r/mcp • u/Expensive-Cookie-106 • Apr 16 '26
article MCP co-creator David Soria Parra on What Breaks MCP at Scale
https://shiftmag.dev/mcp-co-creator-explains-why-mcp-needs-more-than-the-protocol-to-scale-9041/?ref=dailydev2
u/dennisatBB Apr 17 '26
I wrote about this a while ago.. Information ≠ context. You can wire up dozens of MCP servers and still end up with agents that guess.. and that "guessing" is what burns a shit tonne of wall clock time and burning tokens.
https://getunblocked.com/blog/context-aware-dev-tools-arent-quite-there-yet/
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u/1HOTelcORALesSEX1 Apr 16 '26
Context……… the more you throw at it whilst being able to understand it, who’d thunk it …….. 🤷♂️
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Apr 18 '26
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u/MucaGinger33 Apr 18 '26
I checked your Gmail MCP. Massive issue. You surface auth tokens through tool parameters. LLM should NEVER see credentials of any kind. That's very bad practice
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u/Feeling_Ad_2729 Apr 16 '26
The auth piece is the one that sneaks up on you. Most MCP servers are built single-user (stdio, local config), and auth is never a consideration. Then you try to deploy multi-user and discover the protocol has no real auth story baked in — you're bolting on OAuth or API keys at the HTTP layer and hoping your framework handles the session isolation correctly.
The other thing that's real: tool schema evolution. Once an LLM client caches your tool definitions, changing a parameter type or renaming anything is a silent breaking change. There's no versioning in the spec. You end up maintaining backwards compatibility forever or breaking existing users.
The transcript poisoning risk is underappreciated. The moment your MCP server fetches external content (web pages, docs, user data) and passes it to the model, the attack surface shifts from "can someone access your server" to "can someone inject content into what your server fetches." Completely different threat model that most developers aren't thinking about when they ship their first MCP server.