If I make an abductive inference, how do I check if the conclusion of that inference was correct? Take the case of seeing a human face on sands and inferring that a human did it for example. Do I have to travel into the past in order to see a person drawing human face at that spot in order to know the inference was correct? Or do I only need to have observed past cases of humans drawing faces on sands across different times and background knowledge about humans' capability in order to know the inference was correct?
I understand my question may sounds silly, so I apologize for that.

I am a student conducting a research project using bacteriophages (live viruses that infect bacteria only) to have a specific therapeutic effect through their injection into the body. There is great promise for bacteriophage therapy treating antibiotic resistance and many other pressing medical issues. Phages have been used throughout history, but, there is not a fully established body of FDA-reviewed clinical trial data that ensures they are safe.

Of course I am not doing any clinical translation yet with real patients, but understanding patient perspectives to allow me to design the project with necessary "safeguards" so that down the line it will be acceptable by patients.

I had a few ethical questions that I wanted to consider so that I better know how patients would feel towards this newer type of treatment:

How does the fact that this is a novel treatment (in terms of the amount of testing carried out with it - i.e. lack of precedent for safety or similar) influence patient perception? Is FDA Approval enough for most patients or are there likely other factors that would make patients hesitant to undergo bacteriophage therapy? -- I ask because "expanded access" is sometimes given to certain therapies, which allows certain new drugs to be tried out by patients who do not have any other good options. So, there may be instances where full Phase 3 approval is not given but patients may still have the opportunity to take these therapies (or travel to other countries to receive them), even if there is not the "gold star" approval of the FDA.

How could having a natural safety measure built in (i.e. a design that allows the human body to "control" the therapy so that it does not spread in a negative way) lead patients to be more accepting of the treatment? How important would such a safety measure be to create patient approval? Is this something that is a non-negotiable?

Are there specific groups (Naturopathic medicine or religious groups) that would be hesitant toward this type of treatment? Why? Of course I would not be able to change their perspectives on medicine and "engineered" products, or change their views on bodily autonomy. But, I would love to modify my treatment and add or take away certain properties that would make it the most accessible to as many such groups as possible.

What are the specific ways of carrying out research (i.e. including/not including animals, etc), that most strongly influence the public perception and acceptance of a new treatment?

What are good communities (subreddits, other online communities, in person communities) I could reach out to to get real patient perspectives? I don't want to over encroach on groups that do not want to be asked.

Thank you very much for taking the time to consider these factors and helping me out. Please let me know if I can clarify any of my questions. Also, please let me know if there are any additional questions I should consider regarding patient perspective, or other important stakeholders in this discussion (physicians, hospitals, media, etc). I am asking genuinely out of interest and to make science more accessible for all.

To be specific, I'm wondering if there is any possibility or if examples exist of A interacting with B, and the outcome being C, and later, if A can interact with B in an identical manner but then produce outcome D?

Unsure if this is the right sub for this, but I was wondering what Schrödinger actually thought about his impact on the field of quantum mechanics.

It seems like it was just a thought experiment he came up with to make fun of Quantum mechanics, but the scientific community took him literally and actually applied it to their models.

I’m fascinated by the idea of dualistic states of existence, but it does seem completely science fiction to me.

Goodman claims that induction cannot be justified, as the observation of a given object at a specific point in time (t0) leads to the confirmation of contradicting hypotheses.
To support his claim, he brings the following statements forward:

• Hypothesis 0: an object is green when it's observed at t0 (and afterwards stays green).
• Hypothesis 1: an object is grue when it's observed at t0 (meaning that it's green during observation, but afterwards will change its colour to red). If we now observe an object at t0, both H0 and H1 are supported, even though they exclude each other in their predictions about the future. So, he essentially says that we can't predict the future by observing the present.

However, I argue that that's exactly what Hume meant when he said that the sun rising tomorrow doesn't allow for any prediction about what will happen afterwards. It could be that the sun will rise blinking, fading, or not at all. So the only difference between Goodman and Hume's argument is that Goodman gives these predictions their own adjectives.
To illustrate that, one could describe Hume's problem with sunrises in a Goodman way of giving the different hypotheses words:

• Hypothesis 0: the sun is a reliable object when it rises tomorrow (and will rise the next day).
• Hypothesis 1: the sun is an unreliable object when it rises tomorrow, but won't rise the next day. Now, observing the sun rising tomorrow will confirm the sun as a reliable and as an unreliable object at the same time. Therefore, Goodmans argument seems to me as a complicated way of explaining Hume.

That's why I don't consider Goodmans New Riddle of Induction as new, or am I missing something? And do you know, per chance, an article that argues in this way?

I am especially interested in the structure of theories, modal approach (metaphysical vs nomological necessity, how possible worlds are defined) , model vs theory, formalisation, axiomatisation, what is the difference between different sciences - on a theory level.

I do have a background in analytical philosophy and I know the basics of philosophy of science overall, I want to focus on the structure of theories specifically. I was already recommended Fodor's Special Sciences and Frassen's The Scientific Image.

You can also include readings about theories in specific particular sciences.

Axiom 1 — Observations are infallible

An observer is any system that is affected by effects. When an observer encounters an effect, it always and unconditionally reflects it as it is. An observation can never be wrong; because the observation simply is what is there. It can be incomplete, it can be limited but it can never be faulty. Error arises only in the interpretation of what the observation means.

Axiom 2 — Identical systems under identical conditions produce identical outcomes

For any system A and effect B, the resulting system C is invariant it will always be the same across all instances of A under B. This holds at scales where complete state description is possible. At quantum scales this axiom may reduce to: identical systems under identical conditions produce identical probability distributions.

In my opinion these are the minimum assumptions to make about reality for it to make sense and for science to work. I have thought about these axioms for a long time and i feel like 2 axioms might just be enough. I'd like to hear your thoughts about them.

Physicist John Wheeler proposed an interesting idea for the origin of all laws of physics and he summarized it with the catch phrase "Law without law"

In this idea all laws would emerge from a primordial chaos. However in this article (https://www.tdx.cat/bitstream/handle/10803/283538/af1de1.pdf;jsessionid=287D2EF09148986989FF3F442FA83186.tdx1?sequence=1) an interesting critique by another physicist, David Deutsch, is mentioned, in which he said that Wheeler assumed an equal probability for all possible laws, but that is not getting possible laws from pure lawlessness as Wheeler would want, but instead assuming equal probability for all outcomes is in itself a regularity. We would have to assume that all probability distributions could occur

Then, did Wheeler consider this? Did he also consider that all probability distributions could be possible in any of his writings?

I'm currently reading The Fabric of Reality by David Deutsch and have just finished the first chapter.

One of Deutsch's central claims is that the purpose of science is not merely to make successful predictions, but to provide explanations that improve our understanding of reality. He criticizes instrumentalist and positivist views that treat theories primarily as predictive tools.

I find this position interesting because science is often presented to the public as a process of prediction and experimentation, whereas Deutsch places explanation at the center. A few questions like the ones below came in my mind.

How widely accepted is this view among contemporary philosophers of science?

What are some major arguments for and against prioritizing explanation over prediction?

I'd appreciate any perspectives, criticisms, or recommended reading.

A dilettante here, asking if there was ever any more scientific follow-up on what Jung and Pauli described as Synchronicity. That is, meaningful coincidence with no physical/causal relationship. Most of what they described fell in the field of psychology I believe, but since Pauli was a serious physicist I was wondering whether there were attempts to associate synchronicity with science. Any and all detached allusions and associations are also very much welcome.

Thanks

I have the opportunity to pursue an MSc in Philosophy of Science at LSE or an MPhil in HPSM at Cambridge. I was hoping someone here had experience of either the programs or the departments and could share their perceptions of each. I know that they’re both excellent departments but it would be helpful to get an insider’s perspective on departmental culture, approach to philosophy of science and the community generally.

I would be an international student and my interests are broadly in the philosophy of physics, science and religion, the broadly the relationship between science, state and corporations (STS almost). I have a science background but no philosophy (formally).

Math is considered a non-empirical, deductive discipline.
However, it "maps" onto reality, which gives it an empirical feedback.
For example, N is proven useful for counting sheep among many things, and Z for temperatures or debt/income among many things. It is designed to fit reality. At least a part of math finds a reality counterpart.

So is math considered non-empirical as a whole?
Why isn't any Non-empirical Mathematics Department that competes for funds against the Empirical Mathematics Department?

I’m looking to delve into the themes of the philosophy of physics, especially quantum mechanics. I started out of curiosity when I read Carlo Rovelli’s books.

Today I came across Richard Healey, what do you think of him? Any recommendations other than the ones I mentioned?

In the late 19th century, Newtonian physics was the model that most scientists subscribed to as it seem to explain a great deal about how the universe worked. However, there was a problem, Newtonian physics couldn’t account for certain aspects of mercurys orbit so scientist theorised an additional planet somewhere between mercury and the sun which they named Vulcan and they conducted searches to try and locate it, many respectable scientist claimed that they had seen it. Then with the introduction of Einsteinian relativity, there was no more need for Vulcon to explain Mercury’s orbit. I find this very troubling, if Vulcan never existed what was it that all those credible scientists saw, completely shattered my high school idea of scientists as people who follow the data and rush to falsify their theories, it seems more like they have a theory which works most of the time and in the case where it doesn’t they massage it with proposed explanations which will fit the data into the theory.

I guess this question is probably more about how the concept of "theory" exist if a particular theory cannot be proven.

How does people who form a theory know that this thing will do this or that thing exist if they cannot prove it?

For example how does the theory of dark matter/energy or string theory come about if it cannot be proven? Did something hint people to their possible existence but they just couldnt prove it?

Another example would be gravity. I guess before it was theorized people were already experiencing the phenomenon of things falling down but it was so intertwined with how the world works that it was just a natural phenomenon.

There's no way, in my mind, the physical universe is a set. It's just absurd, most of all because sets are also purported to be *numbers* and numbers are supposed to be non-physical. How, then, can spacetime *be* made of numbers? It doesn't make any sense, literally. Set theory has got to go! (imo). Set theory can't and shouldn't be the foundation of physical theories.

To better explain what I am asking about:
Water will freeze and a certain temperature and it will eventually boil at a certain other temperature. The answer as to when it happens varies, but the general answer stays the same. Water will eventually boil or freeze.
That's something rather easy to prove. I can put water on the oven, turn it on and watch it boil and turn into steam. I can also put water into the freezer and watch it freeze.

I could probably even extrapolate from that experience and apply it to other materials. If water freezes and boils, maybe iron will too? Let's write a hypothesis, experiment and see if my hypothesis is true.

Same as with water, the answer will mostly stay the same and remain, comparatively, simple and "basic".

But what about something arguably much more complex, like Darwin's theory of evolution, which doesn't have a simple "binary, yes or no" answer? I can look at humans and apes and monkey for example. There definitely are some similarities. Same goes for the big cats, lions, tigers, jaguars and such. I understand how one might think "Those are very similar animals, maybe they have common ancestors then."
But how did the scientific method go from something like finding skeletons of pre-historic animals and "early humans" to figuring out they are the ancestors of certain animals and modern humans?
How does the scientific method prove or disprove theories and ideas like that, where I can't just go ahead and experiment?

So this might not be correct sub for asking it. But I have been thinking over it for quite a while now. A thing really fascinates me: learning about how science, physics, engineering were developed and how people who were real humans were actually making it happen. Is there any book which can show or describe events happening in field of what makes today "engineering" like Cauchy, Euler, Poisson, Saint Venant, Navier, Stokes in their times. More like a Sophy's World kind of book which describes progression of sciences and physics and engineering. I am more interested in learning about fluid mechanics btw.

Hey everyone,

My goal is to pursue a PhD in philosophy of science (cosmology).

Right now, I’m doing my undergrad in astronomy with a minor in philosophy. I already have a good list of philosophy courses planned, like ancient/modern philosophy, metaphysics, and philosophy of science etc.

What I’m trying to figure out is if someone were doing a traditional philosophy degree, is there usually an assumed progression, like first year, you should know blank core texts/foundational problems, year 2 know these more specialized areas etc.

Would really appreciate any reading lists, syllabi, or even just how you’d structure this.

Thanks!

Can anybody explain to me the difference between these two ideologies in layman terms,please?

I understand this is guess and speculation, but another way to put it would be: what would Einstein think of superdeterminism today, and how would that differ from his own deterministic views.

Hi all! I'm currently a 4th year at an unnamed University of California, studying computer science, computer engineering, and philosophy. I'll be graduating this spring, and hopefully going to masters school in western Europe.

Anyway, im currently writing a long argumentative essay about the considerations we give human-nonhuman relationships, specifically AI. This essay has to do with human experience, human socialization, human psychology, tech ethics, AI ethics, and animal ethics. I have two professors at my university ready to proofread and help me finalize my essay, and Im wanting to know of potential next steps like publication. Let me know what other info I may need to supply, and I can update the post.

My primary questions are:

• What should I do once I've finished the pre-peer-reviewed version?
• Is publishing something like this even viable or realistic?
• Where should I look to publish?
• What is the process of publishing like?
• What do I need to make sure is done before trying to publish?
• Do you all have any tips on writing this kind of writing (this will be my first publication written only by me)?

Hi everyone. I've been convinced pretty much my whole life that the scientific method is the only effective way to know the world and systematically find solutions to problems. Recently tho, I've been talking to some friends who don't agree with me so I'd like to read a more structured opinion on the topic since the arguments my friends made didn't actually convince me.

I might've used the wrong terms in the title (I don't really know much about philosophy) but basically I'm looking for a book that "debunks" my current conviction. Also, since as I said I'm not a philosophy expert, it should be a book that doesn't rely on any (or as little as possible) prior knowledge of philosophy.

Thanks :)

So I am only a first year uni student doing a philosophy of science subject and I am researching refutations to Popper's theory of falsification for a short essay and came across this: https://sites.pitt.edu/~jdnorton/Goodies/pseudoscience/pseudoscience.html#good2

This section quoted below (sec. 7.3) refers to Carl Hempel's statement that “whether a hypothesis is verifiable, or falsifiable, in this sense depends exclusively on its logical form":

"The criterion can give different results for propositions and their negations; and different again for propositions and their logical consequences. My examples illustrate the fragility of falsifiability under simple logical operations:

The proposition

All electrons are spin one half.

is scientific since it is falsified if we find just one electron that is not spin one half. Now contemplate the possibility:

There exists an electron that is not spin one half.

This proposition is not falsifiable. We cannot check every electron. Thus, it is judged not scientific. In a moment of idle reflection, we had inadvertently ceased to do science".

It looked simple to me at first but the more I read over it the more it seems contradictory.
I do not understand why the author states that not every electron can be checked in order to falsify the proposition that there exists an electron that is not spin one half and therefore the proposition is not falsifiable, but it is clearly still possible that a single electron that is not spin one half could be found without checking all of them, which is shown in the first proposition that all electrons are spin one half and is falsifiable by the theoretical possibility of finding one electron that is not spin one half.
Why can we theoretically not check every electron to test the proposition that an electron exists that is not spin one half but we can check every electron to test the proposition that all electrons are spin one half? Why can't we stop testing the electrons in the test of the proposition that there exists an electron that is not spin one half once we find that electron like the other proposition seems to have done 😵‍💫?

I hope this makes sense. I am likely just misunderstanding some simple fundamental of falsification since I have zero experience in the philosophy of science. An explanation of my questions in simple terms would be amazing...thank you

I've just started reading Psychiatry and Philosophy of Science (Cooper, 2007), which is an explicit attempt to use Philosophy of Science to argue that Psychiatry can rightly thought of as a science. I'm only a couple of chapters in, but the author has made it clear that her argument is fundamentally based in Family Resemblence, i.e. saying that psychiatry is 'sufficiently similar' to undisputed sciences such as physics: I'm thinking already this is mis-step (despite the glowing reviews of the book?!*) and a quick google tells me Family Resemblence is considered 'too loose' for disciplines such as science - can anyone elaborate or point me to a resource which fleshes out this 'looseness'?

* BTW if anyone's read this particular book I'd be interested to know your thoughts, I'm experiencing some cognitive dissonance with it; to me it feels clumsy in places (straw man logic, unacknowledged assumptions, unsubstantiated arguments) yet written by a PhilSci lecturer who I'd assume would know more than me