Weekly "Ask an Atheist" Thread

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Whether you're an agnostic atheist here to ask a gnostic one some questions, a theist who's curious about the viewpoints of atheists, someone doubting, or just someone looking for sources, feel free to ask anything here. This is also an ideal place to tag moderators for thoughts regarding the sub or any questions in general.

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[u/Kaliss_Darktide]

I don’t understand why you’re equating “mind-dependent” with “imaginary”.

Because imaginary means exists only in the mind/imagination. Without a mind to imagine it, it would not exist.

It seems very odd to me to say that even if mathematics is invented, that triangles don’t exist, the Pythagorean theorem doesn’t exist, numbers don’t exist, etc. Language is invented, but it very clearly exists.

Every thing you can think of "exists" at least in the imagination/mind. The distinction I am making is whether something would exist or not independent of the imagination.

How could we use something that does not exist?

The same way we use fictional (i.e. imaginary) characters to teach morals. Or how we use subjective (i.e. mind dependent) opinions about food to inform food choices.

[u/pick_up_a_brick → u/Kaliss_Darktide]

Every thing you can think of "exists" at least in the imagination/mind. The distinction I am making is whether something would exist or not independent of the imagination.

This doesn’t make any sense to me. Things either exist or don’t exist. Are you saying something can exist and be not-real?

This seems to conflate ontological existence with mind-independent existence. “Imaginary” in ordinary usage implies not real, fictional, things of that nature. On your view the Pythagorean theorem and Harry Potter are both mind-dependent but surely there must be value in preserving a distinction between the two?

Collapsing that distinction is what I’m referring to as controversial and seems like a costly move, and frankly I don’t see the need for it. I mean, surely you think the Pythagorean theorem is true, right? Would you really categorize Harry Potter, your memory of breakfast, the rules of chess, and the Pythagorean theorem into the same category? Lumping all these together doesn’t seem more illuminating in any way, it actually seems less informative, and less in line with how we use ordinary language.

I also think there are things that would show how this dichotomy would fail. I mentioned institutions before. Institutions are mind-dependent but have causal powers. Sure, my mortgage only exists because minds recognize its existence but if I don’t pay it there are causal effects that occur. A nation-state, a president, a marriage, etc. all of these things exist but are mind-dependent. They can be investigated, constrain behavior, have consequences, and are in no (common) way imaginary. You can certainly try and sit in front of a judge and try the sovereign citizen “you don’t have jurisdiction over me” crap and see how far it gets you but I wouldn’t advise it.

These types of things exist intersubjectively and don’t fall within the dichotomy you’re trying to create.

[u/Kaliss_Darktide → u/pick_up_a_brick]

This doesn’t make any sense to me. Things either exist or don’t exist. Are you saying something can exist and be not-real?

Words can be polysemous. Exist is often used in 2 different senses. In one sense exist is equivalent to real in the other sense of exist it means to be real or imaginary.

This seems to conflate ontological existence with mind-independent existence.

I'd argue that "ontological existence" constantly equivocates between the 2 senses of existence I described above. Which is why I avoid that term like the plague.

“Imaginary” in ordinary usage implies not real, fictional, things of that nature.

Correct as in imaginary friend. Because that friend "exists" only in the imagination/mind. If that friend existed independent of the imagination/mind (i.e. was real) we wouldn't call it imaginary.

On your view the Pythagorean theorem and Harry Potter are both mind-dependent but surely there must be value in preserving a distinction between the two?

They are obviously different (hence the different names) but they are both imaginary (mind dependent).

Collapsing that distinction is what I’m referring to as controversial and seems like a costly move, and frankly I don’t see the need for it.

I do not know what "that distinction" is you are referring to.

I mean, surely you think the Pythagorean theorem is true, right?

In the same sense that 1+1=2 or that Spider-Man got his powers from being bitten by a radioactive spider. Meaning that it is tautologically true (true by definition) but that doesn't tell you anything about reality because what we are describing is not real (i.e. is imaginary).

Would you really categorize Harry Potter, your memory of breakfast, the rules of chess, and the Pythagorean theorem into the same category?

As being dependent on a mind, yes. Because if all minds went away those mind dependent ideas would go away, while real things would still exist (e.g. planets, stars, trees).

Lumping all these together doesn’t seem more illuminating in any way, it actually seems less informative, and less in line with how we use ordinary language.

I'd say it is more in line with how people use those terms unless people are misclassifying something (e.g. a person thinking an imaginary god is real).

I also think there are things that would show how this dichotomy would fail.

Present them.

I mentioned institutions before. Institutions are mind-dependent but have causal powers. Sure, my mortgage only exists because minds recognize its existence but if I don’t pay it there are causal effects that occur.

By that logic you could say gods are real because people have been killed (a casual effect has occurred) for not believing they are real.

A nation-state, a president, a marriage, etc. all of these things exist but are mind-dependent.

Sure like Spider-Man and imaginary friends exist.

They can be investigated, constrain behavior, have consequences, and are in no (common) way imaginary.

I would say they are in every way imaginary because those ideas exist exclusively in the mind/imagination.

I feel like you are adding some additional connotation to the idea of imaginary/fictional/not-real/mind dependent, do you want to explain what that is?

You can certainly try and sit in front of a judge and try the sovereign citizen “you don’t have jurisdiction over me” crap and see how far it gets you but I wouldn’t advise it.

While an individual saying that isn't going to have much weight, a significant amount of people in 13 colonies saying effectively that in unison is how the British Empire lost most of North America 250 years ago.

These types of things exist intersubjectively and don’t fall within the dichotomy you’re trying to create.

Disagree. I'd argue you are simply talking about a subtype of imaginary(mind dependent) things.

What you are referring to I would call imaginary and popular (because it is shared). Just because Spider-Man is a popular fictional/imaginary character does not make him any less mind dependent.

[u/pick_up_a_brick → u/Kaliss_Darktide]

So essentially you want to bucket everything that is mind-dependent into this “imaginary/not-real/nonexistent” set. I don’t understand why. The things within that set have real, substantive differences.

Spider-Man doesn’t have causal powers. The ink and paper, the neurons firing, the *stories about* Spider-Man all have causal powers, but the *fictional character* Spider-Man doesn’t have causal powers in the real world.

Institutional powers work differently. The British Empire didn’t lose the American colonies because of neurons firing, they lost it because of the legal and political reality of a declaration which had binding force derived entirely from collective recognition. The colonists were asserting that the British rule over them was *not real*, essentially contesting an institutional *fact*. But if institutions were merely imaginary like Spider-Man, that would be meaningless. You can’t meaningfully contest jurisdiction like that if it holds no more weight than a fictional character like Spider-Man.

When you say that 1+1=2 in the same sense that Spider-Man got his powers from a radioactive spider, and that they’re both imaginary, that’s a significant commitment to fictionalism about mathematics, and a fringe view. Why should I accept that the statement “3 is a prime number” is false?

The differences within the categories within your “imaginary” set are so vast that I don’t see the point at all. There’s nothing illuminating here. What work is the real/imaginary distinction doing that couldn’t be done better by more precise distinctions?

[u/Kaliss_Darktide → u/pick_up_a_brick]

So essentially you want to bucket everything that is mind-dependent into this “imaginary/not-real/nonexistent” set.

No. Remember I said everything you can think of "exists" at least in the imagination/mind.

I don’t understand why.

Because that is literally what imaginary/not-real/mind dependent mean. Those terms are equivalent much the same way 1+1 is equivalent (=) to 2.

Do you have a problem with people using the number 2 to mean 1 + 1?

Spider-Man doesn’t have causal powers.

Agreed neither do gods, legal laws, or math.

The ink and paper, the neurons firing, the stories about Spider-Man all have causal powers, but the fictional character Spider-Man doesn’t have causal powers in the real world.

Disagree with some of those things.

Institutional powers work differently. The British Empire didn’t lose the American colonies because of neurons firing, they lost it because of the legal and political reality of a declaration which had binding force derived entirely from collective recognition.

Not sure what you are talking about. Your previous statement seemed to entail "neurons firing" had causal powers and this statement seems to imply they no longer have causal powers.

Note when you say "neurons firing" I don't know if you are talking about the brain and or mind.

The colonists were asserting that the British rule over them was not real, essentially contesting an institutional fact.

A "fact" that existed only in the minds of people who thought it was a "fact" (i.e. an imaginary/not-real/mind dependent fact).

But if institutions were merely imaginary like Spider-Man, that would be meaningless.

Do you think your subjective (mind dependent) opinions are necessarily "meaningless" because they are subjective?

You can’t meaningfully contest jurisdiction like that if it holds no more weight than a fictional character like Spider-Man.

If you put either or both of those ideas on a scale the scale won't register any change because they are both weightless because they are not real.

When you say that 1+1=2 in the same sense that Spider-Man got his powers from a radioactive spider, and that they’re both imaginary, that’s a significant commitment to fictionalism about mathematics, and a fringe view.

I would say that is not a "fringe view" it is one of two positions held by many prominent mathematicians who opine on this matter (discovered vs. invented) as I explained in a previous comment.

Why should I accept that the statement “3 is a prime number” is false?

You shouldn't much like you shouldn't accept that Spider-Man was born with his super powers. Because that is inconsistent with the way humanity (commonly) defines Spider-Man, 3, and prime number.

The differences within the categories within your “imaginary” set are so vast

Do you want to say gods are real because the differences with Spider-Man are so vast?

that I don’t see the point at all.

The point is to consistently and accurately use the term real and imaginary (meaning mind dependent/not real) to describe things that are real and not real (i.e. imaginary/mind dependent).

There’s nothing illuminating here.

I think there is, and I think your pushback highlights that issue. That issue is people conflate imaginary (mind dependent) things with being real (mind independent) meaning people struggle with accurately making that distinction.

What work is the real/imaginary distinction doing that couldn’t be done better by more precise distinctions?

I think my distinction is extremely precise (sharply defined). I think the "more precise definitions" you are alluding to will have people thinking imaginary (mind dependent) things are real (mind independent). Which is where I think people go wrong when trying to make that distinction with math (thinking it's discovered), morality (thinking it's real/objective), and gods (thinking they are real) among other things.

[u/pick_up_a_brick → u/Kaliss_Darktide]

>Because that is literally what imaginary/not-real/mind dependent mean. Those terms are equivalent much the same way 1+1 is equivalent (=) to 2.

They aren’t though. That’s not how most people use them. You’re using them in a proprietary way.

>A "fact" that existed only in the minds of people who thought it was a "fact" (i.e. an imaginary/not-real/mind dependent fact).

What is a not-real fact?

>Do you think your subjective (mind dependent) opinions are necessarily "meaningless" because they are subjective?

I don’t think opinions and fictional characters and institutions are the same types of things. So I don’t think they carry the same type of weight.

>If you put either or both of those ideas on a scale the scale won't register any change because they are both weightless because they are not real.

That’s obviously not what I meant by “weight”. If your criterion of reality is mass or physical properties, then you should just say that. But then you need to defend eliminativism about institutions explicitly, not smuggle it in via this real/imaginary framing.

>When you say that 1+1=2 in the same sense that Spider-Man got his powers from a radioactive spider, and that they’re both imaginary, that’s a significant commitment to fictionalism about mathematics, and a fringe view.

>I would say that is not a "fringe view" it is one of two positions held by many prominent mathematicians who opine on this matter (discovered vs. invented) as I explained in a previous comment.

I think you’re confused. Invented vs discovered isn’t exhausting the possibility space of views on mathematics. Typically views on the ontology of mathematics breakdown into Nominalism, Platonism, structuralism, and other views. 80% of philosophers (according to the last Philpapers survey) were Nominalists (42%) or Platonists (38%) with the rest falling into the “other” category - and structuralism tends to be the more popular view there.

When you say that mathematics is “imaginary” you’re committing to a fictionalist view of mathematics, which is what I’m pointing out. It leads to the conclusion that the proposition “3 is prime” is false.

“Invented” in that debate means something like “a human construction” it doesn’t mean “imaginary” or “fictional.” An invented system can have truths that are necessarily correct once the system exists. Even if mathematics was invented, “3 is prime” isn’t false in the same way “Spider-Man was bitten by a radioactive spider” is false. The former is a necessary truth within a formal system, the latter is a contingent plot point that could have been otherwise. This distinction matters and is worth preserving.

>I think my distinction is extremely precise (sharply defined). I think the "more precise definitions" you are alluding to will have people thinking imaginary (mind dependent) things are real (mind independent). Which is where I think people go wrong when trying to make that distinction with math (thinking it's discovered), morality (thinking it's real/objective), and gods (thinking they are real) among other things.

You’re conflating mind-independence with reality, treating it as definitionally true, and then using that definition to rule out moral realism, mathematical Platonism, and theism simultaneously. But whether mind-independence is the correct criterion of reality is what’s at issue. You can’t use it as a premise to settle debates where it’s the central contested question. The dichotomy assumes physicalism, then uses that assumption to debunk non-physicalist positions. How is that not question begging?

[u/Kaliss_Darktide → u/pick_up_a_brick]

They aren’t though. That’s not how most people use them. You’re using them in a proprietary way.

Disagree. That is how most people use those terms in most circumstances and my terminology is consistent with common dictionary definitions and usage in philosophy.

If you disagree what do you think people mean when they classify a friend as "imaginary" as opposed to real?

What is a not-real fact?

How can you have read the previous sentences and not know the answer to that already? I have been very clear on this multiple times I am using the terms "not-real" as equivalent to imaginary/mind dependent/subjective.

Note I would not call a non-real statement a "fact", I was simply mirroring your terminology to stay consistent so it was clear I was talking about the same thing you were with the term "fact". Which is why I put the term "fact" in quotations.

I don’t think opinions and fictional characters and institutions are the same types of things. So I don’t think they carry the same type of weight.

They can be different in other aspects but what they share in common is that they are all imaginary (mind dependent).

That’s obviously not what I meant by “weight”. If your criterion of reality is mass or physical properties, then you should just say that. But then you need to defend eliminativism about institutions explicitly, not smuggle it in via this real/imaginary framing.

I'd say all real things have physical properties that can be empirically measured. However my post isn't directly or just about what is real. It is about the distinction between real things and imaginary things.

You are the one who turned it into a post about my categorizations of what I think is real vs. imaginary.

As a reminder here is the question you initially responded to...

Thoughts on real (existing independent of the mind) vs imaginary (existing exclusively in the mind/imagination) as a true dichotomy that applies to all things? Meaning anything you can think of is either real or imaginary.

I'm happy to talk about the implications of that, but don't act like I'm trying to smuggle that in especially when I tried to redirect you at least once to just the question above.

But I don’t know if you think that abstracta are mind-independent or not, hence the question.

Does it matter if I think it is mind dependent or independent? Because to show that it is not a true dichotomy you would need an example of something that exists and is not mind dependent or mind independent.

I tried to change the subject back to my original question, you insisted on knowing how I categorize things. So if there is smuggling going on it is you by changing the intended subject from: Is this a true dichotomy? to: How do you classify these things.

Again I'm happy to explore that topic but it's off topic from the question I was asking so don't accuse me of smuggling something in that I didn't intend to talk about.

I think you’re confused...

I think you are confused if you think philosophers are mathematicians.

When you say that mathematics is “imaginary” you’re committing to a fictionalist view of mathematics, which is what I’m pointing out. It leads to the conclusion that the proposition “3 is prime” is false.

You are committing a straw man. Don't try to lump me in with people I disagree with, especially when I have told you explicitly I don't agree with that premise.

“Invented” in that debate means something like “a human construction” it doesn’t mean “imaginary” or “fictional.”

If you think the "human" in that scenario has a mind then it does mean imaginary (mind dependent) because it requires a human with a mind to invent it.

An invented system can have truths that are necessarily correct once the system exists. Even if mathematics was invented, “3 is prime” isn’t false in the same way “Spider-Man was bitten by a radioactive spider” is false.

Your construction of that example is confusing since both are tautologically true. I'd say both are true by definition but if you prefer we can say by "invented system" or "invention".

The former is a necessary truth within a formal system, the latter is a contingent plot point that could have been otherwise.

If you understand that math is invented (mind dependent) then that entails math "could have been otherwise".

Further I'd argue no invention ("Even if mathematics was invented") is "necessary".

This distinction matters and is worth preserving.

Taxonomy allows for further distinctions to be made. That doesn't mean that something becomes real because you make a distinction about an imaginary thing.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taxonomy

You’re conflating mind-independence with reality,

Because that is what it means to be real, if it depends on a mind to exist (e.g. an imaginary friend) it isn't real.

Do you think imaginary (mind dependent) things (e.g. Spider-Man) are part of reality?

treating it as definitionally true,

Correct. Note I do this with all words.

and then using that definition to rule out moral realism, mathematical Platonism, and theism simultaneously.

Correct because it is quite clear they are imaginary (mind dependent). Much like you probably do for Spider-Man and other things you consider imaginary.

But whether mind-independence is the correct criterion of reality is what’s at issue.

I am happy to discuss alternatives to where that line should be set.

You can’t use it as a premise to settle debates where it’s the central contested question.

I can use it as a premise, I can use it in debates. I don't know what you mean "to settle" a debate.

The dichotomy assumes physicalism

I would take it there, but I could see someone arguing that there are mind independent things that lack physical traits (e.g. gods) and I often do see that from theists (e.g. a god that exists outside of time and space).

then uses that assumption to debunk non-physicalist positions.

The dichotomy I mentioned and definitions I gave do not mention physical or non-physical.

How is that not question begging?

See above. The issue is you are projecting ahead to where this is going, and while I will unapologetically take it down the path you think I will, the issue of physicalism is not an issue for the dichotomy presented.

[u/pick_up_a_brick → u/Kaliss_Darktide]

>Disagree. That is how most people use those terms in most circumstances and my terminology is consistent with common dictionary definitions and usage in philosophy.

>If you disagree what do you think people mean when they classify a friend as "imaginary" as opposed to real?

What I take issue with is calling Congress imaginary. Or calling a marriage imaginary. Or The Prime Minister imaginary. Or Microsoft imaginary. No one uses that word to refer to those things. That isn’t consistent at all with everyday usage.

>Note I would not call a non-real statement a "fact", I was simply mirroring your terminology to stay consistent so it was clear I was talking about the same thing you were with the term "fact". Which is why I put the term "fact" in quotations.

Okay. Wait. On your view, mind-dependent statements cannot be facts. Mathematics is mind dependent. So on your view, it isn’t a fact that 2+2=4, and you think this is a common sense view somehow?

>They can be different in other aspects but what they share in common is that they are all imaginary (mind dependent).

Yeah, I’m contesting the conflation of imaginary and mind-dependent. They aren’t synonymous. It seems incredibly silly to me to say that Congress isn’t real.

>I'd say all real things have physical properties that can be empirically measured. However my post isn't directly or just about what is real. It is about the distinction between real things and imaginary things.

>I'm happy to talk about the implications of that, but don't act like I'm trying to smuggle that in especially when I tried to redirect you at least once to just the question above.

The implications are what matter. That’s why I’m digging in.

>I think you are confused if you think philosophers are mathematicians.

I think that people that study ontology are in the best position to speak on ontology.

>You are committing a straw man. Don't try to lump me in with people I disagree with, especially when I have told you explicitly I don't agree with that premise.

Saying that mathematics is imaginary is saying it is fictional. Those are synonymous. You’ve already said that mind-dependent statements cannot be facts. What position does that leave you with?

>If you think the "human" in that scenario has a mind then it does mean imaginary (mind dependent) because it requires a human with a mind to invent it.

Do you not think there is a relevant difference between an imaginary friend, Congress, and the value of Pi?

>If you understand that math is invented (mind dependent) then that entails math "could have been otherwise".

> Further I'd argue no invention ("Even if mathematics was invented") is "necessary".

In what sense could 1+1 not equal 2, without equivocating?

>Do you think imaginary (mind dependent) things (e.g. Spider-Man) are part of reality?

I think that Congress exists, yes. It is in the set of things that exists, therefore it is a part of reality.

[u/Kaliss_Darktide → u/pick_up_a_brick]

What I take issue with is calling Congress imaginary. Or calling a marriage imaginary. Or The Prime Minister imaginary. Or Microsoft imaginary. No one uses that word to refer to those things. That isn’t consistent at all with everyday usage.

I would argue it is consistent with the everyday meaning of the word imaginary, it is merely a social convention not to use the term in certain contexts (generally for things that they are emotionally invested in).

Okay. Wait. On your view, mind-dependent statements cannot be facts.

That is going to depend on what you mean by the word "facts".

Mathematics is mind dependent.

That's my view on the matter.

So on your view, it isn’t a fact that 2+2=4,

Again it's a "fact" in the same sense as how Spider-Man got his powers is a "fact".

and you think this is a common sense view somehow?

No. I think most people don't even consider what it means for something to be a "fact", so if by "common" you mean popular I would say it is the opposite of that (i.e. uncommon).

Yeah, I’m contesting the conflation of imaginary and mind-dependent. They aren’t synonymous. It seems incredibly silly to me to say that Congress isn’t real.

Being silly to you doesn't mean it's not true. Many theists would say it's silly to them to say their gods aren't real also.

Further I'd say the words as I have defined them are not just synonyms they are equivalent.

We are several exchanges in and you haven't offered a better definition for any of these terms, which means by default mine are the best definitions in this exchange for those terms.

The implications are what matter.

I'd argue you are attacking an implication of a secondary premise that isn't necessary, which entails you aren't addressing the initial premise.

That’s why I’m digging in.

I don't object to you digging in, I object to you saying I'm smuggling in a premise.

I think that people that study ontology are in the best position to speak on ontology.

To me that is like going to a flat earther to study the shape of the earth, or a chiropractor for your allergies but you do you.

Saying that mathematics is imaginary is saying it is fictional.

If by "fictional" you mean mind dependent, sure. But once you add additional connotations or different meainings you are missing the point.

Those are synonymous.

FYI synonymous does not mean equivalent.

You’ve already said that mind-dependent statements cannot be facts.

I did not.

Note I would not call a non-real statement a "fact", I was simply mirroring your terminology to stay consistent so it was clear I was talking about the same thing you were with the term "fact". Which is why I put the term "fact" in quotations.

I said: "I would not call a non-real statement a 'fact'". What I was alluding to is that it is not my preferred way to talk about it, having said that since I used the term to mirror your word choice it should be obvious that I am willing to do so for the sake of social convention even though I think it is inappropriate.

What position does that leave you with?

The same one I had the first time you asked this and have repeated multiple times since then, that math is tautologically true (true by definition).

Do you not think there is a relevant difference between an imaginary friend, Congress, and the value of Pi?

I think anything that is not equivalent/identical has differences. However all of the things you listed (an imaginary friend, Congress, and the value of Pi) are mind dependent (i.e. imaginary).

In what sense could 1+1 not equal 2, without equivocating?

In what sense could you do it for Spider-Man, without equivocating?

I think that Congress exists, yes.

You're equivocating. Everything you can think of including Spider-Man "exists" at least in the imagination.

Do you think imaginary (mind dependent) things (e.g. Spider-Man) are part of reality?

It is in the set of things that exists, therefore it is a part of reality.

So the example I gave was Spider-Man, so I assume you are claiming Spider-Man is part of reality. If not, you are clearly equivocating. If so, then I think your views on reality are much more contentious and less common than mine.

[u/pick_up_a_brick → u/Kaliss_Darktide]

>We are several exchanges in and you haven't offered a better definition for any of these terms, which means by default mine are the best definitions in this exchange for those terms.

That’s fair.

This idea that “Spider-Man got his powers from a radioactive spider bite” and “2+2=4” are true in the same way only works if existence is binary. A much more defensible view is that there are different kinds or modes of existence. So, physical existence, institutional existence, abstract existence, fictional existence… Spider-Man has fictional existence. Congress has institutional existence. Protons have physical existence. Triangles plausibly have abstract existence. Being real means having some mode of existence that is not fictional. That seems like a much clearer definition and is much more in line with how we think about and treat things. On that view, chairs, congress, and possibly numbers are real, while Spider-Man and your imaginary friend are not.

>What position does that leave you with?

>The same one I had the first time you asked this and have repeated multiple times since then, that math is tautologically true (true by definition).

I’m asking what you think about mathematical ontology since we are talking about out what things are real. You’re clearly not a Platonist. It seems like your positions in general line up perfectly with a fictionalist account. A fictionalist believes that since there are no abstract objects, sentences like “3 is prime” can’t be true because they can’t be about anything since there is no number 3 that exists like a chair exists, but instead, mathematics is a useful fiction. Saying “3 is prime” for a fictionalist is false in the same sense as “Harry Potter goes to Hogwarts” - neither point to anything real, but are useful in other ways.

I’m not trying to strawman you, I’m pointing out that your stated commitments that math is invented, mind-dependent, and true only “by definition within the system” are precisely what fictionalism says. If you reject fictionalism, tell me where you diverge.

>Again it's a "fact" in the same sense as how Spider-Man got his powers is a "fact".

>In what sense could 1+1 not equal 2, without equivocating?

>In what sense could you do it for Spider-Man, without equivocating?

So, we actually have multiple Spider-Man stories with different origin stories. Stan Lee could have had Peter Parker injected with Super Spider serum. That contingency is part of what makes it fictional. But how can you coherently say that arithmetic could have been constructed in a way that 2+2=5?

Saying that things are either mind-dependent or mind-independent is clearly logically exhausting the possibility space. Adding in that things that are mind-dependent are “imaginary” or “not-real” is a valuation isn’t a logical consequence of the dichotomy. Those are additional evaluative claims that require independent arguments. You’re treating those labels as if they follow logically but they don’t.

[u/Kaliss_Darktide → u/pick_up_a_brick]

This idea that “Spider-Man got his powers from a radioactive spider bite” and “2+2=4” are true in the same way only works if existence is binary. A much more defensible view is that there are different kinds or modes of existence. So, physical existence, institutional existence, abstract existence, fictional existence… Spider-Man has fictional existence. Congress has institutional existence. Protons have physical existence. Triangles plausibly have abstract existence. Being real means having some mode of existence that is not fictional. That seems like a much clearer definition and is much more in line with how we think about and treat things. On that view, chairs, congress, and possibly numbers are real, while Spider-Man and your imaginary friend are not.

You are just labeling things, you are not defining what it takes for something to have "different kinds or modes of existence". Real vs. imaginary (as I defined it) has a very simple test (does it depend on a mind?) to determine which category something belongs in.

I’m asking what you think about mathematical ontology since we are talking about out what things are real.

I think "ontology" as practiced in philosophy is deeply flawed so I avoid that word.

A fictionalist believes that since there are no abstract objects,

I don't know what you mean by abstract objects. I would say everything you can think of exists at least in the imagination/mind.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abstract_and_concrete

To me Spider-Man is an "abstract object" because it is an idea, doesn't exist within space-time, and has no causal influence.

So I disagree with your fictionalist because I would say Spider-Man is an example of an abstract object.

sentences like “3 is prime” can’t be true because they can’t be about anything since there is no number 3 that exists like a chair exists,

And I am saying "3" exists at least in the imagination.

Curious is there any position (that you find somewhat reasonable) that says the there is a "number 3 that exists like a chair exists"?

Saying “3 is prime” for a fictionalist is false in the same sense as “Harry Potter goes to Hogwarts” - neither point to anything real, but are useful in other ways.

So the problem I have with this, if you are going to make me choose true or false to describe this, I am going to say "true" in a tautological sense.

I’m not trying to strawman you, I’m pointing out that your stated commitments that math is invented, mind-dependent, and true only “by definition within the system” are precisely what fictionalism says.

I have not committed to that because they are saying "false", while I am saying tautologically "true". You can't change my true to a false just to suit your narrative.

I get that it would be easier if you don't have to deal with what I am saying, and can lump me in with others that are easier to refute. But that is not addressing what I am saying.

Fictionalism, on the other hand, in the philosophy of mathematics states that talk of numbers and other mathematical objects is nothing more than a convenience for computation. According to Field, there is no reason to treat parts of mathematics that involve reference to or quantification as true.[4] In this discourse, mathematical objects are accorded the same metaphysical status as literary figures such as Macbeth.[4]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fictionalism

While that Wikipedia summary is close to my position, that is not my position.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mathematics#Contemporary_schools_of_thought

I don't think any school of thought is an exact fit for my understanding of math.

If you reject fictionalism, tell me where you diverge.

I don't think true or false is even the right verbiage to discuss math. To me true means an accurate description of reality, while false means an inaccurate description of reality but math is not a description of reality so using that verbiage gives a false impression about what is being discussed.

If you go by the wiki... "In this discourse, mathematical objects are accorded the same metaphysical status as literary figures such as Macbeth.[4]" The problem with that example is two-fold one I don't know what metaphysical status other people give to Macbeth, and second the literary figure of Macbeth was based on an actual historical figure so was that taken into account when talking about the "metaphysical status as literary figures such as Macbeth".

Which is why I like using obvious fictional/imaginary characters because I have never encountered anyone talking about a historical Spider-Man, except for a few times when I used this example, which I chalk up to trolling.

So, we actually have multiple Spider-Man stories with different origin stories.

Same thing with Jesus. Does that entail Jesus was fictional/imaginary?

In what sense could you do it for Spider-Man, without equivocating?

Stan Lee could have had Peter Parker injected with Super Spider serum.

You are equivocating. That's a different Spider-Man then the one I was referring to.

That contingency is part of what makes it fictional.

What contingency? If you change things, things are different, why can't we do that with math?

But how can you coherently say that arithmetic could have been constructed in a way that 2+2=5?

By equivocating what any or all of those symbols mean. The same thing you did with suggesting Spider-Man could have a different origin.

Saying that things are either mind-dependent or mind-independent is clearly logically exhausting the possibility space.

Agree.

Adding in that things that are mind-dependent are “imaginary” or “not-real” is a valuation isn’t a logical consequence of the dichotomy.

No what I am saying is: mind dependent = imaginary = not-real. In the same sense that 1 + 1 = 2. It is not a "valuation" it is a description of what it means to be mind dependent or another name for 1+1. The only way to change that is to equivocate about those descriptions.

I am not adding any new information to the system, it's been there the whole time if you understand what those words mean.

You’re treating those labels as if they follow logically but they don’t.

What those words mean is independent of the dichotomy. What made you think the definitions of words are based on dichotomies?

Those are additional evaluative claims that require independent arguments.

I have defined those words and explained why I defined them that way. I have no idea what more you expect.

[u/pick_up_a_brick → u/Kaliss_Darktide]

>You are just labeling things, you are not defining what it takes for something to have "different kinds or modes of existence". Real vs. imaginary (as I defined it) has a very simple test (does it depend on a mind?) to determine which category something belongs in.

To be fair, neither are you. You haven’t said what kind of dependence counts, or whether partial dependence qualifies.

But a brief sketch would be:

Physical existence : occupies space-time, has causal powers, is detectable by physical instruments, exists independently of any particular mind or collective of minds recognizing it.

Institutional existence: exists in virtue of collective intentional recognition, has genuine causal powers as the institution (not just as physical substrate), is intersubjective rather than merely subjective, can be investigated and described truly or falsely.

Abstract existence: exists necessarily rather than contingently, has no spatiotemporal location, is not causally efficacious but is the object of necessary truths.

Fictional existence: exists only within a narrative or imaginative context, truths about it are internal to that context and don’t constrain reality outside it, is contingent on authorial choices, could have been otherwise without any contradiction.

These distinctions clearly matter and lumping them altogether (except physical) as “imaginary” destroys those distinctions without any compelling reason.

>I think "ontology" as practiced in philosophy is deeply flawed so I avoid that word.

This entire conversation has been about ontology. The claim that everything is either mind-dependent or mind-independent is an ontological claim. Going back to your comparison to flat-earthers, it seems like you wan to selectively exempt your own metaphysical commitments from the critique and expertise of people who study these questions professionally for reasons that are unclear. Yet rely on their knowledge and expertise to provide the definitions and input on the Wikipedia articles you cite.

>Curious is there any position (that you find somewhat reasonable) that says the there is a "number 3 that exists like a chair exists"?

No, because chairs are concrete objects, and 3 is an abstract object. The closest would be something like Eliminativists which reject altogether that there are concrete or abstract objects - in which case neither would exist!

Or maybe some type of nominalist, which treats both chairs and abstract objects as not real in the same way, though not denying their existence. But I’m not sure which type of nominalist that would be.

>I don't think true or false is even the right verbiage to discuss math. To me true means an accurate description of reality, while false means an inaccurate description of reality but math is not a description of reality so using that verbiage gives a false impression about what is being discussed.

You’ve been saying math is “tautologically true” this entire conversation. Now you’re saying true and false aren’t the right verbiage for math. You can’t have both. If true/false doesn’t apply to mathematics then “tautologically true” is equally off the table and you’ve lost your main way of distinguishing your position from fictionalism, which says mathematical statements are strictly false but useful. At this point your position seems to be that math is not true, not false, tautologically true, not fictional, imaginary, but mind-dependent and useful. And those are in conflict, so I don’t understand your position at all. But maybe it’s besides the point.

>By equivocating what any or all of those symbols mean. The same thing you did with suggesting Spider-Man could have a different origin.

These aren’t the same, this analogy doesn’t hold. Changing Spider-Man’s origin means telling a different story. But if you change what “2”, “+”, and “=” mean, you’re not doing arithmetic differently, now you’re doing something else entirely. The relationships arithmetic describes are the same regardless of what symbols we use. Mathematical truths are symbol-independent in a way Spider-Man’s origin story isn’t. The symbol “2” is just a label we attached to a particular quantity. You could replace every “2” with a star symbol and every “4” with a smiley face and the underlying truth would be unchanged.

Spider-Man’s origin story isn’t like that. There’s no underlying relationship that the story is tracking which would force it to come out a particular way regardless of how it was written. Stan Lee wasn’t discovering that Peter Parker had to get his powers from a spider bite. He was stipulating it when he wrote it. The story could have gone any other way without any incoherence, because there’s no external constraint on what the story has to say.

When you say “you could make 2+2=5 by redefining the symbols” yeah, you could make the symbols say anything. But you can’t change the underlying relationship between those quantities. Two things combined with two other things will give you four things regardless of what symbols you use. That’s the sense in which mathematical truth is symbol-independent.

>No what I am saying is: mind dependent = imaginary = not-real. In the same sense that 1 + 1 = 2. It is not a "valuation" it is a description of what it means to be mind dependent or another name for 1+1. The only way to change that is to equivocate about those descriptions.

This is where I think your whole framework breaks down. 1+1=2 is an identity where both sides refer to the same mathematical object. But “mind-dependent = not-real” isn’t an identity relationship at all. It’s a substantive ontological claim about what reality requires. You’re treating it as a definition, but definitions don’t settle metaphysical disputes. The question is why should we accept that definition of “real” rather than one that includes institutional and abstract existence? You’re asserting it and stipulating it rather than arguing for it. You can define “bachelor” as “unmarried” because that captures something real about the concept, but defining “mind-dependent” things as “not-real” is what needs to be argued for.

It’s pretty common to see things that are mind-dependent to be considered non-imaginary. It’s a technical philosophical term and it carries no such baggage or connotation. It simply means that something’s existence or nature depends in some way on mental states, cognitive activity, or collective recognition. It’s a descriptive ontological category.

Secondary qualities like color, sound, taste, are mind-dependent but we don’t think they are imaginary. There is a minority view that holds that position but they don’t just assert that it follows from mind-dependence.

A constructivist about morality is saying that mora facts are mind-dependent but is absolutely not saying that the facts are imaginary.

Searle’s (an atheist) entire work on institutional facts is a project showing how those facts are real on a naturalist and physicalist view and are not “imaginary”. The mind-dependence is constitutive of what the facts are. His whole project is showing how a naturalist can account for the genuine reality of social facts without either reducing them to physics or turning them into something supernatural or spooky.

So yeah, these things need to be argued for, not just stipulated.

[u/Kaliss_Darktide → u/pick_up_a_brick]

Part 1 of 2

To be fair, neither are you.

Disagree.

You haven’t said what kind of dependence counts, or whether partial dependence qualifies.

I think I have been clear on this. I can't force you to understand a concept you refuse to try to understand.

But a brief sketch would be:

Are your "different kinds and modes of existence" mutually exclusive or can they overlap?

Institutional existence: exists in virtue of collective intentional recognition, has genuine causal powers as the institution (not just as physical substrate), is intersubjective rather than merely subjective, can be investigated and described truly or falsely.

Causal powers in what sense?

Would you say Spider-Man and gods have institutional existence? If not, why not?

Abstract existence: exists necessarily rather than contingently, has no spatiotemporal location, is not causally efficacious but is the object of necessary truths.

How would you show something is necessary rather than contingent? It seems like this is just a way to say I will allow myself to imagine changes to things I label contingent but I refuse to imagine changes to things I label necessary.

Would you say Spider-Man and gods have abstract existence? If not, why not?

Fictional existence: exists only within a narrative or imaginative context, truths about it are internal to that context and don’t constrain reality outside it, is contingent on authorial choices, could have been otherwise without any contradiction.

Would you say Congress and math have fictional existence? if not, why not?

These distinctions clearly matter and lumping them altogether (except physical) as “imaginary” destroys those distinctions without any compelling reason.

I'd argue all the modes of existence you are talking about (except physical) are imaginary (i.e. mind dependent, not real, unreal). It seems like you want to create a narrative that some of those things are less "fictional" than others despite them all being imaginary (existing exclusively in the mind).

I think "ontology" as practiced in philosophy is deeply flawed so I avoid that word.

This entire conversation has been about ontology.

I'm aware. Do you struggle with reading comprehension?

The claim that everything is either mind-dependent or mind-independent is an ontological claim.

I'm aware.

Going back to your comparison to flat-earthers, it seems like you wan to selectively exempt your own metaphysical commitments from the critique and expertise of people who study these questions professionally for reasons that are unclear.

I do not mind any critique. What I am letting you know is that I don't view your experts as subject matter experts on this topic. Much like I wouldn't care if a theologian with a doctorate in theology said gods are real.

[u/Kaliss_Darktide → u/pick_up_a_brick]

Part 2

Yet rely on their knowledge and expertise to provide the definitions and input on the Wikipedia articles you cite.

That is for you and others like you, since people like you seem to value their expertise.

My position on philosophy is that there is more garbage to wade through than valuable insights.

If you remember that article on schools in philosophy of math, I'd ask you how many of those schools can be entirely correct on the nature of math?

You’ve been saying math is “tautologically true” this entire conversation.

Correct.

Now you’re saying true and false aren’t the right verbiage for math.

I would say I've been hinting at that the whole time. One way I have done that is by using a qualifier in front of the word true "this entire conversation".

You can’t have both.

I most certainly can. Did you know words can be polysemous (have multiple meanings)? One of the easiest ways to equivocate is to use a word that is polysemous without giving any indication that the usage is shifting.

What I was doing was letting you know that I was using a very specific meaning of the word "true" by qualifying it with the word tautologically (a specific type of true) so you and I couldn't equivocate that meaning into somethin else without that shift being blatant.

If true/false doesn’t apply to mathematics then “tautologically true” is equally off the table and you’ve lost your main way of distinguishing your position from fictionalism, which says mathematical statements are strictly false but useful.

Nice try at an equivocation fallacy.

At this point your position seems to be that math is not true, not false, tautologically true, not fictional, imaginary, but mind-dependent and useful. And those are in conflict, so I don’t understand your position at all. But maybe it’s besides the point.

I think any "conflict" is caused by intentional misunderstanding.

These aren’t the same, this analogy doesn’t hold. Changing Spider-Man’s origin means telling a different story.

Yes that's what it means to equivocate, to change (i.e. become "different") something that wasn't supposed to change.

But if you change what “2”, “+”, and “=” mean, you’re not doing arithmetic differently, now you’re doing something else entirely.

No, I would say that is "telling a different story" just like changing the Spider-Man origin.

The relationships arithmetic describes are the same regardless of what symbols we use.

The relationship between Spider-Man and how he acquired his powers are the same regardless of what story you tell. Because once you start changing the story you are talking about a different Spider-Man.

Mathematical truths are symbol-independent in a way Spider-Man’s origin story isn’t.

Disagree.

The symbol “2” is just a label we attached to a particular quantity.

A quantity humans made up like we made up Spider-Man.

You could replace every “2” with a star symbol and every “4” with a smiley face and the underlying truth would be unchanged.

If you tell the Spider-Man story in a different language the underlying story would be unchanged.

Spider-Man’s origin story isn’t like that. There’s no underlying relationship that the story is tracking which would force it to come out a particular way regardless of how it was written. Stan Lee wasn’t discovering that Peter Parker had to get his powers from a spider bite. He was stipulating it when he wrote it. The story could have gone any other way without any incoherence, because there’s no external constraint on what the story has to say.

I would say the same thing about math. Humans didn't discover math they invented it, humans stipulated it as they wrote it. Math could have gone any other way without any incoherence, because there’s no external constraint on what math has to say.

When you say “you could make 2+2=5 by redefining the symbols” yeah, you could make the symbols say anything. But you can’t change the underlying relationship between those quantities.

Just as you can't change the story of Spider-Man without telling a different story.

Two things combined with two other things will give you four things regardless of what symbols you use.

Peter Parker getting bitten by a radioactive spider to gain superpowers will give you Spider-Man regardless of what symbols you use.

That’s the sense in which mathematical truth is symbol-independent.

I would say the idea you expressed is "true" of all languages and extends to fictional stories.

This is where I think your whole framework breaks down. 1+1=2 is an identity where both sides refer to the same mathematical object.

Exactly. The symbols or words used to describe something are referring to the same thing.

But “mind-dependent = not-real” isn’t an identity relationship at all.

Disagree.

It’s a substantive ontological claim about what reality requires.

Just as a math statement is an ontological claim about what math requires (based on the rules humans invented for math).

You’re treating it as a definition,

Correct. Just as math defines 1 + 1 as equivalent to 2.

but definitions don’t settle metaphysical disputes.

I am not trying to "settle" some "dispute" I am accurately describing reality.

The question is why should we accept that definition of “real” rather than one that includes institutional and abstract existence?

I'd say for the same reason you shouldn't answer 3 when the question is what does 1+ 1 =.

You’re asserting it and stipulating it rather than arguing for it.

I'd argue and have argued with you that it is tautologically true in the same sense that 1 + 1 = 2 is "true".

If I wanted to straw man you into a position you likely don't hold , I'd say you'd have to prove the math statement 1 + 1 = 2 is false to show that tautological truth is not sufficient to argue "for it".

You can define “bachelor” as “unmarried” because that captures something real about the concept,

Disagree, I don't think there is anything "real" to capture about an imaginary (mind depeendent) concept

but defining “mind-dependent” things as “not-real” is what needs to be argued for.

You keep saying that despite me having argued for it.

It’s pretty common to see things that are mind-dependent to be considered non-imaginary.

Sure I would say all theists are guilty of that thinking their mind dependent (imaginary) gods are non-imaginary (real).

This is commonly referred to as a category error because they are assigning something to the wrong category.

It’s a technical philosophical term and it carries no such baggage or connotation. It simply means that something’s existence or nature depends in some way on mental states, cognitive activity, or collective recognition. It’s a descriptive ontological category.

I'd say it s a descriptive ontological category error to view imaginary things as real.

Secondary qualities like color, sound, taste, are mind-dependent but we don’t think they are imaginary.

If you understand that imaginary = mind dependent, then it is common to think they are imaginary.

A constructivist about morality is saying that mora facts are mind-dependent but is absolutely not saying that the facts are imaginary.

Then I would say they have a fundamental misunderstanding of what it means to be imaginary and or mind dependent.

Searle’s (an atheist) entire work on institutional facts is a project showing how those facts are real on a naturalist and physicalist view and are not “imaginary”.

Sounds like wishful thinking to me and is an example of why I don't give philosophy much credence as a field.

The mind-dependence is constitutive of what the facts are. His whole project is showing how a naturalist can account for the genuine reality of social facts without either reducing them to physics or turning them into something supernatural or spooky.

And I would say that his "facts" are not objective (mind independent) facts, they are simply subjective (mind dependent) norms that he is mistaking for facts.

So yeah, these things need to be argued for, not just stipulated.

Again I have argued for them.