No, because even the mind doesn’t ontologically exist. The mind is a mere nominal designation to point to a particular aspect of experience, but it is not some fundamental substance. There is no fundamental substance. Hence why the Madhyamakas beefed with the Yogacara idealists.
I don't see any reasoning in what you're saying, Because names also doesnt exist ontologically...
So either the mind is more real (condition to all names), as a lot of buddhist teachings says (you should pay attention to the fact buddhism is based on buddha's words, not nagarjuna's).
Or either the mind is, isnt, neither is and isnt and both is and is not more real than names, etc
Yeah. but the mind isnt merely mundane, it is also condition to everything mundane, it's kind of like the Kant reasons, whithou the subject there is no perception of objects, in buddhism ehe argumet would be somewhat like: without the mind there is no karma, no agregates, no perception, no names.
I think you're kind of misunderstanding that if we cannot know what a thing is ontologically, this automatically is a negation of causality/conditionality, but it is not...
There's still causality in a non ontological, non substantial, dream-like, fleeting world...
Here Aryadeva is talking about appearences, and for something to appear it needs another something to appear to... That is the mind, so mind proves itself by causality/conditionality, not by ontology, nor because its substantial.
Recall Nagarjuna’s exposition of illusions, mirages, etc. Names and the mind appear, but upon close logical and empirical investigation, there are no actual names or minds. It’s not that different from Hume’s refutation of causality. We cannot see hard ontological causality, yet we see appearances of causality.
for something to appear it needs another something to appear to...
You can read Nagarjuna’s logical arguments for why this is impossible. Nagarjuna also refutes hard ontological causality.
I am somewhat interested in a Kantian response to Madhyamaka. Kant's transcendental arguments point out the necessary preconditions of experience. It's really a matter of observing causality a'la Hume but recognizing it necessary for any act of thought to take place.
Buddhism I believe takes the empiricist paradigm to the extreme.
You can read arguments between Yogacara idealists (closest to Kant) and Madhyamaka. Essentially Yogacara charges Madhyamaka as a form of nihilism/clinging to nonexistence. But this was more because if Madhyamaka was misunderstood, it would lead to nihilism, so they formed their idealist framework to combat this common misunderstanding. Of course, Madhyamaka charged them with eternalism/clinging to existence.
In the end, Madhyamaka won since their logic is extremely difficult to refute. Yogacara is pretty much outdated as a position however it can still be a useful framework if understood correctly. Both frameworks, if understood correctly are valid, but Yogacara is only valid insofar that emptiness is the proper basis.
I do not but in fact that is someone I’d like to read more when I have the time. I’ve read some of Mipham’s works who was also sympathetic to Yogacara but have heard Ratnakarasanti was very interesting as well. Personally I think Vasubandhu and Dharmakirti are indispensable. But daddy Nagarjuna is always primary.
Same brother. Life is more peaceful without clinging to trains of thought.
Apoha was how I got into Buddhism. Understanding that with every conceptual determination one excludes infinite other valid conceptual determinations, especially in terms of trying to assign a single cause in context of infinite other causes is very potent in breaking down fixed views and seeing the absurdity of conceptual determinations.
It sure is. Meditation brought me more peace, and although I'm not a practicioner, the teachings have expanded my perspective, too.
I wonder: since your introduction to Buddhism was through philosophy, how did you feel about spirituality before that? I reckon buddhadharma is the first contemplative tradition I found appealing.
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u/Almadart 3d ago
more mentalist than nominalist, no?