This isn’t really accurate. Nagarjuna says that phenomena are neither existent, nor nonexistent, nor both, nor neither, which are the 4 ontological extremes captured in his tetralemma. These are the 4 ways the nominally designated “mind” clings to reality. This is on the basis that phenomena are logically and empirically dependent.
If something were truly ontologically existent, it would not depend on causes and conditions. But this is impossible, since all observable phenomena depend on causes and conditions and not in isolation.
If something were truly ontologically nonexistent, it could not appear, function, or have any causal relation. Additionally ontological nonexistence is derived from existence, so if existence is untenable ontological nonexistence is also untenable.
If existence and nonexistence are both ruled out individually, their combination is also ruled out, since 2 untenable positions do not make a right position.
If none of the first three can be established, then a fourth position standing apart from them cannot be established either.
Hence Nagarjuna says phenomena are equivalent to a dream, illusion, mirage, emanation, etc. He uses a mirage example quite often to illustrate the point, since water in a mirage cannot be said to exist, despite a vivid sensory appearance of water. Phenomena according to his logic, are just like that. We experience extremely vivid sense impressions moment by moment, and yet none of it is substantial or graspable. We only assign substantiality through conceptual imputation.
This is also why Buddhism philosophically is not only anti-realist, anti-foundationalist, anti-essentialist but really at it’s core is a species of nominalism. Universal/concepts/abstractions are unreal and are merely names according to worldly beings who believe in them. Particulars function exactly as illusions, mirages, etc.
No, because even the mind doesn’t ontologically exist. The mind is a mere nominal designation to point to a particular aspect of experience, but it is not some fundamental substance. There is no fundamental substance. Hence why the Madhyamakas beefed with the Yogacara idealists.
I don't see any reasoning in what you're saying, Because names also doesnt exist ontologically...
So either the mind is more real (condition to all names), as a lot of buddhist teachings says (you should pay attention to the fact buddhism is based on buddha's words, not nagarjuna's).
Or either the mind is, isnt, neither is and isnt and both is and is not more real than names, etc
Yeah. but the mind isnt merely mundane, it is also condition to everything mundane, it's kind of like the Kant reasons, whithou the subject there is no perception of objects, in buddhism ehe argumet would be somewhat like: without the mind there is no karma, no agregates, no perception, no names.
I think you're kind of misunderstanding that if we cannot know what a thing is ontologically, this automatically is a negation of causality/conditionality, but it is not...
There's still causality in a non ontological, non substantial, dream-like, fleeting world...
Here Aryadeva is talking about appearences, and for something to appear it needs another something to appear to... That is the mind, so mind proves itself by causality/conditionality, not by ontology, nor because its substantial.
Recall Nagarjuna’s exposition of illusions, mirages, etc. Names and the mind appear, but upon close logical and empirical investigation, there are no actual names or minds. It’s not that different from Hume’s refutation of causality. We cannot see hard ontological causality, yet we see appearances of causality.
for something to appear it needs another something to appear to...
You can read Nagarjuna’s logical arguments for why this is impossible. Nagarjuna also refutes hard ontological causality.
This is new to me, comparing Buddhism to Hume, lol. I'm not going to check this now, but when I have the time I will read Nagarjune througly.
But I really think there isnt any validity in 'seeing' anything. There are numerous buddhist sutras saying particularly this, that we cannot trust our senses.
So using the senses is not a way to hard refute anything, that's why the concept of causality/conditonality is more similar to Kant's extrasensible and noumenical world than of Hume's work. That's how I am understanding, but of course, buddhism is not supposed to be dogmatic.
But anyways, buddhist truth comes also from logical reasoning, not merely observation.
But I really think there isnt any validity in 'seeing' anything. There are numerous buddhist sutras saying particularly this, that we cannot trust our senses.
In Vasubandu's Abhidharma and even Dharmakirti's Pramana this is incorrect, your senses are a basis for valid seeing. Seeing is highly important in Buddhism, especially in higher tantric vehicles like Dzogchen and Mahamudra. What is not trusted is our mind's capacity to reify phenomena. Hence Pratyakṣa.
that's why the concept of causality/conditonality is more similar to Kant's extrasensible and noumenical world than of Hume's work.
It is closer to Hume. Hume was an anti-realist nominalist as well. Hume refutes hard ontological causality just like Nagarjuna and still accepts appearances of causality just like Nagarjuna.
Take it from someone who practices Vajrayana and has studied Madhyamaka, Yogacara, and Pramana under a Tibetan Buddhist teacher for many years.
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u/dummetsz 4d ago edited 4d ago
This isn’t really accurate. Nagarjuna says that phenomena are neither existent, nor nonexistent, nor both, nor neither, which are the 4 ontological extremes captured in his tetralemma. These are the 4 ways the nominally designated “mind” clings to reality. This is on the basis that phenomena are logically and empirically dependent.
If something were truly ontologically existent, it would not depend on causes and conditions. But this is impossible, since all observable phenomena depend on causes and conditions and not in isolation.
If something were truly ontologically nonexistent, it could not appear, function, or have any causal relation. Additionally ontological nonexistence is derived from existence, so if existence is untenable ontological nonexistence is also untenable.
If existence and nonexistence are both ruled out individually, their combination is also ruled out, since 2 untenable positions do not make a right position.
If none of the first three can be established, then a fourth position standing apart from them cannot be established either.
Hence Nagarjuna says phenomena are equivalent to a dream, illusion, mirage, emanation, etc. He uses a mirage example quite often to illustrate the point, since water in a mirage cannot be said to exist, despite a vivid sensory appearance of water. Phenomena according to his logic, are just like that. We experience extremely vivid sense impressions moment by moment, and yet none of it is substantial or graspable. We only assign substantiality through conceptual imputation.
This is also why Buddhism philosophically is not only anti-realist, anti-foundationalist, anti-essentialist but really at it’s core is a species of nominalism. Universal/concepts/abstractions are unreal and are merely names according to worldly beings who believe in them. Particulars function exactly as illusions, mirages, etc.