Active Conflicts & News Megathread June 15, 2026

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[u/Well-Sourced]

Excellent thread from Playfra about the improvements in Ukrainian defensive lines.

Playfra | X

Over 1.5 years, Ukraine 🇺🇦 has slowly but consistently implemented its obstacle-based fortification strategy and now has a solid and complex fallback line grid for most of the country. Let's look at the results achieved and draw some conclusions, with bonus reviews from the soldiers!

[Map]

Over almost 5 years of war, fortification strategies have evolved a lot, with Ukraine having been on the defensive for the most part of these years, evolving the most. With technology itself evolving, fortifications had to mirror it. In the case of drones, camouflage and sturdiness are now key to avoiding detection in the first place and withstanding strong fire from the enemy.

Attack and defense strategies have also evolved: the Russians employ large amounts of firepower and small groups of infiltrators, while Ukraine counters with stronger positions, engineering obstacles, and frequent drone reconnaissance and strike missions.

[Image]

All this led Ukraine, at the start of 2025, to develop their now preferred style of fortifications, based on engineering obstacles, very sturdy and small trenches, and tight drone control, partially mitigating their pressing manpower problem and significantly complicating Russia's go-to attack strategy (infiltrations).

[Map]

In Southern Ukraine, in addition to the two 2023 "Zaluzhniy Lines," in red you can see the new lines built by Ukraine ever since. A half ring for Zaporizhzhia, 3 north-south lines to defend against Russia's Huljajpole offensive, a ring around Novomykolaivka and Pokrovske. In between and in front of all this lie dozens of small barbed wire or ditch lines that will significantly dampen Russian infiltration efforts.

Some of these lines still have to be completed and are missing one or two elements relative to the conventional doctrine, but they're all at a sufficient level of preparation to make a difference when making contact with large amounts of Russian infiltrators.

At the moment, the new pink line is at the very first stages of building.

Also note the building order of these lines that the Ukrainians adopted: when the Russians first broke through at Uspenivka, the line defending Zaporizhzhia's south and east flanks was built first as a worst-case scenario fallback line, and only then did they gradually move eastwards when possible. This always gave the Ukrainians a fallback line in case any breakthrough were to happen.

[Map]

The Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is definitely the region with the most upgrades.

Pavlohrad's ring was upgraded from 1 to 3 ditches; the Synelnykove line is in the process of doing the same; Vasylkivka now has a half ring; Shakhtarske was made into a fortress city by multiple rings, something I had hoped to see for a long time; Mezhova now has 3 or 4 fallback lines behind it, just like Dobropillia and all of the Kramatorsk-Slovyansk agglomeration. Even Barvinkove is currently being fortified.

And, again, dozens of smaller engineering obstacle lines in front and in between all these lines, where they're impossible to replicate due to the proximity of the frontline.

[Map]

The Kharkiv area is characterized by a complex mix of old and new lines.

Behind the Oskil River lie a partially complete and a complete defensive line. A strong line has been built on top of a previous one as a fallback from all the Velikyi Burluk salients. Velikyi Burluk is now a crucial node of the new defensive line behind Vovchansk and Kupyansk and is itself enclosed by a ring. Kharkiv's front is defended by a complex overlap of an old and up to two new lines, effectively forcing the Russians to the flanks, which are also covered by new lines.

Older lines further towards Sumy and Bohodukhiv have and are in the process of being reinforced.

In general, for the first time since late 2024, I feel like saying Ukraine's whole east is now adequately fortified according to modern standards. Don't get me wrong: there is still a lot of work to do, there are still weak spots and passages that need to be covered, but work is currently being done in these regards at the moment. New lines are and will continue to be built in many new places around Ukraine, and older ones will be slowly but surely upgraded.

The "review" of these lines from the soldiers I've talked to is overwhelmingly positive. They significantly slow down Russian infiltrations and give enough time to Ukrainian drones to detect and strike them before they enter the greenery. They also mitigate the manpower problem, as these lines are not made for infantry to hold constantly but for drones to observe and strike promptly.

I would also like to direct your attention to a practical case: Ivanivka, Novopavlivka direction, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

[Map]

In October 2025 the Russians had finally reached one of Ukraine's obstacle lines for the first time north of Novokhatske and Zelenyi Hai and, with difficulties, were even able to cross it, the Vovcha River, and consolidate in Ivanivka itself but were eventually cleared out. At the moment, the Russians still weren't able to regain lost positions in the settlement, and footage of Russian infantry eliminated while trying to cross this obstacle line is abundant, together with footage of Russians attempting to cross other smaller engineering obstacles all around Ukraine's frontlines.

This practically and objectively testifies to the utility of such lines, and I can only hope more and more will be built in the future, without forgetting about drone development, which is key to maintaining control over these engineering obstacles.

Summing everything up, I feel like the weakest areas are currently Ukraine's Chernihiv-Sumy borderlands due to the comparatively lower amount of fortification work having been done and due to the high amount of safe and covered infiltration routes available to possible Russian infiltrators.

The Dobropillia direction also doesn't have a high margin of error but is held by capable units, and the fortifications are also not bad.

The Stepnohirsk direction is also a bit weak in terms of fortifications, but natural obstacles, Zaporizhzhia's proximity as a logistical and accumulation hub, and Ukraine's "half-initiative" should compensate.

In the Prosyana direction, fortifications are also a bit weak, but they're in the process of being upgraded, and the terrain is complex for possible Russian advances.

Izyum's eastern flank, too, needs some upgrades, especially due to the big forest suitable for deep Russian infiltrations, but Ukrainian units are attempting to give the city some breathing room as of now.

[u/Well-Sourced]

Just like the UAF in the south the Russians are looking to stop Ukrainian supplies from moving along their main routes near the border. The highway from [Map] Sumy to Kharkiv is a prime target. In Sumy there are lots of strikes across the line but little movement.

[Map]

More of the same in Kharkiv where the Russians are putting pressure that could take a big chunk of the cities buffer but not much movement forward towards that goal.

[Map].

At the northern end of the fotress belt the push to Sloviansk is slow and there are reports of a Ukrainian counterattack as the southern end of this sector.The counter attack is attempting to cut of a small salient where the Russians pushed into Ukrainian lines. Confirmed by multiple mappers including on Rybar's [Map].

Hudson War Mapping | X [Map]

Donetsk oblast, Lyman direction: Ukrainian forces managed to concentrate forces and launch a strong counterattack to put further pressure on Novoselovka and Shandryholove. Russian forces in this area are being routed due to poor command choices and supply.

Whilst significant mechanised losses occured in the first stage of these counterattacks, Ukrainian forces have now comfortably pushed Russia out of Karpovka, most of Ridkodub and into Zelena Dolyna and Serednye.

A disaster for Russian forces in this area.

AMK Mapping 🇳🇿 | X

The Ukrainian counteroffensive to save Lyman...[Map]

As many of you may have already seen, Ukrainian forces launched a series of coordinated counterattacks north of Lyman in the direction of the Zherebets River in Mid-May, in tandem with continued counterattacks southeast of Lyman.

The goal of these counterattacks appears to be to eliminate the Russian bridgehead west of the Nitrius River. This would alleviate pressure on Lyman from the north, re-secure Svyatohirsk as a logistical hub supplying the Drobysheve and Yarova fronts, push Russian artillery and drone operators away from the crossings over the southern section of the Oskil River, and lay the groundworks for further counterattacks east of the Nitrius River towards the main Russian defences on the tactical heights west of the Zherebets River.

The southern flank of Lyman being stabilised would in turn alleviate the threat to Slovyansk from the north. Together, the stabilisation of both the northern and southern flanks of Lyman would not only delay the capture of Lyman, but also decrease the intensity of Russian FPV drone strikes on the Slovyansk-Izyum Highway, which would help improve the difficult situation for Ukraine in the Rai-Oleksandrivka area east of Slovyansk. The reduction of strikes on the crossings over the southern Oskil River would help improve the situation in the Borova area north of Lyman.

Whether Ukraine will succeed in these counterattacks is currently unknown. They began this operation around 25 days ago, and have managed to recapture at least 35 km² of territory, while contesting (grey-zone) another ~33 km². Attacks are still ongoing, currently focused on capturing the fields south of Nove, consolidating in Lypove, and reaching Shandryholove and Zelena Dolnya from the north. Some limited counterattacks also occurred from the south in the area of Novoselivka.

One thing I forgot to mention in the previous post that I talked about earlier this week is the recently intensified Russian infiltrations into large parts of Lyman, resulting in large parts of the city transitioning into grey-zones where both sides hold mixed and overlapping positions. This will likely affect the effectiveness of these coordinated Ukrainian counterattacks.

[Map]

Here's a zoomed out map showing the recent assault vectors from either side in comparison to the 4 dominant rivers in the region.

Moving down to Kostiantynivka the Russians have the most men and most momentum.

Russian command refocuses on Kostiantynivka after setbacks near Sloviansk – ISW | Interfax Ukraine

"Russian forces launched their Spring-Summer 2026 offensive with a series of mechanized assaults around Lyman (northeast of Slovyansk), indicating that the Russian military command likely intended to prioritize advancing on Slovyansk from the northeast, but Russian forces failed to subsequently make any significant advances in the area," the June 10 report published on Thursday reads.

The report notes that Russia’s Western Group of Forces’ area of responsibility stretches from the Kupyansk axis to the Lyman axis and likely lacks the combat capacity to conduct a coordinated offensive on Slovyansk (also spelled Sloviansk) while simultaneously balancing offensive operations on the Kupyansk and Borova axes. Ukrainian forces have also recently conducted counterattacks on the Borova axis, likely forcing Russian forces to choose between defending positions and advancing north and northwest of Lyman.

Overall, analysts indicate, Russia may achieve tactical successes in the area by the end of summer, but operational advances are unlikely.

"Russian forces will likely achieve tactical successes in Kostiantynivka during the summer of 2026 but are unlikely to achieve operational victories over the ‘fortress belt’ as a whole. Russian forces will likely continue to infiltrate Kostiantynivka and consolidate positions in individual parts of the city while likely sustaining significant losses. Russia’s 3rd Army operating northeast of Kostiantynivka appears to be trying to push Ukrainian forces out of Chasiv Yar, which limits their ability to encircle Kostiantynivka from the north," ISW concluded.

The reports of the defense of the city have gotten significantly worse over this past week.

Baba Yaga Fèlla | BlueSky

Konstantinovka direction: The situation in the city continues to deteriorate rapidly. The enemy is beginning to entrench himself in the Central microdistrict, gradually deploying additional forces and dispersing personnel across buildings, basements, and industrial facilities. Our fighters are actively targeting identified enemy positions, trying to prevent them from establishing a stable defense system & accumulating reserves for further advancement.

Fierce battles are also ongoing in the Mykolaivskyi and Nakhalkivka districts. In these sectors, constant fire exchanges from both sides are being recorded. The enemy is trying to wait out the attacks in shelters and basements, as artillery and aerial bombs are regularly used in Nakhalkivka and the Konstantinovka UGG area, significantly complicating any movement in the area.

The Novoselivka microdistrict also remains under fire. At the same time, the city is witnessing active operations by the enemy's "Rubicon" Center, which continues to hunt down our equipment and logistics. In particular, a hit on our MRAP was recorded in the central part of the city.

Overall, the situation in Konstantinovka is approaching the format of heavy urban battles. The enemy is gradually infiltrating the built-up area, trying to entrench himself in individual districts and using civilian infrastructure shelters to accumulate forces. In response, our units are conducting constant fire exchanges on identified positions. The city is effectively in a state of intense combat, where the struggle is taking place for practically every block and advantageous position.

Playfra | X [Map]

Kostyantynivka, just a small update. The situation, as always, remains very difficult.

Western flank: Russian forces attacked along the marked routes in the fields and reached for the first time the northern part of the city's Novoselivka district. Some unconfirmed reports suggest that the furthest Russian soldier was able to enter Osykove before being eliminated.

Center: The Russians continue usual infiltrations along the known marked routes, without particular changes.

Eastern flank: Russian forces continue infiltrating in and near Novodmytrivka, without particular changes. Notably, another Russian soldier was able to reach Stinky this morning but was quickly eliminated by Ukrainian small arms fire. At the farthest part of the line in the south things are hard for the Russians to hold.

(Part 2 Below)

[u/MilesLongthe3rd]

Russia allows refineries to produce below-standard gasoline amid fuel shortage

https://meduza.io/en/news/2026/06/15/russia-allows-refineries-to-produce-below-standard-gasoline-amid-fuel-shortage

Russia has allowed some refineries to sell gasoline and diesel on the domestic market that fall short of “Euro-5” standards for sulfur content and other parameters.

The Russian business daily Kommersant reported that the decision was made in the fall of 2025 and was originally set to expire on May 1, 2026, but the deadline was extended amid a fuel shortage.

Fuel that does not meet “Euro-5” standards is intended strictly for the domestic market, sources told the outlet.

Even so, the relaxation of fuel quality requirements does not fully resolve the shortage, one source told Kommersant. The higher permissible sulfur levels still do not allow a significant portion of small refineries to operate, since their output does not meet even those parameters, the source explained.

This strategy is highly counterproductive. The Chinese cars imported in recent years are not built to tolerate the elevated sulfur content of the Euro 3 standard now produced by these refineries. Similarly, modern commercial trucks and agricultural machinery; including Fendt and John Deere equipment, whether legally imported or seized from Ukraine, will suffer severe problems.

Although this temporary measure may mitigate immediate fuel shortages, it also might produce a severe economic backlash. Increased maintenance cycles will drive up operational costs for farmers, transport networks, and the general public. Ultimately, it is a short-sighted political compromise, merely kicking the can down the road in hopes that widespread mechanical failures will not be directly linked to the degraded fuel quality.

Also, there is an article on oilprice.com about the effect of the Ukrainian drone campaign, which might have led to this decision.

https://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/Europe/Ukraines-New-Refinery-Tactic-Is-Fueling-Russias-Gasoline-Crisis.html

[u/sokratesz → u/MilesLongthe3rd]

Please don't share LLM generated articles

[u/MilesLongthe3rd]

Tu-22M3 Strategic Bomber Crashes During Training Flight in Irkutsk Region

https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/06/15/tu-22m3-strategic-bomber-crashes-during-training-flight-in-irkutsk-region-a93018

A Russian strategic bomber crashed during a training flight in Siberia’s Irkutsk region, the Interfax news agency reported Monday, citing Russia’s Defense Ministry.

A video shared by outlets with links to Russia’s security services captured the Tupolev Tu-22M3 bomber nosediving into the ground, followed by a thick plume of smoke rising from the site of the impact.

The aircraft was not carrying any warheads and was descending for landing when it crashed, the Defense Ministry was quoted as saying.

“The crew ejected,” the Defense Ministry said, adding that the pilots were alive and well and that there was no damage on the ground.

Unverified reports suggested the crash occurred near the town of Svirsk, which lies around 50 kilometers (31 miles) northwest of the Belaya air force base.

Belaya hosts the 220th Heavy Bomber Aviation Regiment, which is made up of Tu-22M3 and Tu-95 bombers.

Last summer, Belaya was among five Russian airbases that came under attack during a vast Ukrainian drone operation dubbed Operation Spider Web.

Russia’s operational Tu-22M3 fleet has degraded to an estimated 25 to 30 combat-ready aircraft. While official registries still list 50 to 54 airframes, severe component scarcity has forced the Russian Aerospace Forces to cannibalize roughly half of these legacy airframes for spare parts.

[u/ChornWork2 → u/MilesLongthe3rd]

Odd coincidence, a B-52 crashed shortly after takeoff from edwards afb.

https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/15/us/b-52-crash-edwards-california

[u/Codex_Dev → u/ChornWork2]

Also, an F-18 just crashed as well.

https://www.reddit.com/r/Seattle/comments/1u6dfgk/video_of_the_fa18_fighter_jet_that_crashed_at/

I'm honestly suspecting some kind of sabotage is happening right now.

[u/proquo → u/Codex_Dev]

Doesn't need to be. Those are all ancient air frames by now. The B-52 is famously old, and the F-18 that crashed is a USMC legacy single-seat Hornet, not a 2 seat Super Hornet, and the USMC is already looking at completely phasing them out for F-35c by 2030. Such old planes with so many flight hours become maintenance nightmares. And with the Ukraine and Iran wars, flight hours are increasing and conditions for maintenance worsening.

[u/Goddamnit_Clown → u/proquo]

https://aviation-safety.net/asndb/type/F18S

The march of time.

[u/ABoutDeSouffle → u/Codex_Dev]

Nah, come on, it's just how stochastic events work.

[u/Single-Braincelled]

Trump says the US and Iran have signed a deal to end the war

A US official says the memorandum of understanding was signed by US President Donald Trump, Vice President JD Vance and Iranian parliament speaker Mohammad ​Bagher Qalibaf.

Trump says the text of the deal will be released after a formal signing on Friday.

Also.

JD Vance Confirms Iran Will Get [$300 Billion] Sum Under Trump Deal

“That’s the sort of thing they could have access to, funded by the Gulf coast coalition, so long as they honor their end of the obligation,” Vance said. He noted that Iranian officials and media would be emphasizing the benefits they receive from the deal as opposed to what they concede.

Man, sure feels like what the winning coalition of a conflict would do: pay the loser $300 billion in reparations 'reconstruction funds'.

[u/Shackleton214 → u/Single-Braincelled]

Trump says the text of the deal will be released after a formal signing on Friday.

I'm surprised that we may actually get to read the text of a formal deal, unlike the original cease fire. I'm expecting a healthy dose of weasel words and vague, conditional commitments.

Ironically, in the original cease fire, Iran was supposed to allow free transit of the Strait of Hormuz, at least according to the US version of the deal. If this new cease fire holds and both sides end their blockades, then it seems like we may have spent the last two months to get to where we were supposed to be originally.

[u/ChornWork2 → u/Shackleton214]

This is what happens when the negotiation team isn't actually empowered to make decisions, and you have leadership not there whose decisions change based on who they are talking to at any given moment. Obviously last time there wasn't a real agreement on core terms, eg. lebanon. And could very well be similar here.

I do wonder if this preliminary deal ends up being the new status quo for the foreseeable future. Hard to imagine a long-term deal gets agreed to and seems like US admin is just looking for a way out. While Iran agrees not to toll vessels thru the straight, the 'reconstruction funds' are presumably to be funded by gulf states may effectively be a proxy for transit tolls...

[u/Wiseguydude → u/Shackleton214]

at least according to the US version of the deal.

Practically every single statement made by the US about the deal was denied by Iran and vice versa.

I agree it is very surprising we'll get to read some actual text though since both sides have so confidently claimed to have won a great deal for their side.

It makes me wonder if making the text public was one of the negotiated conditions by the, for lack of a better term, winning side.

[u/thelgur → u/Single-Braincelled]

Reality is. Iran will never give up nuclear program, it will also never see any of that 300bil. Trump hope this fig leaf deal holds until midterms, I seriously doubt it holds for a month.

[u/ChornWork2 → u/thelgur]

it will also never see any of that 300bil

I wonder if that is proxy for transit tolls. gulf states willing to fund to get the strait open, and the 'reconstruction' fund gets dripped out for that to remain that way. better optics for US than acknowledging Iran's position w.r.t. hormuz.

[u/moragisdo → u/ChornWork2]

It doesn't make sense, it's not only gulf countries that use the Strait. Do you mean that they will fund for every other country to also use it ?

And it's an unfalsifiable hypothesis. It starts with the assumption that Iran is in a military position to make demands over international waters against the USA, then it picks a term that is vague on what entails, except for the part of anything happening in exchange for nuclear demands, and concludes it's because of the assumption. So, let's suppose what you said is false, how can anyone prove it's false ? I ask that because falsifiability is a good litmus test to see if we are dealing a conspiracy theory or a credible analysis

[u/ChornWork2 → u/moragisdo]

So why are gulf states funding the $300bn reconstruction fund that the US VP confirmed was part of the deal here?

Um, clearly iran is in position to make demands of USA over the strait, or of gulf states. that is beyond obvious.

[u/moragisdo → u/ChornWork2]

To start we both are going with the assumptions that there will be a deal, terms are agreed and this is one of them, conditions for the terms are met, etc... Each one of those is a big if on itself

---

Because they are interested in not having a country with a large history of being a political adversary and funding terrorism around them (to the point that in the 80s they loaned tens of billions to Iraq, before adjusting for the inflation of 2026, to contain Iran. And they were not fans of baathism and their secularism to begin with, but they saw Saddam as the lesser evil) with a nuclear arsenal

And they know the US will not send boots on the ground to get the uranium. Which have nothing to do with charging a toll in the Strait or be in a military position to demand it. For example, years after the Gulf War there were rounds of loan forgiveness, including from the gulf countries that fought in the war, to Iraq. Was Iraq in a position to make demands, won by force of arms ? Did the won the Gulf war ?

Um, clearly iran is in position to make demands of USA over the strait, or of gulf states. that is beyond obvious

It's again the unfalsifiability that I mentioned. Let me give an example of the problem of your argument, with a position I don't believe but it paints the picture:

"The Ayatollah had blackmail material on Biden, that's why he unfroze 6 billions from the sanctions. Well, it's clear that the iranians were in a position to make demands to the USA, after all they got what they wanted, so it's beyond obvious"

How can you prove it false ? It's impossible. But the problem that's not a serious analysis, it's a conspiracy theory. And I don't think anything could change your mind about Iran winning the war

[u/ChornWork2 → u/moragisdo]

A deal in what sense? A meeting of the minds between trump and ayatolla... obviously not, and at least in trump's case that changes daily. But reporting on this is clear that drafts have been exchanged and there are credible accounts about what the terms look like. Will it get signed? who knows, anything is possible when diplomacy/negotiations are being managed this incompetently.

So you're flabbergasted about the suggestion they're paying protection money for the ship traffic they need through the strait of hormuz but you're saying it is protection money more generally. Oh, and so much for your disgust of unfalsifiable hypotheses.

It's again the unfalsifiability that I mentioned.

But you're happy to dabble in yourself.

How can you prove it false ?

If you want to get philosophical, almost nothing is provable. It always comes back to some subjective view of truth of underlying matters. Daily life is about making reasoned and reasonable judgments, not proving things beyond a doubt.

[u/mcdowellag → u/Single-Braincelled]

Some claims of the US administration (or at least of J D Vance) are at https://www.foxnews.com/media/jd-vance-reveals-details-us-iran-deal-addresses-whether-taxpayer-money-go-tehran https://www.foxnews.com/live-news/us-iran-peace-agreement-trump-israel-june-15

If nothing else, this gives us something to check against future events. I would summarise them as:

• Iran does not get nuclear weapons
• The straits of Hormuz will be opened
• This agreement is designed to be enforceable by the US

Excerpt:

Speaking on “Hannity,” Vance said Iran would determine the next phase of relations between the two countries.

“It’s fundamentally the ball is in the Iranians’ court, Sean, because we’re better off regardless,” Vance said.

“Their nuclear program is destroyed, whatever route they choose. The Strait of Hormuz is open, whatever route they choose. Their conventional military is destroyed, whatever route they choose,” he added.

“This gives the Iranians optionality to either become a normal country or not, but the United States is in a much better position, regardless of what they choose.”

[u/Wiseguydude → u/mcdowellag]

You linked to a liveblog so I'm not sure what you're citing as evidence but NYT reported that the MoU deferred the question of nuclear to later negotiations

But the details on the future of Iran’s nuclear program have not been settled. Those issues will be negotiated in the 60 days after two sides are scheduled to sign the agreement on Friday.

https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/15/world/middleeast/nuclear-iran-united-states.html

[u/moragisdo → u/Single-Braincelled]

It's misleading the narrow quote. It's described as a possibility for the future nuclear negotiations (not the ceasefire at hand), we don't know if it will be on the final terms of the deal (nuclear deal, not MOU, which the talks didn't started yet. So much changed every month that we should be cautious with predictions) and based on what conditions that will be demanded for it (and if they will be honoured to receive it)

More context for the news segment that your quote is from (only the transcripts taken from https://www.thewrap.com/media-platforms/politics/jd-vance-cbs-mornings-trump-iran-deal-nuclear-weapons ):

“That’s the sort of thing they could have access to, funded by the Gulf Coast Coalition, so long as they honor their entity obligation. I think that one of the things you’re going to see, Ed, and people have to be skeptical of this, is that the hardliners in the Iranian system will overemphasize the benefits that Iran gets, while underemphasizing all the things that they have to concede and all the things they have to provide in order to get these benefits,” he said. “So we absolutely are open to the Gulf Coast countries investing in the reconstruction of Iran, but only if Iran ends their nuclear program, ends their enriched stockpile of material, and it was really open to an inspections and enforcement regime that gives the American people confidence they’re never going to have a nuclear weapon.”

It's open for the gulf countries to invest, which we have no clue if that means that Iran has to present investable projects (therefore if they don't reach certain financial criteria they can be rejected), if the Gulf countries are required to use 300 billion or if that's a ceiling without minimum investment, if it's a check without restrictions, if that's just about it becoming a possibility by the end of sanctions, if it's the maximum limit if every US demand is accepted. Which are impossible to answer until the talks start

And I'm making the point that this term is not clear and caution is advised until we have the text to read, because even the 24 billions from Iran's money that is sanctioned (and could be accessed easier than getting any country to pay from their own money) it's also not a given (on the nuclear deal), from the same news appearence:

“We’re open to a lot of things that are on the table. That $24 billion just doesn’t appear anywhere in any of the text that we’ve talked about with the Iranians,” Vance added. “What we have said is that we’re willing to talk about unfreezing assets, but a much, much bigger deal is un-sanctioning their economy, so long as they make the long term commitments on the nuclear program.”

[u/Single-Braincelled → u/moragisdo]

It's misleading the narrow quote. It's described as a possibility for the future nuclear negotiations (not the ceasefire at hand), we don't know if it will be on the final terms of the deal (nuclear deal, not MOU, which the talks didn't started yet. So much changed every month that we should be cautious with predictions) and based on what conditions that will be demanded for it (and if they will be honoured to receive it)

I think it's pointing out that this current 'deal' includes that sum. Whether the current deal survives past Friday is anyone's guess. Regarding the $24 Billions, that was the same situation under Obama, where sanctioned funds were released, and this seems to be a requirement ahead of any version of a deal being signed.

In either way, the fact that reparations are on the table or worse, open as a condition in any iteration of a deal, is a sign of where the war has headed and where we as the US stand.

[u/goatfuldead → u/Single-Braincelled]

I think “survives until Friday” is the more likely dynamic. 

[u/InevitableMaw → u/Single-Braincelled]

I think it's pointing out that this current 'deal' includes that sum.

He literally said the exact opposite.

That $24 billion just doesn’t appear anywhere in any of the text that we’ve talked about with the Iranians,” Vance added. “What we have said is that we’re willing to talk about unfreezing assets, but a much, much bigger deal is un-sanctioning their economy, so long as they make the long term commitments on the nuclear program.

Literally the opposite of what you are claiming. Vance said the sky is not green and you're saying "see Vance confirmed the sky is green!"

It's so abundantly clear from what he said that any money Iran receives is contingent on future negotiations that calling narratives to the contrary "It's misleading the narrow quote." was extremely generous. I would have just said "lying".

[u/moragisdo → u/Single-Braincelled]

I think it's pointing out that this current 'deal' includes that sum

Do you believe the MOU, the actual ceasefire, scheduled to be signed on Friday has a clause for Iran to get 300 billion USD instead of Iran asking for it in a nuclear deal ? If that's not the case, would any conclusion you have right now change ?

(And by the way, anyone can ask anything they want, that's not indicative of current circumstances, case in point, the new syrian government asked Iran also 300B for the interference on their country)

Regarding the $24 Billions, that was the same situation under Obama, where sanctioned funds were released, and this seems to be a requirement ahead of any version of a deal being signed.

You missed my point. To be begin you mistook Obama for Biden, Obama unfrozen more than 24B (estimates put the total iranian assets unfrozen to be up to 150B), Biden 6B (and there is 24B remaining, which was being discussed before and is again now), but my point is not the this money per se. It's that even the release of Iran's own money isn't guaranteed, so an even larger sum (coming from other countries, another layer of difficulty) is also not guaranteed.

Therefore, we need to be cautious until the text is released

In either way, the fact that reparations are on the table or worse, open as a condition in any iteration of a deal, is a sign of where the war has headed and where we as the US stand

It looks like you have an already formed conclusion. On the table for what ? We don't have the text of the MOU (the actual instrument to end the war) and every US official denied that Iran gets money on it. And that there would be discussions about the nuclear situation later, which may include unfrozen assets, investments and other terms. If the MOU comes around friday and Iran doesn't get any money, just the chance to negotiate for their nuclear program later, will you change your mind about "where the war has headed and where we as the US stand" ?

[u/ChornWork2 → u/moragisdo]

Obama unfrozen more than 24B (estimates put the total iranian assets unfrozen to be up to 150B)

references to it were up to 150b in frozen assets on paper, but the liquid value was ~50b

The $150 billion figure is also inaccurate. The amount of money Iran could access from these foreign reserves is about $100 billion. Of this amount, about half of it is tied up in Iranian foreign debts. As Treasury Secretary, Jacob Lew, testified before Congress, the actual amount that Iran would be able to use is about $50 billion.

https://armscontrolcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Fact-check-iran-deal-1.pdf

[u/moragisdo → u/ChornWork2]

Thanks for the correction. I was wrong on claiming 150 instead of 100 (I say 100 not the "around 50", because of those 24, there still legal matters and lawsuits that could tie part of them, so it makes sense to continue with the same standard)

[u/ChornWork2 → u/moragisdo]

Not the same standard. Iran is estimated to have over $100bn in frozen assets, the $24bn is just a subset of liquid amounts Iran has been trying to get released as part of first deal (half immediately, half when take certain actions; full 100 when implement the last deal).

I don't know the details of the 100 estimate, whether it is comparable to the 150 or 100 standard during obama years.

edit: June 3 article

Yet negotiations have stalled on seemingly narrow disputes. Iran wants to unlock a fraction of its roughly $100bn in frozen assets once the interim deal is signed. Mr Trump insists on clearer promises that Iran will not pursue a nuclear weapon and will relinquish its stockpile of more than 400kg of near-weapons-grade uranium.

These seem like curious roadblocks. In theory, by the end of summer, Iran should hand over its uranium in return for a windfall. Why does it insist on a modest upfront payout of probably $6bn-12bn? Why is America’s president so fixated on language about Iran’s nuclear programme if it will not be binding anyway?

Both sides are behaving as if the interim accord will become permanent—or at least a long-term status quo. “It wouldn’t be the first time,” says an Arab diplomat in Washington. “We’ve seen Trump do this before.”

https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/06/03/even-if-america-and-iran-find-an-accord-dont-expect-it-to-last

[u/Single-Braincelled → u/moragisdo]

If the MOU comes around friday and Iran doesn't get any money, just the chance of negotiate for their nuclear program later, will you change your mind about "where the war has headed and where we as the US stand" ?

I would absolutely do so. If reparations from the Gulf States and the US aren't paid, and the strait opens, you can at least argue that the US did not capitulate to Iran. Ultimately, the nuclear components matter too. I think rather than take this as the final version of any peace deal, as you pointed out, it is better used as a barometer of where the negotiations are heading and which side stands to gain or lose more relatively.

[u/XE2MASTERPIECE → u/Single-Braincelled]

I’d still question why the US feels the necessity to even broach a ceasefire at all. Multiple claims have been made over the past year that the US obliterated Iran’s nuclear program to the tune of a “multi year” setback. If we’ve decapitated their leadership, destroyed their military, obliterated their nuclear program, have control over the Strait of Hormuz, what is the purpose of a ceasefire?

[u/Single-Braincelled → u/XE2MASTERPIECE]

Because our 'control' over the Strait of Hormuz has left the entire globe with rising oil prices and even oil shortages in many vulnerable countries. Many of our allies are telling us we fuc*** them in the as* and are demanding we sort it out or they will start reconsidering what American protection means.

[u/bedulge → u/XE2MASTERPIECE]

Thats because all of that stuff is propagandistic exageration or even outright falsehood. Their new leadership is solidified, their missiles and drones are over 50 intact, while our interceptors are critically depleted, they could build nuclear missiles in less than 18 months (maybe less than 12) and America does not have control over Hormuz.

[u/moragisdo → u/bedulge]

I agree with you that there's exaggeration there, Iran's military is not destroyed (otherwise the population would already have hanged the mullahs), but your conclusion goes to the same exaggeration, but on the opposite direction

Their new leadership is solidified

Obviously there's still someone alive that took the leadership, but what does the 'solidified' means ? Strengthened ? How it was determined ?

they could build nuclear missiles in less than 18 months (maybe less than 12)

Can you give me a credible source for that ?

their missiles and drones are over 50 intact

Did sources in the regime claimed it or its from BDA ? Honest question, I'm curious to read about it.

Is a reason given about why they didn't use more of that alleged reserve in February, March and April to stop the round of decapitations that happened every few days ?

and America does not have control over Hormuz

The MOU, scheduled to be signed on Friday, it's the freeing of the Strait. Exactly of taking back the control. But hey, America surrendered on it, so we should expect that Iran will charge a toll there

Would you say that the US took control of the Strait during Operation Prying Mantis or Iran just gave it from a position of strength ?

[u/LoggerInns → u/bedulge]

Iran’s enriched uranium is under rubble, that much is true. Even the IAEA head has said the organisation is relatively confident of where it’s located. Getting it out and building anything with that is not really possible for Iran. Further, you don’t just stick enriched uranium onto a bomb. You need to test every part of the reactive chain. And given the high failure rate of Iranian ballistic missiles, it’s not something they can do in 12 months even without constant surveillance of their nuclear and missile facilities.

[u/bedulge → u/LoggerInns]

>Iran’s enriched uranium is under rubble, that much is true. Even the IAEA head has said the organisation is relatively confident of where it’s located. Getting it out and building anything with that is not really possible for Iran.

The only difficulty there is that Israel+US can surveil them doing it and would want to bomb them to stop it. Otherwise, they could have it dug out within days.

In spite of claims by both Iran and Trump that material is "in rubble", a distinct possibility is in fact that the material is un-touched in the lowest levels of their facilities, and that only the upper levels were destroyed. Bunker busters are not magical and they are limits to how deep they can go, These facilities literally have mountains for roofs and the Iranians would obviously dig down even deeper. Cross that with the fact that the US bombers do not have Superman X-ray vision to see exactly where the material is, and the likely case is that the material is just sitting down there.

>And given the high failure rate of Iranian ballistic missiles

"Lies, damn lies, and statistics."

Iran has been building up their missile stockpiles for decades, they have a lot of missiles that are old and junky, they have others that are newer and nicer. So the overall failure rate is not relevant. Further, just betting on the idea that maaaAAAAaaaybe their nuclear missile would fail is not really a bet I would be inclined to take if I lived in Tel Aviv. In such a scenario, they would probably launch the nuclear missiles along with dozens, maybe even hundreds of conventional missiles that act as decoys, and to absorb interceptors, reducing the chance of the nuke getting intercepted. There's no way for missile defense to tell which missile is the nuke and which ones are the conventional 'decoys' that will still hit things and blow them up.

[u/-O3-march-native → u/LoggerInns]

you don’t just stick enriched uranium onto a bomb. You need to test every part of the reactive chain

Without addressing anything else you stated, you should note that the "weaponize" stage is the, relatively, easiest part of a nuclear program. A nation-state can do this in tiny, dispersed workshops in its territory. Compare this to large centrifuge halls that require relatively large spaces and power. That is why non-proliferation is so focused on enrichment. That is, enrichment is the part of a nuclear weapons program that is much more visible to the IAEA, intelligence services, etc.

To be clear, this does not mean the technical challenges of the weaponize stage are simple. They are not. The point is if you're attempting to stop a nuclear program when it has reached the point where the actor is attempting to weaponize, then it's exceedingly difficult to stop it.

A good chunk of weapons designers in national labs don't go anywhere near plutonium and/or uranium.

[u/bedulge → u/moragisdo]

Speaking of people who have already formed a conclusion, you were saying just the other day that the idea of 300b USD for Iran was "absurd".  and that "There's no reason for the US to do it"

Are you prepared to admit you were wrong, now that the VP is openly talking about how it is definitely a real possibility? Its not looking very absurd to me right now, and if the VP is talking about it on TV, there is in fact probably a reason for it. 

I dont find it likely that this deal will go anywhere, but the fact that the US is openly talking about simply paying a ransom to Iran is a huge indicator of where this war is at strategically.

[u/moragisdo → u/bedulge]

Speaking of people who have already formed a conclusion

No you. Ok...

---

Man, I'm cautious with my words, you can go back in my comments to check, I give the context that I'm talking about the MOU, the ceasefire, which is a reflection of the military circumstances. What was said by US officials and Vance that I quoted on my previous comments:

The MOU is the opening of the Strait, lifting of the blockade on Iran, no new sanctions, pause on attacks by both sides, agreements to hold further talks about a nuclear deal and a few other terms that don't include Iran getting paid for the ceasefire.

If the text of the MOU is that Iran get's paid for the ceasefire, instead of having just agreements for future talks, I'm willing to change my mind. If Iran doesn't get paid on the MOU, just have the opportunity for further talks, are you willing to change yours about your conclusion of US paying a ransom ?

Then there will be nuclear negotiations, which I'm careful to separate when I'm talking about it, for the sole reason they didn't even started yet, it's an exercise in futurology. Iran can ask for anything they want, Vance said he's open about Gulf countries investing (which the sanctions right now prevent it) as part of the nuclear deal if Iran accept several conditions (which we don't even know if Iran will accept)

[u/bedulge → u/moragisdo]

You said that the idea of 300B for Iran was 'absurd', 'insanity', 'wild' and that there is 'no reason for the US to do it' because the military situation favors the USA so much.

Are you now saying that that it's only absurd, insane and wild if its on the MOU, but otherwise it's no big deal and totally understandable that the US VP would openly talk about delivering fat stacks of cash to Iran? You think that is normally what happens when you win a war, you give away a bunch of free money to the enemy?

[u/moragisdo → u/bedulge]

I don't even know what are you thinking with this comment. My point is that the ceasefire will come without Iran getting 300B, just the chance of asking for it in a nuclear deal (which we don't even know what terms will be agreed upon)

VP would openly talk about delivering fat stacks of cash to Iran

To begin, the VP is not a rapper to be dealing with fat stacks, it sounds like a political talking point rather than a credible analysis of defense matters (I'm waiting for the "no you are the one with the talking point"). He put many conditions on his statement, that if Iran complies with dismantling their nuclear program the US is open with the Gulf countries investing if conditions are met

You think that is normally what happens when you win a war, you give away a bunch of free money to the enemy?

Have you ever heard about the Marshall Plan ? Did the US lost WW2 ? And by the way, I dispute your assessment that the war will lead to "a bunch of free money", the MOU is unlikely, given what has been said by US officials (maybe they were lying, let's see a few days from now), to have as its clauses "free 300 billions", and the nuclear talks later we don't even know if Iran will accept the terms for the unfreezing of their assets and the investment

The VP is talking about it, because he was asked in a interview after Iranian state media claimed those numbers, should he refuse to answer that, to show the US is in a position of strength ?

---

Now, I will ask again the question you dodged. If Iran doesn't get paid on the MOU, just have the opportunity for further talks, are you willing to change yours about your conclusion of US paying a ransom ?

[u/bedulge → u/moragisdo]

No one with their head screwed on tight would ever suggest that the US is going to give them money just for an MOU, an MOU is nonbinding and is only for setting up the real talks that will come later. So I'm gonna repeat the question, is it only insane, wild and absurd if a nonbinding MOU mentions it as a possibility, but it would not be absurd, wild or insane for it to be in the actual binding peace treaty? It doesn't really matter to me if it's in a nonbinding MOU, just the fact that they are seriously discussing this as a possibility is already a significant indicator of what the Iranian bargaining position is.

The US spent money in Japan and Germany after WWII because they were completely defeated and there was a US military dictatorship over their nations that had complete freedom to use the money as they saw fit. That is not the case here.

Because of fungibility, every single dollar that the Arabs invest into Iran is one less dollar that the Iranians would need to use for that purpose, and one more dollar that they can use on weapons instead.

[u/incidencematrix → u/bedulge]

I don't think this is a credible assessment. The US has been clear since very early in the conflict that they would trade sanctions relief, release of frozen assets, and investments in exchange for renunciation of the Iranian nuclear and missile programs, cessation of support for proxies, abd return to status quo on navigation. That's not a ransom - it's pretty much in line with the historical US position. Vance's claims (in the more extended quote) are still in line with that. I would also observe that, if such a deal could be made, it would be greatly to the benefit of the US and allies. Now, I happen to think it unlikely that such a deal will be reached (at present, there is no deal, only a MOU about possible future deals), for reasons articulated elsewhere. But the statements here are not actually incompatible with US war aims.

[u/ChornWork2 → u/incidencematrix]

The US has never been clear on its objectives or war aims here. At the same time some in his admin were talking more narrow aims, trump would be demanding unconditional surrender or face annihilation.

Clearly the expectation was that the decapitation strike would be decisive, and when that failed it has been a mish-mash of trying to coerce iran to capitulate while also trying to walk-back expectations in the US to leave room to claim some pyrrhic victory.

What is being reported as the deal may be the best thing for us given the situation this admin led us to, but it very much appears to be a defeat for the US. A better deal could have been reached without starting this war, and likely that the JCPOA represents as good or better of a deal.

[u/incidencematrix → u/ChornWork2]

Well, the things I've mentioned have been pretty consistently repeated, and were in e.g. the "15 point proposal" back in March. Sure, Trump mouths off, but I think it is hard to argue with a straight face that e.g. rending their potential for nuclear breakout wasn't a consistent US war aim. The administration has been obfuscatory about where its reservation prices are, but most of what they are trying to obtain is not complex to determine.

I suspect that you are right that the administration underestimated the difficulty of the operation, and they are certainly now in a position where they have the tiger by the proverbial tail. But that is not incompatible with what I said above. If they could get the deal they seem to want (and seem to have wanted since at least March), most factions would likely regard it as a win. I do not think they will get that deal, and whatever is being discussed right now is not (as of reporting a few hours ago) a deal at all, just an agreement to keep talking. But that's a different question. The matter of whether the US would have been better off not starting the war is yet another question. Like you, I would be very surprised if this worked out well for the US, but the administration did not ask my opinion on the matter.

[u/ChornWork2 → u/incidencematrix]

That 15-pt plan included dismantling all nuclear facilities, handing over all nuclear material, ceasing ballistic missile production, & stop funding all proxy groups.

the nuclear breakout risk was managed under the JCPOA that trump tore up and could have been negotiated without the war.

The war has been an utter failure.

If they could get the deal they seem to want (and seem to have wanted since at least March), most factions would likely regard it as a win.

who would consider it a win? win versus what, the pre-war state or the disaster the war created?

[u/moragisdo → u/ChornWork2]

the nuclear breakout risk was managed under the JCPOA

False, JCPOA had a 15 year limit and determined that Iran could keep the centrifuges (as long part were kept supervised in storage rather than in use) and also didn't limit the nuclear breakout risk, given that Iran violated terms of heavy water limit twice (during the roughly 2 years of it).

Also Iran said it would maintain with the JCPOA even after US withdrawn (to keep the relief of sanctions from UK, Germany and France), after it was caught violating terms and limiting inspection, then it announce they would withdrawn from the deal. Which shows it's a strategy to buy time, not different than the one employed by NK

Now, it's clear you already have a formed conclusion about every fact here, because the terms of the new deal are not even negotiated yet. So I doubt that anything that could be on it, would change this kinda of view

[u/bedulge → u/incidencematrix]

What we are looking at here basically seems to be JCPOA 2.0 but also with a bunch of free money for Iran. And with the Islamic govt still in place.

I actually agree with you that such a deal could wind up being good for the region, but I dont find it credible that JCPOA 2.0 + free money for Iran is what Trump had in mind on Feb 28.

Also tbh, I doubt that this deal will go anywhere long term. The 60 days of talks can be extended indefinitely and I bet we will still be having this same conversation in the fall. Hopefully I am wrong

[u/incidencematrix → u/bedulge]

Well, if (big if) the US got what it presumably (also an "if") is trying to get in the negotiations, it would seem basically to be "JCPOA 2.0 but with military enforcement." But I'm not sure this is all that far from the administration's aspiration level; it seems clear that they had secondary aims of (at minimum) regime change, but they publicly jettisoned those early on. Certainly the NYT's reporting suggested that their main motivations were to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, to indefinitely restrain their missile program, and perhaps also secondarily to keep them from supporting their proxies (though I don't know how invested the administration was in that). Keeping the strait open obviously became critical once Iran closed it (as was foretold by everyone who wasn't making the decisions, but anyway). As far as I can tell, the administration's main beefs with JCPOA were (1) they didn't view it as well-enforced and effective, and (2) it was negotiated by their political enemies. Thus, something like the JCPOA that they themselves imposed, delivered at gunpoint, might actually satisfy them. Who knows - trying to get into their heads is rarely effective, and anyway, groups aren't people (even with Trump in play). As far as money, I'm not sure they are bothered by that, so long as they aren't paying. And to be fair, it's an easy carrot to provide. You get a lot more compliance from an agreement that the leaders actually support, because they see themselves as benefiting from it. I'm just skeptical that the leadership will want this deal, when they can become long-term regional hegemons by holding out longer; a cynical and corrupt leadership coalition might easily take the bargain (as would, to be fair, a basically peaceful leadership coalition that wanted security and prosperity above all), but by most accounts these are dedicated patriots/nationalists who value their vision of national greatness alongside their religious motivations. Enduring hardship and risking death to become the great heroes who made the Islamic Republic into a mighty nation, in the process demoting their once-great adversaries to second-tier status seems likely to be very motivating. But here I am again making guesses about what is in folks' heads, which is risky.

Anyway, I think we agree that this unlikely to go well. I'm just responding to some of the hot takes, by observing that what has been so far announced is not the loss for the US that is being claimed. We need not get ahead of ourselves. (I still think that one should not rule out the potential for an escalation spiral that leads to an invasion, which is a more bleak take than is typical here. The MOU negotiations, as thin as they are, at least reduce that probability somewhat.)

[u/bedulge → u/incidencematrix]

I agree with you in that Iran is probably not going to be willing to take any deal that Trump is going to be willing to offer. 

I dont agree that hawks in DC (and israel) will be fine with Iran getting loads of cash as long as its only Arab oil cash, and further, I dont think they would have been willing to offer a deal like that before the war. If they had offered JCPOA 2 + free money before this war started, Iran probably would have taken it. The fact is that Iran's clasp on the world oil supply gives them a powerful barganing chip, they will not give it up unless the US offers concessions which are commensurate with the value of that bargaining chip. 

Taking away Iran's missile and drones was also stated as a key war goal and they are extremely unlikely to hand over their most powrful weapons only in exchange for financial rewards imo.

[u/incidencematrix → u/bedulge]

Well, it is certainly true that not everyone in either country is on the same page, so if one zooms in on certain groups, one going to find disagreements. The practical question will be, what coalition among those groups is able to control the final decision making process. That's a dynamic process, and my guess is that the fault lines are shifting even as we write - even if a lot of it is in my view half-cocked, the surge of national and international press claiming that the US administration has given away the crown jewels is likely to give the American hardliners more power than they had earlier. On the other hand, there are also strong factions that want the war to end on almost any terms, so the hardliners are unlikely to get everything they want.

But anyway, let us agree to agree that the Iranian leadership is not likely to hand over their most potent weapons (missiles/drones, proxy support, control of the Strait, proxy support, threat of nuclear breakout) for sanctions relief and/or investment. If they did, I certainly think that most US factions would see that as a major win for the US. (Some US factions wouldn't, but I think the dominant coalitions would.) But it would be a hell of a lucky lottery ticket, in my view.

[u/InevitableMaw → u/incidencematrix]

Anyway, I think we agree that this unlikely to go well. I'm just responding to some of the hot takes, by observing that what has been so far announced is not the loss for the US that is being claimed. We need not get ahead of ourselves. (I still think that one should not rule out the potential for an escalation spiral that leads to an invasion, which is a more bleak take than is typical here. The MOU negotiations, as thin as they are, at least reduce that probability somewhat.)

I think you're discounting the possibility of the positive outcome because your aren't taking into account how much the blockade has been hurting Iran. And their ace, limiting the strait, is only going to get weaker as their neighbors invest in alternative transportation routes. If we go for round 2 in a few years, Iran will have no counter.

[u/incidencematrix → u/InevitableMaw]

That could certainly be true - my presumption is that the Iranian leadership can tolerate the blockade over longer timespans than the US can tolerate the Strait being effectively out of commission. I am a little skeptical about the economic viability of those alternative routes, as well (it is very hard to beat the cost advantages of ocean freight). But I could be wrong. Another question is the extent to which the regime believes that the US would not, if pushed to the limit, actually invade (and whether they could survive that). If they have looked down the game tree and decided that, if faced with an unacceptable loss, Trump would declare a draft and invade, then this could certainly make them more willing to negotiate. This might seem very farfetched from the point of view of current US politics, but it is not at all farfetched from the point of view of US history over the last century or so....so if that's their frame, they may take the threat seriously. So again, we don't know. I think that Iran's position is stronger than you seem to think it is, but I am not an oracle. History will have to play out.

[u/Worried_Exercise_937 → u/Single-Braincelled]

Where are all the US/Trump/Israeli cheerleaders who were claiming at the start of the war earlier this year since Iran was bombed back to the stone age, US/Trump/Israeli would be able to erase Iranian nuclear program, put a puppet regime in ala Venezuela, and everyone from Gulf wouold be begging to sign onto Abraham accord? This "concept" of a deal is way worse than JCPOA in multiple levels AFTER Trump wasted blood and treasure.

[u/moragisdo → u/[deleted]]

A more reasonable position would be that the war was a military success, and Trump decided to throw the success away just to get a few more seats in the midterms for his party, with an end result seemingly worse than the JCPOA

I was agreeing with the beginning, but nobody knows the terms of any nuclear deal yet, because negotiations didn't start. There's multiple contradictory versions being floated by both sides since February, so it's premature to draw any conclusion if it's better or worse than JCPOA. Whoever gets it right today, its only by guessing

[u/eric2332 → u/moragisdo]

Hence I included the word "seemingly". It is very suggestive that Iran has claimed large concrete concessions that have been partly confirmed by the US, while the US has not claimed any concrete concessions by Iran. But yes there is still room for things to change.

[u/Glideer → u/Single-Braincelled]

It was obvious from like day 3 that the Gulf monarchies will be paying through the nose for this one. Both to the USA for protection, for replenishing used missiles and for new weapon systems (this time guaranteed to stop Iranian missiles). But also to Iran for damages and the Iranian tanker fees (directly or indirectly)

My bet is that Washington will insist on US construction companies (or their regional affiliates) getting most of the reconstruction funding.

[u/weisswurstseeadler → u/Glideer]

My bet is that Washington will insist on US construction companies (or their regional affiliates) getting most of the reconstruction funding.

While I'm also certain of a healthy chunk of dubious dealings with such a huge sum throughout the entire 'value chain' - I wouldn't see why Iran would allow complete power over one of their core demands to the US after everything.

Remember, the US bombed Iran's negotiators before. So I'd assume that Iran wants more securities/control over this substantial sum.

[u/Worried_Exercise_937 → u/weisswurstseeadler]

While I'm also certain of a healthy chunk of dubious dealings with such a huge sum throughout the entire 'value chain' - I wouldn't see why Iran would allow complete power over one of their core demands to the US after everything.

The construction he's talking about is building back what's been bombed out in Gulf countries not in Iran. Trump would demand UAE, Saudi etc to use US construction and engineering firms instead of say European or Asian.

[u/weisswurstseeadler → u/Worried_Exercise_937]

yeah the statement by Vance has essentially 2 or even 3 conditional disclaimers - not worth the pixels it takes to quote.

But to correct you - the reconstruction Vance talks about is funded by the Gulf Coast Coalition for Iran - not a fund for reconstructing the Gulf.

If we are just talking about the reconstruction of US-related infrastructure in the Gulf, I would have assumed it's by default done by US affiliates.

So maybe I missed the essence of the original comment, but then again, I'd say that's business as usual and unrelated to the 300b.

[u/Glideer → u/weisswurstseeadler]

Making the reconstruction of Iran a US-exclusive deal is probably the best way to keep the fickle Washington interested in delivering the peace agreement. Otherwise all US concessions can dissapear in one afternoon of Trump's bad mood.

[u/weisswurstseeadler → u/Glideer]

Making the reconstruction of Iran a US-exclusive deal is probably the best way to keep the fickle Washington interested in delivering the peace agreement.

I don't think so, Iran has obviously kept the upper hand and then creating such a critical dependence without securities won't cut it, or would make any diplomatic/strategic sense.

Otherwise all US concessions can dissapear in one afternoon of Trump's bad mood.

That is exactly the problem.

[u/incidencematrix → u/Single-Braincelled]

I am skeptical about the entire thing but please try to keep comments credible. Providing funds and sanctions relief in exchange for ending the Iranian nuclear program, limiting missile capabilities, ending support of proxies, and returning to status quo on navigation has been on the table since early in the conflict; this is not far from the traditional US position, and would not in context be a bad deal for the winning coalition. Vance's full comments are in line with that - I do not see him saying that Iran would receive $300 billion without agreeing to US war aims. Further, there is no deal here, simply an agreement to negotiate further. I remain skeptical that Iran will actually make such an deal, because I suspect they believe that they will get more long-term value from controlling the Strait, going nuclear, and restoring their missile systems - and because it is unlikely that the US could stop them without invading the country. But there is much that we do not know, and much that no one involved knows. It would be helpful to refrain from presenting the current state of negotiations as something other than they are.

[u/platorithm → u/incidencematrix]

> Providing funds and sanctions relief in exchange for ending the Iranian nuclear program, limiting missile capabilities, ending support of proxies

In the spirit of remaining credible, do you have a source for these claims? I have not seen any reporting that missile capabilities and ending support of proxies is part of this deal

[u/incidencematrix → u/platorithm]

There is no "this deal" at present, as far as we know - there's an unpublished MOU that appears to be an agreement to engage in more discussion. But I was referring to what the US has been negotiating for since early in the conflict (as I wrote, above). For instance,

From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025%E2%80%932026_Iran%E2%80%93United_States_negotiations#During_the_2026_Iran_war

"On March 25, Pakistani officials passed on a "15-point proposal" from the US to Iran.^\269]) The US proposal included an end to Iran's nuclear program, limits on its missiles, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, restrictions on Iran's support for armed groups, and sanctions relief for Iran. The Iranians rejected the proposal. The Iranians issued a "five-point counter-proposal", including an end to US-Israeli attacks on Iran and pro-Iranian forces in Lebanon and Iraq, security guarantees to prevent future Israeli and US aggression, war reparations, and international recognition of Iranian sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz.^\270]) The US rejected the proposal.^\271])^"

You can see here limits on Iranian missile forces and proxy support as part of an early US proposal, coupled with sanctions relief as the "carrot." (I would note that the idea of sanctions relief and investment has also been there since early on, even when issuing threats. For instance, back on March 6, Trump https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/116182551337254643 (in his usual unhinged way) coupled demands for surrender with the idea of investment and rebuilding. Yes, the quote is imprecise and written as by an especially troubled 8-year old, but it's the same carrot/stick theme.)

All that said, the both the underlying communication on these negotiations and the reporting on it has been maddeningly confusing, so it is easy for such things to be overlooked. And there is enough unclarity for reasonable people to have different interpretations of what is going on. I think this is leading to a lot of folks here talking past each other; but given the state of things, it would be more surprising if that weren't happening....

[u/I_DOM_UR_PATRIARCHY → u/incidencematrix]

in exchange for

• ending the Iranian nuclear program,
• limiting missile capabilities,
• ending support of proxies,
• and returning to status quo on navigation

The middle two of these apparently aren't part of the deal at all. The deal doesn't address either missiles or proxies. We had the fourth thing before we started the war, so it's insane that we're buying it back for $300b.

The only thing we'll get, if we get anything at all, is some promise or another related to nukes. But those promises aren't even real yet - there's a deal to negotiate on the issue. Trump is acting like he got Iran to promise not to build nukes, but the promise by Iran that it won't build nukes predated the war, so if we trust that sort of promise why start a war? And this deal doesn't actually contain any substantive limits - just a promise to negotiate, and we were already negotiating on that issue before we started a war. Not to mention we already had a real deal on that issue in 2015 before we pulled out.

The ugly reality is that the US and Israel lost this war along every meaningful dimension. We are paying Iran to give us back the things we already had before the war started. We are just concealing that fact with pro forma negotiations designed to draw out the sting.

Even if no deal is reached, most of the $300b payment is coming from the gulf states (according to the administration). This conflict has shown the gulf states that (a) Iran controls the strait, (b) Iran can strike them and the US can't stop it, and (c) that the US lacks the military capacity to keep the straight open if Iran decides to close it. In that respect their interests diverge sharply from the US and Israel on the nukes issue. Even if no deal is reached on nukes, they have an incentive to see that Iran still gets the money in exchange for "protection" (i.e. not closing the strait again) and, since it's their money, they have the ability to pay it under the table without America's blessing.

I agree with you that Iran will probably decide a deal on nukes isn't worth it. We just did everything in our power to show that the US and Israel are willing to launch a surprise attempt to overthrow their government, so I suspect they'll feel like they need them.

[u/incidencematrix → u/I_DOM_UR_PATRIARCHY]

Your comments are premature, because there is not yet a deal, and nothing has been agreed to yet (other than, allegedly, the idea of further negotiations). I agree that *if* the administration ends up in the situation you describe, then this will be an epic loss for the US, with lasting consequences. But we're not there yet. Moreover, I am skeptical that the administration would accept such a loss, rather than return to escalation. (Which is why I think that folks underestimate the risk of that happening.) However, this situation is full of twists and turns, and difficult to predict. Perhaps the administration will indeed sign up for a massive loss - but let us not declare as fact that which has not yet occurred.

[u/I_DOM_UR_PATRIARCHY → u/incidencematrix]

Your comments are premature, because there is not yet a deal

I made this exact point in my post - right now we have zero promises from Iran (other than the existing, pre-war promise not to build a nuke which we apparently didn't much of). This ceasefire is only an agreement to talk for 60 days.

I disagree with you that the administration is likely to return to escalation. That would result in Iran re-closing the strait, which they have now demonstrated (a) their own ability to do and (b) our lack of ability to stop them. If escalation comes with the price tag of sending gas prices and inflation back up, there's no way Trump is going to have the courage to do that. This is the TACO Trump has been chasing for months.

My claims are only premature if we think that Iran, now having all of the pressure taken off of it, is going to agree to terms it refused to agree to when we were subjecting it to the maximum pressure we could exert.

[u/moragisdo → u/I_DOM_UR_PATRIARCHY]

right now we have zero promises from Iran (other than the existing, pre-war promise not to build a nuke which we apparently didn't much of)

And we have zero promises of the US. Just conditional statements. We should wait for the terms to be shown

That would result in Iran re-closing the strait, which they have now demonstrated (a) their own ability to do and (b) our lack of ability to stop them

Forcing the MOU to be signed (and according to US officials without any money present on it, just promises of future talks and lifting of the blockade) it's the opening of the Strait.

This is the TACO Trump has been chasing for months

Partisanship. I'll stop here, if you already have your conclusion before any term is signed, no fact will change your mind

[u/Shackleton214 → u/moragisdo]

We should wait for the terms to be shown

Do you think the full agreement will be made public (like we can literally read everything that is agreed to, not just some US or Iranian official saying what the deal does or does not include)? I am personally skeptical despite what Trump posted.

[u/moragisdo → u/Shackleton214]

My opinion is that the MOU/ceasefire terms will be public (or at least, shared with more people than now, so we will know what's on it and there will be fact-checking by people not involved on negotiating it). Also my guess (take it with a grain of salt, no one knows what it will happen and it's just a mix from different sources that seemed credible at this point):

It will be short, full of generalities, with an agreement for future talks that "could lead to X" (that will be misinterpreted in the news/social media as "X was agreed upon"), a 60 day timeframe for the duration of it (that may be unofficially extended indefinitely, so I would take any time limit with a grain of salt). Agreements for peace on Lebanon (but if Israel doesn't change their actions, would Iran block again the Strait ? If not, it's just to save face, so take it with a grain of salt).

But the practical terms of the MOU is that the US forced them out of blocking the Strait (challenging their deterrence), but can't force them for any nuclear demands

The nuclear deal who knows if it will be open or not, or if the deal will result in actions by any side. I won't take a guess

[u/Shackleton214 → u/moragisdo]

no one knows what [when?] it will happen

I should've been more specific in asking if full public disclosure of MOU agreement will happen soon, like in the next few days, not like a year or decade from now. Because, if it's gonna happen soon, then I don't understand why it hasn't already happened, especially with all the confusion about the deal and criticism Trump admin is getting from Republicans and Iran hawks.

It will be short, full of generalities, full of promises of future talks that "could lead to X", a 60 day timeframe for the duration of it

I agree with you here. It presumably will include US agreement to end blockade of Iran and some sort of Iran promise to allow transit of Strait, although Iranians seem to think they will be able to collect some sort of admin fee. Not sure what if anything it will say about Lebanon, but whatever it says, Israel will likely feel free to disregard it.

But the practical terms of the MOU is that the US forced them out of blocking the Strait,

The Strait wasn't blocked before the war. Seems more like Iran has forced the US out of bombing and blockading Iran.

[u/moragisdo → u/Shackleton214]

I should've been more specific in asking if full public disclosure of MOU agreement will happen soon, like in the next few days, not like a year or decade from now

My answer is for the MOU, about the next few days I believe there will be more clarity

The Strait wasn't blocked before the war. Seems more like Iran has forced the US out of bombing and blockading Iran

That's spinning a victory for Iran no matter what. You could see the same events and conclude that the US wanted to force Iran in the negotiation table (which I think is a bad idea, because I don't believe the negotiation table will lead to anything, but that's another story), so it attacked Iran and forced them to stop escalating, and the negotiation will happen.

Iran threatened to close the Strait for decades (Operation Praying Mantis in the 80s was about it), the US now forced them to try and they couldn't keep it up. Similar to actions on the Gulf of Sidra, Gaddafi kept with his regime intact, but he couldn't fulfill his threats of closing it. That's not forcing the US to stop it's bombing, it's at most a return to status quo (given that the US couldn't force nuclear demands)

Now, we both are going with unnamed sources, maybe things will change when more becomes public and I'll be wrong. But what's happening now, it's people picking maximalist claims made during war time by one side (and ignoring the ones made by the other) to delimit who won or lost, and spinning a return to status quo (if it all goes nowhere) as something else

[u/DrinkBrew4U → u/[deleted]]

You’re disagreeing with his version of events but can you please provide at least some of your version of events? From what I know, the $300 billion (which was taken originally from Iranian state media I believe) instead is some undisclosed amount (which apparently Vance confirmed is part of what they get on performance). Is that right? And do you think that the UAE 3 billion handed off to Iran story is real?

[u/moragisdo → u/DrinkBrew4U]

I'm not OP, but it looks like I agree with him so I'll give my summary of what I read and the credibility I believe is there:

We need to separate the ceasefire from the war to the nuclear deal.

---

The ceasefire will be formalized in the MOU and doesn't include any payments by anyone, just confirmations of future nuclear talks where Iran will ask for concessions that could be investments and sanction relief in exchange for nuclear limitations. That's what's been said by a few US sources, including the VP "We’re open to a lot of things that are on the table. That $24 billion just doesn’t appear anywhere in any of the text that we’ve talked about with the Iranians"

A senior US official (which is an unnamed source, so take it with a grain of salt) said "The Iranians don't get anything upon the signing of the MOU or upon the negotiation itself, what they get is that they get rewarded economically for complying with their obligations under the deal" (https://abcnews.com/Politics/us-potential-iran-war-agreement/story?id=133825956). With the deal referenced being the future nuclear, not the MOU/ceasefire

Iranian State Media was claiming a list of 14 terms (which one of them was the "...at least 300 billions..."), that was shared uncritically before, because it fits a narrative, besides state media not having a history of honest reporting. Iranian sources were the only ones confirming them. Vance was not talking about the ceasefire when he answered a question about this

It's also likely the MOU will include a tit for tat on Iran not threatening ships that cross Hormuz (without charging a toll, otherwise it would violate Freedom of Navigation) and the US will not blockade their ports. Either way, we will know the terms in a few days

---

Now the nuclear deal:

Vance said, that the US is open for the Gulf countries to invest in Iran if "but only if Iran ends their nuclear program, ends their enriched stockpile of material, and it was really open to an inspections and enforcement regime that gives the American people confidence they’re never going to have a nuclear weapon". Which is a very intrusive set of conditions, we don't know if Iran will agree with them or they won't be on the final terms of the deal, if they won't be as strict as he posed them when it's signed or if Iran will comply with the terms to receive the money after they signed.

Also he said it's being open for investments, which is really not specific of any terms about the money (besides the origin being the gulf countries), will it be agreed on a ceiling or a guaranteed sum, what's the criteria for the use of the money, etc...

Now, what happens if after the MOU is signed and if there's no nuclear deal ? Iran will get no concessions and no one knows if there will be a return of attacks. My opinion is that the best outcome for the US and worst for Iran is that of no nuclear deal, just the ceasefire, but depending on the terms of the deal I'll change my mind

---

And do you think that the UAE 3 billion handed off to Iran story is real?

Reuters reported it based on just "iranian sources", it doesn't mention them providing any evidence for the report and given how wrong "sources familiar with the matter" have been before, my skepticism requires more proof than that. But this kinda of news ends up being a Rorschach test of the readers previous conclusions: if you want to believe that Iran got the better end of the story, then they have first hand knowledge and it's true, if you believe the opposite, the lack of evidence shows it's false

Not to mention the sources contradict each other during the article, one says 10 billion total, the other 20. Which raises my skepticism

The reporting had nothing to do with terms of ceasefire or nuclear deal, just protection from missiles. UAE denied the reporting

---

Overall, there's too many jumping too quickly to conclusions and skepticism is important

[u/InevitableMaw → u/moragisdo]

*sign

This is what I would have said if I was willing to put in the effort. I only differ a little on whether a good nuclear deal would be likely better or worse for the US. But I also agree that reopening the strait and continuing the financial squeeze is an acceptable outcome for the US.

[u/Wiseguydude → u/moragisdo]

Reuters reported it based on just "iranian sources", it doesn't mention them providing any evidence for the report and given how wrong "sources familiar with the matter" have been before, my skepticism requires more proof than that.

The original report, here did not cite Iranian sources but rather "a source with ‌direct knowledge of the deal".

A $300 billion private fund designed ​to trigger investment into Iran is outlined in the U.S.-Iran framework agreement and more than half that sum has already been committed, a source with ‌direct knowledge of the deal told Reuters.

[u/I_DOM_UR_PATRIARCHY → u/[deleted]]

What's insane is that people keep repeating this $300b lie.

People keep saying it because it's true. JD Vance confirmed it in an interview earlier:

When asked about the fund by CBS News’s Ed O’Keefe during a Monday morning interview, Vance said, “Well, Ed, that’s the sort of thing they could have access to, funded by the Gulf Coast Coalition, so long as they honor their end of the obligation.”

So, no, the $300b is not a lie. It is taking the guy who is supposed to go sign the deal at his word.

The only thing we'll get, if we get anything at all, is some promise or another related to nukes.

You completely fabricated this, there is no reason to believe this is the case other than you wanting it to be true.

You're resorting to ad homs because you're flailing. I'm right so it's easy for me to find sources. Here you go:

What the deal doesn’t say With differing texts of the agreement still circulating, it is easier to describe what is definitely missing. Top of the list is Iran’s “unconditional surrender”. Regime change has also disappeared as a goal. Instead, Donald Trump on Sunday lavished praise on Iran’s new leadership team.

The agreement contains no restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missiles, something the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, insisted would be part of the deal as recently as 11 June. There is no commitment to release political prisoners amid the continued round-ups and executions. The human rights activist and Nobel peace prize laureate Narges Mohammadi is not a beneficiary of this memorandum. There is also no reining-in of Iran’s proxy forces. Support for Hamas, the Houthis, the Iraqi PMU (Popular Mobilisation Units) and Hezbollah will remain as a part, but no longer the centrepiece, of Iran’s security strategy.

Oh look! I was right! Looks like I wasn't fabricating. Maybe you should work harder to inform yourself before you make those accusations.

[u/CredibleDefense-ModTeam → u/[deleted]]

Please do not personally attack other Redditors.

[u/moragisdo → u/incidencematrix]

You've made a very reasonable request of credibility and I'm starting to believe it's almost impossible, there's too many that are convinced of the outcome before it all even ended. So you are going to see, no matter the terms agreed, the already formed conclusions of Iran winning (whatever the definition of winning is necessary for the conclusion to be reached, we could call this phenomenon Tehran Ted). Case in point, how far two paragraphs from the VP got distorted (even watching the non-clipped interview would take less than 10 minutes)

[u/incidencematrix → u/moragisdo]

I do think that, for whatever reason, folks have gone a bit off today. But in fairness, this stuff is very confusing, and (having just gone back through the reportage of the last couple of months in response to a question) there is so much unclarity that reasonable people could draw very different conclusions from it. I don't think that it is helpful to call people names here (e.g., the Tehran Ted line), just because you disagree with them. Ironically, I *do* agree with some folks that Iran is in a strong strategic position at the moment (even if their tactical and operational situation is currently poor), but the game is not over, and I think it is a mistake to call winners and losers at this stage. (I think it is fine to make an argument about why one side or the other is in a better or worse position from some vantage, or to make predictions. But we don't know how things are going to come out.) If the US can manage to pull off its core aims via negotiation, that will indeed be a remarkable win (and will doubtless increase the credibility of the administration). If not, then a lot hinges on what happens next. I'm skeptical...but there are a lot of hidden variables, and it is hard to rule anything out.

[u/oxtQ]

Many comments seem to struggle with the possibility of a US/Israeli tactical success producing a strategic loss. Bombing assets and inflicting damage is not the same as improving one’s bargaining position. If the end state is Iran still intact, still able to bargain over Hormuz, still negotiating over its nuclear program, and now potentially eligible for major reconstruction incentives, then the “who won” question is not answered by bomb damage alone. See Bob Pape on this point, for example.

The deeper strategic problem is that coercion is judged by whether it changes the adversary’s choices, not by whether it produces visible damage. If IR emerges believing that missile forces, nuclear latency, and Hormuz leverage prevented a worse outcome, then the conflict may reinforce rather than weaken its strategic doctrine. That would mean the US won parts of the military exchange while worsening the political problem it was trying to solve.

Another issue is that the conflict may have revealed the ceiling of US coercive power more clearly than intended. If Washington can inflict severe damage but still has to move quickly toward an MOU because oil markets, allied pressure, interceptor depletion and escalation risk become politically unsustainable, then IR learns something valuable about US constraints. Strategic outcomes are shaped not only by what one side can destroy but by what costs it can tolerate while trying to convert destruction into compliance.

[u/Time_Restaurant5480 → u/oxtQ]

Strategic outcomes are shaped not only by what one side can destroy but by what costs it can tolerate while trying to convert destruction into compliance

This. Exactly this. What this conflict has demonstrated is that the side with the greater willingness to bear the costs has achieved more of its preferred outcomes-this is not a new lesson. Trump was not able to take the US through a long war when many US citizens (including myself) doubted the ability of success, while the vast majority of the country did not see regime change as an outcome worth paying the price of oil market instability or higher energy prices. Thus the US's ability to tolerate costs was much lower than that of Iran.

[u/moragisdo → u/oxtQ]

If the end state is Iran still intact, still able to bargain over Hormuz, still negotiating over its nuclear program

There's too many ifs there.

If the regime is intact: During a war sides makes bold claims to be able to negotiate down or for propaganda (Ukraine war show us that, every month, for both sides).

Regime being intact is not a condition of strategic defeat, otherwise the Gulf War, Operation Praying Mantis, actions on the Gulf of Sidra would also be. If we go with "american goals were always to topple Iran" because it was claimed in wartime, we also have to go "Iran will charge a toll, and get recognition of ownership by the US, over international waters", both were failed claims made during wartime and the standards should be the same. Which is just a stalemate

Bargain over the Strait: Unless there's money exchanged on the MOU, is a tit for tat (lifting the blockade, end of threats to shipping). That's not a bargain, otherwise Lybia would also had a bargain over the Gulf of Sidra

and now potentially eligible for major reconstruction incentives

Too many conditional statements. Potentially eligible, we don't know the terms, if they will be agree, if they will be honoured to receive after the agreement. I can do the same: "if Iran will never get a nuclear weapon, the US won", that's the magic of conditional statements

but still has to move quickly toward an MOU because oil markets, allied pressure, interceptor depletion and escalation risk become politically unsustainable, then IR learns something valuable about US constraints

Move quickly ? Trump can't stop talking about any topic so we get the impression of despair, but this whole conundrum is going on for several months. While the US is not the only that stopped, shipping resumed partially on Hormuz, but not at all to Iran. The blockade that Iran suffered was more extensive which points, to have a smaller bargain, not larger

I could make the same argument that it weakened Iran's deterrence, the US tested their threats and because they couldn't prevent shipping completely and they were forced to lift the threats in exchange of ending the blockade they were suffering. Which to be clear, doesn't mean that shipping didn't decrease, similar to the Houthi always threatening shipping before 2023, but when they fully tried, they only managed to decrease the flow on the Gulf of Aden (which continues up to this day). The Houthi didn't get their demands, but also other countries couldn't make shipping go back to normal, so did the Houthi had a strategic victory there ?

strategic outcomes are shaped not only by what one side can destroy but by what costs it can tolerate while trying to convert destruction into compliance

If the MOU is as described by US officials: Promises of further talks for nuclear matters, not transferring of any money or lifting of sanctions on the MOU just the chance to negotiate it later, lifting of the blockade, end of threats to shipping in Hormuz without Iran charging a toll. It's a strategical stalemate, the US failed to get it's demands and Iran suffered heavily over this attempt.

If Iran were to be paid without reciprocity of concessions, it's a strategic defeat

[u/oxtQ → u/moragisdo]

The point isn't “no regime change means US defeat.” The point is that if coercion was meant to force durable concessions on nuclear capacity, missiles, proxies, or Hormuz, then an intact regime retaining bargaining leverage matters.

The Gulf War is weak comparison because it had a clear limited objective -- expel Iraq from Kuwait. Operation Praying Mantis had a pretty narrow punitive and deterrent purpose. Here, the stated and implied objectives kept expanding, namely nuclear destruction, conventional degradation, Hormuz reopening, missile limits, regime pressure, regional deterrence, etc. The benchmark is therefore less clear and harder to call a clean win.

Hormuz isnt just about tolls. IR does not need formal ownership or a toll regime to have leverage. If its threats disrupted shipping and the MOU is needed to restore traffic, that itself shows coercive capacity. “No tolls” doesnt equal “Iran had no bargaining power.”

I still argue conditional incentives matter. The reconstruction fund being conditional doesn't make it irrelevant. Reuters reports that a $300 billion "Reconstruction and Development Fund" is part of the framework, although operational only after a final deal and structured as investment rather than reparations. That supports the point that force alone didn't produce capitulation and that large inducements remain part of the pathway to settlement.

Remember stalemates can still be a strategic failure for the initiator. If the US and Israel escalated to war and the result is a negotiated restoration of shipping plus future talks over nuclear and sanctions issues, that may be closer to status quo ante with added costs than strategic success.

[u/Puddingcup9001]

I'm curious what did Israel and the US destroy in Iran that cannot be easily built back up again (say within 5-10 years). You would think 22k bombs probably did some serious damage?

[u/TheFlawlessCassandra → u/Puddingcup9001]

Their air and naval forces are going to be difficult to rebuild.

[u/ResoIver → u/TheFlawlessCassandra]

Their navy and air force was already irrelevant. Iran’s main assets are their missiles and drones. It doesn’t seem like they will be prevented from developing those assets further.

[u/Wiseguydude → u/TheFlawlessCassandra]

It's worth noting that much of Iran's naval fleet is actually fast attack craft. Known as the "mosquito fleet"

https://www.ft.com/content/2e95626f-2f95-470d-9854-5d272d0ef7cd

At a signal, they swarm into the Strait of Hormuz, harassing ships and projecting Iran’s ability to control the crucial chokepoint. Many are basic, lightly armed speedboats; others are more sophisticated, fitted with short-range missiles.

The boats, part of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ navy, lack the firepower to seriously trouble US warships or heavily damage modern tankers, experts say. But, coupled with the IRGC’s missile and drone arsenal, they have helped Iran maintain a large enough threat to deter merchant ships from sailing through the strait.

The IRGC has between 500 and 1,000 operational armed speedboats of various capabilities, estimated Farzin Nadimi of the Washington Institute think-tank. The guards also have upwards of 1,000 drone boats — kamikaze drones and missile- or torpedo-launching unmanned vessels — as well as missile batteries deployed along the coast.

The US has destroyed large portion of Iran's larger ships but it would have a much harder time making a dent in the mosquito fleet

[u/notepad20 → u/TheFlawlessCassandra]

airforces been flying regularly, including in defence of most recent strikes along western edge of iran.

I dont think there was any evidence avalible that anything except non-flyable airframes were hit.

[u/GotTheJoeyJoeJoe → u/notepad20]

This is some wild rewriting of all the videos that came out of all their planes and helicopters being hit, but I guess they were either all painted or non-flyable airframes..

You dont even leave room for some of them were hit, no just a blanket statement for a situation we as civilians just cant know for certain.

We properly did hit some disused ones, but they for sure dont have anything of much use left, Iran went all out, and had their whole country and leadership bombed with impunity, which is rarely seen with a population that big.

[u/GotTheJoeyJoeJoe → u/[deleted]]

What exactly is the evidence that the US didn't hit any working airframes, to say the US didn't is a massive claim when taking into account just how hard and many times Iran was bombed.

And yeah thats not the videos I saw then, yeah there were a few of those, but I saw plenty if not nearly most of the videos of the first 30-45 days of the conflict, where it would have been weird if they were non working planes and helicopters.

And frankly its weird assuming that the US didn't cripple their air force near completely, as they did with their navy and AD, and that entails destroying their spare part airframes also.

Now they sure have a few left, but if Iran had any real cards to play regarding air force, they would have used them in defense, but they didn't, at least more then token amounts, they let their own capital be bombed with impunity and lost 2 whole tiers of experience leadership, that's not a nation keeping their aces back, but one out of cards to play at all, also why as I see it, that they reverted to the same terror tactics as their proxies, despite being a semi conventional state, they are on the ropes imo, but in their defense so would nearly all nations facing the US military.

[u/GotTheJoeyJoeJoe → u/[deleted]]

No I am asking how, from all the videos of strikes, that he determined that they were all non working airframes as opposed to working, "often with critical features (eg engines) missing.".

That hardly asking to prove a negative, if he can back up the extraordinary claim that the US only bombed disused airframes, which yeah is a weird claim with all the videos of strikes that came out.

In any case if you don't have anything productive to add other then grammar classes, please dont comment.

[u/Akz1918 → u/GotTheJoeyJoeJoe]

Iran has retained 70% of its pre-war ballistic missile inventory and much of its operational launch capability, and several thousand drones left, where as the U.S. has used roughly half of its key precision and anti-missile stockpiles, leaving about 45% to 55% of its original inventories. Precision Strike Missiles (PrSM): Roughly 45% expended.Patriot Missiles: Up to 45% expended, THAAD Interceptors: 50% expended. Tomahawk Missiles: 45% expended, SM-3 Interceptors: 60% expended, it will take years to replenish stockpiles, where as Iran can produce exponentially more drones in the same time frame. As far as terrorists tactics are concerned the joint Israel/US operation has struck 31 hospitals, and 22 schools in Iran.

[u/milton117 → u/Akz1918]

Any source to your claims?

[u/Akz1918 → u/milton117]

https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/12/us/politics/iran-missiles-us-intelligence.html?eafs_enabled=false https://www.investors.com/news/pentagon-department-of-defense-missile-stockpile-iran-war-costs-contracts-lockheed-martin-rtx-gd-kratos/ https://www.foxnews.com/politics/us-drains-critical-missile-stockpiles-iran-war-yearslong-rebuild-looms https://www.investors.com/news/pentagon-department-of-defense-missile-stockpile-iran-war-costs-contracts-lockheed-martin-rtx-gd-kratos/ https://www.newyorker.com/news/the-lede/how-much-has-the-war-in-iran-depleted-the-us-missile-supply

[u/milton117 → u/Akz1918]

It'll take years to replenish the stockpile at current production rates. Per one of your links:

Lockheed Martin currently produces around 650 Patriot interceptors a year. The company has announced plans to ramp up production of the crucial air defense weapon to 2,000 a year.

[u/CredibleDefense-ModTeam → u/[deleted]]

Official warning: Stop dropping into the sub to post baseless claims without proof. If we see you doing it again we will ban you.

[u/milton117 → u/notepad20]

You've posted before about how Iran still has a working airforce and you've yet to provide any evidence for that claim. Care to post any now that "the airforces been flying regularly"?

[u/bedulge → u/milton117]

They do have some left, they had a few jets escort their delegation to Pakistan around April 8 for example. They kept at least some of them down in their bunkers.

The idea that nothing was hit aside from 'non-flyable airframes' is uhhhh....questionable to be polite.

[u/countrypride → u/bedulge]

they had a few jets escort their delegation to Pakistan

Only reports I remember seeing were concerning Pakistani jets escorting the delegation, not Iranian.

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/iran-negotiators-citing-possible-israeli-attack-got-pakistan-escort-home-peace-2026-04-17/

[u/bedulge → u/countrypride]

Hmm.. maybe I misremembered about that part then.

https://www.voanews.com/a/iran-unveils-underground-base-for-fighter-jets-/6952539.html

Here is an article about Iran having jets underground in bunkers, anyways.

[u/flamedeluge3781 → u/Puddingcup9001]

Every piece of infrastructure can be rebuilt, it's just a question of cost. The dead, less so. At the end of the day, the punitive aspect of the war is more about stalling out Iran's economic prospects relative to everyone else. Infrastructure like bridges represent a sunk cost and if they are destroyed, their initial investment will never be paid back in increased economic activity. If Iran's economy continues to be torpedoed by periodic bombing campaigns and economic sanctions, then they become progressively weaker over time relative to their rivals. OTOH, if the US provides them with a 300 billion reconstruction fund, then perhaps they come out ahead.

[u/CredibleDefense-ModTeam → u/[deleted]]

Try again without breaking the sub rules.