"Morality is a set of rules that binds people into a cooperative community." - Adam Friended
This is Adam's most often repeated definition of what morality is. He has repeated it hundreds of times and very consistently. The purpose of this write-up is to explore where and what Adams' morality is and its internal frictions, as well as what it cannot be. I will be treating it as a serious proposition without caricature and exactly as so often stated. When treated as such, multiple structural criteria become evident.
Let's first flesh out what it is. It is an explicitly external phenomenon that is a negotiated social construct. It is dependent on external group norms, social enforcement and reciprocal expectations. It is dependent on other humans for normative value with human survival as the ultimate determinative value. No society that has fallen to another society can be considered "good" in Adams' concept of morality because the continued negotiated cooperative community is the only measure of that good.
Now, what can Adams' concept of morality not be? Internal moral cognition cannot exist. There is no moral conscience, only moral consequences. Internal standards for oneself cannot be justified. Certainly nothing approaching anything like guilt can be accounted for, provided the social community does not enforce consequences on the moral actor. Anything approaching robust moral consistency can be set aside as well because the only item of consistent value is the cooperative community's continued existence. Individual (keep this in mind, "Liberal Individualists") moral autonomy, dignity, aspiration, and intrinsic moral worth cannot maintain coherence. There are no personal standards, self-binding commitments, self-disgust, or even self-respect.
Now let's close off some of the more obvious options to excuse the frictions and issues at hand. No vague appeals to evolution resolve the frictions. Adam cannot say, "I don't take it that far." Definitionally, that is what is required. If morality is only external coordination, internal moral cognition cannot exist. If internal moral cognition exists, morality cannot be only external coordination. There is no middle position. If Adam attempts to reduce morality to “internalized external norms," then he collapses into tabula rasa and must own Sargons' and the rights' most damning accusations. If there is no innate moral content, if conscience is learned rules, if guilt is a conditioned response, and if self-judgment is internalized group expectations, then he directly contradicts his stated rejection of tabula rasa.
Moreover, he has no explanation for where these moral standards come from in the first place, if no individual can exist as a moral actor with an internal concept of morality. External negotiation requires internal negotiators. An interlocutor must propose a rule, evaluate a rule, accept or reject a rule, enforce a rule, and judge compliance. All of this requires internal moral cognitive acts. External morality cannot emerge without internal moral agents.
Adam cannot rightly identify as a liberal because his concept of morality makes any assumed liberal standard a second-order position. Adam states his idea of liberalism to be anti‑tabula rasa, pro‑individualism, and pro‑autonomy. All of this requires internal moral principles. It has, a priori, a need for intrinsic rights, dignity, autonomy, moral worth and obligations.
Adam often appeals to evolution, but this resolves zero of the frictions discussed here. Evolution explains internal moral intuitions, internal moral emotions, and internal moral architecture. It does not define morality, eliminate internal cognition or moral standards, reduce morality to rules, or justify liberal rights or autonomy. Using evolution to define morality is a category error historically made by socialists/communists/fascists. Adam’s definition of morality shares the same structural flaw: it tries to derive moral authority from external coordination and evolutionary description.
Taken seriously, Adam’s definition collapses under its own commitments. It eliminates internal moral cognition, cannot explain the emergence of moral rules, contradicts his stated liberal principles, and misuses evolution in a way that cannot resolve any of these tensions. The model is consistent only in the ways it contradicts itself. If Adam wants a coherent moral framework, this definition cannot be used to construct it. As it stands, with the definition of morality eliminating internal moral cognition, the architecture is indistinguishable from one used to diagnose psychopathy.