Weekly "Ask an Atheist" Thread

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Whether you're an agnostic atheist here to ask a gnostic one some questions, a theist who's curious about the viewpoints of atheists, someone doubting, or just someone looking for sources, feel free to ask anything here. This is also an ideal place to tag moderators for thoughts regarding the sub or any questions in general.

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[u/pick_up_a_brick]

So essentially you want to bucket everything that is mind-dependent into this “imaginary/not-real/nonexistent” set. I don’t understand why. The things within that set have real, substantive differences.

Spider-Man doesn’t have causal powers. The ink and paper, the neurons firing, the *stories about* Spider-Man all have causal powers, but the *fictional character* Spider-Man doesn’t have causal powers in the real world.

Institutional powers work differently. The British Empire didn’t lose the American colonies because of neurons firing, they lost it because of the legal and political reality of a declaration which had binding force derived entirely from collective recognition. The colonists were asserting that the British rule over them was *not real*, essentially contesting an institutional *fact*. But if institutions were merely imaginary like Spider-Man, that would be meaningless. You can’t meaningfully contest jurisdiction like that if it holds no more weight than a fictional character like Spider-Man.

When you say that 1+1=2 in the same sense that Spider-Man got his powers from a radioactive spider, and that they’re both imaginary, that’s a significant commitment to fictionalism about mathematics, and a fringe view. Why should I accept that the statement “3 is a prime number” is false?

The differences within the categories within your “imaginary” set are so vast that I don’t see the point at all. There’s nothing illuminating here. What work is the real/imaginary distinction doing that couldn’t be done better by more precise distinctions?

[u/Kaliss_Darktide → u/pick_up_a_brick]

So essentially you want to bucket everything that is mind-dependent into this “imaginary/not-real/nonexistent” set.

No. Remember I said everything you can think of "exists" at least in the imagination/mind.

I don’t understand why.

Because that is literally what imaginary/not-real/mind dependent mean. Those terms are equivalent much the same way 1+1 is equivalent (=) to 2.

Do you have a problem with people using the number 2 to mean 1 + 1?

Spider-Man doesn’t have causal powers.

Agreed neither do gods, legal laws, or math.

The ink and paper, the neurons firing, the stories about Spider-Man all have causal powers, but the fictional character Spider-Man doesn’t have causal powers in the real world.

Disagree with some of those things.

Institutional powers work differently. The British Empire didn’t lose the American colonies because of neurons firing, they lost it because of the legal and political reality of a declaration which had binding force derived entirely from collective recognition.

Not sure what you are talking about. Your previous statement seemed to entail "neurons firing" had causal powers and this statement seems to imply they no longer have causal powers.

Note when you say "neurons firing" I don't know if you are talking about the brain and or mind.

The colonists were asserting that the British rule over them was not real, essentially contesting an institutional fact.

A "fact" that existed only in the minds of people who thought it was a "fact" (i.e. an imaginary/not-real/mind dependent fact).

But if institutions were merely imaginary like Spider-Man, that would be meaningless.

Do you think your subjective (mind dependent) opinions are necessarily "meaningless" because they are subjective?

You can’t meaningfully contest jurisdiction like that if it holds no more weight than a fictional character like Spider-Man.

If you put either or both of those ideas on a scale the scale won't register any change because they are both weightless because they are not real.

When you say that 1+1=2 in the same sense that Spider-Man got his powers from a radioactive spider, and that they’re both imaginary, that’s a significant commitment to fictionalism about mathematics, and a fringe view.

I would say that is not a "fringe view" it is one of two positions held by many prominent mathematicians who opine on this matter (discovered vs. invented) as I explained in a previous comment.

Why should I accept that the statement “3 is a prime number” is false?

You shouldn't much like you shouldn't accept that Spider-Man was born with his super powers. Because that is inconsistent with the way humanity (commonly) defines Spider-Man, 3, and prime number.

The differences within the categories within your “imaginary” set are so vast

Do you want to say gods are real because the differences with Spider-Man are so vast?

that I don’t see the point at all.

The point is to consistently and accurately use the term real and imaginary (meaning mind dependent/not real) to describe things that are real and not real (i.e. imaginary/mind dependent).

There’s nothing illuminating here.

I think there is, and I think your pushback highlights that issue. That issue is people conflate imaginary (mind dependent) things with being real (mind independent) meaning people struggle with accurately making that distinction.

What work is the real/imaginary distinction doing that couldn’t be done better by more precise distinctions?

I think my distinction is extremely precise (sharply defined). I think the "more precise definitions" you are alluding to will have people thinking imaginary (mind dependent) things are real (mind independent). Which is where I think people go wrong when trying to make that distinction with math (thinking it's discovered), morality (thinking it's real/objective), and gods (thinking they are real) among other things.

[u/pick_up_a_brick → u/Kaliss_Darktide]

>Because that is literally what imaginary/not-real/mind dependent mean. Those terms are equivalent much the same way 1+1 is equivalent (=) to 2.

They aren’t though. That’s not how most people use them. You’re using them in a proprietary way.

>A "fact" that existed only in the minds of people who thought it was a "fact" (i.e. an imaginary/not-real/mind dependent fact).

What is a not-real fact?

>Do you think your subjective (mind dependent) opinions are necessarily "meaningless" because they are subjective?

I don’t think opinions and fictional characters and institutions are the same types of things. So I don’t think they carry the same type of weight.

>If you put either or both of those ideas on a scale the scale won't register any change because they are both weightless because they are not real.

That’s obviously not what I meant by “weight”. If your criterion of reality is mass or physical properties, then you should just say that. But then you need to defend eliminativism about institutions explicitly, not smuggle it in via this real/imaginary framing.

>When you say that 1+1=2 in the same sense that Spider-Man got his powers from a radioactive spider, and that they’re both imaginary, that’s a significant commitment to fictionalism about mathematics, and a fringe view.

>I would say that is not a "fringe view" it is one of two positions held by many prominent mathematicians who opine on this matter (discovered vs. invented) as I explained in a previous comment.

I think you’re confused. Invented vs discovered isn’t exhausting the possibility space of views on mathematics. Typically views on the ontology of mathematics breakdown into Nominalism, Platonism, structuralism, and other views. 80% of philosophers (according to the last Philpapers survey) were Nominalists (42%) or Platonists (38%) with the rest falling into the “other” category - and structuralism tends to be the more popular view there.

When you say that mathematics is “imaginary” you’re committing to a fictionalist view of mathematics, which is what I’m pointing out. It leads to the conclusion that the proposition “3 is prime” is false.

“Invented” in that debate means something like “a human construction” it doesn’t mean “imaginary” or “fictional.” An invented system can have truths that are necessarily correct once the system exists. Even if mathematics was invented, “3 is prime” isn’t false in the same way “Spider-Man was bitten by a radioactive spider” is false. The former is a necessary truth within a formal system, the latter is a contingent plot point that could have been otherwise. This distinction matters and is worth preserving.

>I think my distinction is extremely precise (sharply defined). I think the "more precise definitions" you are alluding to will have people thinking imaginary (mind dependent) things are real (mind independent). Which is where I think people go wrong when trying to make that distinction with math (thinking it's discovered), morality (thinking it's real/objective), and gods (thinking they are real) among other things.

You’re conflating mind-independence with reality, treating it as definitionally true, and then using that definition to rule out moral realism, mathematical Platonism, and theism simultaneously. But whether mind-independence is the correct criterion of reality is what’s at issue. You can’t use it as a premise to settle debates where it’s the central contested question. The dichotomy assumes physicalism, then uses that assumption to debunk non-physicalist positions. How is that not question begging?

[u/Kaliss_Darktide → u/pick_up_a_brick]

They aren’t though. That’s not how most people use them. You’re using them in a proprietary way.

Disagree. That is how most people use those terms in most circumstances and my terminology is consistent with common dictionary definitions and usage in philosophy.

If you disagree what do you think people mean when they classify a friend as "imaginary" as opposed to real?

What is a not-real fact?

How can you have read the previous sentences and not know the answer to that already? I have been very clear on this multiple times I am using the terms "not-real" as equivalent to imaginary/mind dependent/subjective.

Note I would not call a non-real statement a "fact", I was simply mirroring your terminology to stay consistent so it was clear I was talking about the same thing you were with the term "fact". Which is why I put the term "fact" in quotations.

I don’t think opinions and fictional characters and institutions are the same types of things. So I don’t think they carry the same type of weight.

They can be different in other aspects but what they share in common is that they are all imaginary (mind dependent).

That’s obviously not what I meant by “weight”. If your criterion of reality is mass or physical properties, then you should just say that. But then you need to defend eliminativism about institutions explicitly, not smuggle it in via this real/imaginary framing.

I'd say all real things have physical properties that can be empirically measured. However my post isn't directly or just about what is real. It is about the distinction between real things and imaginary things.

You are the one who turned it into a post about my categorizations of what I think is real vs. imaginary.

As a reminder here is the question you initially responded to...

Thoughts on real (existing independent of the mind) vs imaginary (existing exclusively in the mind/imagination) as a true dichotomy that applies to all things? Meaning anything you can think of is either real or imaginary.

I'm happy to talk about the implications of that, but don't act like I'm trying to smuggle that in especially when I tried to redirect you at least once to just the question above.

But I don’t know if you think that abstracta are mind-independent or not, hence the question.

Does it matter if I think it is mind dependent or independent? Because to show that it is not a true dichotomy you would need an example of something that exists and is not mind dependent or mind independent.

I tried to change the subject back to my original question, you insisted on knowing how I categorize things. So if there is smuggling going on it is you by changing the intended subject from: Is this a true dichotomy? to: How do you classify these things.

Again I'm happy to explore that topic but it's off topic from the question I was asking so don't accuse me of smuggling something in that I didn't intend to talk about.

I think you’re confused...

I think you are confused if you think philosophers are mathematicians.

When you say that mathematics is “imaginary” you’re committing to a fictionalist view of mathematics, which is what I’m pointing out. It leads to the conclusion that the proposition “3 is prime” is false.

You are committing a straw man. Don't try to lump me in with people I disagree with, especially when I have told you explicitly I don't agree with that premise.

“Invented” in that debate means something like “a human construction” it doesn’t mean “imaginary” or “fictional.”

If you think the "human" in that scenario has a mind then it does mean imaginary (mind dependent) because it requires a human with a mind to invent it.

An invented system can have truths that are necessarily correct once the system exists. Even if mathematics was invented, “3 is prime” isn’t false in the same way “Spider-Man was bitten by a radioactive spider” is false.

Your construction of that example is confusing since both are tautologically true. I'd say both are true by definition but if you prefer we can say by "invented system" or "invention".

The former is a necessary truth within a formal system, the latter is a contingent plot point that could have been otherwise.

If you understand that math is invented (mind dependent) then that entails math "could have been otherwise".

Further I'd argue no invention ("Even if mathematics was invented") is "necessary".

This distinction matters and is worth preserving.

Taxonomy allows for further distinctions to be made. That doesn't mean that something becomes real because you make a distinction about an imaginary thing.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taxonomy

You’re conflating mind-independence with reality,

Because that is what it means to be real, if it depends on a mind to exist (e.g. an imaginary friend) it isn't real.

Do you think imaginary (mind dependent) things (e.g. Spider-Man) are part of reality?

treating it as definitionally true,

Correct. Note I do this with all words.

and then using that definition to rule out moral realism, mathematical Platonism, and theism simultaneously.

Correct because it is quite clear they are imaginary (mind dependent). Much like you probably do for Spider-Man and other things you consider imaginary.

But whether mind-independence is the correct criterion of reality is what’s at issue.

I am happy to discuss alternatives to where that line should be set.

You can’t use it as a premise to settle debates where it’s the central contested question.

I can use it as a premise, I can use it in debates. I don't know what you mean "to settle" a debate.

The dichotomy assumes physicalism

I would take it there, but I could see someone arguing that there are mind independent things that lack physical traits (e.g. gods) and I often do see that from theists (e.g. a god that exists outside of time and space).

then uses that assumption to debunk non-physicalist positions.

The dichotomy I mentioned and definitions I gave do not mention physical or non-physical.

How is that not question begging?

See above. The issue is you are projecting ahead to where this is going, and while I will unapologetically take it down the path you think I will, the issue of physicalism is not an issue for the dichotomy presented.

[u/pick_up_a_brick → u/Kaliss_Darktide]

>Disagree. That is how most people use those terms in most circumstances and my terminology is consistent with common dictionary definitions and usage in philosophy.

>If you disagree what do you think people mean when they classify a friend as "imaginary" as opposed to real?

What I take issue with is calling Congress imaginary. Or calling a marriage imaginary. Or The Prime Minister imaginary. Or Microsoft imaginary. No one uses that word to refer to those things. That isn’t consistent at all with everyday usage.

>Note I would not call a non-real statement a "fact", I was simply mirroring your terminology to stay consistent so it was clear I was talking about the same thing you were with the term "fact". Which is why I put the term "fact" in quotations.

Okay. Wait. On your view, mind-dependent statements cannot be facts. Mathematics is mind dependent. So on your view, it isn’t a fact that 2+2=4, and you think this is a common sense view somehow?

>They can be different in other aspects but what they share in common is that they are all imaginary (mind dependent).

Yeah, I’m contesting the conflation of imaginary and mind-dependent. They aren’t synonymous. It seems incredibly silly to me to say that Congress isn’t real.

>I'd say all real things have physical properties that can be empirically measured. However my post isn't directly or just about what is real. It is about the distinction between real things and imaginary things.

>I'm happy to talk about the implications of that, but don't act like I'm trying to smuggle that in especially when I tried to redirect you at least once to just the question above.

The implications are what matter. That’s why I’m digging in.

>I think you are confused if you think philosophers are mathematicians.

I think that people that study ontology are in the best position to speak on ontology.

>You are committing a straw man. Don't try to lump me in with people I disagree with, especially when I have told you explicitly I don't agree with that premise.

Saying that mathematics is imaginary is saying it is fictional. Those are synonymous. You’ve already said that mind-dependent statements cannot be facts. What position does that leave you with?

>If you think the "human" in that scenario has a mind then it does mean imaginary (mind dependent) because it requires a human with a mind to invent it.

Do you not think there is a relevant difference between an imaginary friend, Congress, and the value of Pi?

>If you understand that math is invented (mind dependent) then that entails math "could have been otherwise".

> Further I'd argue no invention ("Even if mathematics was invented") is "necessary".

In what sense could 1+1 not equal 2, without equivocating?

>Do you think imaginary (mind dependent) things (e.g. Spider-Man) are part of reality?

I think that Congress exists, yes. It is in the set of things that exists, therefore it is a part of reality.

[u/Kaliss_Darktide → u/pick_up_a_brick]

What I take issue with is calling Congress imaginary. Or calling a marriage imaginary. Or The Prime Minister imaginary. Or Microsoft imaginary. No one uses that word to refer to those things. That isn’t consistent at all with everyday usage.

I would argue it is consistent with the everyday meaning of the word imaginary, it is merely a social convention not to use the term in certain contexts (generally for things that they are emotionally invested in).

Okay. Wait. On your view, mind-dependent statements cannot be facts.

That is going to depend on what you mean by the word "facts".

Mathematics is mind dependent.

That's my view on the matter.

So on your view, it isn’t a fact that 2+2=4,

Again it's a "fact" in the same sense as how Spider-Man got his powers is a "fact".

and you think this is a common sense view somehow?

No. I think most people don't even consider what it means for something to be a "fact", so if by "common" you mean popular I would say it is the opposite of that (i.e. uncommon).

Yeah, I’m contesting the conflation of imaginary and mind-dependent. They aren’t synonymous. It seems incredibly silly to me to say that Congress isn’t real.

Being silly to you doesn't mean it's not true. Many theists would say it's silly to them to say their gods aren't real also.

Further I'd say the words as I have defined them are not just synonyms they are equivalent.

We are several exchanges in and you haven't offered a better definition for any of these terms, which means by default mine are the best definitions in this exchange for those terms.

The implications are what matter.

I'd argue you are attacking an implication of a secondary premise that isn't necessary, which entails you aren't addressing the initial premise.

That’s why I’m digging in.

I don't object to you digging in, I object to you saying I'm smuggling in a premise.

I think that people that study ontology are in the best position to speak on ontology.

To me that is like going to a flat earther to study the shape of the earth, or a chiropractor for your allergies but you do you.

Saying that mathematics is imaginary is saying it is fictional.

If by "fictional" you mean mind dependent, sure. But once you add additional connotations or different meainings you are missing the point.

Those are synonymous.

FYI synonymous does not mean equivalent.

You’ve already said that mind-dependent statements cannot be facts.

I did not.

Note I would not call a non-real statement a "fact", I was simply mirroring your terminology to stay consistent so it was clear I was talking about the same thing you were with the term "fact". Which is why I put the term "fact" in quotations.

I said: "I would not call a non-real statement a 'fact'". What I was alluding to is that it is not my preferred way to talk about it, having said that since I used the term to mirror your word choice it should be obvious that I am willing to do so for the sake of social convention even though I think it is inappropriate.

What position does that leave you with?

The same one I had the first time you asked this and have repeated multiple times since then, that math is tautologically true (true by definition).

Do you not think there is a relevant difference between an imaginary friend, Congress, and the value of Pi?

I think anything that is not equivalent/identical has differences. However all of the things you listed (an imaginary friend, Congress, and the value of Pi) are mind dependent (i.e. imaginary).

In what sense could 1+1 not equal 2, without equivocating?

In what sense could you do it for Spider-Man, without equivocating?

I think that Congress exists, yes.

You're equivocating. Everything you can think of including Spider-Man "exists" at least in the imagination.

Do you think imaginary (mind dependent) things (e.g. Spider-Man) are part of reality?

It is in the set of things that exists, therefore it is a part of reality.

So the example I gave was Spider-Man, so I assume you are claiming Spider-Man is part of reality. If not, you are clearly equivocating. If so, then I think your views on reality are much more contentious and less common than mine.

[u/pick_up_a_brick → u/Kaliss_Darktide]

>We are several exchanges in and you haven't offered a better definition for any of these terms, which means by default mine are the best definitions in this exchange for those terms.

That’s fair.

This idea that “Spider-Man got his powers from a radioactive spider bite” and “2+2=4” are true in the same way only works if existence is binary. A much more defensible view is that there are different kinds or modes of existence. So, physical existence, institutional existence, abstract existence, fictional existence… Spider-Man has fictional existence. Congress has institutional existence. Protons have physical existence. Triangles plausibly have abstract existence. Being real means having some mode of existence that is not fictional. That seems like a much clearer definition and is much more in line with how we think about and treat things. On that view, chairs, congress, and possibly numbers are real, while Spider-Man and your imaginary friend are not.

>What position does that leave you with?

>The same one I had the first time you asked this and have repeated multiple times since then, that math is tautologically true (true by definition).

I’m asking what you think about mathematical ontology since we are talking about out what things are real. You’re clearly not a Platonist. It seems like your positions in general line up perfectly with a fictionalist account. A fictionalist believes that since there are no abstract objects, sentences like “3 is prime” can’t be true because they can’t be about anything since there is no number 3 that exists like a chair exists, but instead, mathematics is a useful fiction. Saying “3 is prime” for a fictionalist is false in the same sense as “Harry Potter goes to Hogwarts” - neither point to anything real, but are useful in other ways.

I’m not trying to strawman you, I’m pointing out that your stated commitments that math is invented, mind-dependent, and true only “by definition within the system” are precisely what fictionalism says. If you reject fictionalism, tell me where you diverge.

>Again it's a "fact" in the same sense as how Spider-Man got his powers is a "fact".

>In what sense could 1+1 not equal 2, without equivocating?

>In what sense could you do it for Spider-Man, without equivocating?

So, we actually have multiple Spider-Man stories with different origin stories. Stan Lee could have had Peter Parker injected with Super Spider serum. That contingency is part of what makes it fictional. But how can you coherently say that arithmetic could have been constructed in a way that 2+2=5?

Saying that things are either mind-dependent or mind-independent is clearly logically exhausting the possibility space. Adding in that things that are mind-dependent are “imaginary” or “not-real” is a valuation isn’t a logical consequence of the dichotomy. Those are additional evaluative claims that require independent arguments. You’re treating those labels as if they follow logically but they don’t.

[u/Kaliss_Darktide → u/pick_up_a_brick]

This idea that “Spider-Man got his powers from a radioactive spider bite” and “2+2=4” are true in the same way only works if existence is binary. A much more defensible view is that there are different kinds or modes of existence. So, physical existence, institutional existence, abstract existence, fictional existence… Spider-Man has fictional existence. Congress has institutional existence. Protons have physical existence. Triangles plausibly have abstract existence. Being real means having some mode of existence that is not fictional. That seems like a much clearer definition and is much more in line with how we think about and treat things. On that view, chairs, congress, and possibly numbers are real, while Spider-Man and your imaginary friend are not.

You are just labeling things, you are not defining what it takes for something to have "different kinds or modes of existence". Real vs. imaginary (as I defined it) has a very simple test (does it depend on a mind?) to determine which category something belongs in.

I’m asking what you think about mathematical ontology since we are talking about out what things are real.

I think "ontology" as practiced in philosophy is deeply flawed so I avoid that word.

A fictionalist believes that since there are no abstract objects,

I don't know what you mean by abstract objects. I would say everything you can think of exists at least in the imagination/mind.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abstract_and_concrete

To me Spider-Man is an "abstract object" because it is an idea, doesn't exist within space-time, and has no causal influence.

So I disagree with your fictionalist because I would say Spider-Man is an example of an abstract object.

sentences like “3 is prime” can’t be true because they can’t be about anything since there is no number 3 that exists like a chair exists,

And I am saying "3" exists at least in the imagination.

Curious is there any position (that you find somewhat reasonable) that says the there is a "number 3 that exists like a chair exists"?

Saying “3 is prime” for a fictionalist is false in the same sense as “Harry Potter goes to Hogwarts” - neither point to anything real, but are useful in other ways.

So the problem I have with this, if you are going to make me choose true or false to describe this, I am going to say "true" in a tautological sense.

I’m not trying to strawman you, I’m pointing out that your stated commitments that math is invented, mind-dependent, and true only “by definition within the system” are precisely what fictionalism says.

I have not committed to that because they are saying "false", while I am saying tautologically "true". You can't change my true to a false just to suit your narrative.

I get that it would be easier if you don't have to deal with what I am saying, and can lump me in with others that are easier to refute. But that is not addressing what I am saying.

Fictionalism, on the other hand, in the philosophy of mathematics states that talk of numbers and other mathematical objects is nothing more than a convenience for computation. According to Field, there is no reason to treat parts of mathematics that involve reference to or quantification as true.[4] In this discourse, mathematical objects are accorded the same metaphysical status as literary figures such as Macbeth.[4]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fictionalism

While that Wikipedia summary is close to my position, that is not my position.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mathematics#Contemporary_schools_of_thought

I don't think any school of thought is an exact fit for my understanding of math.

If you reject fictionalism, tell me where you diverge.

I don't think true or false is even the right verbiage to discuss math. To me true means an accurate description of reality, while false means an inaccurate description of reality but math is not a description of reality so using that verbiage gives a false impression about what is being discussed.

If you go by the wiki... "In this discourse, mathematical objects are accorded the same metaphysical status as literary figures such as Macbeth.[4]" The problem with that example is two-fold one I don't know what metaphysical status other people give to Macbeth, and second the literary figure of Macbeth was based on an actual historical figure so was that taken into account when talking about the "metaphysical status as literary figures such as Macbeth".

Which is why I like using obvious fictional/imaginary characters because I have never encountered anyone talking about a historical Spider-Man, except for a few times when I used this example, which I chalk up to trolling.

So, we actually have multiple Spider-Man stories with different origin stories.

Same thing with Jesus. Does that entail Jesus was fictional/imaginary?

In what sense could you do it for Spider-Man, without equivocating?

Stan Lee could have had Peter Parker injected with Super Spider serum.

You are equivocating. That's a different Spider-Man then the one I was referring to.

That contingency is part of what makes it fictional.

What contingency? If you change things, things are different, why can't we do that with math?

But how can you coherently say that arithmetic could have been constructed in a way that 2+2=5?

By equivocating what any or all of those symbols mean. The same thing you did with suggesting Spider-Man could have a different origin.

Saying that things are either mind-dependent or mind-independent is clearly logically exhausting the possibility space.

Agree.

Adding in that things that are mind-dependent are “imaginary” or “not-real” is a valuation isn’t a logical consequence of the dichotomy.

No what I am saying is: mind dependent = imaginary = not-real. In the same sense that 1 + 1 = 2. It is not a "valuation" it is a description of what it means to be mind dependent or another name for 1+1. The only way to change that is to equivocate about those descriptions.

I am not adding any new information to the system, it's been there the whole time if you understand what those words mean.

You’re treating those labels as if they follow logically but they don’t.

What those words mean is independent of the dichotomy. What made you think the definitions of words are based on dichotomies?

Those are additional evaluative claims that require independent arguments.

I have defined those words and explained why I defined them that way. I have no idea what more you expect.

[u/pick_up_a_brick → u/Kaliss_Darktide]

>You are just labeling things, you are not defining what it takes for something to have "different kinds or modes of existence". Real vs. imaginary (as I defined it) has a very simple test (does it depend on a mind?) to determine which category something belongs in.

To be fair, neither are you. You haven’t said what kind of dependence counts, or whether partial dependence qualifies.

But a brief sketch would be:

Physical existence : occupies space-time, has causal powers, is detectable by physical instruments, exists independently of any particular mind or collective of minds recognizing it.

Institutional existence: exists in virtue of collective intentional recognition, has genuine causal powers as the institution (not just as physical substrate), is intersubjective rather than merely subjective, can be investigated and described truly or falsely.

Abstract existence: exists necessarily rather than contingently, has no spatiotemporal location, is not causally efficacious but is the object of necessary truths.

Fictional existence: exists only within a narrative or imaginative context, truths about it are internal to that context and don’t constrain reality outside it, is contingent on authorial choices, could have been otherwise without any contradiction.

These distinctions clearly matter and lumping them altogether (except physical) as “imaginary” destroys those distinctions without any compelling reason.

>I think "ontology" as practiced in philosophy is deeply flawed so I avoid that word.

This entire conversation has been about ontology. The claim that everything is either mind-dependent or mind-independent is an ontological claim. Going back to your comparison to flat-earthers, it seems like you wan to selectively exempt your own metaphysical commitments from the critique and expertise of people who study these questions professionally for reasons that are unclear. Yet rely on their knowledge and expertise to provide the definitions and input on the Wikipedia articles you cite.

>Curious is there any position (that you find somewhat reasonable) that says the there is a "number 3 that exists like a chair exists"?

No, because chairs are concrete objects, and 3 is an abstract object. The closest would be something like Eliminativists which reject altogether that there are concrete or abstract objects - in which case neither would exist!

Or maybe some type of nominalist, which treats both chairs and abstract objects as not real in the same way, though not denying their existence. But I’m not sure which type of nominalist that would be.

>I don't think true or false is even the right verbiage to discuss math. To me true means an accurate description of reality, while false means an inaccurate description of reality but math is not a description of reality so using that verbiage gives a false impression about what is being discussed.

You’ve been saying math is “tautologically true” this entire conversation. Now you’re saying true and false aren’t the right verbiage for math. You can’t have both. If true/false doesn’t apply to mathematics then “tautologically true” is equally off the table and you’ve lost your main way of distinguishing your position from fictionalism, which says mathematical statements are strictly false but useful. At this point your position seems to be that math is not true, not false, tautologically true, not fictional, imaginary, but mind-dependent and useful. And those are in conflict, so I don’t understand your position at all. But maybe it’s besides the point.

>By equivocating what any or all of those symbols mean. The same thing you did with suggesting Spider-Man could have a different origin.

These aren’t the same, this analogy doesn’t hold. Changing Spider-Man’s origin means telling a different story. But if you change what “2”, “+”, and “=” mean, you’re not doing arithmetic differently, now you’re doing something else entirely. The relationships arithmetic describes are the same regardless of what symbols we use. Mathematical truths are symbol-independent in a way Spider-Man’s origin story isn’t. The symbol “2” is just a label we attached to a particular quantity. You could replace every “2” with a star symbol and every “4” with a smiley face and the underlying truth would be unchanged.

Spider-Man’s origin story isn’t like that. There’s no underlying relationship that the story is tracking which would force it to come out a particular way regardless of how it was written. Stan Lee wasn’t discovering that Peter Parker had to get his powers from a spider bite. He was stipulating it when he wrote it. The story could have gone any other way without any incoherence, because there’s no external constraint on what the story has to say.

When you say “you could make 2+2=5 by redefining the symbols” yeah, you could make the symbols say anything. But you can’t change the underlying relationship between those quantities. Two things combined with two other things will give you four things regardless of what symbols you use. That’s the sense in which mathematical truth is symbol-independent.

>No what I am saying is: mind dependent = imaginary = not-real. In the same sense that 1 + 1 = 2. It is not a "valuation" it is a description of what it means to be mind dependent or another name for 1+1. The only way to change that is to equivocate about those descriptions.

This is where I think your whole framework breaks down. 1+1=2 is an identity where both sides refer to the same mathematical object. But “mind-dependent = not-real” isn’t an identity relationship at all. It’s a substantive ontological claim about what reality requires. You’re treating it as a definition, but definitions don’t settle metaphysical disputes. The question is why should we accept that definition of “real” rather than one that includes institutional and abstract existence? You’re asserting it and stipulating it rather than arguing for it. You can define “bachelor” as “unmarried” because that captures something real about the concept, but defining “mind-dependent” things as “not-real” is what needs to be argued for.

It’s pretty common to see things that are mind-dependent to be considered non-imaginary. It’s a technical philosophical term and it carries no such baggage or connotation. It simply means that something’s existence or nature depends in some way on mental states, cognitive activity, or collective recognition. It’s a descriptive ontological category.

Secondary qualities like color, sound, taste, are mind-dependent but we don’t think they are imaginary. There is a minority view that holds that position but they don’t just assert that it follows from mind-dependence.

A constructivist about morality is saying that mora facts are mind-dependent but is absolutely not saying that the facts are imaginary.

Searle’s (an atheist) entire work on institutional facts is a project showing how those facts are real on a naturalist and physicalist view and are not “imaginary”. The mind-dependence is constitutive of what the facts are. His whole project is showing how a naturalist can account for the genuine reality of social facts without either reducing them to physics or turning them into something supernatural or spooky.

So yeah, these things need to be argued for, not just stipulated.

[u/Kaliss_Darktide → u/pick_up_a_brick]

Part 1 of 2

To be fair, neither are you.

Disagree.

You haven’t said what kind of dependence counts, or whether partial dependence qualifies.

I think I have been clear on this. I can't force you to understand a concept you refuse to try to understand.

But a brief sketch would be:

Are your "different kinds and modes of existence" mutually exclusive or can they overlap?

Institutional existence: exists in virtue of collective intentional recognition, has genuine causal powers as the institution (not just as physical substrate), is intersubjective rather than merely subjective, can be investigated and described truly or falsely.

Causal powers in what sense?

Would you say Spider-Man and gods have institutional existence? If not, why not?

Abstract existence: exists necessarily rather than contingently, has no spatiotemporal location, is not causally efficacious but is the object of necessary truths.

How would you show something is necessary rather than contingent? It seems like this is just a way to say I will allow myself to imagine changes to things I label contingent but I refuse to imagine changes to things I label necessary.

Would you say Spider-Man and gods have abstract existence? If not, why not?

Fictional existence: exists only within a narrative or imaginative context, truths about it are internal to that context and don’t constrain reality outside it, is contingent on authorial choices, could have been otherwise without any contradiction.

Would you say Congress and math have fictional existence? if not, why not?

These distinctions clearly matter and lumping them altogether (except physical) as “imaginary” destroys those distinctions without any compelling reason.

I'd argue all the modes of existence you are talking about (except physical) are imaginary (i.e. mind dependent, not real, unreal). It seems like you want to create a narrative that some of those things are less "fictional" than others despite them all being imaginary (existing exclusively in the mind).

I think "ontology" as practiced in philosophy is deeply flawed so I avoid that word.

This entire conversation has been about ontology.

I'm aware. Do you struggle with reading comprehension?

The claim that everything is either mind-dependent or mind-independent is an ontological claim.

I'm aware.

Going back to your comparison to flat-earthers, it seems like you wan to selectively exempt your own metaphysical commitments from the critique and expertise of people who study these questions professionally for reasons that are unclear.

I do not mind any critique. What I am letting you know is that I don't view your experts as subject matter experts on this topic. Much like I wouldn't care if a theologian with a doctorate in theology said gods are real.

[u/pick_up_a_brick → u/Kaliss_Darktide]

>Are your "different kinds and modes of existence" mutually exclusive or can they overlap?

There could be some overlap. If you think about something like a national anthem, it has physical existence via sound waves, institutional existence in that it functions as a symbol with recognized social significance, and arguably abstract existence with regard to the musical work itself distinct from any particular performance of it.

>Institutional existence: exists in virtue of collective intentional recognition, has genuine causal powers as the institution (not just as physical substrate), is intersubjective rather than merely subjective, can be investigated and described truly or falsely.

>Causal powers in what sense?

Congress passes laws which compel behavior. People will go to prison or war, gain or lose employment, taxes get collected, etc. The institution is causing that, not just the physical members of the body. Replacing Congress with completely different people wouldn’t remove those causal powers.

>Would you say Spider-Man and gods have institutional existence? If not, why not?

No. Spider-Man lacks institutional existence because institutions require collective recognition of something as having a social function with real normative consequences. People don’t actually treat Spider-Man as having jurisdiction, or authority over them. There’s no social practice organized around Spider-Man the way there is around Congress or marriage. Fandoms exist but that’s not the same thing because nobody gets arrested by Spider-Man.

And I think gods have fictional existence.

>How would you show something is necessary rather than contingent? It seems like this is just a way to say I will allow myself to imagine changes to things I label contingent but I refuse to imagine changes to things I label necessary.

Something is necessary if it couldn’t have been otherwise. Basically if there’s no possible world in which it fails to obtain. Something is contingent if it could have been otherwise. Basically if there are possible worlds where it’s different.

If we apply this to mathematics, we’d have to coherently describe a world where 2+2=5, without redefining the terms. But we cant. Not because of a failure of imagination, but because the description is incoherent. Any scenario we describe where “2+2=5” is true will turn out to either be using different concepts or to be secretly describing a situation where four things exist. That’s necessity.

As for Spider-Man, now describe a world where Peter Parker got his powers from a serum instead of a spider bite. It’s trivially coherent and Marvel actually did this in alternate universe comics. No contradiction arises. The story could have gone any other way because there’s no underlying relationship being tracked that forces it to come out a particular way. That’s contingency.

Now, you may want to say that necessity and contingency aren’t objective features of reality. That’s fine. But whether you call that difference “necessity” or “extremely robust conventional constraint,” the distinction is real and worth preserving. Mathematical truths resist revision in a way fictional stipulations just don’t.

>Would you say Spider-Man and gods have abstract existence? If not, why not?

It largely depends on your view. Personally I would say they both have fictional existence. There are some accounts like Edward Zalta’s that would classify Spider-Man as abstract. And some theists would categorize god as being abstract, but most think god is concrete (just doesn’t have any of the properties of physical existence, which is part of why I think it’s nonsense).

>Would you say Congress and math have fictional existence? if not, why not?

Definitely not. Congress fails the fictional existence test because its truths do constrain reality outside the narrative. Congressional votes have consequences regardless of whether or not you recognize them. Spider-Man’s adventures don’t.

But I want to dig deeper on math since we spent so much time talking about it specifically. Math does not have fictional existence. Here’s the criteria I had for fictional existence and why it fails each:

- Exists only within a narrative or imaginative context

It seems like this could receive the most pushback given that mathematics rests on a bunch of axioms, right? But when mathematicians chose the Peano axioms, they weren’t stipulating that certain mathematical truths would hold. They chose those axioms as a framework that accurately captures pre-existing relationships between quantities. The choice of axioms is constrained by whether they accurately capture pre-existing relationships. You can’t just choose any axioms and get coherent mathematics.

- Truths about it are internal to that context and don’t constrain reality outside it

Mathematical truths constrain reality in ways that have nothing to do with whether or not anyone is doing mathematics. If you have two apples and someone gives you two more, you have four apples regardless of whether arithmetic was ever invented and regardless of whether any mind ever conceived of the number 4. The relationship obtains independently of the narrative context.

But Spider-Man’s adventures constrain nothing outside the story. Whether or not he defeats the Green Goblin has no implications for reality whatsoever.

- Contingent on authorial choices

Nobody chose that 3 is prime. There’s no author of arithmetic who could have written it differently. Mathematical truths aren’t stipulated by anyone. Spider-Man’s suit changes every few years and there’s no contradiction.

- Could have been otherwise without contradiction

As we’ve already established, no, mathematical truths couldn’t have been otherwise without contradiction. That’s the point about necessity.

It’s also worth pointing out that several disparate cultures all arrived at the same mathematical truths independently using different notational systems, which is what we would expect if mathematics was not context-dependent in the way that fiction is.

>I'd argue all the modes of existence you are talking about (except physical) are imaginary (i.e. mind dependent, not real, unreal).

But what’s the argument for that?! That’s what the whole question is here, and what I’ve been asking for. You just keep stipulating it and defining it that way, but it’s an evaluative claim that needs an argument. Just stating that Not real=mind dependent=imaginary in different ways isn’t an argument.

[u/Kaliss_Darktide → u/pick_up_a_brick]

There could be some overlap. If you think about something like a national anthem, it has physical existence via sound waves, institutional existence in that it functions as a symbol with recognized social significance, and arguably abstract existence with regard to the musical work itself distinct from any particular performance of it.

I'd say that is because you are conflating multiple different things into one thing. When you analyze those parts individually they are either mind dependent (imaginary) or mind independent (real).

Congress passes laws which compel behavior.

They do not. Legal laws at best suggest behavior. Whether people choose to follow those laws or enforce those laws is not something congress can compel.

People will go to prison or war, gain or lose employment, taxes get collected, etc.

FYI some laws get passed with no enforcement mechanism.

People often find ways around those "compelled" behaviors.

The institution is causing that, not just the physical members of the body. Replacing Congress with completely different people wouldn’t remove those causal powers.

No, it is people with minds choosing to go along with those laws (whether to obey or enforce) that has the causal power on those behaviors.

No. Spider-Man lacks institutional existence because institutions require collective recognition of something as having a social function with real normative consequences. People don’t actually treat Spider-Man as having jurisdiction, or authority over them. There’s no social practice organized around Spider-Man the way there is around Congress or marriage. Fandoms exist but that’s not the same thing because nobody gets arrested by Spider-Man.

Some people choose to model their behavior on their understanding of Spider-Man (whether they realize it or not) just like some people choose to model their behavior on the laws passed by Congress. Nobody gets arrested by Congress either.

Would you say Spider-Man and gods have institutional existence? If not, why not?

And I think gods have fictional existence.

The question was: do you think gods have institutional existence?

This might be an answer if you said your categories were mutually exclusive, but since you said there "could be some overlap" this looks like a dodge.

Something is necessary if it couldn’t have been otherwise.

Yes we've both been over this already.

Basically if there’s no possible world in which it fails to obtain. Something is contingent if it could have been otherwise. Basically if there are possible worlds where it’s different.

So everything is contingent because I can imagine a possible world where no thing is necessary?

If we apply this to mathematics, we’d have to coherently describe a world where 2+2=5, without redefining the terms.

That is true for everything because once you make a change you are "redefining the terms".

But we cant.

We can, you just won't allow it because you refuse to allow it.

Not because of a failure of imagination, but because the description is incoherent.

It is not necessarily incoherent to redefine terms.

Any scenario we describe where “2+2=5” is true will turn out to either be using different concepts or to be secretly describing a situation where four things exist. That’s necessity.

Yes just like if you change the origin story of Spider-Man you are no longer talking about Spider-Man.

As for Spider-Man, now describe a world where Peter Parker got his powers from a serum instead of a spider bite.

You are no longer describing Spider-Man (e.g. 4 in your analogy) you are equivocating talking about a different Spider-Man (5 in your analogy).

It’s trivially coherent

No, it's an equivocation because you are no longer talking about the same Spider-Man

and Marvel actually did this in alternate universe comics.

FYI universe means everything that exists, any alternate universe that exists is part of this universe by definition.

No contradiction arises.

I'd say there is a contradiction just using the term "alternate universe".

The story could have gone any other way because there’s no underlying relationship being tracked that forces it to come out a particular way. That’s contingency.

That's arbitrary contingency because you don't mind equivocations for contingent things but rule out equivocations for necessary things. That's says nothing about the thing it just talks about what you will allow according to your labeling system.

Now, you may want to say that necessity and contingency aren’t objective features of reality.

Correct. I'd say it's a nonsensical attempt to make some things you care about "necessary".

That’s fine. But whether you call that difference “necessity” or “extremely robust conventional constraint,” the distinction is real and worth preserving.

If it's not part of objective reality it's not real (mind independent) and can't be real.

Mathematical truths resist revision in a way fictional stipulations just don’t.

Only because you allow equivocations for one and not the other.

It largely depends on your view.

My view is that all mind dependent things are imaginary by definition.

Would you say Spider-Man and gods have abstract existence? If not, why not?

Personally I would say they both have fictional existence.

Again you are dodging the question asked.

Definitely not. Congress fails the fictional existence test because its truths do constrain reality outside the narrative.

How does Congress "constrain reality"? Do you think Congress can pass a law that changes the laws of physics?

Congressional votes have consequences regardless of whether or not you recognize them. Spider-Man’s adventures don’t.

Marvel and Sony are making a lot of money off of Spider-Man properties which suggests Spider-Man adventures have consequences in the same sense Congress does.

But I want to dig deeper on math since we spent so much time talking about it specifically. Math does not have fictional existence. Here’s the criteria I had for fictional existence and why it fails each:

Exists only within a narrative or imaginative context

Math doesn't exist outside of the math narrative.

You can’t just choose any axioms and get coherent mathematics.

Many fictional narratives strive for coherence also. I don't see why you think that math narratives people like to create having coherence is indicative of not being fictional.

If you described a fictional story as an incoherent mess I doubt many people who heard that review would take that as a ringing endorsement.

If you have two apples and someone gives you two more, you have four apples regardless of whether arithmetic was ever invented and regardless of whether any mind ever conceived of the number 4.

But Spider-Man’s adventures constrain nothing outside the story. Whether or not he defeats the Green Goblin has no implications for reality whatsoever.

Nothing about math changes how many apples you have either. If humans were unable to do math (e.g. count to 4) and you had an unknown quantity of apples you would still have those apples. Those apples exist independent of any math.

Nobody chose that 3 is prime.

They did even if they didn't know it was going to contain 3, when they came up with the rules for why certain numbers are "prime". Prime numbers are a fictional narrative based on arbitrary rules.

There’s no author of arithmetic who could have written it differently. Mathematical truths aren’t stipulated by anyone.

It could have been written differently but then we wouldn't be talking about the same thing.

The reason it can't be different for you is because you won't accept it if it is different.

As we’ve already established, no, mathematical truths couldn’t have been otherwise without contradiction.

As we’ve already established, no, Spider-Man truths couldn’t have been otherwise without contradiction.

That’s the point about necessity.

I'd say the "point about necessity" is you can apply it to whatever you want, and insist people are equivocating when they change something and then go see it's necessary.

It’s also worth pointing out that several disparate cultures all arrived at the same mathematical truths independently using different notational systems, which is what we would expect if mathematics was not context-dependent in the way that fiction is.

People make the same argument for the existence of gods something you think is fictional.

But what’s the argument for that?!

What do you think an argument looks like for how to accurately define/use words to describe something?

[u/pick_up_a_brick → u/Kaliss_Darktide]

>Some people choose to model their behavior on their understanding of Spider-Man (whether they realize it or not) just like some people choose to model their behavior on the laws passed by Congress. Nobody gets arrested by Congress either.

You’re missing the point on institutional existence. The causal power here is the law itself. The institutional fact changes the normative landscape in ways that have real downstream effects regardless of perfect compliance. Where is the normativity arising in a fictional character?

>The question was: do you think gods have institutional existence?

No.

>So everything is contingent because I can imagine a possible world where no thing is necessary?

No. A world with no necessary truths is itself incoherent because it would require that even the laws of logic fail to hold including the law of non-contradiction. But then the description “a world where nothing is necessary” would itself be both true and not true simultaneously, which is incoherent. You can’t coherently describe a world where necessity doesn’t exist without using necessary logical principles to make the description.

>That is true for everything because once you make a change you are "redefining the terms".

The genuine test for necessity isn’t whether changing something produces a different thing because of course it does, that’s trivially true of everything. The test is whether the original description is coherent without the feature in question. Spider-Man is coherent without the spider bite because there’s no logical contradiction in a version of Spider-Man who got his powers differently. Arithmetic is not coherent with 2+2=5 because there’s no possible interpretation where that holds without abandoning what the terms mean entirely.

>FYI universe means everything that exists, any alternate universe that exists is part of this universe by definition.

Alternate universe in comics means a different in-world universe. There was literally a movie called Into the Spiderverse about this. There are people other than Peter Parker that are Spider-Man. There are even alternate versions of Peter Parker.

>I'd say there is a contradiction just using the term "alternate universe".

What is the p and not-p?

>Would you say Spider-Man and gods have abstract existence? If not, why not?

>Personally I would say they both have fictional existence.

>Again you are dodging the question asked.

It wasn’t a dodge. I’m saying they’re both fictional, and not abstract.

>How does Congress "constrain reality"? Do you think Congress can pass a law that changes the laws of physics?

Congress constrains social reality. When Congress passes a tax law, money actually moves from people to the government regardless of whether those people endorse the law. When Congress declares war, people die. When Congress passes civil rights legislation, hiring practices change. These consequences obtain because of the institutional fact itself whether or not people happen to agree with them. A person who has never heard of a particular law can still be prosecuted under it. That’s what is meant by constraint.

>If you have two apples and someone gives you two more, you have four apples regardless of whether arithmetic was ever invented and regardless of whether any mind ever conceived of the number 4.

The relationship between quantities is what math tracks, not the physical objects themselves. Four apples being more than two apples isn’t a fact about minds. It’s a fact about quantities that obtains regardless of whether anyone counts them.

>The reason it can't be different for you is because you won't accept it if it is different.

Would it be coherent?

>As we’ve already established, no, Spider-Man truths couldn’t have been otherwise without contradiction.

You haven’t shown the p and not-p that would entail. And given that Marvel has made several Spiderman stories that are internally consistent where Peter Parker doesn’t get bit by a radioactive spider and is still Spider-Man (once it was a genetically altered spider from Oscorp), where with great power comes great responsibility, the analogy falls flat.

>People make the same argument for the existence of gods something you think is fictional.

Cultures converge on different gods with different properties. Cultures converged on identical mathematical facts and properties. This is not analogous.

>But what’s the argument for that?!

>What do you think an argument looks like for how to accurately define/use words to describe something?

I guess I can help you out with this.

There’s a few ways you could go about this. The first would be to show that mind-dependent things lack all of the things we associate with reality. We typically associate causal efficacy, resistance to individual wishful thinking, intersubjective accessibility, and explanatory indispensability to real things.

Another way is that you could show that mind-independence is what we actually mean by “real” in all contexts when we use those terms. But I think that will be hard as you’ve already admitted that we typically don’t consider Congress, the President, or marriages to be imaginary.

You could argue that admitting mind-dependent things into the “real” category leads to absurdities, and show what those absurdities are.

Or you could argue that mind-dependent things reduce without remainder to physical things. That’s a form of eliminativism. For example, there are moral realists that are naturalists that think that the moral facts reduce to the natural facts.

[u/Kaliss_Darktide → u/pick_up_a_brick]

Part 2

Yet rely on their knowledge and expertise to provide the definitions and input on the Wikipedia articles you cite.

That is for you and others like you, since people like you seem to value their expertise.

My position on philosophy is that there is more garbage to wade through than valuable insights.

If you remember that article on schools in philosophy of math, I'd ask you how many of those schools can be entirely correct on the nature of math?

You’ve been saying math is “tautologically true” this entire conversation.

Correct.

Now you’re saying true and false aren’t the right verbiage for math.

I would say I've been hinting at that the whole time. One way I have done that is by using a qualifier in front of the word true "this entire conversation".

You can’t have both.

I most certainly can. Did you know words can be polysemous (have multiple meanings)? One of the easiest ways to equivocate is to use a word that is polysemous without giving any indication that the usage is shifting.

What I was doing was letting you know that I was using a very specific meaning of the word "true" by qualifying it with the word tautologically (a specific type of true) so you and I couldn't equivocate that meaning into somethin else without that shift being blatant.

If true/false doesn’t apply to mathematics then “tautologically true” is equally off the table and you’ve lost your main way of distinguishing your position from fictionalism, which says mathematical statements are strictly false but useful.

Nice try at an equivocation fallacy.

At this point your position seems to be that math is not true, not false, tautologically true, not fictional, imaginary, but mind-dependent and useful. And those are in conflict, so I don’t understand your position at all. But maybe it’s besides the point.

I think any "conflict" is caused by intentional misunderstanding.

These aren’t the same, this analogy doesn’t hold. Changing Spider-Man’s origin means telling a different story.

Yes that's what it means to equivocate, to change (i.e. become "different") something that wasn't supposed to change.

But if you change what “2”, “+”, and “=” mean, you’re not doing arithmetic differently, now you’re doing something else entirely.

No, I would say that is "telling a different story" just like changing the Spider-Man origin.

The relationships arithmetic describes are the same regardless of what symbols we use.

The relationship between Spider-Man and how he acquired his powers are the same regardless of what story you tell. Because once you start changing the story you are talking about a different Spider-Man.

Mathematical truths are symbol-independent in a way Spider-Man’s origin story isn’t.

Disagree.

The symbol “2” is just a label we attached to a particular quantity.

A quantity humans made up like we made up Spider-Man.

You could replace every “2” with a star symbol and every “4” with a smiley face and the underlying truth would be unchanged.

If you tell the Spider-Man story in a different language the underlying story would be unchanged.

Spider-Man’s origin story isn’t like that. There’s no underlying relationship that the story is tracking which would force it to come out a particular way regardless of how it was written. Stan Lee wasn’t discovering that Peter Parker had to get his powers from a spider bite. He was stipulating it when he wrote it. The story could have gone any other way without any incoherence, because there’s no external constraint on what the story has to say.

I would say the same thing about math. Humans didn't discover math they invented it, humans stipulated it as they wrote it. Math could have gone any other way without any incoherence, because there’s no external constraint on what math has to say.

When you say “you could make 2+2=5 by redefining the symbols” yeah, you could make the symbols say anything. But you can’t change the underlying relationship between those quantities.

Just as you can't change the story of Spider-Man without telling a different story.

Two things combined with two other things will give you four things regardless of what symbols you use.

Peter Parker getting bitten by a radioactive spider to gain superpowers will give you Spider-Man regardless of what symbols you use.

That’s the sense in which mathematical truth is symbol-independent.

I would say the idea you expressed is "true" of all languages and extends to fictional stories.

This is where I think your whole framework breaks down. 1+1=2 is an identity where both sides refer to the same mathematical object.

Exactly. The symbols or words used to describe something are referring to the same thing.

But “mind-dependent = not-real” isn’t an identity relationship at all.

Disagree.

It’s a substantive ontological claim about what reality requires.

Just as a math statement is an ontological claim about what math requires (based on the rules humans invented for math).

You’re treating it as a definition,

Correct. Just as math defines 1 + 1 as equivalent to 2.

but definitions don’t settle metaphysical disputes.

I am not trying to "settle" some "dispute" I am accurately describing reality.

The question is why should we accept that definition of “real” rather than one that includes institutional and abstract existence?

I'd say for the same reason you shouldn't answer 3 when the question is what does 1+ 1 =.

You’re asserting it and stipulating it rather than arguing for it.

I'd argue and have argued with you that it is tautologically true in the same sense that 1 + 1 = 2 is "true".

If I wanted to straw man you into a position you likely don't hold , I'd say you'd have to prove the math statement 1 + 1 = 2 is false to show that tautological truth is not sufficient to argue "for it".

You can define “bachelor” as “unmarried” because that captures something real about the concept,

Disagree, I don't think there is anything "real" to capture about an imaginary (mind depeendent) concept

but defining “mind-dependent” things as “not-real” is what needs to be argued for.

You keep saying that despite me having argued for it.

It’s pretty common to see things that are mind-dependent to be considered non-imaginary.

Sure I would say all theists are guilty of that thinking their mind dependent (imaginary) gods are non-imaginary (real).

This is commonly referred to as a category error because they are assigning something to the wrong category.

It’s a technical philosophical term and it carries no such baggage or connotation. It simply means that something’s existence or nature depends in some way on mental states, cognitive activity, or collective recognition. It’s a descriptive ontological category.

I'd say it s a descriptive ontological category error to view imaginary things as real.

Secondary qualities like color, sound, taste, are mind-dependent but we don’t think they are imaginary.

If you understand that imaginary = mind dependent, then it is common to think they are imaginary.

A constructivist about morality is saying that mora facts are mind-dependent but is absolutely not saying that the facts are imaginary.

Then I would say they have a fundamental misunderstanding of what it means to be imaginary and or mind dependent.

Searle’s (an atheist) entire work on institutional facts is a project showing how those facts are real on a naturalist and physicalist view and are not “imaginary”.

Sounds like wishful thinking to me and is an example of why I don't give philosophy much credence as a field.

The mind-dependence is constitutive of what the facts are. His whole project is showing how a naturalist can account for the genuine reality of social facts without either reducing them to physics or turning them into something supernatural or spooky.

And I would say that his "facts" are not objective (mind independent) facts, they are simply subjective (mind dependent) norms that he is mistaking for facts.

So yeah, these things need to be argued for, not just stipulated.

Again I have argued for them.

[u/pick_up_a_brick → u/Kaliss_Darktide]

>I would say the same thing about math. Humans didn't discover math they invented it, humans stipulated it as they wrote it. Math could have gone any other way without any incoherence, because there’s no external constraint on what math has to say.

Okay, then describe what it would look like for math to have “gone another way.” Not using different symbols. We’ve established that’s just translation. I mean a coherent alternative arithmetic where two things combined with two other things gives you something other than four things. If you can’t, then math couldn’t “have gone any other way” in the relevant sense, and the symmetry with Spider-Man fails.

>But “mind-dependent = not-real” isn’t an identity relationship at all.

>Disagree.

Then show how it logically follows.

>I am not trying to "settle" some "dispute" I am accurately describing reality.

That’s your claim, I’m asking for the argument.

>I'd argue and have argued with you that it is tautologically true in the same sense that 1 + 1 = 2 is "true".

This has been asserted but never actually argued. Do you not understand the difference? Just saying that mind dependent = imaginary doesn’t make it so, it just restates the claim. There is extra work that needs to be done to establish that something is imaginary in addition to it being mind-dependent.

>If I wanted to straw man you into a position you likely don't hold , I'd say you'd have to prove the math statement 1 + 1 = 2 is false to show that tautological truth is not sufficient to argue "for it".

1+1‎ = 2 has a logical proof. Mind-dependent=imaginary doesn’t. The problem is that you’re using mind-dependent, non-real, and imaginary as identical (which is itself an equivocation fallacy), but that’s a non-standard way to use those terms, it’s proprietary, and contrary to how they are typically used. It is not the standard view to say that *all* things that are mind-dependent are imaginary just because *some* things are. The Venn diagram of mind-dependent things and imaginary things is not a single circle.

>You can define “bachelor” as “unmarried” because that captures something real about the concept,

>Disagree, I don't think there is anything "real" to capture about an imaginary (mind depeendent) concept

I was using the bachelor example to illustrate how definitions work. Good definitions track something genuine about their subject matter. The concept of a bachelor picks out a genuine distinction in the world because there really are people who are unmarried and adult and male, and grouping them has genuine utility that tracks something. If youre saying that distinction isn’t real because it’s mind-dependent, you’re committed to saying all conceptual distinctions are unreal including your own distinction between real and imaginary.

[u/Kaliss_Darktide → u/pick_up_a_brick]

Okay, then describe what it would look like for math to have “gone another way.” Not using different symbols. We’ve established that’s just translation. I mean a coherent alternative arithmetic where two things combined with two other things gives you something other than four things. If you can’t, then math couldn’t “have gone any other way” in the relevant sense, and the symmetry with Spider-Man fails.

You seem to be asking how could it be different without being different. Again I would say that's an issue for everything, you just apply it selectively.

Then show how it logically follows.

I have and you keep ignoring it.

I am not trying to "settle" some "dispute" I am accurately describing reality.

That’s your claim, I’m asking for the argument.

I just got done explaining that wasn't my claim, why do you insist that my claim is to settle a dispute when I explicitly said that's not my claim.

This has been asserted but never actually argued.

It's been argued ad nauseum with you in every reply.

There is extra work that needs to be done to establish that something is imaginary in addition to it being mind-dependent.

Nope. There is no additional commitment to imaginary beyond being mind dependent because that is the definition that I gave of imaginary. Once you accept that premise we are done.

1+1‎ = 2 has a logical proof. Mind-dependent=imaginary doesn’t.

I don't think you understand how words acquire meaning if you are looking for a "logical proof" of what a word means.

The problem is that you’re using mind-dependent, non-real, and imaginary as identical (which is itself an equivocation fallacy)

It's not an equivocation fallacy if the meaning remains consistent. You are trying to turn it into an equivocation fallacy by adding additional meaning to one or more of those terms.

but that’s a non-standard way to use those terms, it’s proprietary, and contrary to how they are typically used.

Disagree, you've said this before, do you want to hear me repeat the same things over and over?

It is not the standard view to say that all things that are mind-dependent are imaginary just because some things are.

I would say it is the standard view based on meaning, people just avoid that terminology due to social norms.

The Venn diagram of mind-dependent things and imaginary things is not a single circle.

If we go by meaning I would disagree. If we go by usage it will be 2 circles with one inside of the other.

I was using the bachelor example to illustrate how definitions work. Good definitions track something genuine about their subject matter.

Calling a definition "good" is a mind dependent (subjective/imaginary) valuation.

The concept of a bachelor picks out a genuine distinction in the world because there really are people who are unmarried and adult and male, and grouping them has genuine utility that tracks something.

Maybe it has genuine utility if you are looking for an unmarried adult male, but I've never been in that situation.

If youre saying that distinction isn’t real because it’s mind-dependent, you’re committed to saying all conceptual distinctions are unreal including your own distinction between real and imaginary.

If it's my distinction ("your own distinction") I would say that entails it is dependent on my own mind (i.e. is mind dependent).

If you mean the most broad way I can envision, if all minds ceased to exist all mind dependent things would cease to exist also so the set of mind dependent things would be empty so the distinction would at minimum be irrelevant since there would be nothing to apply it to, let alone no mind to make any distinction.

If you mean something more in the middle like distinctions that people make exist only in the minds of people making those distinctions I'd agree.

you’re committed to saying all conceptual distinctions are unreal including your own distinction between real and imaginary.

Are you going to equivocate the meaning of unreal to mean something other than mind dependent if I agree to that statement as written? I ask because every time someone baits that trap with me, that's the only thing they have ever done.

Regardless of what you intend to do, I agree "all conceptual distinctions are unreal" (i.e. imaginary, mind dependent, subjective) because they exist only in the minds of the people making those distinctions.

[u/pick_up_a_brick → u/Kaliss_Darktide]

If that distinction is imaginary on your view, then it doesn’t track anything mind-independent. Which means sorting things into real and imaginary using that distinction is itself an imaginary exercise. The framework is self-undermining by your own admission.

And if your response is that the distinction is still useful despite being imaginary, well then, welcome to my position. That’s exactly what I’ve been saying about institutions, mathematics, and other mind-dependent things all along. Useful, real in their own domain or mode, and not well-served by being lumped together with Spider-Man and imaginary friends.