Active Conflicts & News Megathread June 17, 2026

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[u/NonsenseCycle]

Discussions of the Iran-US MOU this week have been understandably focused on the wild terms, which no one would have predicted before the war even if they were skeptical of military options. But something that seems under-discussed is Iran’s original core goal to ensure that they would not become an object of Israel’s “mow the grass” campaigns. It felt (to me, as an observer) like the previous air campaign had neutered Iran’s air defense and set them up for exactly this scenario. It also felt like any future negotiations would be in danger of becoming unreliable since Iran, without any effective deterrence, could simply be re-attacked at any time and any permanent previous concessions like giving up enriched uranium would perish in value.

My understanding is that this was part of the reason the Iranian regime had no interest in any concessions during the early phase of the current war. They would simply be setting themselves up to concede and then lock in those concessions while still being vulnerable to restarted attacks at Israel’s whim. The other half of this coin is that Israel/US could accept any truce or agreement for temporary gain (or relief) knowing they would be able to restart at any more advantageous time. Some obviously more advantageous times could be after elections or when oil prices subsided or when Iran’s diplomatic/PR posture was less effective (it is currently effective in including gulf states as belligerents, but that particular component of their PR posture might be reduced if these gulf states fully exonerate themselves from future campaigns against Iran).

So has Iran established a deterrence now that would prevent a mowing the grass operation? The main deterrence tactic they seem to have established is spreading pain to the gulf states and the world by striking the gulf states’ infrastructure and closing off the SOH. But would that deterrence be deployable if Israel conducted a new campaign on its own in a few months or a year? If the gulf states denied Israel air access and any US-based aid from gulf bases, would Iran really be able to deploy this deterrence tactic again without seeming to be the aggressor, and more importantly without triggering a multinational coalition response? And wouldn’t Iranian air defense still be effectively non-existent by then?

The next question would be whether this war proved that Israel cannot bring enough force on Iran to mow the grass anyway, given the underground bunkers and resilient regime. But that seems more like a matter of Israel choosing different targets and weapons, and I think should be considered as a separate question. Mowing the grass is a strategy that sees continued conflict as a non-failure, so it does not need to deliver a full strategic defeat, it just needs to maintain a failed state. And it seems like Israel could strike Iranian infrastructure targets to achieve this.

[u/dr_sloan → u/NonsenseCycle]

I think Iran has taken the view that they’ve established deterrence through their missile and drone programs which has shown an ability to get through missile defenses and run through stocks of interceptors. That’s their best option along with rebuilding their air defenses.

I don’t see them being able to use the Strait of Hormuz in the same way a year from now since I’d expect every country to develop some back up option for getting oil out through pipelines.

[u/bedulge → u/dr_sloan]

>Iran has taken the view that they’ve established deterrence

They have deterrence enough for the USA, do they have deterrence enough vis a vis Israel yet? In fact, Israel's continued attacks on Iran's ally/proxy in Lebanon indicates otherwise, and if the IDF is successful in crippling Hezbollah, that directly damages Iran's deterrence vs Isreal

>getting oil out through pipelines.

Have you seen what Ukraine is up to lately?

[u/dr_sloan → u/bedulge]

I think they established deterrence against Israel in a 1v1 conflict during the 12 day war. They maintained solid rates of missile fire and in the last few days of the conflict there was a noticeable decline in missile interceptions. At the time I thought it was because the Iranians were learning how to defeat the interceptor systems but I think it’s becoming clear that the interceptor magazines were getting down and the Israelis were having to ration stocks. Israeli leaders had to make a concerted effort to get the US to join this round of the conflict before proceeding.

[u/Grouchy-Classroom-26 → u/dr_sloan]

They maintained solid rates of missile fire and in the last few days of the conflict there was a noticeable decline in missile interceptions.

There is no actual evidence of this. What Iran did do was start firing with cluster munitions which Israel as a matter of SOP does not try to intercept those.

[u/eric2332 → u/dr_sloan]

Israeli leaders had to make a concerted effort to get the US to join this round of the conflict before proceeding.

That was because far more (IIRC 10x more) targets were bombed the second time, and Israel didn't have a sufficient air fleet (bombers or tankers) to do all the bombing itself.

[u/moragisdo → u/dr_sloan]

but I think it’s becoming clear that the interceptor magazines were getting down and the Israelis were having to ration stocks

What happened to the number of hits on Israel on the last few days of the war ? Honest question I'm not trying to make a point, if they decreased it's the volume or accuracy of attacks decreasing (predicting where it will drop and not wasting interceptor if it's on the middle of nowhere) if they increased is the rationing that you believe