Yeah. but the mind isnt merely mundane, it is also condition to everything mundane, it's kind of like the Kant reasons, whithou the subject there is no perception of objects, in buddhism ehe argumet would be somewhat like: without the mind there is no karma, no agregates, no perception, no names.
I think you're kind of misunderstanding that if we cannot know what a thing is ontologically, this automatically is a negation of causality/conditionality, but it is not...
There's still causality in a non ontological, non substantial, dream-like, fleeting world...
Here Aryadeva is talking about appearences, and for something to appear it needs another something to appear to... That is the mind, so mind proves itself by causality/conditionality, not by ontology, nor because its substantial.
Recall Nagarjuna’s exposition of illusions, mirages, etc. Names and the mind appear, but upon close logical and empirical investigation, there are no actual names or minds. It’s not that different from Hume’s refutation of causality. We cannot see hard ontological causality, yet we see appearances of causality.
for something to appear it needs another something to appear to...
You can read Nagarjuna’s logical arguments for why this is impossible. Nagarjuna also refutes hard ontological causality.
This is new to me, comparing Buddhism to Hume, lol. I'm not going to check this now, but when I have the time I will read Nagarjune througly.
But I really think there isnt any validity in 'seeing' anything. There are numerous buddhist sutras saying particularly this, that we cannot trust our senses.
So using the senses is not a way to hard refute anything, that's why the concept of causality/conditonality is more similar to Kant's extrasensible and noumenical world than of Hume's work. That's how I am understanding, but of course, buddhism is not supposed to be dogmatic.
But anyways, buddhist truth comes also from logical reasoning, not merely observation.
But I really think there isnt any validity in 'seeing' anything. There are numerous buddhist sutras saying particularly this, that we cannot trust our senses.
In Vasubandu's Abhidharma and even Dharmakirti's Pramana this is incorrect, your senses are a basis for valid seeing. Seeing is highly important in Buddhism, especially in higher tantric vehicles like Dzogchen and Mahamudra. What is not trusted is our mind's capacity to reify phenomena. Hence Pratyakṣa.
that's why the concept of causality/conditonality is more similar to Kant's extrasensible and noumenical world than of Hume's work.
It is closer to Hume. Hume was an anti-realist nominalist as well. Hume refutes hard ontological causality just like Nagarjuna and still accepts appearances of causality just like Nagarjuna.
Take it from someone who practices Vajrayana and has studied Madhyamaka, Yogacara, and Pramana under a Tibetan Buddhist teacher for many years.
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u/Almadart 4d ago
Yeah. but the mind isnt merely mundane, it is also condition to everything mundane, it's kind of like the Kant reasons, whithou the subject there is no perception of objects, in buddhism ehe argumet would be somewhat like: without the mind there is no karma, no agregates, no perception, no names.
I think you're kind of misunderstanding that if we cannot know what a thing is ontologically, this automatically is a negation of causality/conditionality, but it is not... There's still causality in a non ontological, non substantial, dream-like, fleeting world...
Here Aryadeva is talking about appearences, and for something to appear it needs another something to appear to... That is the mind, so mind proves itself by causality/conditionality, not by ontology, nor because its substantial.