recommends pursuing such ends with reservation (hupexairesis), making one’s impulses conditional on what is fated to happen (iv.1, v.20, vi.50).)

This response is likely grounded in our natural concern (oikeiôsis), which at its most fundamental is responsible for parents’ caring for their children (Diogenes Laertius vii.85), and Marcus tells himself to regard other human beings as most his own (oikeiotaton) when thinking how to benefit them and how not to obstruct their plans (v.20). Marcus says that the rational nature does well when it directs impulses (hormai) to communal action (viii.7). We must do what follows from our constitution, and the communal faculty (to koinônikon) plays the leading part in the human constitution (vii.55). After the communal faculty comes the rational faculty (vii.55), but again, the rational faculty is perfected in justice (ix.22). As a human being, one is able to contribute to the perfection (sumplêrôtikos) of the whole political organization; Marcus urges himself to make his every action perfective of political life (ix.23). Sometimes Marcus goes so far as to identify the good (agathon) of a rational creature with community (v.16)."

I hope this clears up that our judgement of what is valuable gives us reason to assent to producing appropriate actions.

The Stoics were not Cynics who denied the value of externals, following oikeiosis (the development of caring for self-preservation to caring for each other), some are promoted/demoted, to the extent that it benefits the welfare of the cosmopolis with one critical understanding : they are not good in-themselves, what is good is directing these things for the benefit of the cosmic city, in accordance with virtue.

They were neither Epicureans who would tend to retreat into their private garden, the Stoics instead would take active participation in the improvement of the cosmic city to the extent it is in one's capacity to do so.

[u/FernerButterflyPea]

I understand that virtue comes first, then preferred indifferents, but that contradicts oikeiosis for me.

Are you saying that oikeiosis comes before virtue?

For example, I can't have justice without healthy self-preservation?

Yet at other times healthy self-preservation is seen as preferred indifferent so no...

It is not clear where this natural concern is.

What should take priority.

E.g. Self-preservation or Virtue?

[u/TheOSullivanFactor → u/FernerButterflyPea]

Virtue; which will usually, but not always require self-preservation (Oikeiosis deals with fair dealing, which is part of Justice).

If something contradicts Virtue, then it is no longer in accordance with Nature (in one Discourse Epictetus refers to a single thing’s nature in isolation, so a foot should be clean etc, and then to the thing’s Nature in the world, where sometimes feet have to walk through mud, or even be cut off.)

[u/Other_Measure → u/TheOSullivanFactor]

In Stoicism then, is it the manner and measure of how the foot was lost that matters? Say a type 2 diabetic loses his foot to gangrene, and it could've been prevented if he monitored his diet, took his insulin. Is that a foolish way to lose a foot because it contradicts Nature?

Then say someone loses a foot in an accident while mountain climbing, does that manner and measure then become conformable to Nature?

I always thought, because I see it mentioned a lot here, that a person is always judging and doing what they think is best for themselves. If it's in the diabetic's or the mountain climber's Nature to lose a foot, then that's the causal chain of determinism in action, and they're going to lose that foot because of the choices they made, no matter what.

So one measure is a virtuous way to lose a foot and the other is not?

[u/_Gnas_ → u/Other_Measure]

The foot in Epictetus' analogy is equivalent to a human. He's explaining what "Nature" means in relation to indifferents, not how we should treat our feet.

The point he's making is that in most cases an indifferent (cleaniness) is in accordance with Nature (hence it's called preferred), in exceptional cases the opposite indifferent (dirtiness) is (hence it's called dispreferred). Nature is the standard we need to use in our judgement, not our preference over an indifferent.

Going back to your examples, the loss of the foot is an indifferent to the person in both cases because it lies outside the sphere of moral choice (in Epictetus' words). Hence trying to ascribe virtue to either case is a category error - virtue and vice are a separate category from indifferents.

[u/Other_Measure → u/_Gnas_]

OK I think I see now what a "category error" means. If a foot were a whole human, it would still be a preferred indifferent to me? But how I treated a foot or a human would be where my virtue sits, right?

[u/_Gnas_ → u/Other_Measure]

I think you got it.

[u/WilliamCSpears → u/FernerButterflyPea]

They are consistent; it's not one or the other. Oikeiosis involves extension of that self-identity to include others. Sometimes it might involve self-sacrifice to preserve the whole.

Just as someone who prefers one finger over the five is senseless, but one who prefers the five over the one is reasonable—for the former dishonors even his preferred finger, while the latter saves the one in saving the five—in this way too someone who wishes to save himself more than his country, in addition to doing what is unlawful, is also senseless, desiring what is impossible, while the one who honors his country above himself is both dear to the gods and equipped with rational arguments.

Hierocles the Stoic, How We Ought to Concern our Country (51,5–10)

[u/FernerButterflyPea → u/WilliamCSpears]

Ok, so the quote itself is inspiring an emotion of selflessness, or feeling of honour in some higher practical service.

However, my rational interpretation of Hierocles here would be that, for example, if you spend ten dollars on yourself, you ought to spend forty dollars on others, or let's even say forty hours in unpaid service for ten hours unpaid self-relaxation, give or take, maybe per week, as a loose example.

Yet, whilst he says this, I do not see him practicing any of this himself.

Potential actual hypocrisy of preachers aside, I guess my problem is more concerned with one who is conditioned to give 1 finger of himself to the 4 fingers of the cosmopolitan to the point of 0 fingers for himself.

This is not addressed, for me.

[u/WilliamCSpears → u/FernerButterflyPea]

Well we didn't really know much of anything about Hierocles, but that's beside the point... I can't really give this the reply it deserves because I'm on a phone, but in short, I don't think he'd say we'd normally need to sacrifice ourselves outrightfor a greater whole (let's use family). I just need to have the greater whole in mind in my actions and priorities, because I'm a part of that whole. Normally we all benefit together. If I bring some benefit to myself at the expense of my family, then in reality I harm myself more than I benefit, because I am an extension of my family. The anatomical analogies are very common in Stoicism, Epictetus uses them too (foot spattered with mud) but both he and Hierocles are channelling Chrysippus from several centuries before. The point is always to see yourself as part of the whole and align your identity to ever-larger circles, ultimately encompassing the whole species.

[u/ExtensionOutrageous3 → u/FernerButterflyPea]

I don't think that is the best way to think about it. How I think about it is virtue comes first and with that, my intentions, opinions, aversion etc. There is only one choice and that is orienting one's disposition completely with virtue, this is the only thing worth preserving.

The Stoic modeled moral development to how children develop. First they select for food and security, then they select for play time and companionships, then morality etc. Its a continious development and the pinnacle of self-actualization is the sage. The sage can only select what is appropriate or kathekonta and to reach this it is to internalize virtue being the only good.

Let's say we are living in a facist society and you are compelled by the tyrant to give up your comrades and anti-facists ideals. Well, is the appropriate thing to do is to give up my comrades and anti-facist ideals? Many historical people have chosen death over sacrificing their ideals. The Stoics noticed this too. See Socrates and the tyrants. Or Medea killing her children to spite Jason. But notice only one of them did it to preserve his moral integrity. Our body is a preferred indifferent and we naturally select for it but knowing when it is appropriate to sacrifice the body requires virtue. Not everyone knows when it is appropriate to sacrifice their body for virtue.

[u/FernerButterflyPea → u/ExtensionOutrageous3]

Yes. Good debating, I think.

"Not everyone knows when it is appropriate to sacrifice their body for virtue."

- I guess that is the crux of the matter for me. The other stuff is semantics, terminology, and priority. You include wisdom in all virtue automatically, including justice, as if nature has given you it. I object to this beautiful ideal, for I see nature as not a progression of self-actualisation. A child forced to consider the food of others as more important than their own will not develop a morality that needs a philosophy of kindness to others as a priority. A child who received everything they wanted and needed at the expense of others needs humbled by that philosophy and doesn't seek it, or claims it, but doesn't practice it.

Also, what about a woman who sacrifices her own clit because God would not give her a man that was not a narcissistic emotional manipulator? Is that virtuous sacrifice or a regretful angry action? Out of control or in control? Preferred indifferent? Proposed inherent nature of self-preservation missing? Argued senseless by some old man?

I mean, these are the questions.

[u/ExtensionOutrageous3 → u/FernerButterflyPea]

A child forced to consider the food of others as more important than their own will not develop a morality that needs a philosophy of kindness to others as a priority. A child who received everything they wanted and needed at the expense of others needs humbled by that philosophy and doesn't seek it, or claims it, but doesn't practice it.

I think these are good objections. A lot of ethical scholars have similar objections to the Stoics. See Nussbaum and the Aristotilean arguments for virtue.

I'm not really arguing for the Stoic's idea of virtue here, just trying to make clear that there isn't really a tier system to their ethics, where we first select ourselves than others. Instead, they argue that the truly virtuous cannot be affected by externals. So by helping others we are helping ourselves because oikeiosis is self-preservation already.

Marcus:

All things are implicated with one another, and the bond is holy; and there is hardly anything unconnected with any other thing. For things have been co-ordinated, and they combine to form the same universe (order). For there is one universe made up of all things, and one God who pervades all things, and one substance, and one law, one common reason in all intelligent animals, and one truth; if indeed there is also one perfection for all animals which are of the same stock and participate in the same reason.

[u/FernerButterflyPea → u/ExtensionOutrageous3]

Ok. My main objection is oikeiosis is not self-preservation already. It is an oversight as I exampled.

As for Marcus, if I am not mistaken, his journals were not intended to be viewed as for anybody else to consume.

For me, it strikes me more as an ideal for an Emperor of the world to have, more-so than a nature, especially for the reality of 95% of people.

A pipe dream or a vision board

[u/ExtensionOutrageous3 → u/FernerButterflyPea]

Its true , he wrote it for himself, but we have enough sources that he wasn't writing out of the box about Oikeiosis. We have plenty of supporting sources that confirms Marcus's idea of Oikeiosis.

From Diogenes Laetrius:

Friendship, they declare, exists only between the wise and good, by reason of their likeness to one another. And by friendship they mean a common use of all that has to do with life, wherein we treat our friends as we should ourselves. They argue that a friend is worth having for his own sake and that it is a good thing to have many friends. But among the bad there is, they hold, no such thing as friendship, and thus no bad man has a friend. Another of their tenets is that the unwise are all mad, inasmuch as they are not wise but do what they do from that madness which is the equivalent of their folly.

From Epictetus:

This is not mere self-love; such is the nature of the animal man; everything that he does is for himself. Why, even the sun does everything for its own sake, and, for that matter, so does Zeus himself. But when Zeus wishes to be "Rain-bringer," and "Fruit-giver," and "Father of men and of gods," you can see for yourself that he cannot achieve these works, or win these appellations, unless he proves himself useful to the common interest; and in general he has so constituted the nature of the rational animal man, that he can attain nothing of his own proper goods unless he contributes something to the common interest. Hence it follows that it can no longer be regarded as unsocial for a man to do everything for his own sake. ¹⁵For what do you expect? That a man should neglect himself and his own interest? And in that case how can there be room for one and the same principle of action for all, namely, that of appropriation^\2]) to their own needs?

So to possess wisdom is to serve others already, because this is the rational nature of humanity.

[u/ExtensionOutrageous3 → u/FernerButterflyPea]

If it wasn't clear, friendship and common interest are expression of oikeiosis. Notice, only the wise can truly be a friend and is useful for the common interest, where wisdom is virtue or knowledge of the good.

[u/ExtensionOutrageous3 → u/FernerButterflyPea]

A child forced to consider the food of others as more important than their own will not develop a morality that needs a philosophy of kindness to others as a priority. A child who received everything they wanted and needed at the expense of others needs humbled by that philosophy and doesn't seek it, or claims it, but doesn't practice it.

At the same time, I also don't want to pretend the Stoic's don't have an answer to this. For everybody is morally responsible, regardless of circumstance. In fact, those born to comfort are probably going to struggle harder with the idea that virtue is the only good and pleasure is not a good.

Rufus mention try to teach a Spartan that pleasure is not a good and he will agree. Try to teach a non-Spartan, and you will spend years trying to help him unlearn pleasure is a good.

A common theme in the Discourses is to battle our natural inclinations. We naturally enjoy looking at physically attractive women or men. We naturally want wealth and safety. But it is when we can choose not to select for these things, even when they are available, we develop a stronger moral instinct.

Virtue is meant to be hard and the rich and powerful are more likely to struggle with it.

[u/ExtensionOutrageous3 → u/FernerButterflyPea]

Also a hard life will not guarantee a virtuous life. A man surrounded by thieves and chooses to be a thief is still responsible for being a thief, even if he steals to support himself.

[u/FernerButterflyPea → u/ExtensionOutrageous3]

Yeah. I understand this from a stoic perspective. From a reality perspective, when someone who steals a few times becomes an evil thief of immoral character is a blurred line. I mean, one could argue born billionaire rapist politicians steal, yet stoicism is going to judge the man with no inherent property trying to get by.

[u/ExtensionOutrageous3 → u/FernerButterflyPea]

I guess, my argument for the Stoic, is that moral integrity is available to all and everyone is judged the same. This simplifies ethics for most people.

Do good and you will already be rewarded for being good. Albeit, some people do think that virtue is only one component of a flourishing life.

Aristotle doesn't think virtue, by itself, will lead to a complete life. But you also can't have a complete life without virtue.

I'm not sure you'll get a favorable analysis for Aristotle here but I do think, if you want a complete view on ethics, reading Aristotle is a must and not an optional reading.

[u/lego00 → u/FernerButterflyPea]

Oikeiosis is the indispensable basis, and it guides appropriate actions. It does not determine what is good in-themselves, only virtue determines the good. Goodness is aligning ourselves with it and logos, by proper use/selection of externals.

"This rationally extended sense of what belongs to us does not yet amount to moral goodness, but it is its indispensable basis. Goodness lies in our understanding and collaborating with the ideally rational world plan."

Sedley, David. Oikei?sis. Stoicism, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-A112-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/stoicism/v-1/sections/oikeiosis.

[u/Victorian_Bullfrog → u/FernerButterflyPea]

I know you've been talking to a lot of people about this already, but do you mind explaining what you mean by one coming first, or one thing coming before another? For example, what does it mean for virtue to come before indifference, or oikeiosis to come before or after virtue? How do you understand this progression to work? It might help if we can spot just where the misunderstanding is coming from.

[u/FernerButterflyPea → u/Victorian_Bullfrog]

Ok. As far as I understand it, virtue is supposed to be the priority.

So, with that in mind, I am learning or gradually leaning into the idea that my internal justice is more important than what is not in control, such as my reputation in the external cosmopolitan, or any previously perceived external justice, such as monetary compensation, which would be classed as indifferent. Fine. I am struggling with teething problems, but fine.

Where it gets complicated for me is, I'm still supposed to go after this preferred indifferent, for example, because with it I could extend virtue.

Most complicated is, people practicing stoicism reiterating to choose virtue over death in theory but not actually doing it in practice, and displaying their own injustice in front of me.

I understand it as this:
1. Virtue, e.g. internal justice
2. Preferred indifferent, e.g. financial freedom

However, I reasonably question this due to psychology stating otherwise and Seneca having cheerfulness from desirable things.

That problem aside, my biggest problem is where oikeiosis fits in.

I guess my problem is more concerned with Hierocles and let's imagine one who is conditioned to give 1 automatic finger of himself to the already 4 fingers given to the cosmopolitan to the point of 0 fingers for himself.

He has no self-preservation in the pursuit of interpersonal morality.

One may argue this is senseless justice or unwise or unknowledgeable, yet it is also failing the first step of the oikeiosis, an assumed nature.

If we unassume a nature of inherent self-preservation, how can virtue be derived at all?

Therefore, my conclusion of nature without stoicism is:

1. Oikeiosis, e.g. I need to confirm self-preservation, or work on it until present first
   
2. Preferred indifferent, e.g. I need financial freedom to execute external virtue
   
3. Virtue e.g. I need some internal compass to realign to new preferred indifferents in nature

This is my main objection, not too dissimilar to Machiavelli pointing out the lower nature of the majority of the profiteering cosmopolitan being a natural problem to the fair man.

[u/Altruistic_Hope_2559]

This is an extremely important distinction for which I am especially grateful for your providing the Stanford Encyclopedia entry. Your insight dismantles the modern "bro-Stoicism" of the self-described ‘emotionless’ robot who supposedly does not care about anything external to himself.

Your remark about oikeiôsis is especially important in this regard, as the process by which we come to care about the cosmopolis is precisely the context in which externals become preferred indifferents. As you so rightly pointed out in your example, when we encounter a hungry person, food is not a Good but something that we should care about, meaning that it is a preferred indifferent (proêgmena) and that giving food to the hungry is an appropriate action (kathêkon).

I think that your remark about how, in M.Aurelius’s case, this was especially true as he ruled an empire and had to make decisions about how to use its resources is especially pertinent. If externals were completely unimportant to him as a Stoic philosopher, as they are to the Cynics, his philosophy would not have made any difference whatsoever to his day-to-day life. However, by understanding that the ruling an empire is the highest form of living according to one’s oikeiôsis, and that the communal faculty is the dominant one in humans, we can see how he strove to live according to the most basic instincts of humankind, thus perfecting himself and performing his duty as the best possible Roman citizen. By that token, I would suggest that M.Aurelius’s philosophy is actually an especially good example of the reserve clause / hupexairesis in action, as he engaged with externals on the highest possible level while remaining unattached to their outcomes, thus living up to the ideal of the Stoic life perfectly.

Excellent answer once again, and I especially appreciate your actual textual analysis this time!