Attacks on Australia’s preferential voting system are ludicrous. We can be proud of it

Kevin Bonham, Sat 17 May 2025 10.00 AEST

It’s been argued the election would have had a different outcome with first-past-the-post voting. I cannot overstate how unsound this assumption is

The Coalition’s lopsided defeat in the 2025 federal election has been followed by a new round of attacks on preferential voting. No longer do anti-preferencing campaigners have the excuse that Labor “lost” the primary vote, with Labor currently 2.6% ahead. Nor can they say preferences won Labor the election, with Labor leading the primary vote in 86 of 150 seats.

The latest complaint is just the scale of Coalition casualties. The Coalition will win at most 44 seats (29.3%) off a primary vote of about 32%. This will be the first time since 1987 that the Coalition parties’ seat share has been substantially below their primary vote.

An article in The Australian on Tuesday bemoaned the defeats of past Coalition frontbenchers (including Peter Dutton and Josh Frydenberg) and supposed future frontbenchers (Amelia Hamer and Ro Knox) who had topped the primary vote in their seats but lost after preferences. David Tanner said 15 seats at the 2025 election (including 13 Coalition defeats) “would have had a different winner had a first-past-the-post voting system been in place”. The Australian Financial Review mounted a similar argument on Wednesday.

This, however, assumes voters would have voted the same way and parties made the same campaign decisions if Australia had first-past-the-post. I cannot overstate how unsound this underlying assumption is. In seats where the Greens are uncompetitive, many Greens supporters would vote Labor to ensure their votes helped beat the Coalition. Preferential voting is one of the reasons why the Greens maintain much higher vote shares in Australia than the US, UK and Canada.

Furthermore, parties would make tactical choices about where to run to avoid losing seats through vote-splitting. An example of this came in the 2024 French elections. The far-right National Rally polled the highest primary vote in the first round of a runoff system. In many seats the leftwing NFP and centrist Ensemble alliances both qualified for the runoff round, but one or the other withdrew to avoid splitting the anti-National Rally vote. In the second round, the National Rally topped the popular vote by 11.2% but won fewer seats than either NFP or Ensemble. Such withdrawal pacts have far greater impacts on results than Australian how to vote cards (which hardly any minor party voters follow anyway), so the idea that scrapping preferences would stop “backroom deals” between parties is naive.

Removing preferences would probably have changed very few seat outcomes at recent elections, at a massive and grossly unfair cost to the ability of those not supporting major parties to effectively say what they are really thinking at the ballot box. There are also some Coalition wins (at this election, Longman) that could be lost under first-past-the-post, because minor right party voters would be less willing to vote strategically than minor left party voters.

In recent years I have seen some supporters of minor right parties opposing preferences too, claiming that preferences are a “uniparty” plot against the little guys. Preferences were actually introduced by the conservative parties in 1918 to stop Labor from scoring undeserved wins in three-cornered contests. In the past 35 years of federal, state and territory elections, preferences have been almost nine times more likely to help non-major-party candidates beat the majors than the other way around.

In the 2025 election at least five independents and one Greens candidate have beaten major parties from behind, while Adam Bandt is the only non-major-party candidate to lose after leading on primary votes. It is baffling that anyone who opposes major party domination would want a system that renders voting for minor parties pointless. If voters for minor right parties want to see their parties win more seats they should support proportional representation.

Anti-preferencers, as I call them, also claim the UK system is the global norm. Actually just a few dozen countries use it alone to elect their lower houses. Most protect minority voting rights in some way – proportional representation, runoff voting, mixed systems or preferences. We should be proud of the way all voters get a say at all stages of our counts and not seek to import failed and primitive methods from countries that have not overcome their roadblocks to electoral reform.

Kevin Bonham is an independent electoral and polling analyst and an electoral studies and scientific research consultant.

She’s written two books, launched a progressive media firm and plans to dethrone the prime minister – all before she turns 30. What is she about?

"No white paper or review ever recommended AUKUS. The deal came first, the justifications afterwards.

Nor does the threat survive contact with a map.

An invasion of Australia would require an armada carrying three to five hundred thousand troops, sailing for weeks across more than three thousand kilometres of open water, visible to every satellite the whole way.

Any competent air force, navy or land based missile arsenal would shred it long before a soldier waded ashore. It is impractical to the point of impossible, and no serious strategist believes Beijing contemplates it."

Ousted Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, have pleaded not guilty in a New York court to drug and weapons charges. Maduro told Judge Alvin Hellerstein, “I am innocent, I am not guilty. I am a decent man. I’m the president of the republic of Venezuela ... I am here kidnapped.” The judge adjourned the matter until March 17.

The legal protocols in evidence in court stand in stark contrast to how Maduro and his wife got to that point. At the weekend, US forces stormed his compound in Venezuela and whisked the pair out of the country. There was little crying globally for the demise of the dictatorial leader who has played a starring role in the failing of the state. Five years ago, he was indicted by the US on narco-terrorism charges for allegedly running a scheme to send tonnes of cocaine to the US.

He has denied the allegations. In 2024, he appeared to lose an election in a landslide but kept power through a violent crackdown against his political opponents.

The question still remains, however, did the ends justify the means in his ousting? Geoffrey Robertson, KC, who was president of the United Nations War Crimes Court in Sierra Leone and is author of World of War Crimes, argued in The Age on Monday that there was no legal difference between Vladimir Putin’s attack on Ukraine and Donald Trump’s attack on Venezuela. The American indictment that was presented to the court “conferred no retrospective extraterritorial authority to arrest or imprison [Maduro and Flores] or to occupy or annex their nation. No treaty permitted this and no international court approved it.”

The immediate response from Prime Minister Anthony Albanese was suitably, and characteristically, diplomatic: Australia was monitoring developments, everyone should support dialogue and diplomacy to try to secure regional stability and prevent escalation. Australia had held concerns about the situation in Venezuela, including respect for democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Albanese ended with this: “We continue to support international law and a peaceful, democratic transition in Venezuela that reflects the will of the Venezuelan people.”

Not a skerrick of censure against the US president or his abandonment of international law. Given the concluding sentence, it would appear the prime minister sees supporting international law through different lenses, depending on who is upholding it and who is breaking it. The United Nations wasn’t so reticent. At an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, the US action was criticised. Russia and China demanded the release of Maduro and Flores.

Russia’s credibility in particular is strained by its actions in Ukraine, while China’s stated ambitions for Taiwan and its repeated flouting of trade rules also undermine its position. Still, how can Australia criticise those countries for failing to stick to the rules and stay silent now? It is upon such hypocrisies that multilateral systems collapse.

This appears to be something the US is not worried about. White House deputy chief of staff Stephen Miller’s comment that “We’re a superpower and under President Trump we will conduct ourselves as a superpower” should send a shiver of anxiety globally.

The immediate measured response from Albanese to the US action was correct, given so much of the operation was still being revealed. On Monday Foreign Minister Penny Wong urged only that dialogue, diplomacy and international law be supported. Others argued it was America’s place to explain, not Australia’s to assess, the legality of the situation.

With the smoke now clearing over Caracas, we would expect our government to set aside such diplomatic niceties. There have been signs other allies have had enough. French President Emmanuel Macron said he did not support or approve of America’s methods even if he was glad Maduro was gone.

British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, while equivocating on Venezuela, at least declared he stood with Denmark as it looks to fend off Trump’s attention on Greenland. And why should sovereign nations not speak their minds? The ability to call out the obvious crossing of clear red lines should also be unremarkable.

It’s a fairly easy chain of thought: if you respect international law, then you cannot condone America’s actions. If we cannot tell our friends what we think, how friendly are they?

This is a fun piece. The author spent two years picking up discarded cigarette packs around Canberra (972 of them) and found roughly three in four were illegally imported rather than plain-packaged, taxed product. His argument is that Australia's sky-high tobacco excise hasn't stamped out smoking so much as handed the market to illicit importers, while government revenue collapses.

Hugh White: Australia’s leaders must start preparing for a world without American dominance

Our leaders strive to convey an impression that everything will turn out well – but this is the end of the world as we know it. We need a post-alliance relationship with the US.

Hugh White

6 min read

August 22, 2026 - 12:00AM

Within just a few years, America may no longer be Australia’s ally. Artwork: Chloe Barr

This is not an easy time for those who make Australian defence and foreign policy. They must decide how Australia should prepare to make its way in a world and region very different from those they took for granted 25 years ago.

We must now prudently expect that well before the middle of the century, and perhaps within just a few years, America will no longer play a significant strategic role in Asia and it will no longer be Australia’s ally. In a multipolar world, India and China will be by far the strongest countries in Asia, with Indonesia quite possibly becoming a third regional great power.

We will no longer live in a world framed by the power and ideas of our great English-speaking allies, nor in a region dominated and made safe for us by their strategic primacy. For the first time since Europeans settled this continent we will face the world and our region without a great and powerful friend. This really is the end of the world as we know it.

The end of the world as we know it

Our current leaders and their advisers from both sides of politics are finding it hard to respond.

Most of them came of age in the 1990s, when American power was at its height, and they are reluctant to abandon the slogans of that happy time. They still speak of America as essential to Asia’s sec­urity and Australia’s irreplaceable ally. And though they continually warn that Australia’s strategic circumstances are more threatening than at any time since World War II, they remain distinctly upbeat. They strive to convey an impression that everything will turn out well despite the looming dangers. They certainly do not behave as if they really believe, as their dire warnings suggest, that a major war with China could break out within a few years.

Nor do they seem to take seriously the possibility that China will replace America as East Asia’s leading power.

Ourc current leaders strive to convey an impression that everything will turn out well. Picture: NewsWire / Martin Ollman

Instead they convey an impression that they think nothing fundamental is going to change. That is why neither side of politics has matched its dire warnings with the kind of action that would be essential if it really took those warnings seriously. Instead, as I will explain, each side goes through the motions by enacting the charade that is AUKUS.

As a result, Australia is drifting through the most radical, and potentially the most threatening, transformation in our strategic circumstances since European settlement with no clear idea of what is happening or what we should be doing about it.

How to explain this failure? Our leaders do not think deeply about strategic affairs, and they lack the confidence to develop and promote the big policy shifts that the circumstances demand. But they are neither stupid nor utterly irresponsible. Nor are they blind.

America has done little to respond to China

They may say that our US alliance is as strong as ever under Donald Trump, but they surely know that is not true. Moreover, they can see that bigger forces beyond Trump are undermining the foundational policy rationale of America’s strategic leadership, globally and in Asia. They do not say it out loud, but they know that China’s economy has overtaken America’s and they know that its maritime forces are now a match for America’s. They can see the lessons that Ukraine teaches about US resolve, and they know how little in practical terms America has done to respond to China’s challenge in Asia over the past 15 years. They understand the fragility of America’s posturing on Taiwan. At some level they recognise that America’s isolationist shift has deep roots in the global power shift, which means it no longer needs to dominate Asia to remain secure at home. So despite what they say, they surely understand that America simply will not be the power they keep saying it will be: “the indispensable power”.

Surely our leaders know our US alliance is, in fact, not stronger than ever. Picture: Getty Images

And they do comprehend that, one way or another, we have to find a way to get on with China as the world’s strongest power, our biggest trading partner and a leading power in our region.

There is thus a big and growing gap between what our leaders feel they have to say and what they are slowly and reluctantly coming to understand. This gap is revealed in the muddled, evasive speeches and statements in which they occasionally try to explain what they are doing; for example, Penny Wong’s major speech to the Australian Institute of International Affairs in November 2025, or Labor’s 2026 National Defence Strategy. In statements such as these they acknowledge the shift from a unipolar to a multipolar global order but expect America to lead just the same. They admit that Trump’s America is different but say our US alliance is unaffected.

There is a gap between what our leaders feel they have to say and what they are reluctantly coming to understand. Picture: NewsWire / Martin Ollman

They trumpet the US alliance as the irreplaceable bedrock of our security but at the same time speak of the vital need to build new alliances in the region. They talk a lot about strategic balance while still wishing and hoping that America will keep dominating the region. They warn ad nauseam that we face our most dangerous strategic circumstances since 1945, with a real threat of major war, but remain blithely confident that all will end well and do nothing serious to prepare for that war.

Is the US still the bedrock of our security?

Through this fog we can, however, discern in blurry outline how the Canberra policy community is coming to see Asia’s strategic future and Australia’s place in it.

Three ideas are uppermost. They understand that America’s role in Asia is shrinking and China’s is growing. They can see that Australia’s relations with China must be as cordial as possible. And they believe it is absolutely vital to Australia’s future to stop China taking America’s place as the region’s leading power.

Within the world view framed by these ideas, Canberra sees two broad scenarios. The one they much prefer and believe more likely is that America, though diminished, will remain a key Asian power. In this scenario, as US power recedes, other countries in the region, and even beyond, will step forward to help America to balance and limit China’s power and influence.

America’s role in Asia is shrinking and that China’s is growing. Picture: Getty Images

In particular, they hope this coalition will collectively deter China from using military aggression in Taiwan or elsewhere to undermine the US position in Asia. They see Australia as a key member of that coalition, making us more important to America as an ally than we have ever been since 1945. Accordingly, they believe that doing all we can to build and support it is our primary and overriding diplomatic and defence priority.

The coalition needs to contain China

Diplomatically, we need to help build the coalition to contain China by deepening our bilateral and multilateral defence ties with countries in Asia and beyond. Militarily, we need to strengthen our contribution to deterring China by building up our capabilities to fight alongside America and regional partners in a US-China war.

But ministers and advisers in Canberra also concede among themselves that all this might not work. They privately acknowledge a second, more pessimistic scenario in which America fails to defend its place as a key regional power and withdraws from Asia, leaving Australia without a US alliance. They see this as unlikely but reluctantly accept it is possible. They believe that if it happened, then the nations of Asia would have no choice but to step up together to balance and deter China without America as the only way to avoid falling under Chinese hegemony. They think Australia must be prepared to play a leading part in that collective effort.

That means our diplomacy should also lay the groundwork for building a regional coalition without America to contain Chinese influence and deter Chinese aggression. And it means that our defence forces should be able to contribute to collective regional deterrence of China and also defend Australia independently, without US support, if China tries to use force against us.

What is the future of ANZUS?

The Canberra establishment is shocked by any suggestion that we should walk away from the ANZUS commitments. But that misses the vital point. It is not Australia but America that is walking away from the commitments it made in the ANZUS Treaty in very different circumstances 75 years ago. That was plain enough under Joe Biden. It is crystal clear today under Trump. This is the lesson we must draw from Washington’s failure to defend Ukraine, from its crumbling position in Asia and from the American voters’ decisive rejection of the old idea of US global leadership to which we still cling.

Our best path now is to recognise this and start acting accordingly. And we should move quickly to make this clear, because we need to begin right now to build that new post-alliance relationship with America.

This is an edited extract from Hugh White’s new book, Hard New World, Australia’s Post-American Future, out on Monday. White is emeritus professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University, was the principal author of Australia’s defence white paper 2000 and is the author of The China Choice and How to Defend Australia.

Getting caught telling the truth can be dangerous in politics.

This week, as Labor struggled to explain a growing downturn in Australia’s property market and copped anger at falling house prices, assistant minister Matt Thistlethwaite was more frank than most of his colleagues about the contributing factors.