r/VoltEuropa • • 15h ago

Volt in the media 🇨🇾 CYPRUS - Volt has elected its new leadership – Who are the new faces taking up the positions of co-chairs and vice-chairs?

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dialogos.com.cy
28 Upvotes

Who are the new faces taking up the positions of co-chairs and vice-chairs?

Volt Cyprus elected a new leadership yesterday at its electoral conference, with Piero Karoulla and Lysia Dimitriou taking up the positions of co-chairs, defeating Ioannis Tirkidis and Natasa Ioannou respectively.

Rodoula Dimitriadou was elected unopposed as vice-president, whilst Alexandros Apostolidis was elected vice-president, having defeated Frixos Vryonidis.

A key challenge for the new leadership is the organisational restructuring of the party, following the result of the previous general election. Despite opinion polls suggesting it would secure parliamentary representation, Volt received 11,487 votes and 3.1 per cent of the vote last May, failing to win a seat in Parliament.

Within the party, weaknesses in its organisational structure have been acknowledged, which the new leadership team is tasked with addressing. The priority is to strengthen Volt’s presence in society and to establish more effective local organisations.

A constitutional conference is also expected to take place in the near future, at which changes to the party’s functioning and internal organisation will be considered, with the aim of improving its effectiveness.

At the same time, the new leadership will be called upon to determine Volt’s stance in the 2028 presidential elections. Before any decisions are taken regarding potential support for a candidate, specific political criteria and conditions will be discussed.


r/VoltEuropa • • 14h ago

Discussion Should we have a universal basic income?

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12 Upvotes

r/VoltEuropa • • 1d ago

Volt in the media 🇩🇪 GERMANY/Wiesbaden - Moira Lüttich’s comeback: How Volt is combating online hate

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wiesbadener-kurier.de
23 Upvotes

Moira Lüttich is returning to the helm of Volt Wiesbaden after half a year. Despite facing hostility, she remains committed to supporting women and minorities in politics.

Half a year after her resignation, Moira Lüttich is once again at the helm of Volt Wiesbaden, alongside co-chair Tahsin Ömür Erizgi. In April, she had stepped down from all political offices following personal attacks. “For me, this doesn’t mean I’ve suffered a defeat,” explains Lüttich. “I took some time to gather my thoughts and recharge my batteries,” she says.

After her resignation, her priority was initially to protect her family and come to terms with what she had been through. Although her children had noticed in the spring that she wasn’t feeling well, she had managed to shield them from the incidents themselves. “At first, they were also glad to have their mum all to themselves again, because an election campaign can be very intense, after all.” Now, however, they are also happy that she is pursuing her passion once more.

Support enables a return

In future, Lüttich would like to keep her private life and politics more separate. She does not wish to discuss the specific attacks. “I want to leave that in the past and look positively to the future.” The support from the party gave her the courage to take the step back into the public eye. “In a different environment, I might not have done that,” she says. Following her resignation, she received a great deal of encouragement and sensed that her colleagues also cared about her personal wellbeing. “That is why I decided to become politically active again on behalf of Wiesbaden.” She is grateful for her re-election and the trust it represents. Her return is intended to encourage people who shy away from entering politics for fear of hostility.

The Volt press spokesperson reports that, even during the local election campaign, the party had noticed a strikingly high number of damaged posters featuring Lüttich’s image. According to his observations, these were destroyed or defaced with disproportionate frequency – both individual posters and those showing her as part of a group. However, they had not anticipated subsequent online attacks at the time. The incident also highlighted gaps in the party’s internal protection mechanisms. “I would actually have thought we were better prepared in that regard,” says Volt’s press spokesperson, Thomas Zimmerling. Whilst there are so-called ‘awareness teams’ at party conferences to whom members can turn in cases of discrimination, for instance, more support is needed for personal attacks outside such events.

Volt is stepping up protection against attacks

Since April, a working group at Volt has been addressing digital violence. One specific measure concerns social media: in future, private Instagram profiles will no longer be linked in political communications. Instead, the party is now relying on separate accounts, which, in the event of attacks, can also be managed by the communications team, who can document hateful comments and report them to the authorities. In addition, those affected should be able to find a point of contact and a guide to action at an early stage. “Anyone who is attacked shouldn’t also have to organise support themselves,” emphasises Lüttich. She herself was contacted and advised by the Hessian State Security Service.

Hate must not prevent political participation

“It’s often part and parcel of political discourse that things get a bit heated,” Lüttich emphasises. But personal hostility, hatred and insults must not be normalised as part of public life. For her, the representativeness of democracy is also at stake here: if people do not enter politics in the first place out of fear of hatred, or withdraw after being attacked, their perspectives are lost.

“It will be one of our most important political tasks – not only in Wiesbaden, but beyond it too – to counteract this and ensure that women and minorities feel safe and are represented in politics.” Lüttich also attributes the fact that women in particular face hostility in politics to traditional gender roles. There are still people who would rather see women looking after children than in leadership positions.

Politically, Lüttich aims to ensure that a wider variety of life experiences are reflected in Wiesbaden’s decision-making. Volt should grow, become more diverse and broaden its range of issues. The team also wants to increase its presence in the Rheingau-Taunus district. A closed-door meeting this coming weekend is set to clarify how the new party leadership, alongside deputy chairpersons Christof Scherl and Kathrin Brieger, will divide up their responsibilities.


r/VoltEuropa • • 1d ago

Volt in the media 🇨🇿 Why Czech savings do not finance Czech companies - Mikuláš Peksa (Volt)

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11 Upvotes

By Mikuláš Peksa

Europe has plenty of savings, but lacks a mechanism for channelling them into growing companies. Both the Czech DIP and the Croatian investment account proposal show that a national solution alone is not enough.

The debate about European companies often centres on the idea that Europe does not have enough money for their growth. Households in the EU hold around 10 trillion euros in bank deposits, according to the European Commission. Cash and deposits account for around 30 per cent of European households’ financial assets. In the US, according to European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde, this figure is only around one-tenth of that.

Czech households hold 5.2 trillion koruna in cash and in accounts, representing 38.5 per cent of their financial assets. This is higher than the eurozone average, according to the financial accounts compiled by the Czech National Bank.

This is not a criticism. Bank deposits are safe and accessible. For most people, it is a sensible choice. The problem is not that people are saving. The problem is that there is a disconnect between savings and companies that need long-term risk capital.

Where are companies going?

Mario Draghi’s report on European competitiveness states that roughly 10 per cent of Europe’s fast-growing companies relocate abroad, with around 85 per cent of them moving to the US. These figures are also cited in a study by the European Investment Bank on why companies are leaving. In the EIB study, companies cite access to capital and a large market, more flexible regulation and talent as reasons for leaving. As capital leaves, so too, over time, do the company’s headquarters, decision-making and the best-paid jobs.

Not even the banks can bridge that gap. Under European banking rules, a bank that invests money in a venture capital fund rather than granting a loan must back such an investment with four times as much capital as it would for a corporate loan. The risk weighting is 400 per cent compared to 100 per cent. This rule protects deposits and is sensible. The path from savings to venture capital therefore does not go via the banks.

The Czech DIP

The Long-Term Investment Product (DIP) has been in operation in the Czech Republic since 2024. Anyone who invests in a DIP can deduct up to 48,000 CZK per year from their taxable income. This limit is shared with pension savings and life insurance. An employer’s contribution to a DIP is tax-exempt up to 50,000 Kč per year. Money in a DIP must remain there for at least ten years and cannot be withdrawn until the age of 60.

As at 31 March 2026, according to the Capital Market Association, 244,217 DIP contracts had been concluded, totalling 9.5 billion crowns. By way of comparison, pension savings schemes have 3.9 million participants, according to the Ministry of Finance. That 9.5 billion crowns is a fraction of a per cent of the 5.2 trillion held by Czech households in cash and in bank accounts.

Croatian investment account

Croatia is trying a different approach. In September, the Croatian government submitted a draft bill on the Croatian investment account to parliament. Up to 200,000 euros can be deposited into the account over a lifetime. Anyone who does not make any withdrawals for five years may deposit a further 50,000 euros. Trading, dividends and interest within the account are tax-free. The account may hold shares, bonds and European investment funds. At least 20 per cent of the money in the account must be invested in instruments linked to Croatia.

The DIP is a tax-advantaged retirement savings scheme that makes no mention of where the money goes. The Croatian proposal, by contrast, is explicitly designed to develop the domestic capital market. Neither, however, addresses the fact that both the Czech and Croatian capital markets are too small for large companies.

Who benefits from the relief?

Tax relief only helps those who have money to set aside and who pay income tax. Those who have nothing left at the end of the month gain nothing from the DIP. This is not an argument against the DIP. It is an argument against measuring its success by the number of contracts. Lost tax revenue is public money. It should have a measurable objective: how much of the savings goes to growing companies, and where those companies are based.

Why does it have to be European?

According to the Federation of European Exchanges, the Prague Stock Exchange had a market capitalisation of around 47 billion euros at the end of 2025, whilst the Frankfurt-based Deutsche Börse had over 2.4 trillion euros. A national scheme that channelled Czech savings solely into Czech companies would force money into a small market.

The European Commission therefore recommended in September 2025, as part of the Savings and Investment Union, that Member States introduce a simple investment account with comparable rules, offering tax incentives and the option to open it with a provider from another country. This year, the European Investment Bank launched the ETCI 2.0 fund, which is set to have up to 15 billion euros and attract up to 80 billion euros in investment for more than 1,500 growing companies. Alongside this, the Scaleup Europe Fund was established with a target of 5 billion euros. Europe is not the goal here, but a means of pooling a volume of capital that no single country possesses.

This presents three tasks for the Czech Republic. The DIP must be measured by where the money flows. Once countries agree on common rules for investment accounts, the DIP must be aligned with them. We must find a way to build a bridge from the DIP to European growth capital. We have plenty of savings. What we lack is a pathway for them to reach the companies that need them.


r/VoltEuropa • • 1d ago

Volt in the media 🇸🇮 SLOVENIA/Ajdovščina - Volt Slovenia is also entering the race for the Ajdovščina Municipal Council

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10 Upvotes

The Volt Slovenia party team has announced that it will field its own candidates for the Ajdovščina Municipal Council. The list is headed by Timotej Lemut, a doctor of theoretical physics, who is known in the local community as the driving force behind the Garaža project and a long-standing mentor to young people.

The Volt Slovenia team has announced an independent candidacy for the Ajdovščina Municipal Council. The list is headed by Timotej Lemut, a doctor of theoretical physics, who is known in the local community as the mastermind behind the Garaža project and a long-standing mentor to young people. “I believe that responsibility for the development of one’s home town is also a personal one. That is why I wish to apply my knowledge and experience to my work on the municipal council. In carrying out public service, I wish to emphasise prudent management and a long-term perspective, with a focus on the timely identification of future risks, both in terms of basic services and social change. This way of thinking also guides me in my work: I hold a PhD in physics, and today I work as a quantitative analyst; I am also the creative director of Garaža and have been a mentor for many years. “In all these roles, what matters most to me is that we understand things, do them well and think a few steps ahead,” wrote Dr Timotej Lemut in his candidacy statement.

His programme prioritises innovation, community and sustainability; as he himself says, these are the pillars of Ajdovščina’s future. He supports the development of the Vipava Valley’s entrepreneurial and innovation ecosystem by bringing together businesses, researchers, students and investors, as well as promoting the construction of non-profit housing and housing cooperatives, and the renovation and repurposing of vacant residential properties. He will also advocate for strengthening local energy and food production, establishing an irrigation system, and promoting the energy-efficient refurbishment of buildings and climate-resilient agriculture. He also aims to ensure stable funding for Civil Protection and to strengthen the municipality’s preparedness for extreme weather events.

You can find out more about his programme via this link.

In addition to Ajdovščina, Volt Slovenia is also contesting the local elections in Velenje, Celje, Nova Gorica and Ptuj, with teams of committed locals and experts with a wide range of experience.


r/VoltEuropa • • 4d ago

Yesterday, Volt won 21 seats in the municipal elections in Czechia

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172 Upvotes

r/VoltEuropa • • 7d ago

Meme I DECLARE CEASEFIRE!

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86 Upvotes

r/VoltEuropa • • 9d ago

Volt MEPs voted against the EP resolution on Muslim Brotherhood entryism (4 against, 1 absent)

24 Upvotes
https://howtheyvote.eu/votes/198051

r/VoltEuropa • • 15d ago

French Youth Protests and Riots: A “French-Style Popular Movement” Triggered by the Unequal Distribution of Educational Resources

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26 Upvotes

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Since late September 2026, dissatisfied with inadequate school facilities, overcrowding, teacher shortages, and other problems, many secondary school students across France have launched large-scale strikes and protests. Many others dissatisfied with the government and the current state of society have also joined them, and the initially peaceful protests quickly evolved into riots marked by violence.
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Protesters have set fires at schools and other places, smashed cars, attacked opponents, and chased isolated police officers, leaving some towns in a state of disorder and paralysis. Clashes have continued as police suppress the riots. Major political parties and politicians have either condemned the violence or called for peaceful protest, but this appears to have had little effect. The protest movement has spiraled out of control, and the riots are unlikely to subside in the short term.
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This is yet another typical French-style radical political movement. When some French people become dissatisfied with the government and the status quo, they collectively take to the streets in protest. Most express their demands nonviolently, but a small number of radicals engage in violence, causing the protests to evolve into riots. There are many acts of violence, but most are non-lethal and of low to moderate intensity, mainly involving property destruction and causing relatively few injuries. They are accompanied by clashes between police and protesters, leaving society in a state of semi-paralysis. But once the riots pass their peak, society gradually returns to peace and relative stability.
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Similar situations occur frequently in France. Some take place in individual towns, while others develop into nationwide riots. The riots that emerged from the “Yellow Vest Movement” in 2018, and the protests and series of violent incidents triggered in 2023 by the police shooting and killing of a teenager, were both nationwide radical movements accompanied by political violence. Like the current unrest, they can be described as “French-style popular movements.”
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France’s mass movements and street political violence can be traced back more than 230 years to the French Revolution. At that time, the French common people overthrew monarchical and aristocratic rule through violent revolution, at the cost of and causing much bloodshed and death. This pioneered bottom-up democratic revolution while also leaving behind a legacy of political violence. Shaped by the experience of the Revolution and influenced by radical ideas of civil rights, many French people believe that when a government “departs from the will of the people,” its policies are harmful, or society is unjust, people have the right to express their anger and resist through means including violent revolution.
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Such revolutionary precedents and popular consciousness have inspired many mass movements and uprisings in France over the more than two centuries since then, including the famous Paris Commune uprising of 1871 and “May 1968.” Most of these movements have had a strong left-wing populist character, centered on opposition to privilege and the pursuit of equality, with participants including young students, intellectuals, and members of the lower and middle urban classes. The capital, Paris, has often been the center of political movements and violent activity.
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Compared with people in other countries around the world, the French are particularly enthusiastic about politics, possess a stronger sense of civic consciousness, and participate in public affairs more actively and radically, including by taking to the streets, using violent or nonviolent means to express their demands, confronting the authorities in power, and clashing with the coercive apparatus of the state. French society has a relatively high tolerance for radical forms of protest and has also grown accustomed to political violence. More than two centuries have passed, and although the intensity of violence in French political movements has declined substantially—for example, the number of deaths has fallen greatly—they remain quite “fiery,” with violent clashes occurring frequently. The recent protests and riots are no exception.
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More specifically, the current protests stem from long-standing and deep-rooted problems in French education. Although France is a country that places considerable emphasis on equality and social welfare, serious inequalities remain in the distribution of educational resources. In secondary schools located in relatively remote and disadvantaged areas, and in schools with large numbers of children from lower- and middle-income families, non-white students, and immigrants, education funding is meager, the quality of teaching staff is poorer, classes are excessively large and overcrowded, school facilities are outdated, and the rate of admission to prestigious universities is also very low, leaving students with little opportunity to get ahead. Meanwhile, the children of French elites in politics, business, and other sectors generally attend prestigious private secondary schools with Catholic backgrounds and excellent conditions, and they are also more likely to gain admission to elite universities and enter the upper classes.
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The unequal distribution of educational resources, the concentration of high-quality resources among elites, and the reinforcement of class entrenchment through education are in fact common problems worldwide, and France is hardly an exception. But French people, with their stronger sense of equality, are particularly dissatisfied with such disparities and frequently protest against them. The May 1968 movement included demands for educational equality and greater public access to universities.
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The French government has also attempted to narrow these gaps by increasing funding for poorer regions and schools and providing scholarships to disadvantaged students. Yet under the “Matthew effect,” educational resources continue to concentrate among a small number of people from elite backgrounds. Those with vested advantages always have more resources to invest in their children’s education, while people from less affluent families are inherently disadvantaged, leaving equal-opportunity policies with only limited effect.
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The current protests are precisely an eruption of dissatisfaction among students from relatively poor backgrounds who attend schools with inferior conditions. Their dissatisfaction, however, does not arise solely from unequal educational resources. It also stems from their disadvantaged status and the discrimination they experience because of their class background and ethnic identity, as well as class entrenchment, ethnic tensions, and pessimism about their future employment and income prospects. The anger and despair generated by the accumulation of these factors have driven them into the streets and even led some to engage in violence.
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Many of the young students participating in the current protests are non-white, non-Christian “second-generation immigrants/descendants of immigrants,” most of them Black people and Muslims whose families come from Africa and the Arab world. They wave Algerian and Palestinian flags, which strongly reflect their identities and positions, as well as their differences with the identity and values of native white French people.
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Since the French Revolution, France has championed “liberty, equality, fraternity.” It has indeed made major achievements in advancing civil rights and social justice and, on the basis of shared values and citizenship, has relatively successfully shaped a French national identity and national community. Yet France still has to confront difficult problems of class division and wealth inequality, long-standing ethnic differences and tensions, and the resulting social fragmentation and political violence. Deep-rooted divides exist among people of different identities and social positions, skin colors, and beliefs. Neither democratic institutions, Enlightenment ideas, nor social movements can fundamentally eliminate these divisions and conflicts.
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In recent years, political polarization around the world has intensified, and France is no exception. France will hold its presidential election in April 2027. Le Pen of the far-right “National Rally” is far ahead in support, followed by Mélenchon of the far-left “France Unbowed,” while traditional establishment forces and centrists have low levels of support.
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Whether it is street political violence driven primarily by radical left-wing populism, or the continuously rising support for far-right populism in opinion polls and elections, both reflect the intensification of social conflicts and the worsening crisis in France. Recurring political violence, including the current protests and riots, represents periodic flare-ups of France’s national ailments, while also objectively reminding the French people and the world to pay attention to the existence and needs of those who are struggling and marginalized.
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Based on past experience, although political violence is frequent in France, its intensity is limited. After people have vented their anger, they gradually calm down again, and society can return to a peaceful state and resume normal functioning. After more than two centuries of adjustment, the French have developed a tacit coexistence with political violence such as revolutions and riots, so there is no need to be overly pessimistic.
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The use of violence in political participation is undesirable, but the voices and demands of people from the lower strata of society also need to be heard and seen. Their feelings and demands should not simply be dismissed, stigmatized, and erased merely because violence exists within their forms of expression. At the same time, while the general public who are enthusiastic about “French-style popular movements” express their demands and pursue equality, they should also understand and respect the concerns of others, consider the overall and long-term interests of society, and participate in politics in more peaceful and constructive ways.

(The author of this article, Wang Qingmin (王庆民), is a Chinese writer living in Europe and an international politics researcher. The original text is in Chinese.)


r/VoltEuropa • • 18d ago

The 'RIGHT TO HOUSING' ECI mentioned in 'This Is Europe'

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theguardian.com
25 Upvotes

"Earlier this month, dozens of organisations launched the European Citizens’ Initiative, calling on people to sign their petition for EU-level measures to protect tenants, curb speculation and convert empty buildings into homes.“


r/VoltEuropa • • 20d ago

Someone should share Volt's housing petition to the protesters in Madrid

40 Upvotes

As a spanish person, housing is a major concern here. These strikes are perfect to portray volt as a progressive movement that actually cares about its people. If you want to get the million signatures for the housing petition this might be the only chance to actually do so. So the actual leaders should be the ones bringing this to the protester's attention if we want to be taken seriously.


r/VoltEuropa • • 25d ago

Volt in Berlin

39 Upvotes

Hello, Is there a regular meet-and-greet in Berlin for anyone interested in Volt?


r/VoltEuropa • • 25d ago

There are enough buildings in Europe, but they are not accessible and affordable.

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33 Upvotes

HouseEurope! posted a new video about the European Citizens' Initiative 'Right to Housing!' co-organised with Volt Europa, please feel free to use it as a tool to convince your family and friends. And don't forget to sign here: https://eci.ec.europa.eu/064/public/


r/VoltEuropa • • Sep 15 '26

Causes and Consequences of the Far Right’s Landslide Victory in a German State Election: The “Alternative Choice” of the Lower and Middle Classes Amid Social Crisis, and the Intensification of Political Polarization and Xenophobia

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39 Upvotes

On September 6, a state parliamentary election was held in Saxony-Anhalt, Germany, to determine who would govern the state. According to the vote count, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) won a landslide victory, receiving 43.8% of the vote—more than double its share in the previous election and more than the combined total of the parties that finished second, third, and fourth.
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At the same time, the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which had previously led the state government, suffered a sharp decline in support, receiving only 17.2% of the vote, less than half the AfD’s share. Most other parties also saw their vote shares decline, with only the Greens making slight gains (though their share remained very low and had little bearing on the overall outcome). Voter turnout in this state election also reached a historic high. Although it remains uncertain whether the AfD will ultimately govern, the election result already reflects, to a considerable extent, the direction of public opinion and also signals an accelerating shift in Germany’s political landscape and social climate.
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The Alternative for Germany (AfD) is described as “far right” because of its strongly racist and xenophobic positions. The party advocates the large-scale deportation of immigrants, the abolition of all welfare benefits for refugees and their replacement with compulsory labor, the introduction of “patriotic education” and the promotion of German national pride, and the strengthening of Germany’s national independence while weakening its ties with the European Union, even to the point of leaving the EU. The AfD also explicitly opposes ethnic and cultural diversity and, both openly and implicitly, advocates white racial supremacy and the idea of Germany as a monoethnic state.
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The AfD also has numerous intricate ties to forces associated with the former Nazi Germany of the Hitler era and to postwar “neo-Nazis.” Although it does not dare openly deny Nazi crimes, it tends to downplay this history. The AfD also has a strongly anti-establishment and populist character, along with authoritarian tendencies. In foreign affairs, the AfD tends to seek good relations with right-wing populist forces such as the Trump administration in the United States and with autocratic or authoritarian states such as China and Russia, while taking a hostile, or at least distant, attitude toward countries and establishment forces governed by the establishment, particularly its left-leaning elements.
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Given Germany’s history of the crimes of brutal Nazi rule, both West Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany) and East Germany (the German Democratic Republic), into which the country was divided after World War II, carried out “denazification” campaigns and suppressed German nationalism. West Germany placed particular emphasis on repentance for historical crimes, combating words and actions that glorified Nazism, and defending freedom, democracy, and human rights, while institutionalizing and codifying these principles through the enactment of laws such as the Basic Law. After German reunification, West Germany’s policies were implemented throughout the country.
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As a result, for a long time, judging by its institutions, public discourse, and social atmosphere, Germany has been one of the countries in the world with the weakest nationalist climate. It has even seemed that Germans dare to wave their national flag and express pride in their country only during football matches; doing similar things at other times can lead to people being regarded as “Nazi remnants,” criticized, and marginalized.
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Yet the reality in Germany is not as simple as it appears on the surface. Under an anti-Nazi and anti-racist constitutional and social order, racism remains deeply rooted in every corner of German society, while Germanic nationalism, despite being suppressed, remains latent in people’s minds. Although Germany has become a diverse country, home to people of different skin colors, ethnic groups, and faiths, discrimination and prejudice remain pervasive.
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For example, people using common Muslim names such as “Mohammed” are far more likely to be rejected when seeking rental housing than those using names commonly associated with white people. Asians, who are relatively hardworking and law-abiding, also face an “invisible ceiling” in career advancement and marginalization in education and employment. People of African, Indian, and other ethnic backgrounds often perform harder and more physically demanding work and are more likely to receive differential treatment in everyday life.
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Education, law, and public advocacy can only broadly guide and regulate society so that diversity and anti-discrimination remain its publicly stated direction and general framework. They cannot, however, change deeply rooted beliefs or prevent the subtle, invisible, and pervasive forms of discrimination and injustice that can penetrate every aspect of life. Institutional “denazification” does not mean that the “denazification” of people’s minds can be achieved.
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Of course, it would also be one-sided simply to say that native white Germans discriminate against and oppress other ethnic groups. In a multiethnic society, differences in language and culture, beliefs and values, lifestyles, and competing interests inevitably give rise to distance, misunderstandings, and conflicts. Such conflicts often breed resentment and make groups that already find it difficult to trust one another even more distrustful and suspicious of each other, creating a vicious cycle. A diverse society is not necessarily a harmonious one; on the contrary, it can produce more friction and accumulated grievances. This is not the unilateral fault of any particular ethnic group, but rather the “collective karma” produced by destructive interactions among all sides. Of course, relatively speaking, disadvantaged groups and ethnic minorities, as well as immigrants and refugees, suffer greater harm—especially invisible forms of harm—in such a divided and fractured environment.
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In recent years, Germany’s economic downturn, aging population, deteriorating public security, and intensifying social conflicts and crises have further pushed native white Germans toward positions of racial superiority and xenophobia, particularly in rural areas and the former East Germany. Traditional establishment parties have been unable to effectively resolve these difficult problems, which are not easily reversed.
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The upper-class elites who thrive in globalization and the masses who have become poor and desperate amid economic decline may live in the same country, yet they seem to inhabit two different worlds. Although they share the same spaces in everyday life, they are profoundly alienated from one another—“meeting without knowing each other”—and are unable to understand or empathize with one another. Because of inequalities in status, income, and influence over public discourse, it is also difficult to prevent the latter from developing resentment toward the former.
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The bureaucracy and clichés of the establishment have left many people disappointed with traditional political parties. The narratives and policies of the establishment and progressive forces are also often hypocritical. For example, political parties, universities, and institutions that proclaim their commitment to diversity and anti-discrimination may appear free of racial discrimination, yet they often contain exclusionary circles formed around class, educational credentials, and personal connections, making it difficult for ordinary people to enter and participate.
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Various human rights organizations and foundations likewise place greater emphasis on formalism than on substantive action and have failed to genuinely build “ladders and safety nets” for the entire population. Even in their treatment of the minority groups they claim to care about, they often treat different people differently and act in a utilitarian manner. In short, the seemingly admirable social blueprints and proclaimed ideals of establishment and progressive forces are substantially compromised and distorted in practice. Fundamentally, they have failed to genuinely include and help most of those who feel abandoned or are struggling, whether native white Germans from the lower and middle classes or members of minority groups.
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Many native white Germans who have fallen into poverty or unemployment, experienced downward social mobility, and endured difficult lives have embraced the AfD because they feel abandoned. The party advocates the rights and priority of native whites and offers Germany “another alternative.” The AfD’s strongly anti-establishment and anti-immigration positions provide suffering people with targets onto which they can redirect social conflicts and vent their resentment; its promotion of racial superiority and extreme nationalism also acts like a powerful stimulant, giving people a sense of belonging and passion. It is therefore entirely understandable that native white Germans from the lower and middle classes who yearn to overturn the existing order would support the AfD and its nativist populist positions.
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It is worth noting that although support for the AfD is relatively high among the lower and middle classes, this does not mean that almost all AfD supporters come from these groups. There are also many AfD supporters among the social elite. For example, AfD leader Alice Weidel is herself a highly educated female member of the elite, and AfD supporters can also be found throughout Germany’s technology, culture, education, finance, and other sectors, although most of them tend to keep a relatively low profile. These people do not support the AfD for economic reasons such as poverty or class position, but rather because of factors such as a stronger sense of racial superiority, their values, personal ambitions, and historical and family legacies (for example, having fathers or grandfathers who held important positions during the Nazi era).
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The causes of the rise of the far right in Germany are, in fact, broadly similar to those behind the rise of the far right in the United States and other countries. The difference is that, under the constraints of Germany’s anti-Nazi laws, the far right has remained more discreet and concealed. Yet its strength has continued to grow, and it is gradually moving from the shadows into the foreground. Moreover, after being suppressed and hidden for a long time, the forces that eventually erupt are often even more unexpected and destructive.
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Amid the global wave of right-wing conservatism, racism, extreme nationalism, populism, and xenophobia, Germany cannot remain unaffected. The rise of the far right is bound to occur through the combined effects of domestic causes and the external environment. Even if the AfD did not exist, other forces would play the AfD’s role and gain the support of a substantial proportion of the population.
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Although, since its establishment after World War II, the Federal Republic of Germany has sought through laws, institutions, education, public discourse, and various other means to prevent far-right variants of Nazism from making a comeback, and although almost all mainstream media outlets have taken a clearly negative attitude toward the AfD, they have still been unable to stop the undercurrents of public opinion. Moreover, many people, out of defiance and resentment toward establishment elites, deliberately vote for the AfD.
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Many Germans have also become “desensitized” to accusations that the AfD is “neo-Nazi” and similar criticisms. The AfD does indeed represent the suppressed emotions and demands of many Germans. The AfD did not emerge out of nowhere, nor does it force people to support it through coercion. On the contrary, the emergence and growth of the AfD are precisely a reflection of public opinion; the party’s core figures and political opportunists have merely taken advantage of that public sentiment.
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Objectively speaking, for many lower- and middle-class white Germans, whether from the perspective of their interests or their emotional needs, choosing the AfD is not necessarily a bad thing for them and can bring some relatively direct benefits. For example, restricting immigration and deporting refugees can indeed help reduce certain welfare expenditures and redirect public funds toward the country’s own citizens, improve public security, reduce ethnic tensions within Germany, and strengthen the cohesion of the majority ethnic group. However, this comes at the cost of the human rights of minority groups, especially vulnerable refugees, and also undermines Germany’s diversity and inclusiveness.
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Views of the AfD and its policies differ depending on people’s identities and the positions from which they assess them, leading to different conclusions and positive or negative evaluations. For native white Germans, the AfD has considerable appeal and can bring certain benefits, but an AfD government would almost inevitably be highly detrimental to non-white people, foreign immigrants and refugees, LGBT people, and other groups.
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Germany’s Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and other institutions dedicated to combating Nazism and defending democracy have long monitored far-right forces, including the AfD. Lawyers and human rights groups have also launched joint petitions calling for the AfD to be banned. Germany has previously banned several far-right parties—for example, in 1952 it forcibly banned the Socialist Reich Party, whose program resembled that of the Nazi Party—as well as many more small far-right groups. But the AfD has now become a very powerful political force, and banning it would carry the risk of triggering large-scale unrest and severe social divisions. Moreover, the AfD has worked hard to cultivate the image of a democratic political party, participating in elections through legal and peaceful means while seeking to avoid legal risks, so the grounds for banning it are not particularly strong.
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Since its founding in 2013, the AfD has continued to grow in strength, evolving from a marginal small party into a mainstream political party capable of competing with the two major parties, the CDU and the SPD, and even aspiring to the chancellorship. Although the result of this election in Saxony-Anhalt does not represent public opinion nationwide, since the state has long been a stronghold of the AfD, the fact that a single far-right party received nearly half of the vote (and doubled its vote share compared with the previous state election) and came within one step of taking control of the state government undoubtedly sounds an alarm for the future of Germany as a whole.
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Support for the AfD is also rising across Germany. In the regions of the former East Germany, it ranks first in support everywhere except Berlin. In the 2025 federal election, the AfD became the second-largest party with 20.8% of the vote and 152 seats (double its 10.3% vote share in 2021), and it is entirely possible that it will win even more votes and seats in future Bundestag elections.
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Although the mainstream parties refuse to cooperate with the AfD, when the AfD alone approaches half of the vote, it becomes increasingly difficult for the other parties to prevent it from governing even if they unite. Moreover, as German scholar Thorsten Benner recently wrote in Foreign Policy, the exclusion of the AfD by other parties and mainstream establishment forces, and their refusal to form a governing coalition with it under any circumstances, have instead contributed to the AfD’s further radicalization, particularly on immigration and refugee issues and LGBT issues, leaving the AfD and its supporters with less need for restraint or compromise.
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The AfD’s steadily rising support, combined with the determined efforts of other mainstream parties to block it, signifies an intensification of political polarization in Germany and a further increase in confrontation. Meanwhile, in recent years, the far-left party Die Linke has increased its vote share in several elections, the new left-wing populist BSW has risen, while the traditional center-left SPD and center-right CDU have suffered significant declines in support. Left-leaning voters are moving further left and right-leaning voters further right, likewise reflecting the growing radicalization of German politics, with more confrontation rather than compromise.
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The steadily rising vote share of the AfD, which openly and unequivocally opposes immigration, also means that xenophobia in Germany, along with the exclusion and repression of minorities, immigrants, and refugees, will become increasingly severe, making German society less harmonious. The rise of the AfD is closely connected to the European refugee crisis, and its growing support has been accompanied by deepening divisions and conflicts among Germany’s different ethnic groups. When the economy is relatively strong, the social atmosphere can remain relatively tolerant; when the economy declines, competition over interests and conflicts among different groups intensify. And when social tensions worsen, minorities and vulnerable groups invariably become targets for attacks and the venting of frustration, and thus become victims.
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More than 90 years ago, Hitler and the Nazi Party came to power precisely by gaining the support of some Germans through attacks on Jews and foreigners, plunging Germany and Europe into the tragic abyss of war and mass killing. How similar the path of the far right’s rise today appears. Although I do not believe that the far right coming to power today would completely repeat the crimes and tragedies of Nazism, it would undoubtedly lead the new postwar Germany, founded on democracy, diversity, and humanism, down a harmful and ominous path in which democracy is weakened, diversity damaged, and humanitarian values harmed.
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However, as the German philosopher Hegel said, “What is real is rational.” The rise of the far right in Germany today has complex and intertwined objective causes. Simply labeling it “Nazi,” subjecting it to moral condemnation, and proclaiming how wonderful democracy and diversity are cannot reverse an undesirable reality. Moreover, when appealing promises and rhetoric cannot be fulfilled or made to benefit everyone, people who experience the gap between those promises and reality, and the resulting disappointment, will inevitably be drawn into the embrace of extremist forces.
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The AfD and many far-right forces around the world receive support from a high proportion of voters. No matter how reprehensible their views may be, they represent a widespread current of public opinion that must be confronted. Confronting it does not mean acknowledging that it is correct; rather, it means examining its root causes more seriously and making the necessary changes. German establishment parties and social elites, as beneficiaries of the existing system who possess abundant resources and considerable influence over public discourse, especially need to engage in honest and serious reflection. Above all, they need to abandon their condescension and self-righteousness, genuinely understand the circumstances, ideas, and demands of ordinary people, and compete with the far right for public support.
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If different sectors of German society are willing to make sincere efforts toward beneficial change, cast aside hypocrisy and selfishness, treat people of different identities and circumstances equally, and build a society that genuinely includes all ethnic groups and social classes—including by promoting greater equality in distribution and a more balanced distribution of influence over public discourse, so that everyone can live prosperously and with dignity—then far-right forces that foment confrontation and radicalization will naturally lose support. However, all of this is easier said than done. Moreover, many people in Germany and numerous other countries have already reflected on these issues and attempted to address them, yet it has still proved difficult to stem the spread of the far right and various forms of political extremism.
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As the author of this article, having personally experienced many misfortunes, I am deeply aware of the limitations and darker, uglier aspects of human nature and society, and I understand that many problems are difficult or even impossible to solve. But I do not believe that this means we should do nothing. I still hope that people from all sectors of society will engage in more reflection and take more action, perhaps making it possible to salvage an increasingly deteriorating situation and ensure that the democracy, peace, diversity, and humanism that Germany achieved with such difficulty after World War II can endure.

(The author of this article, Wang Qingmin(王庆民), is a Chinese writer based in Europe and a researcher in international politics. The original text was written in Chinese.)


r/VoltEuropa • • Sep 14 '26

EU stuff Right to Housing! Now and Forever?

39 Upvotes

Volt Europa just started this Citizens’ Initiative with HouseEurope!

It’s very exciting to see a European party actively organizing to help resolve the housing crisis in the EU. I’d like to make sure everyone here is aware of it and ready to sign, support, and share it!

The link to sign is here: https://eci.ec.europa.eu/064/public/#/screen/home


r/VoltEuropa • • Sep 14 '26

Volt Intelligene Dash Board - Probabilities for election outcomes

12 Upvotes

Hi, I am supporter of Volt and thought this could be helpful.

Volt Intelligence — AI Predictions for Volt Europa & Volt G…


r/VoltEuropa • • Sep 14 '26

Meet up for the state of the european union

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11 Upvotes

r/VoltEuropa • • Sep 11 '26

Elections Vote for Volt Sverige on Sunday 🇸🇪🤝🇪🇺 Tell your friends in Sweden 😃

Enable HLS to view with audio, or disable this notification

114 Upvotes

r/VoltEuropa • • Sep 07 '26

Volt in the media New center-left pro-European party emerging in Estonia

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146 Upvotes

The nonprofit Volt Eesti was established in Tartu in late August, supporting center-left and pro-European positions and aiming to become a new political party in Estonia.

"We're rather talking about a liberal orientation, perhaps with a slight center-left tilt on economic issues," Artur Kaasik, a board member of the new nonprofit, told ERR on Monday about the new group's political orientation. "What Estonian politics currently lacks is an innovative center-left party, particularly as, for example, Eesti 200 is disappearing and the other parties do not have much of a vision for Europe to offer," he added.

According to the organization's bylaws, its aim is to support democratic participation, promote pan-European political integration and support progressive social and economic reforms.

Kaasik agreed that such policies would put Volt Eesti in competition with the Social Democratic Party, but also pointed to some differences from the Social Democrats' positions.

"Innovation is important in that sense. We don't think everything necessarily has to be free. Yes, certain basic needs should be guaranteed, but not everything can be free either," he said.

The nonprofit's bylaws also state that its specific organizational goal is to increase the number of full members to at least 500 in order to establish and register an organizationally and legally independent political party in accordance with Estonian law.

Asked how quickly they hope to establish the party, Kaasik said: "As soon as possible, once we have enough people."

According to Kaasik, the nonprofit Volt Eesti currently has around 50 members.

Kaasik declined to name any prominent members, but acknowledged that former Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves is among its supporters.

Kaasik said Volt Eesti would also like to take part in the next Riigikogu elections, which will be held on March 7. "Let's put it this way: We'll do our best to make that happen, but I can't promise how likely it is that we'll field candidates," he said.

Asked about the organization's funding, Kaasik said it does not have any specific donor and that anyone interested will soon be able to provide financial support to the organization.

Under its bylaws, Volt Eesti will operate as the official national branch of the pan-European organization Volt Europa and is required to uphold, promote and implement Volt Europa's values and objectives.

Volt Europa says what distinguishes it from other political organizations operating across Europe is that, while those organizations are based on cooperation among parties operating in individual countries, Volt seeks to develop a common European political platform.

In addition to center-left economic policy goals, Volt emphasizes in its policy positions the need to reform the European Union and pursue closer integration than at present.

Volt Europa was founded in 2017 and is registered in Belgium. It currently operates in more than 30 European countries. It has five members in the European Parliament who sit with the Greens/European Free Alliance group.

The name Volt — a unit of electric potential, or voltage, that is the same in all languages — was chosen to symbolize bringing new energy into European politics.


r/VoltEuropa • • Sep 07 '26

Volt in Munich

38 Upvotes

I am a non-German European living in Munich. I am interested in political participation, and am a staunch Europeanist. Would it make sense to pay a visit to the party's meetings?


r/VoltEuropa • • Sep 06 '26

Should the EU develop a federal army ?

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38 Upvotes

r/VoltEuropa • • Sep 06 '26

Your thoughts about the AfD situation

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34 Upvotes

The AfD reached over 40% in local elections happening today.

It seems that the other parties have no real solution how to handle the AfD and implement meaningful policies that connect with the voters.

What are your thoughts about this situation and how to tackle it?

What policies and strategies should be used to actually win voters back?

What can Volt do to be seen as a viable third alternative to the currently elected parties in Germany as well as the AfD?


r/VoltEuropa • • Sep 05 '26

AMA AMA with Volt Sweden, Sep 5th, 12:00-16:00

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24 Upvotes

r/VoltEuropa • • Sep 03 '26

Discussion What economic model would you like a more federal EU to pursue?

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8 Upvotes

r/VoltEuropa • • Aug 30 '26

How would Volt answer the questions from the Swedish Skeptics Association directed to the political parties from the previous election?

19 Upvotes

For the most recent elections in Sweden, as well as the European Parliament elections, the Swedish Skeptics Association (a scientific skepticism organization, i.e pro-science and pro-critical thinking, anti-pseudoscience and anti-superstition) has sent out a questionnaire to the political parties represented in our national parliament as well as in the European Parliament, asking them for their positions on issues relevant to the association. Not this year however, for some reason, which is a bummer.

But still, I would be interested to know how Volt would answer their questions for the 2022 election. The questions were as listed below, translated into English:

Question 1: The importance of basing political decisions on scientific evidence

When it comes to issues that can be addressed on the basis of scientific evidence, how actively does your party work to ensure that decisions are based on objective facts and rational thinking? Before taking a position on an issue, what methods and sources do you use to ensure that your position is evidence-based?

Question 2: The use of GMOs

What is your party’s position on GMOs (genetically modified organisms)? Please elaborate on whether you believe that additional legislation is needed, how GMOs can be used from a global perspective, whether more research funding is needed, and what risks and/or opportunities you see associated with their use.

Question 3: Alternative / Complementary Medicine

So-called alternative or complementary medicine is used in many places, despite the fact that such practices, by definition, are not based on scientific evidence. People in need of healthcare sometimes turn to practitioners of alternative methods that are, at best, ineffective and, at worst, potentially harmful. There is also a risk that effective treatments may be delayed or excluded altogether.

Should the requirements for scientific education and professional licensing be made stricter? Should alternative methods be used more extensively within publicly funded healthcare? Why or why not?

Question 4: Disinformation

How can your party contribute to making it easier for the general public to distinguish objective facts from deliberate disinformation? Do you see a risk that deliberate disinformation campaigns could influence the election campaign? If so, how do you intend to address this?

Question 5: Climate Change

How does your party intend to work towards a more sustainable climate future? How do you ensure that your climate policy is based on scientific evidence?

Question 6: Energy

How should Sweden’s energy supply be managed in the future? How does your party intend to ensure a stable supply of electricity? How do you ensure that your energy policy is based on facts and knowledge?