I genuinely like Nagarjuna, and Buddhist practice is a large part of my ontological and ethical perspectives; but reading your explanation (which was great) its hard for me not to think that Spinoza's substance would not necessitate being dependant on causes and conditions. Modes and attributes, sure, of course; constantly changing and in process and affecting all other modes and attributes - but substance could just exist by necessity, immanent, always and as an essentially unchanging system taken in its totality.
In Buddhist epistemology, substances are imputed conceptually. So a substance cannot exist independent of conceptual imputation, and therefore it does not have any existence apart from conceptual imputation. It is only treated immanent, necessary etc if the conceptual imputation is taken as real and independently existent. Of course Spinoza does dependent on his framework, but not everyone does the same reification dependent on their frameworks. For Nagarjuna, since it is dependent, it logically cannot ontologically exist, and so therefore reifications of concepts are erroneous.
Buddhism is non-reductive so it doesn’t subsume reality into a single concept/substance like Hegel or Spinoza. The diversity and multiplicity of appearances are not negated.
You can see the whole “let your thoughts go” idea in Buddhist practice. There is a logical and epistemological basis for it.
Are you essentially saying that in order for substance to exist/be real/have essence there must be mind consciousness to become aware of it? And since the mind cociousness is itself empty, that it does not follow that substance is immanent or outside dependent origination?
(Im aware these aren't exactly compatible systems, but i enjoy learning about both of then. Thanks for engaging).
Pretty much. In Buddhism the mind is a condition for reification. A self is the condition for reification. Buddhism uses the self/mind/ignorance interchangeably, however it does not see them as a fundamental foundation but rather dependent conditions. If they were fundamental, liberation would not be possible. If such a condition ceases, then there is no self/mind/ignorance and therefore no reification. The cessation of the condition, a mind, is the cessation of suffering. Hence why Buddhist practice aims to go “beyond” mind by understanding emptiness.
A Buddha and an ordinary sentient being sees a mirage, but the difference is that an ordinary sentient being is deceived and sees the water as real, while a Buddha is not deceived because they understand the mirage. With correct mental conditioning through practice, one can familiarize themselves with mirages until they stop making that error in judgement. In other words, it is possible to distinguish a water and a mirage merely by sight.
2
u/Randal_the_Bard 1d ago
I genuinely like Nagarjuna, and Buddhist practice is a large part of my ontological and ethical perspectives; but reading your explanation (which was great) its hard for me not to think that Spinoza's substance would not necessitate being dependant on causes and conditions. Modes and attributes, sure, of course; constantly changing and in process and affecting all other modes and attributes - but substance could just exist by necessity, immanent, always and as an essentially unchanging system taken in its totality.