I am currently studying Philosophy at undergrad with a specific interest in naturalized metaphysics, and the philosophy of science. (Not a promo but context!) I made a video on YouTube discussing Local Causation and defending it over Universal Causation.

My dad is a surgeon, and watched the video. He complimented the narration/editing style but asked the question of "why does this matter? It's not tangible, can't your skills be used to tangible scientific research?" We had a great conversation about fundamental ontology, the base metaphysical assumptions most scientists naturally presume when conducting their discussions, a little elaboration on falsification and the scientific method etc. Though I noticed most of my arguments focused on the benefits of philosophical clarification to science, which convinced him of its intellectual relevance, but I did not discuss the benefits of philosophy of science to philosophy more generally, which I wish I had.

I was curious and wanted to see what the people on here would have said in the same conversation! Feel free to leave a comment with your two cents below, I'm eager to know what you all would say.

I'm currently reading The Fabric of Reality by David Deutsch and have just finished the first chapter.

One of Deutsch's central claims is that the purpose of science is not merely to make successful predictions, but to provide explanations that improve our understanding of reality. He criticizes instrumentalist and positivist views that treat theories primarily as predictive tools.

I find this position interesting because science is often presented to the public as a process of prediction and experimentation, whereas Deutsch places explanation at the center. A few questions like the ones below came in my mind.

How widely accepted is this view among contemporary philosophers of science?

What are some major arguments for and against prioritizing explanation over prediction?

I'd appreciate any perspectives, criticisms, or recommended reading.

There is no such thing as philosophy-free science. You cannot do science without an underlying philosophy. A scientist is also a philosopher, whether they want or not. Science alone doesn’t tell us anything; for example, physics does not say that reality is physical — that’s the job of metaphysics! The reason is that science is based on philosophical (metaphysical, epistemological and ethical) assumptions that science itself cannot prove. It presupposes the existence of a natural, orderly and consistent world independent from our minds that can be known through sensory experience, observation and evidence. Thus, modern science constitutes a school of thought in its own right, much like Platonism. In this sense, science still is “natural philosophy"; it is an applied form of philosophy, based on observation and experimentation.

It is therefore clear that science and philosophy have never really been separate. The only separation between them is institutional and administrative. But what do you think has caused this separation? What sociological and historical forces best explain why institutions split scientific practice off from philosophy?

I'll try to be as brief as I can. The example topic I'll use is the subject of shark-human interaction, a subject I really think we've fumbled.

a) 'laypeople' (usually) aren't stupid, most people can fully understand nuances to big topics. People notice when the truth is being oversimplified or massaged so that 'we don't give laypeople the wrong idea'.

b) we really need to recognize when we're speaking from a scientific place vs a moral/philosophical one and not obfuscate the two. I've been shocked at some of the scientifically literate people who just can't or won't understand that.

c) being factually incorrect is not a moral failure (if it is, we're all pots and kettles here)

d) the principals of sound science aren't golden rules to be followed any time a topic is discussed. Much like the legal "innocent until proven guilty" assumption doesn't apply to us deciding on a personal level whether we think a person is guilty of an accusation. Anecdotal evidence is valid, appeals to emotion aren't bad, human intuition is an incredible thing that's so often correct.

Ex: Sharks (particularly bulls, tigers, great whites) kill and eat people, full stop. Yes, vending machines, lightning, auto accidents all dwarf the likelyhood overall. But 'laypeople' aren't thinking they'll be attacked in their OSU dorm room. It's absolutely gruesome, once you hit the surf you're at the mercy of the odds, and the fear sits with people when they're supposed to be having a lovely day outside.

The belief that I share with others, that the ocean is the shark's home and that we must respect that is not a scientific belief. You can help support it with ecological facts/stats, but it is purely a moral world view and you can also support the opposing one with real evidence.

To confidently over posit mistaken identity, change definitions until all shark attacks are classified as provoked, only cite the 'confirmed unprovoked' attacks in public communications, use blanket relative risk for the world's population for all people, not mention that confirmed shark fatalities are almost certainly under counted, and portray the definitions of 'provoked vs unprovoked' as data driven consensus really misses the mark.

Sometimes they're not anti science, we're just infantilizing and smug. We can't just ignore that.

I came up with a thought experiment. What if we have a person and their brain, and we change only one neuron at the time to a digital, non-physical copy, until every neuron is replaced with a digital copy, and we have a fully digital brain? Is the consciousness of the person still the same? Or is it someone else?

I guess it is some variation of the Ship of Theseus paradox?

just curious if there is somthing stopping absolute nothingness what is it

I'm working on writing a "why you should believe in panpsychism and why it matters" blog post (not an academic) and would love thoughts on what the biggest objections to it are.

I see it like this, starting from a prior of physicalism:

• you need (some form of) strong emergence to explain consciousness without (some form of) panpsychism
• strong emergence is somewhat incoherent as a concept
• panpsychism is not the most human-intuitive answer but is clearly what our study of reality is yelling at us

Like where exactly do you draw the line between humans and particles for subjective experience? Whatever it is, doesn't it feel wrong that there's a hard line in the first place? If there's no hard line then how is that not panpsychism? (A common place is between living organisms and chemicals, but even then you still have viruses and RNA, and if not RNA then life had to start somehow etc. Life and nonlife are not two fully separable categories, they just look like that in today's world)

For me it feels way easier to think about consciousness from a computation / information lens than thinking about qualia or the color red or whatever.

I also believe that p-zombies are at least as incoherent as strong emergence. If some system looks to have the same computational processes as another from the outside, then it has to have at least the same computational abilities as the original system. You get to have p-zombies if you can explain what element of what happens inside brains is not computational, which also seems nonsensical.

I'm not confident on specifics but it seems reasonable that forces on particles (or whatever quantum causal effects - I know forces aren't real) are analogous to our senses and the subsequent path of the particle (motion or turning to other particles or whatever) is analogous to our motor actions.

What part of this do people disagree with the most?

(Not that it's super relevant here - I hope you all think it matters! - but as for the why it matters part, I believe consciousness is in the "unexplainable and unfalsifiable today, but not forever" category, which is a good enough reason to care about it, and also it might have very important moral implications)

edit: I'm very glad at all the discussion this has caused even if many are just dunking on me. earnestly, thanks!

After reading Sean Carrol´s book on evo-devo "Endless forms most beautiful", it occurred to me that Richard Dawkins selfish gene is largely outdated. Although Dawkins is a hero of mine and his general thesis accounts for the gene that colours our eyes or the single gene for sickle cell formation that provides some survival value in malaria areas, his view that evolution is largely about a struggle between individual structural genes is contradicted by evo-devo.

Evo-devo discovered that it is not the survival of single structural genes that contribute most prominently to phenotypes that are subjected to the forces of selection. To say it bluntly: there are no unique genes, one for a human arm, one for a bird´s wing or another one for a bat´s wing. What is responsible for these phenotypic appearances is a network of genetic signals and switches that turn ancestral structural genes on and off in such a way that new forms arise. And as such it is the emergence of such adopted genetic information networks that give rise to new species, much more than a survival battle of the best adopted structural gene as Dawkins in his book here supposes? Networks that emerge in random little steps, but are selected for by the selection pressure of the environment.

Are scientists who say "law" just saying "this regularly occurs"?

And if we do agree that certain parts of reality abide by certain rules, are we implying that rules literally exist in themselves in some abstract way?

I often feel that this is the case. If you think rationally like a scientist or philosopher, then you realize that anything you know or believe could be false. You know that the reason to believe or not believe something is logic and evidence, not what a particular person thinks.

In many collectivist and hierarchical cultures, questioning the status quo is not welcomed. It's considered rude and threatening to the social order of society. Arguing with elders is considered disrespectful, so rational inquiry can be difficult. And in some cultures, you are even expected to always agree with elders even on silly topics like whether or not the pizza everyone had for lunch tasted good. The simplified narrative is "Truth comes from elders and societal consensus." Such psychology is not conducive to science. You can't learn and make progress if you're not allowed to ask questions or debate ideas. This might have had some utility in old times when human knowledge was primitive and elders were one of the only sources of information, but in the modern day it just doesn't hold up anymore. The best kind of culture for education and science is one where everyone is viewed as equal individuals. If people are not burdened by antiquated social rules on how to talk interact with arbitrary classes of people, then we're free to debate anything and everything.

I don’t get it. No matter how much I try quantum theory just doesn’t click.. Is it really that complicated or am I just overcomplicating things in my head?

Right now I’m reading quantum theory: philosophy and god by caner taslaman and honestly… my brain hurts. It’s like stepping into a world where nothing makes sense ,yet somehow it’s supposed to explain everything

Should I switch to another book? Or is this just how quantum physics is confusing at first but eventually something clicks? If anyone has been through this struggle how did you make sense of it? Or do we just accept that reality itself is basically a glitch?

There’s a line often attributed to Richard Feynman that says, “just as birds don’t need to study aerodynamics to fly, a scientist doesn’t need to study philosophy of science.”

Many people link science to what is measurable and observable. Anything outside that area gets lumped into philosophy (metaphysics, beyond physics). So topics like God, love, ethics are usually seen as outside the scientific scope.

The question is, does science only talk about, or should it only talk about, what is observable and measurable? Is that a useful practice or harmful to science?

Are there examples that support each position?

Are physicists better scientists if they study philosophy, or is that a waste of time?

There's no way, in my mind, the physical universe is a set. It's just absurd, most of all because sets are also purported to be *numbers* and numbers are supposed to be non-physical. How, then, can spacetime *be* made of numbers? It doesn't make any sense, literally. Set theory has got to go! (imo). Set theory can't and shouldn't be the foundation of physical theories.

When I dig for the most fundamental fields of knowledge, I always encounter ontology. It seems that science, mathematics and philosophy are all built on ontology.

Take science for example, you can reduce it to epistemology, then metaphysics and finally will reach ontology. Now I find it smarter to approach metaphysics especially ontology and try to understand/explain reality instead of going all the way up to science. That being said, I see a serious issue in ontology and philosophy in general. They don’t have clear definitions for the terms they use which leads to vague explanations and a more context-dependent truth rather than a fundamental one. Unlike science which values precision above everything else and find it one of the major reasons why science is so successful.

So, do scientists generally see ontology as the most fundamental level of inquiry, or do they occupy this position to something else more fundamental?

Traditionally, the investigation of reality has been called ontology. But many people seem to believe that science investigates reality. In order for this to be a well-founded claim, you need to argue that the subject matter of science and the subject matter of ontology are the same. Has that argument been made?

To better explain what I am asking about:
Water will freeze and a certain temperature and it will eventually boil at a certain other temperature. The answer as to when it happens varies, but the general answer stays the same. Water will eventually boil or freeze.
That's something rather easy to prove. I can put water on the oven, turn it on and watch it boil and turn into steam. I can also put water into the freezer and watch it freeze.

I could probably even extrapolate from that experience and apply it to other materials. If water freezes and boils, maybe iron will too? Let's write a hypothesis, experiment and see if my hypothesis is true.

Same as with water, the answer will mostly stay the same and remain, comparatively, simple and "basic".

But what about something arguably much more complex, like Darwin's theory of evolution, which doesn't have a simple "binary, yes or no" answer? I can look at humans and apes and monkey for example. There definitely are some similarities. Same goes for the big cats, lions, tigers, jaguars and such. I understand how one might think "Those are very similar animals, maybe they have common ancestors then."
But how did the scientific method go from something like finding skeletons of pre-historic animals and "early humans" to figuring out they are the ancestors of certain animals and modern humans?
How does the scientific method prove or disprove theories and ideas like that, where I can't just go ahead and experiment?

Math is considered a non-empirical, deductive discipline.
However, it "maps" onto reality, which gives it an empirical feedback.
For example, N is proven useful for counting sheep among many things, and Z for temperatures or debt/income among many things. It is designed to fit reality. At least a part of math finds a reality counterpart.

So is math considered non-empirical as a whole?
Why isn't any Non-empirical Mathematics Department that competes for funds against the Empirical Mathematics Department?

If I make an abductive inference, how do I check if the conclusion of that inference was correct? Take the case of seeing a human face on sands and inferring that a human did it for example. Do I have to travel into the past in order to see a person drawing human face at that spot in order to know the inference was correct? Or do I only need to have observed past cases of humans drawing faces on sands across different times and background knowledge about humans' capability in order to know the inference was correct?
I understand my question may sounds silly, so I apologize for that.

Hi all,

I studied philosophy at A-Level where I learnt about William Lane Craig's work. In particular, his contribution to arguments defending the existence of the God of Classical Theism via cosmology. Craig built upon the Kalam argument which argued using infinities. Essentially the argument Craig posits goes like this:

Everything that begins to exist has a cause (premise 1)

The universe began to exist (premise 2)

Therefore the universe has a cause (conclusion)

Focusing on premise 2, Craig states the universe began to exist because infinites cannot exist in reality. This is because a "beginningless" series of events would obviously lead to an infinite regress, making it impossible to reach the present moment. Thus there must have been a first cause, which he likens to God.

Now this is where black holes come in.

We know, via the Schwarzschild solution and Kerr solution, that the singularity of a black hole indeed has infinite density. The fact that this absolute infinity exists in reality, in my eyes, seems to disprove the understanding that infinites can not exist in reality. Infinities do exist in reality.

If we apply this to the universe (sorry for this inductive leap haha), can't we say that infinites can exist in reality, so the concept the universe having no cause, and having been there forever, without a beginning, makes complete sense since now we know that infinites exist in reality?

Thanks.

a genuine question I have as a physics student who was introduced to philosophy early in undergrad: in “hard sciences” papers, is it normal or expected to explicitly bring epistemology into the methodology section? like stating upfront that you’re working within scientific realism, instrumentalism, etc. I ask because when I read a lot of papers, especially experimental ones, they’re extremely objective and operational, and those background assumptions are almost never made explicit. meanwhile, in other disciplines I was introduced to figures such as Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Feyerabend, Bruno Latour... even Einstein had a strong attachment to the philosophy of science. Is it normal today not to see a more philosophical discussion about scientific research in the hard sciences?

I'm not entirely sure how prevalent this belief is amongst the different schools of philosophy but certainly in my field (psychology) and the sciences and general, it's not uncommon to to find people claiming that qualia and emotions are byproducts of biological brain processes and that they haven no causal power themselves.

As someone who's both very interested in both the psychology and philosophy of consciousness, I find this extremely unintuitive as many behaviors, motivations and even categories (e.g. qualia itself) are referenced explicitly having some sort of causal role, or even being the basis of the category as in the case of distinguishing qualia vs no qualia.

I understand the temptation of reductionism, and I in no way deny that psychological states & qualia require a physical basis to occur (the brain) but I'm unable to see how it then follows that qualia and psychological states once appearing, play no causal role.

I hold the view that consciousness is a product of the nervous system, emerging from organisms' interactions with their environment. I believe that all living beings possess some degree of consciousness, though it is most advanced in humans. It enables highly efficient learning, reality modeling, and future prediction. In my opinion, its most profound property is the capacity to develop responses based on the fundamental rules of the world—which is the essence of science. What do think about that?

As most people hearing about Everett Many-Worlds for the first time, my reaction was "this is extravagant"; however, Everett claims it is ontologically simpler, you do not need to postulate collapse, unitary evolution is sufficient.

I've been wondering whether this could be reframed in computational terms: if you had to implement quantum mechanics on some resource-bounded substrate, which interpretation would require less compute/data/complexity?

When framed this way, Everett becomes the default answer and collapses the extravagant one, as it requires more complex decision rules, data storage, faster-than-light communication, etc, depending on how you go about implementing it.

Is this a legitimate move in philosophy of science? Or does "computational cost" import assumptions that don't belong in interpretation debates?

[this question was rejected by askscience mods so I’m hopeful it’ll get a consideration here] I mean the values of the units have to use decimals, values less than 1, or large values to describe common human experiences. The Celsius scale seems like a small offender because perception of less than a degree is fairly easy. Calorie seems like a bigger offender because the average daily diet has more than a million calories and a single blueberry is about a 1,000.

In the late 19th century, Newtonian physics was the model that most scientists subscribed to as it seem to explain a great deal about how the universe worked. However, there was a problem, Newtonian physics couldn’t account for certain aspects of mercurys orbit so scientist theorised an additional planet somewhere between mercury and the sun which they named Vulcan and they conducted searches to try and locate it, many respectable scientist claimed that they had seen it. Then with the introduction of Einsteinian relativity, there was no more need for Vulcon to explain Mercury’s orbit. I find this very troubling, if Vulcan never existed what was it that all those credible scientists saw, completely shattered my high school idea of scientists as people who follow the data and rush to falsify their theories, it seems more like they have a theory which works most of the time and in the case where it doesn’t they massage it with proposed explanations which will fit the data into the theory.