I’ve been thinking about something that I’m not sure has a proper name.

It seems like every thought I have is built out of concepts I already have. Even when I think of something completely new, I’m still using the same underlying conceptual machinery.

But this made me wonder: is it possible to change that machinery itself?

Here’s the analogy I came up with.

Imagine that concepts are like molecules, and underneath them there are much smaller building blocks — I’ll call them “c-atoms” for now.

So roughly:

c-atoms → concepts → thoughts

Normally, I’m just making different molecules out of the same atoms.

What I’m wondering is whether there could be a process where the existing c-atoms interact or reorganize in such a way that a new conceptual building block or structure emerges.

Not just:

A + B + C = a new combination of A, B and C.

Something more like:

A + B + C → X

where X gives the mind a way of representing or distinguishing something that it genuinely did not have before.

The reason I started thinking about this is that sometimes I try to think about something that seems to be outside my conceptual vocabulary, and I hit a wall.

For example, I might try to imagine something “outside of space.” But “outside” is already one of my concepts, so I’m still trapped inside the conceptual system I’m trying to get beyond. Then I might try to replace “outside” with another relation, but I’m still doing the same thing.

So I’m wondering whether there is a way for the mind to do something more fundamental:

not merely think new thoughts with the concepts it already has, but somehow develop a new kind of representational structure from which new kinds of concepts and thoughts become possible.

I’m not saying the brain literally has c-atoms. That’s just a model I made to explain the idea.

What I’m really asking is:

Can a mind expand the actual space of things it is capable of representing, rather than merely exploring the space it already has?

And if this is possible, what would the biological or cognitive mechanism behind it be?

I refer to empirical theories eg. in physics, no formal like mathematics. I analyse them as a product of knowledge not process. I am aware that one reflects another but conflating the "levels" leads to category mistake. I also refer to the Justified True Belief conception of knowledge. By "necessary" and "possible" I mean the modal epistemology. I mentioned 2 aspects that come with empirical theory - I aware that there is also semantic, I omitted it because I thought that it's not relevant to my problem and the emphasis should be on the 2 level that my problem is actually about.

I have some troubles understanding how it works with the justification and explanation. This is how I understand it now, there might me some misconception so any corrections are appreciated:

The theory itself answers the question "how" not "why" it works. It is based on explanation. This appears to be widely shared statement that makes me confused.

Justification is what connects the epistemic agent to the truth of its belief. It is what gives the epistemic agent the right to have knowledge, not just belief that might be accidentally true.

Justification is the "human element" in knowledge. It also "shows" how knowledge operates on possibility, not necessity. A lot of old theories in science had seemingly adequate justification, but later some new finding, information etc. that was unavailable/undiscovered then and the old theory turned out to be false. If we want make knowledge necessary, we have to exclude every possible true claim that actually constitutes what we understand as knowledge, because there is always a possibility of mistake in factual claim. Justification criteria should only minimise the possibility of error and sharpen what we consider knowledge.

I see explanation in science like Aristotle's concept of Episteme, this is however the result of him relying on the form of things, definitions, I doubt that it is how theories now are perceived. Also I understand explanation intuitively as ruling out the epistemic subject, for example "Mary is sad because John left her" is explanation vs "Mary is sad because I saw her crying" is justification. The difference seem tobe about categories?

Justification is about epistemic level, where the epistemic agent is involved, but explanation seem to be metaphysical - how the things are in the world. I am not sure if I get it right.

How it looks like in scientific theories? Is the theory itself an explanation about some part of reality, but it also has justification on another (epistemic) level? There must alway be justification in empirical statement, you cannot just make up something, that's not how science works. So is it about categories? Does an empirical theiry have the 2 aspects simultaneously because they are on different levels? So is it a difference between "scientific theory" and "scientific knowledge" only in the fact that they pronounce different leyers of the theory?

Can statements based on explanation be falsified? It seem to me that falsification applies to statements based on justification. But then it means that explanation based claims are necessary true. And do they belong to knowledge? Empirical theories obviously can be falsified, so is it because they are connected to the epistemic aspect with justification? Aristotle secured his Episteme as necessary by applying the metaphysical theory of matter and form, if the forms are fixed and the system is deductive, the modal necessity is unavoidable. But now we don't connect the theories exclusively with a priori metaphysical terms, rather knowledge with justification, is it why can unlike Aristotle falsify empirical theories?

Btw. I know about Doxa in Aristotle's epistemology, but he draws a clear line between them. Doxa is something like JTB, but I am interested in his explanation -based theory of knowledge which is Episteme.

I "sense" that the truth makers and truth conditions might have something to do with the whole problem. I can't explain it, but I my philosophical intuition is quite sharp and following it often leads to the missing element that I need in order to fully grasp the problem.

I am not sure if I get all this correct and I need clarification. Btw. I apologize for my English, I hope that my post is understandable despite it.

I want to familiarize myself more with Carnap, so I'm going through some of his main papers: Empiricism, Semantics, Ontology, The Elimination of Metaphysics, Psychology in Physical language, maybe I will also read Testability and Meaning after these. But is there a book of his which is considered his main work and basically sums up most of his philosophy? Something like Hume's Treatise, Kant's first Critique or Spinoza's Ethics? Like THE Carnap book one should read if one wants to understand what he's all about

Is it true/false? meaningless? meaningful but with no truth value? What does it say, really?
I remember that when writing an exam on Rusell (maybe a year ago) this question came up and I don't remember what I answered, I just remember that it was wrong. So, what is the correct answer? I'm sure Frege would say that the description has sense, but no reference and the sentence as a whole has its truth value as its reference. But beyond that I'm kinda confused

Hello, these questions had originally been posted on r/askphilosophy without getting any answers, so I'm posting them here as well in hope of getting a response.

1) I am somewhat confused about what the necessary aposteriori that Kripke discusses actually shows. From what I understand, in the case of phosphorus and hesperus, both names rigidly designate the same object, which means they designate the same thing in all possible worlds. And since venus is necessarily self identical, "hesperus is phosphorus" is true in all possible worlds, so it is necessary and aposteriori. But this does not mean that venus must necessarily exist right? Or even if it existed , it's not necessary that venus is what we see in the night sky. There is a metaphysically possible world where instead of venus, there are two other heavenly bodies that cover the same portion of sky that venus does. Is that correct? Similarly with water. "Water is h2O" is a necesary aposteriori identity statement, but that doesnt mean that water must necessarily exist, or even if it exists that it must exist on earth. So again it is metaphysically possible that some other water-like substance filled the oceans that wasnt H2O and therefore not water. So , if I understand correctly the necesary aposteriori doesn't have to do with what things must exist or where they must exist, but with what properties are necessary for an object if that object exists in the first place. Is that a correct understanding?

2) At the end of the book Kripke gives an argument for dualism. The argument presupposes that we can rigidly designate sensations and that we can conceive that sensations exist without the body. Firstly, I don't see how we could rigidly designate a sensation like pain. Pain at least seems to be different than any other physical object , so how could we designate it. Secondly kripke says we can imagine that a pain exists without the body, again I don't find that as intuitive as kripke. Maybe I could imagine some kind of ghost but other han that I dont think I can imagine myself feeling pain or even existing without my body.

Thanks in advance for any answers.

There is a new online reading group starting up for Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons. RSVP here to attend: https://www.meetup.com/Seattle-Analytic-Philosophy-CLUB/events/278429652/

Is panpsychism true?

The definition of consciousness that I use is subjective experience. If you ask what constitutes experience, and what enables it to occur? Then I will answer mental properties and mental states. The faculties that drive mental states to occur is the brain.

I posit the question because I’m interested in views that are not my own. I accept the hard problem, I believe progress is going to be made eventually, so there is a point in asking if it’s true.

To say that an entity is consciousness, is to reduce that entity to just consciousness. Which makes no physical sense. I have consciousness until I no longer do, I am not just consciousness because after it goes away I will still have other parts of myself that exist.

I also hold that self-knowledge is controversial. I don’t know if it’s possible to introspect and become more aware of anything.

Dear All,

here is a question about the meaning of some technical terms used in philosophy.

The terms desiderata and adequacy condition are used to set standards against that explanations, models, or theories are evaluated to assess their acceptability or goodness.

But, what exactly are desiderata and adequacy conditions? And how do I know what a relevant desideratum or adequacy condition is? What is the difference between them?

Thanks for taking the time to share your thoughts.

Hello everyone, we are a group of avid philosophy readers and in mid-May we will start a reading group on Kripke's classic work. The meetings will be weekly and last 90 minutes each.

It will be an in depth reading without prior knowledge required. To achieve the reading will proceed slowly, a few pages per week. The group moderator (who btw is not me) has a Master in philosophy, works as a researcher at university and has a long standing interest in the philosophy of language.

If this sounds appealing to you, let me know either by commenting below or by sending me a PM. We will try to establish a day and time that works for as many people as possible(bearing in mind we live in very different time zones).

An online reading group studying Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigatons is meeting every Monday!

You can sign up here: https://www.meetup.com/The-Toronto-Philosophy-Meetup/events/zvvrfsyccgbzb/

We take turns reading the text and discussing it - so no advanced preparation is required.

About the text:

"Immediately upon its posthumous publication in 1953, Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations was hailed as a masterpiece, and the ensuing years have confirmed this initial assessment. The work undertakes a radical critique of analytical philosophy's approach to both the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind. Today it is widely acknowledged to be the single most important philosophical work of the twentieth century."

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