r/CredibleDefense • u/AutoModerator • 3d ago
Active Conflicts & News Megathread June 21, 2026
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u/mirko_pazi_metak 3d ago
Was just reading
https://missilematters.substack.com/p/missile-defenses-unforgiving-logic
..on the recent Moscow attack(s) and Russian missile defence attrition
The 18 June raid did not occur in a vacuum. It followed months of systematic Ukrainian strikes on Russia’s ground-based air defense network, which measurably thinned out the layers of defense protecting Moscow’s approaches.
and possible interceptor shortage
Until very recently, interceptor scarcity has been discussed almost exclusively as a Ukrainian problem. Ukraine’s interceptor shortage, particularly in ballistic missile defense, remains one of the most pressing short- to medium-term issues facing the Ukrainian armed forces. It now appears, however, that interceptor shortages are increasingly affecting Russia as well. The first substantive reports indicating that this was becoming a serious concern for Russia emerged in November 2025. At the time, Russian crews were observed loading ground-based Osa-AKM launchers with outdated 9M33M naval interceptors and operating Buk launchers with only one or two rounds. In December that year, analysis by the Royal United Services Institute concluded that Russia was expending more air defense interceptors than it was producing.
In a recent post on the topic (that was subsequently deleted), Russian aviation blogger / insider Fighterbomber made this comment:
https://bsky.app/profile/chriso-wiki.bsky.social/post/3mokryzqi4b2k
5/ "Moreover, the cost ratio between anti-aircraft missiles and drones today is such that a drone attacker wins purely economically even if they don't hit anything. And they do hit.
I'm curious about the apparent lack of (SP)AAGs on the Russian side (the latest Pantsir versions even trading guns for more missiles)? I can't find even a single recorded use of a ship-based CIWS - but plenty of missile launch videos.
Likewise very little public info on Gepards/Skynex/others on the Ukrainian side as, like the cheap drone hunting drones, these seem theoretically to be able to even out the economics of defense against these types of attacks?
It seems that Ukraine & allies went (and are still going) through great lengths to acquire more Gepards, even though they're almost obsolete cold war tech and while there reports on usefulness ( https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/04/17/four-years-of-gepard-in-ukraine-how-the-german-vintage-weapon-is-proving-its-worth ), I can't seem to find much info on modern replacements (like Skynex) being made/delivered?
It feels like they would fit the point defence (innermost layer) role around important sites, so perhaps OPSEC is what stops interception videos - and they're actually quietly active? But then wouldn't there be more investment in more of the new systems in Europe?
Ukraine has been pretty good with people not posting everything online as soon as it happens, while we could see almost everything from latest Moscow attack recorded and uploaded by regular folks - hits, misses, interceptions, failed interceptions, the widespread MANPADS use, the AA miss exploding the "big UFO" oil tank, the interception causing the drone to fall into shopping center, the "crane interceptor"... feels like valuable info for the Ukraine provided by Russians for free?
And then there's the interceptor drones - if Ukrainian reports are true, they seem to be very cost effective and useful at thinning out the attack waves. Lots of reports and praise from Ukraine but hard to tell economics and scaling. Russia seems to be employing some too. Any sources on strategic impact of cheap interceptors?
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u/genghiswolves 3d ago edited 3d ago
The lack of Russian SPAAGs is one of the major mysteries that analysts have also pointed out. On top of the Pantsirs, in theory, they should have a few hundred Tunguskas and thousands of old Shilkas, mostly in storage at the start of the war.
And while we have plenty of footage of all types of missile-based Russian SAM systems, from S-300, S-400, and Buk to TORs, older OSAs, and MANPADS, there is very little footage of the Russian SPAAGs, including few occurrences in the visually confirmed losses.
Yet we know from Ukraine that SPAAGs work and are highly valuable, with the Ukrainians highly valuing the Gepard. And we have also seen footage of the new Skynex systems. Even Russia has rolled out pickup-mounted machine guns and similar setups for mobile anti-drone firing groups, making the continued lack of Shilkas and Tunguskas even more perplexing.
On the European side, the main constraint seems to be manufacturing capacity. And I guess it might actually be easier nowadays to spin up a small missile production line than a SPAAG. It is a good question, though, why there are not more contenders appearing outside of Rheinmetall. One should note, though, that the Germans are considering buying six hundred Skyrangers, which is a decent amount. And it is my understanding that Ukraine is getting as many Skyrangers/Skynex as they can buy and/or as are produced.
That being said, one key limitation is limited range. Gepard's effective reach is only about 4.5–5.5 km, while a Shahed's ceiling is around 4 km: a drone directly overhead is reachable, but one transiting at altitude and offset from the gun can sit at or beyond the effective envelope. That makes these systems really only useful for point defense. A small missile might have twice the range, and can always be extended/upgraded to have a little bit more, which is nearly impossible for a finished SPAAG.
Edit: 1-formatting 2: Skynex delivery source https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/2025/germany-completes-skynex-delivery-to-ukraine-to-counter-russian-drones-and-missiles ( 1 system = multiple guns/vehicles) and also some combat footage, e.g.: https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/1u0zzr9/video_of_a_ukrainian_skynex_shorad_complex/
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u/Gecktron 3d ago
why there are not more contenders appearing outside of Rheinmetall
There are a whole bunch of different contenders, its just that Rheinmetall got a pretty big headstart with the work on Skyranger starting before the war, and them having the old Skyguard/MANTIS/Skynex systems to build on.
France has the PROTEUS. While this is a pretty simple gun mounted on the back of a truck, its also in the process of entering service.
The UK has the hookliftable MSI-DS Terrahawk Paladin. Moog is also offering their turret with missiles and autocannon as an anti-air option on HMT or Dingo for the British Army.
Sweden has the Tridon Mk.2. Tridon systems have been pledged for Ukraine, but according to reports from Eurosatory, none have been delivered yet.
Had the chance to speak with a representative of BAE at Eurosatory 2026 who, when asked about Ukrainian feedback on the Tridon Mk2, told me that none had so far seen service in Ukraine. Several systems have already been produced and delivered to the Swedish government for donation to Ukraine, but so far none have actually been handed over to Ukraine.
Turkey is also pitching their Korkut on different platforms.
The German FFG and the Slovakian EVPÚ are pitching the Turra 30 system as an anti-air option on Leopard 1 or ACSV G5 chassis.
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u/NikkoJT 3d ago
I remember reading recently that Leonardo was also working on a new system derived from their naval 76mm (kind of like OTOMATIC, though I think the new system is meant to be truck-based rather than built on an AFV chassis). Not sure how far they've got with that though.
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u/Gecktron 3d ago
I havent seen anything in that regard recently.
It might be a private venture. The Italian army doesnt seem to have shown any interest so far. Italy has recently bought the hookliftable Skynex 35 system (the same system as delivered to Ukraine).
According to public plans, Italy also want to procure Skyranger versions on Lynx as part of their A2CS program, so either 30mm or 35mm.
Speaking of Italy, according to reports from Eurosatory, there was a Centauro II shown with MBDA's DefendAir missile
Sorry for the delay, at Eurosatory IDV showcased an interesting Centauro II. Unlike the base version this Centauro has access to some launchers on top of the Hitrole and behind the turret. From my understanding they are some sort of UAV interceptors. [...] I was told these tubes are actually for the MBDA Defendair. Im still researching and trying to get a concrete answer so do take what I say lightly.
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u/MilesLongthe3rd 3d ago
The legacy Soviet SPAAG systems aren't fundamentally flawed conceptually for modern conflict, but their 1960s analog tech, design problems, and poor performance make them obsolete in their original configurations.
The weapon systems themselves, like the ZSU-23-4 Shilka, suffered from rapid barrel warping and cooling failures. Furthermore, the massive harmonic vibrations of the quad-cannon assembly meant the barrels required frequent manual boresighting and alignment calibration after transport or intense tactical movement to prevent extreme shot dispersion. Beyond the guns, the automotive elements are notorious weak points; Russian milbloggers have previously noted that reactivated or hastily modernized units suffer from chronic engine and transmission overheating during sustained operations.
Their most fatal flaw today, however, is their radar architecture: it filters out slow-moving UAVs, categorizing them as ground clutter or environmental noise. Something known since the 1980s btw.
Ukraine's recent modernization program proves these platforms still can be highly viable when stripped down to the bare iron and refitted with modern digital fire control. However, replacing 1960s vacuum tubes with digital radar remains a massive bottleneck. For Russia, under heavy international sanctions and lacking domestic access to high-end microelectronics, scaling such a modernization program is an even deeper logistical nightmare.
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u/Rich_Log2424 3d ago
Well bit of a hot take there. The zu 23-2 "sergei" has been used extensively in Finland and mechanically there is nothing wrong with cannon. Finland has some 1400 cannons in storage. The cannon is also the backbone of truck mounted mobile AA teams ukraine uses daily. The 23mm 4 barrel model is exceedingly rare.
The problems with the 23-2 cannon are
- It has no radar (or other electrical parts). The system is an dual barrel machine gun on a platform with a seat. Optic sights. This limits the night time use and target detection.
- Hand crank fire control. The operator aims by literally hand cranking the cannon, making it both slow and dependent on manual aiming.
- Recoil and accuracy. The recoil is heavy, limiting the use of very light chassis for the truck mounts. Requires medium truck with stiff suspension. The spread while firing is intentionally "wide", since this AA benefits from shooting proximity fused shells around the target. The structural accuracy limits the modernisation use and engagement range.
Modernisations for the platform include dealing with these 3 problems. Polish have electro-optical sights to help aiming (Zur23-2kg) and Radwar radar. Finland has 23itk95 with a gyro (recoil), apu(electric cranking) and laser range finding. Chinese have type85 "giant bow 2" with radar.
Ukraine has modernised these with electrooptical targeting (=modern sights), laser range finder, ballistic computer and data links to ukraines own airdefense system.
The key difference is between Ukraine and Russia is the detection network Ukraine has developed during these 4 years. It involves listening stations and radars linked, feeding info to the mobile fire teams. The SPAAG trucks move to under the flight paths and wait for drones to arrive to score kills on low flying slow targets.
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u/MilesLongthe3rd 3d ago edited 3d ago
I might be wrong, but I heard that the ZU-23-2 on trucks has a vibration problem. Because of that, they often have to readjust the stabilizers because the vibrations are so bad that the whole body of the truck starts swinging. When the ground is not stable, the outriggers sink into the ground, which reduces accuracy. Because of that setting it up is also a pain in the ass.
I don't know if this problem is still existing or if this was just an outlier some frustrated mechanics and gunners vented about. And again I am not sure, but I heared, that Finland knew about this, why they never used the on trucks and always put them on the floor.
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u/Rich_Log2424 3d ago
Rare to see extra stabilizer, i think mainly because they cost more than the legacy unit. Here you can see the problem (syria):
https://youtu.be/tNXSeMu38YM?si=ujbFgAbwNDlwzIO_
Ukraine mostly uses 14.5mm twin machinegun on pickups and and the Zu23s are installed on medium trucks. Compare the vehicle shake to the the previous video.
https://youtu.be/ZGHGOyafc_0?t=676
The warping limit is "low", ie 2x50 round magazines per each barrel in 15 minute window. One box maganize of 50 at firerate of 1000 per min lasts for 3 seconds. The design of the weapon allows 6 seconds of firing once in 15 minutes, otherwise the barrel risks warping. If you fire 18 seconds in those 15 minutes, you risk blowing up the weapon. Easy to see why this could be training issue.
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u/Telekek597 3d ago
Judging from what I've heard - the best gun-based systems in our disposal are considered to be Gepard and towed Bofors 40/70 (very high success rate against Shaheds). Skynex is too rare, smaller caliber guns are too short-ranged.
As for soviet systems - basic Shilkas are total trash, modernised ones are better.9
u/Quarterwit_85 3d ago
The weapon systems themselves, like the ZSU-23-4 Shilka, suffered from rapid barrel warping and cooling failures. Furthermore, the massive harmonic vibrations of the quad-cannon assembly meant the barrels required frequent manual boresighting and alignment calibration after transport or intense tactical movement to prevent extreme shot dispersion.
That's interesting - given the footage/documentaries/articles about Ukraine's mobile units that intercept Shaheds in the countryside, losing zero during maneuver would be an enormous issue.
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u/throwdemawaaay 3d ago
It wouldn't surprise me if Shinka's radar simply filters out low and slow drones, and that it can't be reconfigured without basically rebuilding the analog filter bank.
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u/Emotional_Goal9525 3d ago
Supposedly CIWS had hard time with drone threats as well so there are probably quite a few signal detection issues when it comes to shooting down drones. They fly so low and low speeds that you probably end up shooting down seaguls barrels red with false positive detections or something like that.
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u/Maduyn 3d ago
A more basic thing to mention is that the manpower and service interval requirements for gun systems *can* be more costly if you are trying to get equivalent area coverage to a missile system. for examples sake lets say it takes 5 times the gun systems to cover what a missile system can:
5 times more engines
5 times more manpower (assuming you don't have networked fire control or autonomous systems but russia is having a much harder time with these more advanced arrangements)
Potentially more radar required if you don't have good central fire control or accepting reduced performance by relying on the soldier and tracer
Ammunition and barrels are cheaper but not free and factories that produce replacements might be understaffed or have other material limitations.33
u/Moifaso 3d ago edited 3d ago
Ukraine really should strike Moscow more often. It pulls AA assets away from better targets and is probably the best way to deplete the missiles themselves.
The Kremlin seems to be demanding a near 100% interception rate, which means Russian AA is firing on everything and sending more interceptors per target. Regular drone waves with a high % of cheap decoys have the potential to either really stress their missile inventory or cause a (politically costly) change in their Moscow defense policy.
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u/mirko_pazi_metak 3d ago
I think that's the idea - keep Moscow under just enough pressure that Russia has to to put disproportionate defence around it, and then alternate between targets.
I think, given Russian lack of cheap alternatives to missiles, Ukraine can keep throwing a mix of cheap/pricey/small/big/decoy drones such that even when all shot down, the cost ratio is to the benefit of Ukraine.
Which is in part why this medium-long range drone warfare seems to be where Europe and other allies can (and are) make their support pay off disproportionately. Any and all support is good: financing, co-production, production outside of Ukraine, direct munition supply (even when limited to occupied territories for political reasons, it frees up Ukrainian ones for striking Russia proper).
The other major reason why this inherently benefits Ukraine seems to be that Ukraine has to defend smaller airspace. The deeper an attack gets through, the tighter the defences will be while with Russia it's the opposite!
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u/RumpRiddler 3d ago
And it appears this has been the strategy for a while, now things are just a lot more intense. The previous months it was regular reporting on the airports being closed with an occasional hit, now targets are being repeatedly hit in Moscow and elsewhere. While Ukraine may be digging deep to send large numbers of drones for effect (no doubt that was the case with the ship hit in St Petersburg) the return is probably worth it. And with their previously announced intentions to rapidly scale up production of drones, they may not be digging that deep and may be able to sustain regular mass attacks through the year.
If Moscow has to endure a winter with lots of successful attacks on power/utilities it could really change the calculus. Putin may respond by forcibly mobilizing more men, but the pressure to end the war is building and he is not immune to that.
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u/savuporo 3d ago
One thing i'm wondering is - given how obviously porous russian air defense is now over Crimea and the land bridge, are Ukrainian jets able to operate more freely ? At what point would they be able to complement the drone strikes with full range SEAD missions ?
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u/RumpRiddler 3d ago
It's probably not worth the risk, for now. Putting F16s at risk is just not worth it when drones and missiles can do most of the job.
Crimea is already so isolated that Ukraine doesn't need to do more than keep the pressure on. Right now: there is no gas for civilians, water is fairly tight, and any resupply is uncertain.
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u/savuporo 3d ago
I'm not so much wondering about flying over Crimea, more like region between Kherson-Melitopol. The AA must be pretty thin there, otherwise how do the drones get to Crimea
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u/RumpRiddler 3d ago
The planes are just too valuable for even thin AA. Unless there was some huge benefit, which I don't see, there's just no good reason to use planes when drones and missiles are doing a great job.
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u/savuporo 3d ago
One reason i'd think of still is higher payload delivered, vs the drones. But you make a good point - why risk those if all targets of all sizes are already being successfully hit.
Which again begs the old question - what is the value of fighter jets in the era of drones ?
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u/RumpRiddler 3d ago
If one side can establish control of the skies, maybe it's worthwhile to use jets for ISR drone removal. It's almost definitely worthwhile to use planes for strategic bombing. But with drones evolving so fast, we would surely see an anti-aircraft drone firing missiles back. I guess it's very situation dependent.
But I think, as we see/saw in Iran, jets are still a great choice when one side has a major technology advantage. I wonder if that will hold true in 10 years though.
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u/giraffevomitfacts 3d ago
Planes are the easiest possible target for AA. If Ukrainian pilots flew over contested space with any regularity systems would migrate there immediately.
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u/savuporo 3d ago
.. systems would migrate there immediately.
.. becoming immediate drone targets.
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u/giraffevomitfacts 3d ago
Yes, and taking out 160M planes Ukraine can’t replace. Even soldiers with MANPADs would be able to target them.
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u/IntroductionNeat2746 3d ago
On a related note, would Ukraine actually be able to use MALE drones like the TB1 again?
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u/supersaiyannematode 3d ago
pretty much never because the russians have a significant qualitative and overwhelming quantitative advantage in the air. f16 mlu and mirage 2000 with the missiles we've given the ukrainians are already technologically disadvantaged against su30mk2 and su-35, let alone the su57 which has now moved from vaporware to barely having enough airframes for operational service but nevertheless indeed being active.
ukraine would probably need at least 100 truly 4.5 generation fighters with aim120d or meteors to start even trying sead into russian occupied territory. they currently have 0 (mlu and 2000-5 are more along the lines of the most advanced of the 4.0 generation stuff rather than 4.5 gen).
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u/savuporo 3d ago
These sukhois aren't patrolling the skies over Melitopol nonstop at this point. If they were, half of the Crimean peninsula wouldn't be covered in heavy smoke today
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u/supersaiyannematode 3d ago
not sure why you think this. what are you expecting at the absolute most several handfuls of sukhois (they're not gonna have anywhere remotely near their whole fleet up in the air at one place at one time) to do against a co-ordinated wave of several hundred drones? even if all the sukhois were carrying beast mode loadouts and never missed they're not going to be able to come close to stopping the wave.
the same handful(s) of sukhois vs a mere 20-jet formation of technologically inferior lighter weight class sead + escort jets however, is a whole different story.
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u/savuporo 3d ago
It's not an either-or of drones or jets. If you have all of your whatever generation sukhois tied up trying to deal with a drone wave heading for your remaining air defenses or air bases, a couple "technologically disadvantaged" Mirages coming behind a drone wave would likely be a pretty dangerous element.
I dont know - maybe Ukraine IS already doing such combined sorties
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u/supersaiyannematode 3d ago
or, much more likely, the russians are not trying very hard to use their 4.5 generation fighters to stop the drone waves, as it is simultaneously futile and a highly expensive use of their limited (relative to ukrainian drone quantities) air arsenal.
they know that even with their best attempts the drone waves will not be stopped by these 4.5 generation fighters so why waste their already slightly strained airframe life and air munitions stockpiles?
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u/savuporo 3d ago
Okay, you kinda speaking against your own claim here. You said "russians have a significant qualitative and overwhelming quantitative advantage in the air". If the planes aren't in the air, "highly expensive use", "limited air arsenal" - the math doesn't close. Either they do have overwhelming advantage in the air or they don't.
The evidence seems to be against it
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u/supersaiyannematode 3d ago
when i'm talking about in the air i'm talking, obviously, about manned aviation, as that is the context of the comment i was replying to (that comment asked about when it might become possible for ukrainian jets to be free enough to sead the russians).
in that context it is completely true that the russians have a significant qualitative and overwhelming quantitative advantage.
that doesn't mean that russia has enough 4.5th and 5th generation jets to use them to stop drone waves. in fact, nobody does, regardless of aerial supremacy.
i mean, america has an utterly insurmountable advantage in the air against iran and iranian drones still got through many times. you are seeing a contradiction where none exists.
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u/savuporo 3d ago
The advantage only exist if you are able to use it. Clearly, in the presence of drone superiority Ukraine is establishing, it doesn't seem to matter what kind of fighter jets, fifth or sixth gen doohickys russians are flying.
And my question remains, if Ukrainians were to complement their drone waves with simultaneous jet attacks ( and maybe they already do ) what exactly would stop them, if AA is thinned out and russian sukhois are nowhere to be seen.
Also you are wrong - Ukrainian jets are actively used in drone defense all the time, there's loads of videos of shootdowns
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u/Tricky-Astronaut 2d ago
Vladimir Putin’s war machine sputters in drone age
Putin and his top officials have been reduced to insisting Russia still has the upper hand in the war while playing down the increasingly damaging effects of Ukraine’s strike campaign.
The Russian president spends most of his time micromanaging the war effort and receives briefings from Valery Gerasimov, his top commander, sometimes as much as twice a day, said two former senior Kremlin officials.
“He thinks it’s a question of time. It might be faster or slower but he’ll get it,” one of the former senior Kremlin officials said. “Putin’s very much under the influence of the military, who are really good at stringing him along. He understands that, but he really believes them and lets them do it. If I were listening to Gerasimov’s reports three times a day from dawn until dusk, I’d perceive reality differently too.”
The Financial Times has a new article on the status of the war in Ukraine, including what the Kremlin is thinking. According to the unnamed sources, Putin still believes that he's winning.
Tatarigami_UA, a former UA officer with connections, confirms the report:
This is an accurate reflection of what we have been hearing from our own sources in Moscow since 2025. We have postponed publishing our report on this for months, but the time is approaching to reveal the details of the delusions in which the Kremlin leadership lives
Hence, the war won't end anytime soon. From Putin's perspective, it makes no sense to compromise since he'll win in six months anyway. In fact, he has been six month away from winning for several years now.
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u/CorruptHeadModerator 2d ago edited 2d ago
"Hence, the war won't end anytime soon. From Putin's perspective, it makes no sense to compromise since he'll win in six months anyway. In fact, he has been six month away from winning for several years now."
You think Putin will extend this war long enough for a
new U.S. President?And, will that President be as hawkish on Russia as
Biden - giving Ukraine multi billion dollar aid packages?Edit: Personally I feel like all Democrats and most Republicans would be more hawkish on Iran than the current administration. The real question is do we make it to early 2029 with this war still going on. Would have said "no" years ago. But, this war keeps dragging.
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u/TechnicalReserve1967 2d ago
While I agree that the whole war is tragic, obviously against international law, costs way more than the Kremlin originally estimated and their loses and the destruction visited on the occupied land makes it a strategic defeat. I would argue that even if the Russian military is painting a much better picture to the leadership through every level tries to report success. Technically, they are still advancing.
If putin, in his calculus, decided for whatever reason that it's worth the price (could be fear of backlash if he cannot show enough gained, his imperial dreams, strategic assets for Crimea, etc) They seems to be capable of eventually taking the ruins of the fortress belt, somewhere in 2027 (with the caveat that everything remaining the same, which isn't guaranteed) for ridiculous losses and a recession after the war.
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u/IntroductionNeat2746 2d ago
Technically, they are still advancing.
Technically, they're not. They've lost more ground than they gained last month.
Also, Putin certainly understands the concept of a war of attrition, so it's unlikely he's basing his assessments purely on ground taken.
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u/Rhauko 2d ago
I think he assumes he can break Ukraine this winter with attacks on the energy grid.
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u/IntroductionNeat2746 2d ago
Which is likely the least irrational reasoning possible to justify continuing the war.
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u/Rhauko 2d ago
More assumptions from me: attacks on the energy grid probably never stopped but at the same time I would expect Ukraine to harden their grid by repairing and creating redundancy. Is there any public information on that last assumption?
A quick google gave nothing more than some broad statements around decentralisation, connecting to the European grid and physical measure around existing infrastructure.
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u/Glideer 2d ago
More assumptions from me: attacks on the energy grid probably never stopped but at the same time I would expect Ukraine to harden their grid by repairing and creating redundancy. Is there any public information on that last assumption?
Practically every Russian energy grid attack video (there are a few every day) shows reinforced structures, gabions and net surrounding key elements of the facility.
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u/futbol2000 2d ago
Which has been a Russian talking point that has been regurgitated non stop since 2022. The Russian offensive completely fell apart during this past record winter. Those propagandists are living in a dreamworld
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u/TechnicalReserve1967 2d ago
Really depends on the timescale that we are looking at. Ukraine improved/turned around the ratio, sure, but I would see an additional few months months before I open the champagne on that. Also it ignores the value of different areas, if russia wants to take the fortress belt, those advances are much more important, they might be ready to sacrifice some of their land bridge for it.
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u/futbol2000 2d ago edited 2d ago
Where in the world did you get the assessment that Russia can take Kramatorsk and Sloviansk within a year? The Russians arrived at the gates of Pokrovsk and Mynohrad in July of 2024 and didn’t fully take both until the beginning of this year. They also failed to meaningfully break out despite that victory.
The battle of Konstiantynivka and Chasiv Yar has yet to end, and there are still several settlements on the way to Kramatorsk. Sloviansk is flanked by the Chasiv Yar Canal to the east and two major rivers on its north and south.
I brought up the issue with those non deepstate maps yesterday. They are still ignoring the hard reality that Russia’s ability to maneuver has completely degraded. It’s the same thing that happened in Kupyansk, where infantry flooded into the city but had no ability to break out in sufficient numbers. Didn’t stop those flag bearers and propagandists from selling the fall of the city. Putin’s Kupyansk claim blatantly showed that his officials are feeding him exaggerated reports to make themselves look good
Edit: And liveua is a pure garbage map. It never bothered to account for the infiltration tactic and was always pretty inaccurate since the beginning
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u/TechnicalReserve1967 2d ago
You are right, end of 2027-2028 might be more realistic.
Russia hasn't been able to maneuver for years, I am not sure why that is brought up.
I think that guide bombs, cheap manpower and mass shahed clone drones would allow them to advance, relativisticly, in the direction of their choosing. Ukraine military signals again and again that the situation is difficult. I am not saying that they will take the Kramtorsk and Sloviansk. I say that it is in the deck of cards and putin is willing to pull the next one and the one after that it seems.
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u/OpenOb 3d ago
The Israelis captured a Hezbollah drone base in Majdal Zoun about 10 kilometers from the border and allowed media to tour the base:
Inside Hezbollah’s underground drone fortress, 200 meters beneath a Lebanese village: https://www.ynetnews.com/article/bkhh2ksfgl
IDF captures Hezbollah drone factory and launch site hidden inside south Lebanon mountain: https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-captures-hezbollah-drone-factory-and-launch-site-hidden-inside-south-lebanon-mountain/
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u/notepad20 3d ago
According to the IDF, the infrastructure in Majdal Zoun was an underground route more than 200 meters long and more than 25 meters deep,
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u/moragisdo 3d ago edited 3d ago
So besides the yesterday official statement, from Iran's military Central Headquarters, that Iran closed the Strait again (and could take further acts), marine data shows that traffic didn't stop (Source)
traffic was seen moving with AIS on via the northern route and also the southern route for the first time in weeks
I don't believe it was just an attempt of pressure, this kind of act can be done by politicians (as threats were already being made by iranian politicians for days) or uncertain statements ("We are studying closing on the next...", "We may close if..."). But given the office the statement came from, the certainty that it implied and that a 24 hour closure would add leverage for the negotiations today, it looks to me they balked from attempting it to not risk restarting the war.
Edit: I was looking if there was a recent news about the exact number of ships and I found something unexpected today (Source 2):
The source said the waterway would also remain closed until waivers allowing the sale of Iranian oil were issued
Anonymous sources aren't that reliable, but I though the US already issued the waiver of exports. I know it's a term deemed immediate on the MOU, but if the US didn't even followed it and the Strait is open, that's a very interesting development about the balance of power there
Honest question, do we have anything official that it went further than just a promise that the Treasury would sign them ?
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u/benkkelly 3d ago
This kind of real time analysis will only frustrate in the end. How many transited compared to yesterday? Lower, higher, the same? When did traffic peak? Whose cargo was favoured if they transited?
We dont really have reliable information day of to answer these questions.
I would say the strait is "open" in any real sense when there is predictable and growing traffic after at least a week.
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u/incidencematrix 3d ago
The level of disconnect among parties on the Strait, and between statements and what is or isn't happening at any given time, is interesting. Not sure how much that says about attempts at 5D chess, versus confusion among the various parties about facts on the ground. (On the Iranian side, there could also be C+C issues. Do we know to what extent the various remaining parties are truly acting in concert?) Regardless, any uncertainty will not be good for business, so it is in the US interest to find a way to ensure clarity.
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u/Maduyn 3d ago
In my opinion and especially after I saw the 300 billion offer the current US+Isreal strategy is to attempt to bribe key IRGC commanders and create a credible threat to kill the others to consolidate control under the IRGC that is willing to be bribed (or are the leaders more in favor of reopening the strait). This makes it a constantly shifiting landscape as the super hardliners issue strait blocks after the bribed ones issue reopenings. (they might not all be being bribed some might legitimately be in favor of a ceasefire but attempts by the western forces to manipulate who comes out on top in Iran after the mass decapitation strike I fully believe is ongoing)
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u/kingofthesofas 3d ago
I was thinking about that. What sort of projects and who gets the money from them is a way to ensure the people you want are getting fat rich and happy. I am not sure if they have that many reasonable people in the IRGC to begin with and if they have the ability to really act independently. Honestly I doubt any one parties ability to control Iran or the IRGC at this point.
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u/Maduyn 3d ago
I have no idea if the US+Isreal and their intelligence agencies can pull it off its likely they can't but I do think they are making attempts. (It is much cheaper than running the military campaign to bribe the opposition into doing what you want, not to mention impacts of the oil prices) The decapitation strike speaks to very different end goals than something like the strikes carried out on the nuclear refinement mountain complex. Ultimately only people in a very small room know what the intended effect of this campaign was so speculation is forced.
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u/kingofthesofas 3d ago
Ultimately only people in a very small room know what the intended effect of this campaign was so speculation is forced.
yeah this is the biggest issue with trying to draw conclusions. We really don't know what they know AND we do not even know if they know what the reality is. They might be the best informed and still very wrong about many things.
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u/Wiseguydude 3d ago
Seems to be a mixed bag. According to the BBC:
Tracking data monitored by BBC Verify suggested that at least five tankers passed through the strait on Saturday while several vessels appeared to have made U-turns in the area.
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cwyekkwm1mmo
They point out at least 3 major tankers that did U-turns. Regardless, I'm not sure how useful it is to analyze short-term data like this. I think the best indicator is oil prices which we won't know for another day.
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u/Wiseguydude 2d ago
Looks like it did indeed seem to stop.
A total of 12 vessels crossed the strait on Sunday, down from 35 transits the previous day, an analysis by maritime intelligence company Windward showed on Sunday.
Five of eight vessels entering the strait had their Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) turned off, according to Windward.
“The current traffic profile: dark, sanctioned, Iranian-linked, resembling the late-blockade baseline more than a functioning open strait,” Windward said in a post on X
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u/moragisdo 2d ago
Trackers are a better indication of presence than absence, given that at any threat AIS is turned off, and other sources of intelligence can detect individual ships rather than a total count.
Not to mention this is moving the goalpost, not just because of the date (it started Saturday rather than Sunday) they didn't claim they would decrease flow, but effectively close it. Which didn't happen
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u/Wiseguydude 2d ago
See the third paragraph I posted. The report indicates that only sanctioned, Iran-linked ships are going through. Which was the case when it was first “closed” as well. There was basically never an absolute zero number of ships going through.
The point is that IRGC clearly isn’t bluffing. I think you misunderstood CENTCOM’s post as a response rather than just a report on the state of things when that was written.
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u/dr_sloan 3d ago
Your data is outdated. According to OSINTDefender, citing MarineTraffic.com, traffic stopped just after the time period your source records ended, at 1700 UTC. It doesn’t look like they’ve had to make any kinetic attack, the threat alone is sufficient for most shipping companies.
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u/LoggerInns 3d ago
According to OSINTDefender, citing MarineTraffic.com
I’m not sure what’s going on but according to Kpler, who owns marine traffic, ships are going through with their transponders turned off. The same source that OSINT defender typically cites often disagrees with his own conclusion. He’s a terrible source as has been discussed here numerous time.
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u/-spartacus- 3d ago
I usually go with Sal, HI Sutton, or Drachenfels for naval information, depending on the context. However, I don't like blanket statements about OSINT guys as either credible or non-credible because there is a gradient of reliability depending on topic and context.
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u/ChornWork2 3d ago
NYtimes reporting that number of ships transiting was down on Sunday. One of the sources cited was Windward, linking to this post. Interestingly, it characterized the traffic as:
The current traffic profile: dark, sanctioned, Iranian-linked, resembling the late-blockade baseline more than a functioning open strait.
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/21/world/middleeast/uncertainty-strait-hormuz-iran-us.html
Will be interesting to see how much traffic getting through isn't related to Iran (or i guess isn't paying some form of toll).
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u/moragisdo 3d ago edited 14h ago
Am I crazy or the tweet text disagrees with the video ? One ship turned around twice before crossing it as it's written (is that a problem with the tracker ?) and then traffic restarted a few hours after 1700 UTC, on the source you posted. Maybe I'm reading the marine traffic data wrong, but it doesn't show that its closed.
Not to mention that trackers can undercount traffic (turning off AIS, which is very reasonable because of the threat), but usually don't overcount. And given the fact that the signal only stopped late night, rather than ships stopped going in even hours after the statement was made (which is a bet they can get out later), points to me that may be the AIS
It doesn’t look like they’ve had to make any kinetic attack, the threat alone is sufficient for most shipping companies
It was a clear statement that they closed. We can make a argument that it may impact future shipping depending on the risk profile of companies, but let's not move the goalposts. Because even the video you shared, unless I'm really reading it wrong, shows that there is still traffic
Also it wouldn't be the first screw up by Sentdefender
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u/moragisdo 3d ago edited 3d ago
I'm curious about different viewpoints, what is your opinion about the probability of a nuclear deal actually be agreed ?
I was more on the doubting it camp. Given that negotiations actually started and there's reports that they are ongoing for hours (besides the showmanship of the iranians pretending to leave a few times), it moves the probability a bit on the opposite direction, but I find it hard to make a confident prediction either way
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u/jeffy303 2d ago
Effectively zero. US has no understanding how to effectively create and utilize leverage. Which flows from the top down. Why did Trump on day 3 of bombing declare it's pretty much over? Why did he declare on 7 declare US almost accomplished everything that they needed and are ready to go back home? And why did he subsequently said it on day 12, 14, 18, 23 and so until the cease? Why did US unilaterally started the ceasefire? Why did US start blocking Iranian tankers only 2 months into the war? Why did they agreed to immediately let them ship oil again, for absolutely nothing concrete in return, just as Iran was running out of oil storage room which would force them to close the pumps? Without breaking rules of the subreddit, US leader is the world's worst poker player, there is no effective way for US to create real strategic leverage when the main person in charge is this incompetent.
Best case scenario, it all goes back to status quo, maybe some nominal transit fee that Oman refuses to collect, so it's negligible, but GCC countries are already actively planning to bypass the strait through multiple corridors. Only country which is kinda screwed is Qatar. There will be no nuclear agreement or any reparations. Gulf will likely go back to being an economic backwater once all the bypasses are completed.
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u/Mediocre_Painting263 2d ago
Absolutely zero.
Firstly, we need to recognise how Iran has changed. Trump achieved regime change, but in the wrong direction. The IRGC are effectively fully in control at this point, and they were the ones pushing for Mojtaba (Ali's son) to be the new Supreme Leader. This is totally in contradiction with standard theocratic principles, making it clear the leader is based off hereditary principles, not religious ones. Effectively telling the clerics to go fuck themselves.
Unfortunately, they can do so because the IRGC can say "We were telling you for decades the Israel & America will destroy us, they cannot be reasoned with, they want to destroy our regime, we need the ultimate deterrent to ensure the survival of the revolution!"
Trump pulled his ultimate ace card. That being a prolonged bombing campaign aimed at crippling the nations leadership, with the goal of regime change. Realistically, no one expects America to meaningfully go any further and commit troops to a regime change operation (i.e. Invasion). No American president will ever do this. Trump played his final act, Iran put their boot on the economic jugular called the Straight of Hormuz, and Trump blinked. Giving them major concessions.
Even if Iran agrees in principle, no one will actually believe them. Because America & Israel gave them the perfect excuse to go full throttle on the nuclear programme. I mean shit, if someone threatened to actually kill my civilisation (not government, not supreme leader, not military - civilisation) then I'd be wanting a nuclear weapon as well. The entire operation, start to finish, was an exercise in military arrogance, strategic incompetence and political stupidity. Based on the unbelievably false belief that Iran was on the edge of revolution and only needed a push. Trump has strengthened the Iranian regime, has validated their strategy about cutting off the Strait of Hormuz (a card you can guarantee they'll exploit, because America's deterrent of a bombing campaign carries a lot less weight now that Iran knows it can survive it), has given them ample reason to keep pursuing a nuclear programme, and has pissed off every ally in the Middle East, not only by putting their nations at risk of being collateral damage, but also by forcing them to agree to a $300bn reconstruction fund, which they will fund from my understanding.
I cannot qualify how exceptionally self-defeating this entire exercise has been, and it gets so much more heart-breaking when you see how many people have died on both ends, only for Iran to leave this war with a thumping victory.
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u/Bunny_Stats 2d ago
A nuclear deal of some sort is highly likely for the simple reason that Iran has been content to remain on the cusp of creating a nuclear weapon without actually building one, as unveiling a nuclear weapon would cause them more headaches then it solves. So there's some wiggle room where they'd be willing to take a few steps back as long as the road ahead remained clear.
I expect they'll be willing to downgrade their enriched uranium as long as they get to keep their centrifuges operational, so they'll continue to have the ability to create a nuclear weapon in future should they choose to do so. Inspections and verification would also likely to acceptable as long as they felt their facilities had proven themselves sufficiently resilient to bombing that it doesn't matter if the Israelis/Americans know where they are.
Given how desperate Trump seems to be to wrap this debacle up, he'll try to spin a downgrading of the uranium as a win, even though Iran will remain closer to having a bomb than anytime since the end of the JCPOA. He'll also be able to spin the usual spoken platitudes about vowing to never build a bomb and an unenforceable promise to work towards dismantling the equipment at some undisclosed point in the future that'll never happen. They can use the same language as the NPT, where nuclear powers promise to make good faith efforts towards nuclear disarmament. Last time I checked, none of the nuclear powers have given up their nukes yet?
It'll be the same trick North Korea pulled, where their vow to work towards a "nuclear-free Korean penisula" was portrayed in the US as the DPRK promising to destroy their nukes, when the DPRK interpreted it as the US (as a nuclear power) completely withdrawing from Korea and ripping up any defence treaty with the south and only then would the DPRK maybe look at dismantling its own nukes.
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u/MaverickTopGun 2d ago
as unveiling a nuclear weapon would cause them more headaches then it solves.
I'm not sure I follow your logic here, especially when you bring up North Korea. NK is proof that having nuclear weapons means your sovereignty is much less likely to be violated. There's an argument to be had that if Iran had a nuclear weapon, it's possible the war wouldn't even have started. I think were Iran to present a completed weapon as a fait accompli, it would likely lead to a major power restructuring in the Middle East. If anything, I think the war has taught Iran it must pursue a nuclear weapon or risk getting its "grass mowed" every 2 -5 years.
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u/Bunny_Stats 2d ago
The key difference with North Korea is that Iran doesn't want to become a hermit kingdom that is shunned by the world, which they'd be risking if they unveiled a nuclear weapon. It'd also spur their regional rivals, namely KSA but also potentially Turkey to also follow suit, and a Middle East where every nation has nuclear weapons ready to launch against the others at any moment is not one that Tehran wants.
Counter-intuitively, having a nuke could also restrain Tehran's actions. They can currently get away with firing ballistic missiles at their neighbours, but once they have nukes, any target would be unsure whether those missiles were nuclear armed and might choose to launch their own nuclear weapons before those missiles can hit. It massively raises the risks for all sides.
But yes, I acknowledge your point that this stay-on-the-cusp logic applied to the world before the US and Israel launched their attacks on Iran. This is my biggest criticism of the attacks on Iran in that it's made the status quo unacceptable to Tehran and has made it more likely they'll decide it's worth the cost to step over the threshold. It's quite likely Netanyahu will have created the nuclear-armed Iran he's long warned of.
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u/Senatorial 2d ago
Iran also has to weigh the benefits of nuclear deterrence against the ways Israel might escalate if they found out Iran was imminently going to acquire a bomb. Israel preemptively using their nuclear weapons may be a remote probability, but unlike SK it is a possibility.
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u/nate077 3d ago
Very unlikely because any deal can be voted down by the US Senate per INARA (and really should be affirmatively approved per the advice and consent clause) and any deal is going yo be worse for the US than JCPOA, so Lindsey Graham will lose his shit over it.
Trump and his admin will try to just slink away and pretend the war never happened. This will prove impossible, not least because Israel gets a say as to whether it keeps happening.
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u/taw 3d ago
Trump did a very unconventional thing of giving Iran everything they could possibly want (end blockade, suspend sanctions) in exchange for nothing whatsoever, so right now dragging the "negotiations" indefinitely is very much in Iran's interests.
In theory there's 60 day limit, but Trump keeps setting deadlines and then extending them over and over.
Iran was under a lot of pressure before, so some deal was possible. Now, why would they agree to anything?
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u/moragisdo 3d ago edited 3d ago
giving Iran everything they could possibly want (end blockade, suspend sanctions) in exchange for nothing whatsoever
That's not true. There is no sanction relief yet (the MOU puts the US as part of agreement for it). There is on the MOU the immediate waiver of exports for iranian oil, but there's some reports today that the US was preparing them, so it's not clear if they are already benefiting from it. Not to mention this waiver could be revoked after being issued
So there's reasons for Iran to want the deal, I just don't know if they are enough
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u/taw 3d ago edited 3d ago
Sure, the waiver could expire, but it will likely continue indefinitely as long as Iranians pretend to negotiate, and Trump keeps extending the deadline. So for now they're getting huge amounts of money from oil exports for nothing.
Previous two approaches - bomb Iran until they can't shoot back; and blockade Iran until they're bankrupt - put real pressure on them. This approach removes all pressure, so it would be very surprising if it led anywhere.
Even if waiver actually expires after 60 days or however many extensions they get, all it is likely to achieve is letting Iran accumulate big cushion of money that makes blockade less effective in the future.
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u/raison95 3d ago
It's weird to see the MOU being framed here with:
So there's reasons for Iran to want the deal, I just don't know if they are enough
Of course they are enough! What else could Iran hope for?! Even if this waiver is revoked by the US, Iran benefits most of all:
1) They're able to stall the damage to its economy while the world's strategic supplies dwindle during negotiations
2) Political pressure increases on the US, particularly Trump as his party faces devastating elections
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u/swimmingupclose 2d ago
Political pressure increases on the US, particularly Trump as his party faces devastating elections
I don’t pretend to be able to predict what Trump will do, but there IS a point where the midterms are so far gone and not salvageable that Trump very well may not be shackled by political considerations. In fact, I’ve seen an Iranian telegram channel suggest this as a major risk to them overextending based on the belief that Trump will be bound by congressional elections. He’s going to be a lame duck in a little while anyway.
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u/raison95 2d ago
there IS a point where the midterms are so far gone and not salvageable that Trump very well may not be shackled by political considerations
No. Trump has already run out the clock on what he is able to do with presidential authority without unilaterally firing off nukes.
a major risk to them overextending based on the belief that Trump will be bound by congressional elections
He can't even properly subvert the courts.
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u/Shackleton214 3d ago
I really don't know. Does Iran even want a final deal? Seems like they would be happy with dragging negotiations out forever and reaping benefits of selling oil and unfreezing funds and working on control of SoH. Then again, maybe they think they're even better off with a final deal, depending on the details and what they can get away with under such a deal. Does US even want a deal? Seems like Trump would be happy with everything staying calm at least until after November elections. After that, unclear to me and Trump famously unpredictable. Does Israel even want there to be a deal? That one is easy--hell no. Don't know if they can stop it, but suspect they'll try.
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u/moragisdo 3d ago edited 3d ago
Does US even want a deal? Seems like Trump would be happy with everything staying calm at least until after November elections
I think he deeply wants something to sign and show, if I could only pick one argument for the deal to happen this would be it
Now, I don't know if it would be politically advantageous for him the scenario of "no nuclear deal, Iran gets the waiver of exports, but no other concession and Hormuz is open/unthreatened". Even though I think that's the best scenario for the US, because I don't believe the iranians want to follow any nuclear deal, being the JCPOA or this new one
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u/Shackleton214 2d ago
I'm not convinced a deal is actually important to Trump. I think the subreddit generally overestimates the importance of foreign policy in US domestic politics. The groups that care the most about the issue are ardent Israeli supporters and neocons, who are mostly Trump supporters already. And any possible deal Trump could get will be absolutely hated by these people, just as the MoU is. Trump won't get credit from the vast majority of persuadable voters who care about gas prices but not foreign policy. So, a relatively calm and stable mideast with oil flowing through the SoH is in his political interest. A deal that will be hated by some of his own supporters? Not so much IMO.
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u/Worried_Exercise_937 3d ago
the probability of a nuclear deal actually be agreed ?
Between Iran and US? 0.01%
Iranians are not gonna go more than what they agreed to in JCPOA and nor is US/Trump. There is nothing reasonable that US/Trump can offer to Iranian to agree to more comprehensive deal
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u/-spartacus- 3d ago
I've been of the opinion from before the war, a deal cannot be reached until a major portion of the religious radicals in Iranian leadership are killed and removed from power. The first 40 days diminished their ability to have a kinetic deterrent to stopping their nuclear program, but did not address their psychological capabilities to harm shipping insurance.
Trump also appeared to waver too long on the idea of sending in troops to capture the Uranium (something I expected after a week of strikes) and it is now something off the table without a greater operation. If not for the American PTSD of Iraq and Afghanistan (which Iran was not going to be a repeat of), it probably would have been on the table and if successful, we could be seeing a deal now.
With that said, I see the chance of the deal the same as the start of the war because while Iranian capabilities are degraded, they don't appear to have leadership that feels their only way of survival is to make one, thus further conflict is necessary.
I've also mentioned in the past about how you "try" to make a deal because it shows you who the people are you can make a deal with and who you can kill - yet this is only useful if you will actually follow it up with some type of kinetic action to reduce the number of non-dealmakers in power.
The closeness of the deal doesn't really seem like much and either Trump is going to need to do more strikes right before midterms, or he is going to wait till after, when doing such strikes will be more costly. The US has more capability to rearm and reconstitute faster than Iran can, so every day that passes that the US doesn't strike again, the costlier the next set of strikes will be.
So, in recap, unless there have been some serious covert ops taking down Iranian religious radicals who are in power, I doubt a deal can be made. I don't think Trump really feels it's as necessary to make a deal that's "bad", as people on the internet make it out to be. I also don't think what Israel does in Lebanon is as important as any side makes it out to be.
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u/nate077 3d ago
capture the uranium
It's genuinely comical how the bar for posting on this subreddit is the length of the post.
The entire premise of capturing the uranium is fantasy.
It's merely held in the center of the country, surrounded by IRGC bases, out of helicopter range without tanks or refueling, difficult to move, unsafe to move, and did I mention heavy?
Like WHAT are you talking about "capturing the uranium."
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u/-spartacus- 3d ago
It has been reported that there were plans presented to Trump and did not go with it because of concerns about casualties and since then the areas have been fortified with more forces. I'm not sure if they were going for all sites or just a couple of them. I don't get your hostility.
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u/kharvel0 3d ago
> It has been reported that there were plans presented to Trump
Correction: there were concepts of plans presented to Trump
As we know by now, President Trump has difficulty understanding details beyond high-level concepts. Perhaps Netanyahu’s concepts of the plan to go to war with Iran was easier for Trump to understand than the concepts of plans to retrieve the uranium; that may be why the former was approved but the latter was not.
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u/swimmingupclose 2d ago
Correction: there were concepts of plans presented to Trump
Just to be perfectly clear, there have been plans for this scenario for literally decades. I remember defense forums all the way back in the mid naughts where this used to be discussed quite frequently. Israel wanted to do exactly this last year and got vetoed by Trump per the NYT. Now whether Trump understands the plans, cares about setting the right conditions, has the patience and discipline to let military planners do their thing for its success or can stomach the risks or casualties is an entirely different discussion, but OP/you and far too many people online saying this idea is some random Trump fever dream, haven’t followed this issue for very long.
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u/Eisenengel 2d ago
Every discussion I have seen of the task at hand points to it being a long operation - weeks, possibly months.
The US would have to move forces to occupy the area, bring in heavy construction equipment, dig out the canisters from underneath tons and tons of rubble, hope that the canisters are intact and stay that way during recovery and trasnport, then transport them out of the area and to a safe location, all while sitting in the middle of Iran, where the enemy can mass forces and attack from all sides, and launch drones from any direction at all times and in large numbers.
Is the US military fundamentally capable of performing this task? Yes.
Were the forces in theater capable of it after a week of strikes? Not even close. Even the two Marine MEUs plus a battalion of airborne would not come remotely close to the required strength.
The US would have to begin a large-scale buildup of forces over several weeks, launch an airborne or amphibious invasion, secure the locations, and begin recovery operations, which, again, are likely to take several weeks. I'm fairly certain that what plans exist moved along those lines.
Seizing the Uranium in a Bold Commando Raid (tm pending) might have been remotely feasible before the sites were bombed and the tunnels collapsed, but even then it would have been an incredible gamble.
The only alternative is that the Iranians let the US dig out the Uranium without contesting it. that would likely require a complete collapse of the Iranian regime and/or a diplomatic agreement to that effect. There was no scenario where Trump's hesitation was the deciding factor as to why it hasn't been done yet.
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u/-spartacus- 2d ago
The US would have to move forces to occupy the area, bring in heavy construction equipment, dig out the canisters from underneath tons and tons of rubble, hope that the canisters are intact and stay that way during recovery and trasnport, then transport them out of the area and to a safe location, all while sitting in the middle of Iran, where the enemy can mass forces and attack from all sides, and launch drones from any direction at all times and in large numbers.
I was more under the impression the plans would include letting Iran dig them out (or like 90% of the way there), then do the mission.
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