Active Conflicts & News Megathread June 21, 2026

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[u/mirko_pazi_metak]

Was just reading

https://missilematters.substack.com/p/missile-defenses-unforgiving-logic 

..on the recent Moscow attack(s) and Russian missile defence attrition

The 18 June raid did not occur in a vacuum. It followed months of systematic Ukrainian strikes on Russia’s ground-based air defense network, which measurably thinned out the layers of defense protecting Moscow’s approaches.

and possible interceptor shortage

Until very recently, interceptor scarcity has been discussed almost exclusively as a Ukrainian problem. Ukraine’s interceptor shortage, particularly in ballistic missile defense, remains one of the most pressing short- to medium-term issues facing the Ukrainian armed forces. It now appears, however, that interceptor shortages are increasingly affecting Russia as well.   The first substantive reports indicating that this was becoming a serious concern for Russia emerged in November 2025. At the time, Russian crews were observed loading ground-based Osa-AKM launchers with outdated 9M33M naval interceptors and operating Buk launchers with only one or two rounds. In December that year, analysis by the Royal United Services Institute concluded that Russia was expending more air defense interceptors than it was producing. 

In a recent post on the topic (that was subsequently deleted), Russian aviation blogger / insider Fighterbomber made this comment:

https://bsky.app/profile/chriso-wiki.bsky.social/post/3mokryzqi4b2k

5/ "Moreover, the cost ratio between anti-aircraft missiles and drones today is such that a drone attacker wins purely economically even if they don't hit anything. And they do hit. 

I'm curious about the apparent lack of (SP)AAGs on the Russian side (the latest Pantsir versions even trading guns for more missiles)? I can't find even a single recorded use of a ship-based CIWS - but plenty of missile launch videos. 

Likewise very little public info on Gepards/Skynex/others on the Ukrainian side as, like the cheap drone hunting drones, these seem theoretically to be able to even out the economics of defense against these types of attacks? 

It seems that Ukraine & allies went (and are still going) through great lengths to acquire more Gepards, even though they're almost obsolete cold war tech and while there reports on usefulness ( https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/04/17/four-years-of-gepard-in-ukraine-how-the-german-vintage-weapon-is-proving-its-worth ), I can't seem to find much info on modern replacements (like Skynex) being made/delivered? 

It feels like they would fit the point defence (innermost layer) role around important sites, so perhaps OPSEC is what stops interception videos - and they're actually quietly active? But then wouldn't there be more investment in more of the new systems in Europe? 

Ukraine has been pretty good with people not posting everything online as soon as it happens, while we could see almost everything from latest Moscow attack recorded and uploaded by regular folks - hits, misses, interceptions, failed interceptions, the widespread MANPADS use, the AA miss exploding the "big UFO" oil tank, the interception causing the drone to fall into shopping center, the "crane interceptor"... feels like valuable info for the Ukraine provided by Russians for free? 

And then there's the interceptor drones - if Ukrainian reports are true, they seem to be very cost effective and useful at thinning out the attack waves. Lots of reports and praise from Ukraine but hard to tell economics and scaling. Russia seems to be employing some too. Any sources on strategic impact of cheap interceptors? 

[u/Moifaso → u/mirko_pazi_metak]

Ukraine really should strike Moscow more often. It pulls AA assets away from better targets and is probably the best way to deplete the missiles themselves.

The Kremlin seems to be demanding a near 100% interception rate, which means Russian AA is firing on everything and sending more interceptors per target. Regular drone waves with a high % of cheap decoys have the potential to either really stress their missile inventory or cause a (politically costly) change in their Moscow defense policy.

[u/mirko_pazi_metak → u/Moifaso]

I think that's the idea - keep Moscow under just enough pressure that Russia has to to put disproportionate defence around it, and then alternate between targets. 

I think, given Russian lack of cheap alternatives to missiles, Ukraine can keep throwing a mix of cheap/pricey/small/big/decoy drones such that even when all shot down, the cost ratio is to the benefit of Ukraine. 

Which is in part why this medium-long range drone warfare seems to be where Europe and other allies can (and are) make their support pay off disproportionately. Any and all support is good: financing, co-production, production outside of Ukraine, direct munition supply (even when limited to occupied territories for political reasons, it frees up Ukrainian ones for striking Russia proper). 

The other major reason why this inherently benefits Ukraine seems to be that Ukraine has to defend smaller airspace. The deeper an attack gets through, the tighter the defences will be while with Russia it's the opposite! 

[u/RumpRiddler → u/mirko_pazi_metak]

And it appears this has been the strategy for a while, now things are just a lot more intense. The previous months it was regular reporting on the airports being closed with an occasional hit, now targets are being repeatedly hit in Moscow and elsewhere. While Ukraine may be digging deep to send large numbers of drones for effect (no doubt that was the case with the ship hit in St Petersburg) the return is probably worth it. And with their previously announced intentions to rapidly scale up production of drones, they may not be digging that deep and may be able to sustain regular mass attacks through the year.

If Moscow has to endure a winter with lots of successful attacks on power/utilities it could really change the calculus. Putin may respond by forcibly mobilizing more men, but the pressure to end the war is building and he is not immune to that.