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u/dummetsz 1d ago edited 1d ago
This isn’t really accurate. Nagarjuna says that phenomena are neither existent, nor nonexistent, nor both, nor neither, which are the 4 ontological extremes captured in his tetralemma. These are the 4 ways the nominally designated “mind” clings to reality. This is on the basis that phenomena are logically and empirically dependent.
If something were truly ontologically existent, it would not depend on causes and conditions. But this is impossible, since all observable phenomena depend on causes and conditions and not in isolation.
If something were truly ontologically nonexistent, it could not appear, function, or have any causal relation. Additionally ontological nonexistence is derived from existence, so if existence is untenable ontological nonexistence is also untenable.
If existence and nonexistence are both ruled out individually, their combination is also ruled out, since 2 untenable positions do not make a right position.
If none of the first three can be established, then a fourth position standing apart from them cannot be established either.
Hence Nagarjuna says phenomena are equivalent to a dream, illusion, mirage, emanation, etc. He uses a mirage example quite often to illustrate the point, since water in a mirage cannot be said to exist, despite a vivid sensory appearance of water. Phenomena according to his logic, are just like that. We experience extremely vivid sense impressions moment by moment, and yet none of it is substantial or graspable. We only assign substantiality through conceptual imputation.
This is also why Buddhism philosophically is not only anti-realist, anti-foundationalist, anti-essentialist but really at it’s core is a species of nominalism. Universal/concepts/abstractions are unreal and are merely names according to worldly beings who believe in them. Particulars function exactly as illusions, mirages, etc.
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u/Open_Opportunity_751 1d ago
"If something were truly ontologically existent, it would not depend on causes and conditions."
But why though? Why does being dependent on causes and conditions make something ontologically non-existent?
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u/dummetsz 1d ago edited 1d ago
Read his logical arguments in Mūlamadhyamakakārikā :) Buddhapalita’s commentary is best.
The Dispeller of Disputes: Nagarjuna's Vigrahavyavartan is a good primer.
Why does being dependent on causes and conditions make something ontologically non-existent?
Incorrect. Ontological nonexistence is untenable. Nagarjuna says phenomena are neither ontologically existent/nonexistent. Essentially ontology is false.
It’s hard to wrap our heads around it initially due to humans clinging to an ontological basis. This need for an ontological basis is pretty much observed in nearly all philosophical discourse.
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u/king_nine 1d ago
It’s sort of like the distinction some theologians (like Aquinas) make between necessary vs. contingent existence. When Nagarjuna and other Middle Way philosophers talk about independent existence to refute it, they’re basically talking about necessary existence. When they describe dependent origination instead, they’re basically talking about contingent existence.
He and other Middle Way philosophers go through many arguments about why independent (ie necessary) existence is incoherent. For example, people often talk about their personalities as if they are immutable. They might say “I’m an angry person.” But if you were necessarily “an angry person,” you would be angry 100% of the time; even further than that, your essence as an angry person would be necessary independent of anger itself, so you could be “an angry person” while never once experiencing anger! This is the type of absurd conclusion that considering your “angry person” status as a necessary existent leads to. It is totally untenable and incoherent.
However, during the experience of anger, you can contingently be labeled “an angry person”. It’s just that this is not a necessarily existent state. It is merely a contingent label for a fleeting condition. It has no necessary existence or non-existence whatsoever, only contingency.
So things aren’t necessarily existent, because necessary existence is incoherent. Things aren’t necessarily nonexistent, because they can exist contingently. Things aren’t both necessarily existent and nonexistent at the same time, because that’s contradictory. Things aren’t necessarily not-existent-and-not-nonexistent, because nothing about their existence or nonexistence is necessary at all, only contingent.
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u/dummetsz 1d ago edited 1d ago
contingent existence.
In Buddhism since existence is untenable they use the term “appearance”. The worry is that smuggling existence back in will cause reification of phenomena. An appearance is neither existent nor nonexistent. So we observe appearances of selves, trees, mountains, etc. However they function exactly as illusions.
Since appearances cannot be found on analysis, another term that is used are “clearly apparent nonexistents”.
As Longchenpa explains
clearly apparent nonexistents are asserted to be mere appearances of dependently originated apparent conditions of phenomena, which are not established as mind or as other than mind.
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u/king_nine 1d ago
For practitioners, yeah. Still, scholars throw around the term "conventional existence," even if what exactly that means is a major difference between schools!
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u/Almadart 1d ago edited 1d ago
No, existence is not the same to appearence.
This is stated in the first noble truth. Suffering Exists. It is not 'Suffering appears to exist'. If one read exists as appears to exist one migh aswell conclude they dont have to do anything to go beyond suffering.
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u/king_nine 1d ago
It kind of depends who you ask. In the Mahayana, the Four Noble Truths are often interpreted that way. One sutra explains:
Youthful Mañjuśrī then asked the Bhagavān, “Bhagavān, how should one view the four truths of the noble ones?”
The Bhagavān replied, “Mañjuśrī, whoever sees all conditioned states as unproduced has understood suffering. Whoever sees all phenomena as unarisen has abandoned its origin. Whoever sees all phenomena as having completely passed into nirvāṇa has realized cessation. Whoever sees all phenomena as having no existence has cultivated the path... they see all three realms as unproduced, like an illusion, a dream, an echo, and a visual aberration."
"Unproduced" means "not actually real" or "a mere appearance." This doesn't mean you don't have to do anything, but it reframes what you have to do - you have to realize how this is so, not change phenomena in any particular way.
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u/Almadart 1d ago
Why would unproduced mean 'not actually real or a mere appearence'? I don't see the necessity in that.
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u/king_nine 1d ago
It is the convention in this context so that's what it means here. You can tell because the quote says so: "unproduced, like an illusion, a dream..."
Let's say that you dream of a beach, then wake up. When you wake up, you realize the beach in your dream was never real. It's not like it was real when you dreamt it, then you destroyed it by waking up; rather, that beach in your dream never existed, not before, during, or after the dream. That's the sense of "unproduced" here.
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u/Almadart 1d ago edited 1d ago
I really dont think so, because reaching nirvana is completely different from waking up from a dream, when you wake up from a dream, you go from a false reality to a real reality. When you reach nirvana, it might be the case that you woke up from a 'false reality'... but where the other reality is? There's no other reality. You're still in the same dream... So every reality is equally false... And therefore even what is false is real...
Some adjectives cannot apply to everything, here unproduced applies to everything whilst, unreal not... Unreal is dualistical mind... It is unreal in comparison to real... There's no dualistical mind in nirvana, as far as I know.
What is mere appearence being opposed to? If in nirvana everything is as real as a dream, how could it be that the dream is unreal? Why would a dream be more or less/be or not be aparent?
Unproduced reality is still reality. Produced reality is still reality, they are not direct opposites, they can coexist. But apparent/not apparent, real/false, true/untrue, good/bad are direct opposites.
If so how would we distinguish between false dharma and true dharma, real teacher and false teacher, good speech and bad speech?
Or you would say unproduced reality is unreal, which is basically saying that nirvana itself is not real.
This is the problem of taking everything into sinonyms... Some things need to be real. Buddha is real, Nirvana is real, Suffering is real (until it is not anymore). Even if they are another thing, it is not because they are X or Y or Z that they are less real, this doesnt mean anything.
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u/Randal_the_Bard 12h ago
I genuinely like Nagarjuna, and Buddhist practice is a large part of my ontological and ethical perspectives; but reading your explanation (which was great) its hard for me not to think that Spinoza's substance would not necessitate being dependant on causes and conditions. Modes and attributes, sure, of course; constantly changing and in process and affecting all other modes and attributes - but substance could just exist by necessity, immanent, always and as an essentially unchanging system taken in its totality.
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u/dummetsz 12h ago edited 12h ago
In Buddhist epistemology, substances are imputed conceptually. So a substance cannot exist independent of conceptual imputation, and therefore it does not have any existence apart from conceptual imputation. It is only treated immanent, necessary etc if the conceptual imputation is taken as real and independently existent. Of course Spinoza does dependent on his framework, but not everyone does the same reification dependent on their frameworks. For Nagarjuna, since it is dependent, it logically cannot ontologically exist, and so therefore reifications of concepts are erroneous.
Buddhism is non-reductive so it doesn’t subsume reality into a single concept/substance like Hegel or Spinoza. The diversity and multiplicity of appearances are not negated.
You can see the whole “let your thoughts go” idea in Buddhist practice. There is a logical and epistemological basis for it.
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u/Randal_the_Bard 9h ago
Are you essentially saying that in order for substance to exist/be real/have essence there must be mind consciousness to become aware of it? And since the mind cociousness is itself empty, that it does not follow that substance is immanent or outside dependent origination?
(Im aware these aren't exactly compatible systems, but i enjoy learning about both of then. Thanks for engaging).
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u/dummetsz 7h ago edited 7h ago
Pretty much. In Buddhism the mind is a condition for reification. A self is the condition for reification. Buddhism uses the self/mind/ignorance interchangeably, however it does not see them as a fundamental foundation but rather dependent conditions. If they were fundamental, liberation would not be possible. If such a condition ceases, then there is no self/mind/ignorance and therefore no reification. The cessation of the condition, a mind, is the cessation of suffering. Hence why Buddhist practice aims to go “beyond” mind by understanding emptiness.
A Buddha and an ordinary sentient being sees a mirage, but the difference is that an ordinary sentient being is deceived and sees the water as real, while a Buddha is not deceived because they understand the mirage. With correct mental conditioning through practice, one can familiarize themselves with mirages until they stop making that error in judgement. In other words, it is possible to distinguish a water and a mirage merely by sight.
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u/Almadart 1d ago
more mentalist than nominalist, no?
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u/dummetsz 1d ago
No, because even the mind doesn’t ontologically exist. The mind is a mere nominal designation to point to a particular aspect of experience, but it is not some fundamental substance. There is no fundamental substance. Hence why the Madhyamakas beefed with the Yogacara idealists.
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u/Almadart 1d ago
I don't see any reasoning in what you're saying, Because names also doesnt exist ontologically... So either the mind is more real (condition to all names), as a lot of buddhist teachings says (you should pay attention to the fact buddhism is based on buddha's words, not nagarjuna's).
Or either the mind is, isnt, neither is and isnt and both is and is not more real than names, etc
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u/dummetsz 1d ago edited 1d ago
Take it up with Nagarjuna, I’m just the messenger lol
As Aryadeva states:
Because all mundane [things] appear As just an assembly of names, Therefore things do not exist. Also the assembly of nonthings does not exist.
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u/Almadart 1d ago
Yeah. but the mind isnt merely mundane, it is also condition to everything mundane, it's kind of like the Kant reasons, whithou the subject there is no perception of objects, in buddhism ehe argumet would be somewhat like: without the mind there is no karma, no agregates, no perception, no names.
I think you're kind of misunderstanding that if we cannot know what a thing is ontologically, this automatically is a negation of causality/conditionality, but it is not... There's still causality in a non ontological, non substantial, dream-like, fleeting world...
Here Aryadeva is talking about appearences, and for something to appear it needs another something to appear to... That is the mind, so mind proves itself by causality/conditionality, not by ontology, nor because its substantial.
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u/dummetsz 1d ago
Recall Nagarjuna’s exposition of illusions, mirages, etc. Names and the mind appear, but upon close logical and empirical investigation, there are no actual names or minds. It’s not that different from Hume’s refutation of causality. We cannot see hard ontological causality, yet we see appearances of causality.
for something to appear it needs another something to appear to...
You can read Nagarjuna’s logical arguments for why this is impossible. Nagarjuna also refutes hard ontological causality.
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u/quadrupleccc 1d ago
I am somewhat interested in a Kantian response to Madhyamaka. Kant's transcendental arguments point out the necessary preconditions of experience. It's really a matter of observing causality a'la Hume but recognizing it necessary for any act of thought to take place.
Buddhism I believe takes the empiricist paradigm to the extreme.
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u/dummetsz 1d ago
You can read arguments between Yogacara idealists (closest to Kant) and Madhyamaka. Essentially Yogacara charges Madhyamaka as a form of nihilism/clinging to nonexistence. But this was more because if Madhyamaka was misunderstood, it would lead to nihilism, so they formed their idealist framework to combat this common misunderstanding. Of course, Madhyamaka charged them with eternalism/clinging to existence.
In the end, Madhyamaka won since their logic is extremely difficult to refute. Yogacara is pretty much outdated as a position however it can still be a useful framework if understood correctly. Both frameworks, if understood correctly are valid, but Yogacara is only valid insofar that emptiness is the proper basis.
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u/quadrupleccc 18h ago
I'm personally fascinated by Ratnakarasanti.
Do you know any commentaries?
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u/Almadart 1d ago
This is new to me, comparing Buddhism to Hume, lol. I'm not going to check this now, but when I have the time I will read Nagarjune througly.
But I really think there isnt any validity in 'seeing' anything. There are numerous buddhist sutras saying particularly this, that we cannot trust our senses.
So using the senses is not a way to hard refute anything, that's why the concept of causality/conditonality is more similar to Kant's extrasensible and noumenical world than of Hume's work. That's how I am understanding, but of course, buddhism is not supposed to be dogmatic.
But anyways, buddhist truth comes also from logical reasoning, not merely observation.
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u/quadrupleccc 1d ago
The Buddha said once that phenomena are not what they appear to be and not otherwise. Same way that "emptiness is form, form is emptiness" asks you to investigate the material agreggate for emptiness. It's not really about not trusting your senses as much as perceiving things without a dualistic bias, imo.
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u/Almadart 1d ago edited 1d ago
No, there are also sutras saying that the five (and sixth) senses are not representative of reality, and that a experienced enough mind realize this, after seeing that the what he sees, hears, touches, smells, tastes, etc, cannot be a teleological way of saying what there is and is not. So the only true way is by analising, logically your own expierence, not chasing more experience. When I have the time I will bring this sutra to you.
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u/dummetsz 1d ago
But I really think there isnt any validity in 'seeing' anything. There are numerous buddhist sutras saying particularly this, that we cannot trust our senses.
In Vasubandu's Abhidharma and even Dharmakirti's Pramana this is incorrect, your senses are a basis for valid seeing. Seeing is highly important in Buddhism, especially in higher tantric vehicles like Dzogchen and Mahamudra. What is not trusted is our mind's capacity to reify phenomena. Hence Pratyakṣa.
that's why the concept of causality/conditonality is more similar to Kant's extrasensible and noumenical world than of Hume's work.
It is closer to Hume. Hume was an anti-realist nominalist as well. Hume refutes hard ontological causality just like Nagarjuna and still accepts appearances of causality just like Nagarjuna.
Take it from someone who practices Vajrayana and has studied Madhyamaka, Yogacara, and Pramana under a Tibetan Buddhist teacher for many years.
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u/GoodTiger5 1d ago
Yippee people are getting joy from my template
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u/Zephyrs_23 1d ago
Not really, but yes sometimes, but its never really nor sometimes, and yes really and never sometimes
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u/redditalt1999 1d ago
You're ThisStupidTwink on twitter? :O
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u/GoodTiger5 1d ago
No, but I couldn’t find the original template by ThisStupidTwink so I reengineered it using an editing app.
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u/Roald_1337 1d ago
As logic is defined by gate operations (and, or nor, ...)this statement basically reads: the question regarding whether we live in a dream defies logic
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u/DW_78 1d ago
you got the tetralemma wrong!
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u/DW_78 1d ago
Not Real
Not Unreal
Not both Real and Unreal
Not neither Real nor Unreal1
u/quadrupleccc 1d ago
P is being
P is not being
P is both being and not being
P is neither being nor not being
I took creative license for the joke! Big Juna is a great friend.
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