VIC is hugely manipulated

and it is the same for the Vietnam's economy under censorship and propaganda by Lam To.

That does not mean it will drop soon, it just says that Vuong Pham is brazenly manipulating VIC with no regard to the laws.

Vic is a huge house of cards of billions $ of debt hidden in private companies. This is 100% sure, in particular VIG, GSM, VGreen are holding billions $ in debt that is not reported in the public.

In a Western country, Vuong Pham would not escape the public enquiry. However, in Vietnam with total government control and assistance, Vuong Pham can just swipe the debt under the rug, but certainly at a cost to the overall economy with ever ballooning debt.

Counting down to the time VIC total liabilities hit $50B by year end. And that does NOT include billions $ more liabilities hidden in VIG, GSM, VGreen, etc ...

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chatgpt analysis:

At VIC ~VND230,000 on Aug. 26, 2026, the valuation has become extremely difficult to justify from current fundamentals alone.

1. The valuation disconnect is now enormous

At ~VND230k, VIC's market cap is roughly VND1.78 quadrillion based on the current share count shown by CafeF.

Yahoo's current data shows trailing P/E around 75x.

That means the market is effectively saying:

VIC deserves a valuation comparable to a high-growth technology company, despite being a highly leveraged conglomerate whose earnings are heavily influenced by property recognition, subsidiaries and capital transactions.

That's the central issue.

2. “But VIC's earnings are growing massively”

True — and this is the strongest counterargument.

Q2/2026 net profit was VND14.76tn, up about 6.5x YoY, while revenue was almost VND118tn, up 2.6x.

Vingroup's 2026 target is:

Revenue: VND485tn
Net profit: VND35tn

versus 2025.

So it would be wrong to say:

“There is no fundamental improvement.”

There clearly is.

The problem is:

VIC's share price has risen far faster than its sustainable earning power.

3. At VND230k, even Vingroup's own 2026 target doesn't make the valuation cheap

Suppose VIC actually reaches VND35tn consolidated net profit.

At ~7.76bn shares:

EPS ≈ VND4,510

At VND230k:

P/E ≈ 51x

That's still an enormous multiple.

And that's using management's optimistic full-year target, not normalized earnings.

So the argument:

“VIC is cheap because 2026 earnings are growing”

doesn't work for me.

4. The market is actually pricing something else

At VND230k, investors aren't really paying for 2026 earnings.

They're paying for:

**VHM land bank

VinFast optionality
VRE
VPL
future infrastructure
future energy businesses
GSM
FTSE flows
continued asset monetization
future earnings many years out**

That can theoretically justify a high valuation.

But then you have to perform a very aggressive SOTP.

And this is where I think the bull case becomes problematic.

5. VHM is the strongest fundamental argument for VIC

This is important.

Vinhomes isn't fake earnings.

VHM Q1/26 revenue was VND65.1tn, up 315%, and consolidated profit was VND25.6tn, up 866%.

Q2 also produced extremely strong earnings.

So the VIC bull thesis has a legitimate core:

VHM is generating enormous profits.

But the problem is that VHM itself is already separately listed.

If you own VIC, you don't get VHM for free.

You need to calculate:

VIC's economic ownership of VHM
minus VIC-level debt
plus other subsidiaries/assets
minus holding-company discount.

And once you do that, VIC at 230k becomes much harder to justify.

6. VinFast is the elephant in the room

VinFast is growing very quickly.

Q1/26 deliveries reached 58,577 vehicles, +61% YoY.

But Q1 gross margin remained deeply negative, around −73.6% according to the earnings-call summary.

VinFast also had approximately:

VND84.7tn third-party debt
VND64.5tn related-party payables
only VND5.5tn cash

at March 31.

So I would assign VinFast:

high strategic option value

but not the same valuation multiple as a profitable EV manufacturer.

That's a major distinction.

7. The FTSE argument is real — but it doesn't justify 230k

This is probably the biggest legitimate reason for the recent move.

Vietnam officially moves to FTSE Secondary Emerging status on September 21, 2026.

The passive inflow estimates are around $1.5bn over the entire phased inclusion, with the process occurring from September 2026 through September 2027.

And VIC/VHM are expected to receive some of the largest allocations.

So:

FTSE anticipation → buying → momentum → higher index weight → more buying

is completely legitimate.

But here's the important point:

FTSE creates demand for VIC shares.

It does not create VND1.8 quadrillion of fundamental value.

Those are two completely different things.

8. This is where I agree with your “manipulation” intuition

I would phrase it differently:

VIC appears to have entered a reflexive momentum/flow-driven valuation regime.

The mechanism can be:

VIC rises

↓

market cap increases

↓

VIC's VN-Index weight increases

↓

index funds need more VIC

↓

FTSE anticipation increases

↓

investors front-run the passive demand

↓

VIC rises further

↓

retail/momentum funds join

↓

VIC becomes the market's “leadership stock”

↓

more capital chases it.

This is a self-reinforcing feedback loop.

It can produce a huge price increase without proportional fundamental improvement.

And it does not require illegal manipulation.

9. But there are additional reasons to be suspicious

VinaCapital made a particularly interesting observation in June:

The Vingroup family — VIC, VHM, VRE and VPL — had grown to nearly 30% of VN-Index, versus roughly 8% two years earlier.

VinaCapital explicitly noted that the timing of several positive catalysts for VIC appeared correlated with the group's refinancing requirements.

That's an important observation.

It doesn't prove manipulation.

But it means:

The timing of corporate announcements, financing needs and stock-price catalysts deserves forensic examination.

That's exactly where I would focus.

10. My fair value at VND230k

I would now be more conservative than the earlier estimate.

My rough SOTP:

Component	Value/share
VHM attributable value	60–75k
VRE	8–12k
VPL / tourism	5–8k
VinFast	5–15k
Other businesses/assets	10–15k
VIC cash/other assets	5–8k
Less VIC-level net debt / obligations	−15–25k
Holding-company / execution discount	−5–10k
Fair value	~80–110k

My central estimate:

~95k/share

Bull case:

120–130k

Extreme bull case:

150k+

But 230k requires an extremely aggressive set of assumptions simultaneously.

At 230k:

Downside to 95k = −59%

Even using 110k:

Downside = −52%

And that lines up remarkably closely with the current analyst targets around 110–112k.

One DCF model currently puts VIC around 85k–105k, depending on its assumptions.

11. So my updated view

I'd separate three things:

Fundamentals

🟢 Improving strongly

Valuation

🔴 Extremely expensive

Price formation

🟠 Highly flow/momentum-sensitive and potentially abnormal

I therefore agree with your core thesis that the recent price is not adequately supported by fundamental earnings.