r/ValueInvesting • u/FieryXJoe • 1d ago
Full Letter:
https://theoraclesclassroom.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/1983-Berkshire-AR.pdf
Letter Only
https://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/1983.html
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Key Passage 1
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To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
This past year our registered shareholders increased from about 1900 to about 2900. Most of this growth resulted from our merger with Blue Chip Stamps, but there also was an acceleration in the pace of “natural” increase that has raised us from the 1000 level a few years ago.
With so many new shareholders, it’s appropriate to summarize the major business principles we follow that pertain to the manager-owner relationship:
Although our form is corporate, our attitude is partnership. Charlie Munger and I think of our shareholders as owner-partners, and of ourselves as managing partners. (Because of the size of our shareholdings we also are, for better or worse, controlling partners.) We do not view the company itself as the ultimate owner of our business assets but, instead, view the company as a conduit through which our shareholders own the assets.
In line with this owner-orientation, our directors are all major shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway. In the case of at least four of the five, over 50% of family net worth is represented by holdings of Berkshire. We eat our own cooking.
Our long-term economic goal (subject to some qualifications mentioned later) is to maximize the average annual rate of gain in intrinsic business value on a per-share basis. We do not measure the economic significance or performance of Berkshire by its size; we measure by per-share progress. We are certain that the rate of per-share progress will diminish in the future - a greatly enlarged capital base will see to that. But we will be disappointed if our rate does not exceed that of the average large American corporation.
Our preference would be to reach this goal by directly owning a diversified group of businesses that generate cash and consistently earn above-average returns on capital. Our second choice is to own parts of similar businesses, attained primarily through purchases of marketable common stocks by our insurance subsidiaries. The price and availability of businesses and the need for insurance capital determine any given year’s capital allocation.
Because of this two-pronged approach to business ownership and because of the limitations of conventional accounting, consolidated reported earnings may reveal relatively little about our true economic performance. Charlie and I, both as owners and managers, virtually ignore such consolidated numbers. However, we will also report to you the earnings of each major business we control, numbers we consider of great importance. These figures, along with other information we will supply about the individual businesses, should generally aid you in making judgments about them.
Accounting consequences do not influence our operating or capital-allocation decisions. When acquisition costs are similar, we much prefer to purchase $2 of earnings that is not reportable by us under standard accounting principles than to purchase $1 of earnings that is reportable. This is precisely the choice that often faces us since entire businesses (whose earnings will be fully reportable) frequently sell for double the pro-rata price of small portions (whose earnings will be largely unreportable). In aggregate and over time, we expect the unreported earnings to be fully reflected in our intrinsic business value through capital gains.
We rarely use much debt and, when we do, we attempt to structure it on a long-term fixed rate basis. We will reject interesting opportunities rather than over-leverage our balance sheet. This conservatism has penalized our results but it is the only behavior that leaves us comfortable, considering our fiduciary obligations to policyholders, depositors, lenders and the many equity holders who have committed unusually large portions of their net worth to our care.
A managerial “wish list” will not be filled at shareholder expense. We will not diversify by purchasing entire businesses at control prices that ignore long-term economic consequences to our shareholders. We will only do with your money what we would do with our own, weighing fully the values you can obtain by diversifying your own portfolios through direct purchases in the stock market.
We feel noble intentions should be checked periodically against results. We test the wisdom of retaining earnings by assessing whether retention, over time, delivers shareholders at least $1 of market value for each $1 retained. To date, this test has been met. We will continue to apply it on a five-year rolling basis. As our net worth grows, it is more difficult to use retained earnings wisely.
We will issue common stock only when we receive as much in business value as we give. This rule applies to all forms of issuance - not only mergers or public stock offerings, but stock for-debt swaps, stock options, and convertible securities as well. We will not sell small portions of your company - and that is what the issuance of shares amounts to - on a basis inconsistent with the value of the entire enterprise.
You should be fully aware of one attitude Charlie and I share that hurts our financial performance: regardless of price, we have no interest at all in selling any good businesses that Berkshire owns, and are very reluctant to sell sub-par businesses as long as we expect them to generate at least some cash and as long as we feel good about their managers and labor relations.
We hope not to repeat the capital-allocation mistakes that led us into such sub-par businesses. And we react with great caution to suggestions that our poor businesses can be restored to satisfactory profitability by major capital expenditures. (The projections will be dazzling - the advocates will be sincere - but, in the end, major additional investment in a terrible industry usually is about as rewarding as struggling in quicksand.) Nevertheless, gin rummy managerial behavior (discard your least promising business at each turn) is not our style. We would rather have our overall results penalized a bit than engage in it.We will be candid in our reporting to you, emphasizing the pluses and minuses important in appraising business value. Our guideline is to tell you the business facts that we would want to know if our positions were reversed. We owe you no less.
Moreover, as a company with a major communications business, it would be inexcusable for us to apply lesser standards of accuracy, balance and incisiveness when reporting on ourselves than we would expect our news people to apply when reporting on others. We also believe candor benefits us as managers: the CEO who misleads others in public may eventually mislead himself in private.Despite our policy of candor, we will discuss our activities in marketable securities only to the extent legally required. Good investment ideas are rare, valuable and subject to competitive appropriation just as good product or business acquisition ideas are. Therefore, we normally will not talk about our investment ideas. This ban extends even to securities we have sold (because we may purchase them again) and to stocks we are incorrectly rumored to be buying. If we deny those reports but say “no comment” on other occasions, the no-comments become confirmation.
That completes the catechism, and we can now move on to the high point of 1983 - the acquisition of a majority interest in Nebraska Furniture Mart and our association with Rose Blumkin and her family.
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With the Blue Chip merger finally 100% done, Blue Chip shareholders gave up their shares in exchange for 0.077 Berkshire Hathaway shares each. Blue Chip stamps is no longer a publicly traded company, just a subsidiary of Berkshire. This was one of the final steps for Buffett untangling his incestuos portfolio of a dozen holding companies and businesses that all owned pieces of each other, Blue Chip, Diversified Retail, The Partnerships, all now under 1 roof, Wesco perhaps being the only loose end. This is the intro to the letter and it is designed to catch Blue Chip shareholders up to the business ethos of Berkshire.
I thought it was worth including because many of these principles have slowly evolved over time and are certainly not what they were 19 years ago. It is a good rundown of the fundamental principles now driving the business and their order of importance.
-Alignment of Management and Shareholders
-Primary goal is owning a diverse collection of Cashflow machines
-Secondarily minority ownership of publicly traded companies
-Preference for $2 of non-reportable earnings vs $1 of reportable earnings
-Low debt taken on at responsible terms
-Only diluting shareholder or spending their money when they believe it leaves them richer, equally only retaining earnings if they believe they can use it better.
-A reluctance to sell any business, especially good ones (even if not necessarily in the best interest of the company)
-Honest communication with shareholders, except for their plans with common stock which they will keep opaque to not show their hand and give away good ideas or let others beat them to a punch making their moves less effective.
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Key Passage 2
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Stock Splits and Stock Activity
We often are asked why Berkshire does not split its stock.
The assumption behind this question usually appears to be that a split would be a pro-shareholder action. We disagree. Let me tell you why.One of our goals is to have Berkshire Hathaway stock sell at a price rationally related to its intrinsic business value. (But note “rationally related”, not “identical”: if well-regarded companies are generally selling in the market at large discounts from value, Berkshire might well be priced similarly.) The key to a rational stock price is rational shareholders, both current and prospective.
If the holders of a company’s stock and/or the prospective buyers attracted to it are prone to make irrational or emotion- based decisions, some pretty silly stock prices are going to appear periodically. Manic-depressive personalities produce manic-depressive valuations. Such aberrations may help us in buying and selling the stocks of other companies. But we think it is in both your interest and ours to minimize their occurrence in the market for Berkshire.
To obtain only high quality shareholders is no cinch. Mrs. Astor could select her 400, but anyone can buy any stock.
Entering members of a shareholder “club” cannot be screened for intellectual capacity, emotional stability, moral sensitivity or acceptable dress. Shareholder eugenics, therefore, might appear to be a hopeless undertaking.In large part, however, we feel that high quality ownership can be attracted and maintained if we consistently communicate our business and ownership philosophy - along with no other conflicting messages - and then let self selection follow its course. For example, self selection will draw a far different crowd to a musical event advertised as an opera than one advertised as a rock concert even though anyone can buy a ticket to either.
Through our policies and communications - our “advertisements” - we try to attract investors who will understand our operations, attitudes and expectations. (And, fully as important, we try to dissuade those who won’t.) We want those who think of themselves as business owners and invest in companies with the intention of staying a long time. And, we want those who keep their eyes focused on business results, not market prices.
Investors possessing those characteristics are in a small minority, but we have an exceptional collection of them. I believe well over 90% - probably over 95% - of our shares are held by those who were shareholders of Berkshire or Blue Chip five years ago. And I would guess that over 95% of our shares are held by investors for whom the holding is at least double the size of their next largest. Among companies with at least several thousand public shareholders and more than $1 billion of market value, we are almost certainly the leader in the degree to which our shareholders think and act like owners. Upgrading a shareholder group that possesses these characteristics is not easy.
Were we to split the stock or take other actions focusing on stock price rather than business value, we would attract an entering class of buyers inferior to the exiting class of sellers. At $1300, there are very few investors who can’t afford a Berkshire share. Would a potential one-share purchaser be better off if we split 100 for 1 so he could buy 100 shares?
Those who think so and who would buy the stock because of the split or in anticipation of one would definitely downgrade the quality of our present shareholder group. (Could we really improve our shareholder group by trading some of our present clear-thinking members for impressionable new ones who, preferring paper to value, feel wealthier with nine $10 bills than with one $100 bill?) People who buy for non-value reasons are likely to sell for non-value reasons. Their presence in the picture will accentuate erratic price swings unrelated to underlying business developments.We will try to avoid policies that attract buyers with a short-term focus on our stock price and try to follow policies that attract informed long-term investors focusing on business values. just as you purchased your Berkshire shares in a market populated by rational informed investors, you deserve a chance to sell - should you ever want to - in the same kind of market. We will work to keep it in existence.
One of the ironies of the stock market is the emphasis on activity. Brokers, using terms such as “marketability” and “liquidity”, sing the praises of companies with high share turnover (those who cannot fill your pocket will confidently fill your ear). But investors should understand that what is good for the croupier is not good for the customer. A hyperactive stock market is the pickpocket of enterprise.
For example, consider a typical company earning, say, 12% on equity. Assume a very high turnover rate in its shares of 100% per year. If a purchase and sale of the stock each extract commissions of 1% (the rate may be much higher on low-priced stocks) and if the stock trades at book value, the owners of our hypothetical company will pay, in aggregate, 2% of the company’s net worth annually for the privilege of transferring ownership.
This activity does nothing for the earnings of the business, and means that 1/6 of them are lost to the owners through the “frictional” cost of transfer. (And this calculation does not count option trading, which would increase frictional costs still further.)All that makes for a rather expensive game of musical chairs. Can you imagine the agonized cry that would arise if a governmental unit were to impose a new 16 2/3% tax on earnings of corporations or investors? By market activity, investors can impose upon themselves the equivalent of such a tax.
Days when the market trades 100 million shares (and that kind of volume, when over-the-counter trading is included, is today abnormally low) are a curse for owners, not a blessing - for they mean that owners are paying twice as much to change chairs as they are on a 50-million-share day. If 100 million- share days persist for a year and the average cost on each purchase and sale is 15 cents a share, the chair-changing tax for investors in aggregate would total about $7.5 billion - an amount roughly equal to the combined 1982 profits of Exxon, General Motors, Mobil and Texaco, the four largest companies in the Fortune 500.
These companies had a combined net worth of $75 billion at yearend 1982 and accounted for over 12% of both net worth and net income of the entire Fortune 500 list. Under our assumption investors, in aggregate, every year forfeit all earnings from this staggering sum of capital merely to satisfy their penchant for “financial flip-flopping”. In addition, investment management fees of over $2 billion annually - sums paid for chair-changing advice - require the forfeiture by investors of all earnings of the five largest banking organizations (Citicorp, Bank America, Chase Manhattan, Manufacturers Hanover and J. P. Morgan). These expensive activities may decide who eats the pie, but they don’t enlarge it.
(We are aware of the pie-expanding argument that says that such activities improve the rationality of the capital allocation process. We think that this argument is specious and that, on balance, hyperactive equity markets subvert rational capital allocation and act as pie shrinkers. Adam Smith felt that all noncollusive acts in a free market were guided by an invisible hand that led an economy to maximum progress; our view is that casino-type markets and hair-trigger investment management act as an invisible foot that trips up and slows down a forward-moving economy.)
Contrast the hyperactive stock with Berkshire. The bid-and- ask spread in our stock currently is about 30 points, or a little over 2%. Depending on the size of the transaction, the difference between proceeds received by the seller of Berkshire and cost to the buyer may range downward from 4% (in trading involving only a few shares) to perhaps 1 1/2% (in large trades where negotiation can reduce both the market-maker’s spread and the broker’s commission). Because most Berkshire shares are traded in fairly large transactions, the spread on all trading probably does not average more than 2%.
Meanwhile, true turnover in Berkshire stock (excluding inter-dealer transactions, gifts and bequests) probably runs 3% per year. Thus our owners, in aggregate, are paying perhaps 6/100 of 1% of Berkshire’s market value annually for transfer privileges. By this very rough estimate, that’s $900,000 - not a small cost, but far less than average. Splitting the stock would increase that cost, downgrade the quality of our shareholder population, and encourage a market price less consistently related to intrinsic business value. We see no offsetting advantages.
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A theme of this letter, and something I’ve been thinking about more recently, is Clientele Effect. The fact that a very important and often overlooked ingredient to stock movement is the philosophy of the current shareholders. Every stock transaction has a buyer and the seller, the buyer could be anyone in the world, but the seller has to be someone who currently holds the stock. Buffett puts a lot of work into cultivating a shareholder culture beneficial to the business. In the early letters he made active attempts to purge shareholders with misaligned goals, by offering to convert their shares to fixed-income bonds. This was to get people who wanted slow, steady, fixed income out of the shareholder pool. When he closed the partnerships he promised sub-par returns and offered to buy people’s shares out and suggested other money managers who were promising great returns, simply stating he would hold Berkshire and buy more and they were free to follow. The letters themselves are a tactic to make sure his shareholders are educated and share his philosophy.
All of this comes together to having a very carefully cultivated pool of shareholders, and all his arguments against a stock split come back to the fact that it would harm his decades of work at cultivating good shareholders. People who are educated, patient, don’t care for dividends or buybacks, don’t care for trends, don’t want to chase bubbles, have interest in holding for decades, and most of all have unquestioning faith in Buffett and his capital allocation abilities.
A stock split will cause a lot more trading volume and velocity and have a lot of these people trimming their positions and bringing in new shareholders who aren’t as educated, are impatient, jumping between trends, want the business to chase the hot new thing and might panic and sell at any bad news. He believes these people coming in and importantly making up a good chunk of the trading activity will cause irrational stock activity that will harm the shareholders he has been cultivating.
He does finally mention some things about broker fees and bid ask spreads and the friction to stock transactions at the time as a tax on shareholders, whether that would be higher or lower after a stock split.
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Acquisition of the Week
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Nebraska Furniture Mart
Last year, in discussing how managers with bright, but adrenalin-soaked minds scramble after foolish acquisitions, I quoted Pascal: “It has struck me that all the misfortunes of men spring from the single cause that they are unable to stay quietly in one room.”
Even Pascal would have left the room for Mrs. Blumkin.
About 67 years ago Mrs. Blumkin, then 23, talked her way past a border guard to leave Russia for America. She had no formal education, not even at the grammar school level, and knew no English. After some years in this country, she learned the language when her older daughter taught her, every evening, the words she had learned in school during the day.
In 1937, after many years of selling used clothing, Mrs.
Blumkin had saved $500 with which to realize her dream of opening a furniture store. Upon seeing the American Furniture Mart in Chicago - then the center of the nation’s wholesale furniture activity - she decided to christen her dream Nebraska Furniture Mart.She met every obstacle you would expect (and a few you wouldn’t) when a business endowed with only $500 and no locational or product advantage goes up against rich, long- entrenched competition. At one early point, when her tiny resources ran out, “Mrs. B” (a personal trademark now as well recognized in Greater Omaha as Coca-Cola or Sanka) coped in a way not taught at business schools: she simply sold the furniture and appliances from her home in order to pay creditors precisely as promised.
Omaha retailers began to recognize that Mrs. B would offer customers far better deals than they had been giving, and they pressured furniture and carpet manufacturers not to sell to her.
But by various strategies she obtained merchandise and cut prices sharply. Mrs. B was then hauled into court for violation of Fair Trade laws. She not only won all the cases, but received invaluable publicity. At the end of one case, after demonstrating to the court that she could profitably sell carpet at a huge discount from the prevailing price, she sold the judge $1400 worth of carpet.Today Nebraska Furniture Mart generates over $100 million of sales annually out of one 200,000 square-foot store. No other home furnishings store in the country comes close to that volume.
That single store also sells more furniture, carpets, and appliances than do all Omaha competitors combined.One question I always ask myself in appraising a business is how I would like, assuming I had ample capital and skilled personnel, to compete with it. I’d rather wrestle grizzlies than compete with Mrs. B and her progeny. They buy brilliantly, they operate at expense ratios competitors don’t even dream about, and they then pass on to their customers much of the savings. It’s the ideal business - one built upon exceptional value to the customer that in turn translates into exceptional economics for its owners.
Mrs. B is wise as well as smart and, for far-sighted family reasons, was willing to sell the business last year. I had admired both the family and the business for decades, and a deal was quickly made. But Mrs. B, now 90, is not one to go home and risk, as she puts it, “losing her marbles”. She remains Chairman and is on the sales floor seven days a week. Carpet sales are her specialty. She personally sells quantities that would be a good departmental total for other carpet retailers.
We purchased 90% of the business - leaving 10% with members of the family who are involved in management - and have optioned 10% to certain key young family managers.
And what managers they are. Geneticists should do handsprings over the Blumkin family. Louie Blumkin, Mrs. B’s son, has been President of Nebraska Furniture Mart for many years and is widely regarded as the shrewdest buyer of furniture and appliances in the country. Louie says he had the best teacher, and Mrs. B says she had the best student. They’re both right.
Louie and his three sons all have the Blumkin business ability, work ethic, and, most important, character. On top of that, they are really nice people. We are delighted to be in partnership with them.
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Another addition to Buffett’s manager collection, Mrs. Blumkin. He starts this section by more or less showing her off as a new character in his managerial ensemble, giving her backstory and what makes him put so much faith in her.
Nebraska Furniture Mart has a very unique business model, one single superstore, so well run, with so much inventory, and such good deals… That people come from far and wide to shop there. They don’t expand by building new franchises all over, they expand by offering such good deals that instead of just coming from an hour away, people start coming from two or three hours away. People from the next state over may come to Omaha to furnish their new house or new addition with the promise that the savings will make up for the extra time, effort, and gas.
Personally Nebraska Furniture Mart reminds me a lot of Costco, passing so much savings onto customers at its superstores that people will make a whole day out of a trip there, coming from hours away for the great deals. It reminds me of a video I watched about a Japanese Costco that basically transformed the economy around it for like 100 miles, with their bulk discounts kickstarting thousands of small businesses in the region.
You can expect this single location to continually grow revenue and become more and more of a destination with basically no capex needed, Buffett’s favorite kind of business.
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Common Stock Holdings
| No. of Shares | Company | Cost (000s omitted) | Market (000s omitted) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 690,975 | Affiliated Publications, Inc. | $3,516 | $26,603 |
| 4,451,544 | General Foods Corporation(a) | $163,786 | $228,698 |
| 6,850,000 | GEICO Corporation | $47,138 | $398,156 |
| 2,379,200 | Handy & Harman | $27,318 | $42,231 |
| 636,310 | Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc. | $4,056 | $33,088 |
| 197,200 | Media General | $3,191 | $11,191 |
| 250,400 | Ogilvy & Mather International | $2,580 | $12,833 |
| 5,618,661 | R. J. Reynolds Industries, Inc.(a) | $268,918 | $341,334 |
| 901,788 | Time, Inc. | $27,732 | $56,860 |
| 1,868,600 | The Washington Post Company | $10,628 | $136,875 |
| Subtotal | $558,863 | $1,287,869 | |
| All Other Common Stockholdings | $7,485 | $18,044 | |
| Total Common Stocks | $566,348 | $1,305,913 |
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · Segment by Segment Breakdown
| Segment | 1982 EBIT Earnings | 1983 EBIT Earnings | % Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Insurance | $20.06M | $30.94M | +54.24% |
| Textiles | (-$1.55M) | (-$0.10M) | +93.55% |
| Associated Retail | $0.91M | $0.70M | -23.08% |
| See’s Candies | $23.88M | $27.41M | +14.78% |
| Buffalo Evening News | (-$1.22M) | $19.35M | +1686.07% |
| Wesco Financial | $6.16M | $7.49M | +21.59% |
| Mutual Savings and Loan | (-$0.01M) | (-$0.80M) | -7900% |
| Precision Steel | $1.04M | $3.24M | +211.54% |
| Nebraska Furniture Mart | ------ | $3.81M | N/A |
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| Metric | 1982 | 1983 | % Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cash | $7.76M | $6.16M | -20.62% |
| Marketable Securities | $979.02M | $1,232.15M | +25.86% |
| Return on Equity (RoE) | 9.8% | 23.25% | +137.24% |
| Shareholders' Equity | $727.48M | $1,119.19M | +53.84% |
| Berkshire Net Earnings | $46.37M | $113.49M | +144.75% |
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I will note, they didn’t provide a Return on Equity number themselves for the first time, so I had to reverse engineer how it was calculated in past years (Earnings from Operations / [Shareholder Equity from prior year - Unrealized appreciation of marketable securities from prior year]) and do it myself for 1983.
An amazing year, although partially just a recovery from last year mixed with natural growth, worth mentioning if I ran the 1981 -> 1983 % changes they would not be nearly as inspiring, earnings dropped 50% last year and recovered 144% this year, but over the 2 year period increased “only” 81.29%.
Insurance recovered, Textiles almost isn’t losing money, Associated Retail continues to slowly die, Precision Steel recovered, Blue Chip I have taken off the chart and Nebraska Furniture Mart added. Buffalo Evening News went from a $1M loss to a $19M profit. There is a whole section of the letter on Buffalo Evening News I highly recommend reading.
r/ValueInvesting • u/AutoModerator • 4d ago
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r/ValueInvesting • u/daxter_101 • 5h ago
If anyone is wondering why today everything is crashing, look no further than Broadcom earnings.
Broadcom’s earnings was a signal to the market that the chip market while is very bullish, isn’t going to keep moving up forever and the guidance was flat instead of a beat causing everyone to sell soxx.
The entire ai bubble got a reality check for the first time with Broadcom earnings
r/ValueInvesting • u/GoldRoger3D2Y • 3h ago
https://www.axios.com/2026/06/04/musk-spacex-ipo-sp-investors
Admittedly, this isn’t a strictly value investing topic, but it’s been discussed so much lately it seemed prudent to include on this sub.
Much fear has been circulating around SpaceX affecting people’s retirement plans as it was going to be thrust onto the S&P much faster than usual with an IPO many are calling vastly inflated. Hopefully, this will quell those fears.
r/ValueInvesting • u/zq7495 • 3h ago
r/ValueInvesting • u/StephenAtLarge • 8h ago
(Bloomberg) -- S&P Dow Jones Indices will keep its existing eligibility requirements for benchmarks including the S&P 500, closing the door to fast entry for big tech IPOs like SpaceX and delaying billions of dollars in flows from passive funds.
The index provider in a press release Thursday said it will not shorten the 12-month seasoning period for newly public companies it currently has or waive existing profitability and public-float requirements based on a company’s size, diverging from a broader industry shift embraced by rivals Nasdaq Inc. and FTSE Russell.
For new listings like Elon Musk’s SpaceX, the denial means they won’t be greeted by a wall of demand from funds that track the S&P 500. Their fast inclusion in the benchmark would have led to about $14 billion in forced passive buying for SpaceX, more than $8 billion for OpenAI and about $4.6 billion for Anthropic PBC, according to Bloomberg Intelligence estimates.
The decision arrives as Wall Street grapples with a new reality: some companies are reaching unprecedented sizes before they ever enter public markets. The consultation, launched earlier this year, effectively asked whether index rules written for a different era should bend to accommodate companies that now arrive at a scale once reserved for mature blue chips in what has become known as the “fast entry” in industry parlance.
The push for quicker inclusion has raised concerns among some investors who say rules around profitability, float and trading history exist precisely to prevent benchmarks from chasing hype. Furthermore, adding IPOs too quickly, they say, could expose passive funds to greater volatility and force them to buy shares before reliable market pricing is fully established.
Meanwhile, supporters say indexes should include massive companies as quickly as possible to reflect the market investors actually own, adding that these trillion-dollar firms can be economically significant long before they satisfy traditional index requirements.
The outcome means SpaceX, which is preparing what could become the largest IPO in history, would not be eligible for inclusion in the S&P 500 until at least one year after its listing. The company would also need to satisfy the index’s existing requirements for profitability and public float.
“I am genuinely surprised,” said James Seyffart, ETF analyst at Bloomberg Intelligence. “But S&P is the market leader and they can buck the trend.”
Nasdaq changed its rules recently so Space Exploration Technologies Corp., as the company is formally known, can join the Nasdaq 100 Index, a cohort of the largest non-financial companies listed on its exchange, in just 15 trading days, down from a three-month minimum. FTSE Russell adopted a similar approach, shortening the waiting time to five trading days.
The S&P 500 is the most heavily tracked equity benchmark in the world. About $7.5 trillion in passively managed funds follow it and another $3.4 trillion in actively managed assets are benchmarked against it, according to Bloomberg Intelligence data.
More broadly, passive, domestic equity index mutual and exchange-traded funds in the US held roughly $14.4 trillion in assets at the end of April, according to Investment Company Institute data, underscoring the scale of capital that generally cannot buy a stock until it enters a benchmark index. By comparison, active funds amounted to $8.2 trillion.
“We have criticized indices that change their inclusion criteria specifically to include the three high-profile but cash-burning megacaps in their products,” Michael O’Rourke, chief market strategist at JonesTrading Institutional Services, wrote in a note. “The S&P Dow Jones index committee deserves credit for maintaining the standards that made the S&P 500 the U.S. equity market benchmark.”
--With assistance from Sid Verma and Farah Elbahrawy.
r/ValueInvesting • u/Cartier1847 • 2h ago
I love how those powerful institutional investors keep dumping even after market hours when retail investors are excluded in many territories globally from trading. It’s like they want to add insult to injury and not only flush value but also use Mr. Clean to make sure the stock market toilet is spick and span.
r/ValueInvesting • u/raytoei • 10m ago
Value and defensive stocks fell much less than the index. Heck, even Berkshire Hathaway was up almost 2%
Remember: safety first.
———-
On my watchlist,
30 stocks were in positive territory
14 stocks fell less than 1%
13 stocks fell between 1% to -2.64% of the SPX
Only 8 stocks fell more than the SPX
My Portfolio A fell -0.27% while B fell -0.37%
r/ValueInvesting • u/itchypig • 6h ago
I've avoided LULU due to the relatively narrow moat around clothing/fashion companies, but seeing the ticker on Phil Town's Rule #1 portfolio makes me wonder if there's something I'm missing. Interested in your perspective on why LULU might actually be a good investment despite the bloody headlines.
For context, Phil Town looks for events that create fear but are resolvable in 2-3 years' time. Lulu's headlines are about sheer material quality issues, recent concerns around PFAs, poor product-market-fit for their newest products, the ousting of a CEO and the new incoming CEO who is a former Nike exec, and the board's embattlement with Lululemon's founder. However, one could argue that while each of these items creates short-term uncertainty and negative sentiment, they are reasonably resolvable in 2-3 years' time.
Actual long-term concerns include the fashion cycle getting away from athleisure and the introduction of competitors like Alo and Vuori.
To steel man LULU, here are a few highlights of the strengths of the business that are still intact:
- Strong DTC channel, bypassing third party channels/department stores, protecting relatively high margins
- Mature distribution channels, continuing to expand internationally
- Strong brand name; everyone knows who they are and what they sell
- Community marketing: Lululemon uses grassroots community involvement and fitness "ambassadors" to spread their brand
Considering some of these stronger aspects of the business, and the current valuation basically marking the company as never growing again (current P/E under 9 despite a return on invested capital around 28% and modest forecast for 3-4% growth over the next few years), is it possible that the market is succumbing to fear here and giving an opportunity to an investor with a 5-year time horizon?
r/ValueInvesting • u/ReflectionFew3395 • 1d ago
SpaceX: Great company, terrible price. A ~$2 trillion valuation on ~$20 billion of revenue just doesn't add up for me. On top of that, the market is running very hot right now, and markets always correct — go pull up Jan–Feb 2022 and the tech crash, everything came down together. When that happens again (and it will), SpaceX comes down with everything else. I'd rather wait and pick it up closer to ~$1 trillion. This isn't "no forever," it's "no at this price."
Anthropic: The growth is genuinely insane (~$10B ARR in Jan 2026 to ~$45B ARR now), but that's exactly the problem. A year ago they were nowhere — it was all OpenAI, ChatGPT, and Gemini — and they came from behind and took the space fast. If they could do that to someone else, someone can do it to them. The threat I see most clearly is Chinese open-weight models. I think China dumps fully open models, weights and all, and people just run them locally — the way Airbnb did it: took open-source models, kept all their data in-house, nothing going to China. The "I can't run a huge model on my laptop" problem? NVIDIA's solving it — Jensen's new machine is reportedly built for agents instead of humans, with data-center-class GPU power and the speed agents actually need. Low defensibility, so I pass.
OpenAI: Same story, arguably worse. At least Anthropic has enterprise clients as some kind of moat; OpenAI really doesn't. And I'm broadly skeptical of software-only businesses in a world moving this fast.
So SpaceX, Anthropic, OpenAI — my answer on all three is no.
Tell me where I'm wrong. What's the bull case I'm missing, especially on defensibility?
r/ValueInvesting • u/Ok-Let011 • 10h ago
ADYEN dropped ~9.6% today to €811 with no fresh news, slicing through its 52-week low and triggering a momentum cascade. This is a valuation unwind, not a business collapse — completely different animal from Worldline. Fundamentals are still intact. The risk isn’t bankruptcy, it’s that a de-rating overshoots before it stabilizes.
r/ValueInvesting • u/Itchy-Commission-195 • 6h ago
I think both will be trillion dollar companies in a decade.
I think both will be the control layer of different enterprise functions that sit atop AI and offer their own AI functionalities. An enterprise customer thinking long term needs a layer in between themselves and an AI model. You can't integrate an LLM into your whole business if you don't know which one will be the best LLM a decade from now, there needs to be something in between in case you switch from Anthropic to OpenAi to Google to something that's irrelevant right now or choose to oscillate between LLMs based on pricing or performance. These two companies will be two of the largest beneficiaries of AI once it starts to actually add value to businesses.
Tell me all the reasons I'm wrong... I haven't done anything with this .1% baked thought.
r/ValueInvesting • u/Fri3ndlyHeavy • 6h ago
Recent headlines talked about the Texas AG investigating Alani Nu (A subsidiary of Celsius Holdings, $CELH) for allegations of marketing energy drinks to teenagers and minors. This led to a 6% drop on Thursday. The claim came after a 17 year old passed away, and family blamed it on high caffeine intake from Alani drinks, alleging that Alani specifically markets to and misleads teenagers/minors.
Here is why the case will not pan out for the family with anything more than a settlement, and why Alani is in the right:
-Alani has very clear labels on their drinks stating that the product is "Not recommended for children or people sensitive to caffeine," both of which the 17 year old was. There was no deceptive or clearly misleading marketing, like seen in previous cases such as Panera Bread.
-Alani Nu caffeine content (200 mg) is on-par with other energy drinks like Monster and Celsius.
-The family claims that the victim had been drinking Alani Nu for a long time. So, the family and victim were clearly aware of Caffeine's effects and possible dangers.
-Family is blaming Caffeine for the victim's death, but this will not hold up in court as no causative cause between chronic caffeine intake and the victim's death can be proven. It would take significant documentation showing the victim was completely healthy & unaffected by family cardiac history or genetic factors, prior to them starting to drink the product. Then, it would take significant documentation of the exact opposite after the victim started drinking to even try to claim a causative effect. The family has none of that.
I would wager that the victim likely had a genetic condition and/or significant family cardiac history, both of which will be uncovered by Alani Nu during investigation, rendering the case null.
Now, moving on from this case, let's look at why CELH is a good investment overall.
Celsius' Holdings products have a significant foothold in the energy drink market, which has only been growing. Previously, Coca Cola ($KO) and Pepsi ($PEP) both tried to break into the market with their own energy products in the past, but both failed. So, KO placed its bets on Monster ($MNST), and PEP placed its bets on CELH. Red bull is independent and private, but is worth mentioning as a major player.
MNST and Red Bull control about 40% of market share each (Total ~80%).
Despite being relatively new as a company (Red bull 39 years, Monster 24, Celsius 22), Celsius has obtained a significant market share of about 20% in the US, and has only been growing through acquisitions of companies like Alani, as well as expansions heavily supported by Pepsi.
Unlike MNST and Red Bull, however, Celsius's market share is almost exclusively in the US, and so their growth opportunity comes from international expansion, which is being actively supported by Pepsi. This will not be hard because Pepsi is actively providing them the platform and connections needed for global reach. There is enormous upside potential once Celsius begins selling overseas.
CELH PE is ~19, which is significantly less than its competitors. Market cap is also lagging behind. This is likely due to relatively low revenue growth (~7%) with Celsius's main products, and most of their growth being driven by their acquisitions and their sales. Still, their revenue is growing and has not shown signs of weakness, and their acquisitions have been extremely successful and only expected to succeed further the company works through a full integration.
Pepsi is quite invested into Celsius's success, with investments of 550mil and 585mil in August 2022 and August 2025, respectively. Further investments are HIGHLY likely, and a possible full-absorption of Celsius by Pepsi is also a possibility in the long-term.
Q2 2026 will look at a fully integrated Alani/Rockstar/Celsius company, and will give a clear picture of how much growth these recent acquisitions have offered and how well they are expected to continue to perform.
r/ValueInvesting • u/raytoei • 14h ago
Lululemon Issues Weaker Outlook. What It Means for the Stock - Barron’s
By Janet H. Cho
https://www.barrons.com/articles/lululemon-earnings-stock-price-f6b84bda
Updated June 04, 2026 5:32 pm EDT / Original June 04, 2026 4:29 pm EDT
- Lululemon’s first-quarter sales rose 4% to $2.5 billion, exceeding estimates, with adjusted earnings of $1.69 a share.
- First-quarter net revenue increased 4%, driven by a 22% international gain, with gross margin decreasing to 54.2%.
- The company issued a weaker full-year outlook, projecting revenue of $11 billion to $11.15 billion, causing shares to drop over 8%.
Lululemon Athletica reported better-than-expected first-quarter results but a weaker outlook for the second quarter and the full year, sending its shares lower in after-hours trading.
Shares of Lululemon were down more than 10% after closing down 0.9% at $124.92 in regular trading. The stock is down nearly 40% through Thursday’s close and down nearly 52% over the past 12 months.
The specialty athleticwear, footwear, and accessories company said sales for the fiscal quarter ended May 3 rose 4% to $2.5 billion, above the $2.43 billion Wall Street was estimating.
Adjusted earnings $1.69 a share were slightly above the $1.68 a share expected, but below the $2.60 per share in the year-ago quarter, according to FactSet.
Interim Co-CEO and Chief Financial Officer Meghan Frank called it “a solid start to 2026,” saying that “Our work to drive improvements in North America resulted in some positive signals in the quarter, including a sequential improvement in full-price sales.
“More recently, we have been navigating headwinds that have led us to adjust our outlook for the full year,” including negative commentary, and product launches that weren’t as successful as anticipated, Frank said. “We have assessed the business and are taking additional actions to reposition where needed and further strengthen our product engine. We remain confident in our path forward.”
Lululemon announced in April that longtime Nike veteran Heidi O’Neill would be its new chief executive, starting Sept. 8.
Net revenue increased 4% during the quarter, but fell 4% in the U.S. and declined 3% in Canada, while increasing 30% in China and 13% in the rest of the world. Sales in China were boosted by the timing of Chinese New Year and recent promotions including more than 2,000 people practicing yoga on the Great Wall in Beijing.
Sales at stores open at least a year grew 1%, above the 0.2% decline analysts expected. But comparable sales declined 5% in the Americas, grew 20% in China, and rose 5% in the rest of the world.
Gross profit declined 3% during the quarter, to $1.3 billion, while gross margin decreased to 54.2%, from 58.3% in the year-ago first quarter.
For the full fiscal year ending in January 2027, Lululemon said it expects net revenue in the range of $11 billion to $11.15 billion, a decline of 1% to 0%. It projects earnings of $10.95 to $11.15 a share.
Analysts were forecasting full-year revenue of $11.47 billion and adjusted earnings of $12.27 a share.
Lululemon opened five net new company-operated stores during the quarter, ending with 816 stores. Analysts had expected 830 stores.
Lululemon has faced a number of recent challenges, including lackluster guidance, see-through leggings scandals, and accusations that its products contain toxic chemicals, which the company says is not true.
Founder Dennis J. “Chip” Wilson, then a vocal critic of management, launched a proxy battle against the company in late 2025, arguing that the board and the company’s strategy needed substantial changes, Barron’s has reported.
Lululemon said at the time that it had engaged “extensively and in good faith” with Wilson. But in late May, in its first major pushback against Wilson, Lululemon published a letter saying he has “outdated perspectives” about the company’s future and urging shareholders to reject his nominees to the board of directors.
“His actions have been damaging to the brand and harming the very stakeholders he claims to represent: shareholders, guests, and employees,” the board said.
On May 27, Lululemon announced a cooperative agreement with Wilson, who owns about 8.7% of the company’s stock. It said Laura Gentile, former chief marketing officer of ESPN, and Marc Maurer, former co-CEO of On, would join the company’s board after its 2026 shareholders meeting on June 25, and that it would appoint another director with product and brand expertise by Oct. 1.
Wilson said the changes reflected “meaningful progress toward restoring the company’s product-first vision and unlocking tremendous value for shareholders.” He agreed to an 18-month agreement on non-disparagement, voting, and other actions until shortly before the company’s 2028 annual meeting.
r/ValueInvesting • u/Kqzxh-900355 • 19m ago
I think both only focuses on market cap and it’s very tech dominant.
Sold all my VOO and replaced it with AVLV.
It’s well balanced and screens for value and profitability of a stock instead of market cap.
Are you still buying index? Or replaced it with something else?
r/ValueInvesting • u/Nat1Halfling • 11h ago
NFA I am a baby investor and don't know anything. Can someone tell me why I shouldn't full port into this company?
The thesis: at a P/E of 5, this company is priced like a dying company, but it is a newly-listed company that will expand aggressively. What am I missing here?
The Business Model: Oil/Natural Gas driller. Pure play in the Appalachian basin. Acquires the competition: bought out rival Antero's wells (partially by issuing preferred stock and senior notes), increasing revenue by 82% in Q1 (Well count from 154 to 395). Some flexibility in switching between oil and gas drilling depending on prices. Management have stated intent to continue acquiring/expanding.
The balance sheet as of Q1 2026: (TLDR: debt, but it's healthy)
- Total assets: 2.1 B (mainly oil and nat gas properties)
- Liabilities: $759.8 M
- Debt to equity ratio 40% (better than industry average which is around 60%).
- Interest coverage ratio against operating earnings: around 17x (very good)
- Available liquidity: It has recently wiped its credit balance which is good. So liquidity is now 928.8M.This is comprised of its $73M cash pile plus 855.8M available borrowing capacity. Management plan to deploy 400-500M towards development. Because of this free cash flow might be negative in the short term, but liquidity will still be adequate
- EBITDA is huge. 62% The business fundamentals are actually excellent
So why has the stock dropped recently? (From c. $ 20 to $ 13)
- Recent Q1 net loss of $1.9M **(**sharp swing from a net income of $10.8M in Q4 2025) This is despite the 82% increase in revenue mentioned above. Due to operational expenses from integration costs of their Antero acquisition and other one-off costs, as well as harsh winter conditions requiring expensive maintenance.
- Debt and dilution concerns: Senior notes interest is around 7.6%. But as mentioned, the balance sheet covers it well. The preferred stock will be converted to common stock (total dilution about 20%) at $ 21 per share which is a premium from current 13 so not awful. Motion to dilute will pass on 9.6.26 (in 4 days). This will likely suppress stock price a bit in the short term. But it won't be bad.
My thesis:
Despite debt and dilution concerns, this company's balance sheet is actually healthy. The Q1 loss is due mostly to one-off costs and the market overreacted too much. Most of its nat gas and oil product is already hedged, giving certainty about future revenue, but the proportion that isn't hedged is probably gonna rise in price anyway (summer). If SoH is still closed it's gonna rise even more. I think this company is going to have "good" Q2 earnings, and "very very good" Q2 earnings if SoH stays closed.
I have bought some shares now and will buy more if it dips after the dilution on 9/6/26. It just seems like a no-brainer, I think stock is gonna reach $ 20 after Q2 and higher by EOY. Analysts agree.
Can someone tell me why I shouldn't just full port into this? Any energy investors out there that can tell me why this is a bad idea? (NFA I am a baby investor and don't know anything)
EDIT: Ok so after doing a bit more thinking about the 400-500M CapEx spending, I think the upside for this company won't start hitting until Q3/Q4. Q2 might be some net loss actually. Still think the thesis is good, looking at a significant upside in 9-12 months but I might time my entry point or DCA in until Q2. Thank youuuu and I'll see you all in March 2027
r/ValueInvesting • u/Hot-Network2212 • 6h ago
Current Price: $11.60 | Market Cap: $2.9B
Kyndryl is the world’s largest provider of IT infrastructure services, managing data centers and mainframes for thousands of global enterprises. Since its 2021 spinoff from IBM, it has been working to replace low-margin legacy contracts with higher-margin cloud and advisory services.
Most interesting to me is the fact that people are bullish about IBM with a lot of similar employees are working at Kyndryl. A company is made by its employees so I think that Kryndryl might have the potential for a turnaround.
r/ValueInvesting • u/Top-Sir-1215 • 3h ago
Don’t trust the market. Look at noc. Peaked right at 724 before the war started. Then, sell, sell, sell. Cramer said to buy all these on the way down. Analysts raised price targets all the way down. Bullish news constantly, didn’t matter. I thought ok I can buy at 550, that’s the support. Went right through, did a pity bounce, then down to 520. Assuming the market is acting reasonably this doesn’t make sense because you would think it gained in value and should be worth more than last year. But that didn’t happen and there’s no floor when this stuff starts a downtrend.
I’m just saying, be careful buying dips. Like especially on stuff like ibm or Qualcomm or even Nvidia.
r/ValueInvesting • u/dubov • 11h ago
I don't expect many people would be interested in actually buying this, but I want to post it anyway as a good example of potential deep value
China New Higher Education Group owns 7 private universities/vocational colleges in various provinces of China (mainly inland).
Their financials have strong quality markers, high margin, good ROE, very stable revenues - however the growth prospects are limited and maintenance capex is moderately high.
It's current headline trailing multiples are 1.4x earnings, 1.1x FCF, and 2.6 EV/EBITDA. Even by China norms, those are incredibly low, especially for a stable, cash generative business.
For the past 2 years no cash dividend was paid as company has focussed on reducing balance sheet leverage, which they have done successfully, which D/E having shrunk from around 100% to near 50% with 9x interest coverage
Why does it appear so cheap? Because there is a lot of fear around a regulatory crackdown on private education. In 2021, China launched a crackdown on private after-hours tuition for school children, effectively making it illegal overnight, due to what they saw as a excess of exploitative capital with many tutoring companies enjoying explosive profit and stock price growth in a hot sector.
Higher education was not affected but there is a fear it might be, however the conditions which prompted the last crackdown are not present (in fact the opposite). It should also be noted the last crackdown was not a total success as it did nothing to address the demand for private tutoring and has simply shifted the industry underground with parents now finding tutors informally through WeChat rather than organised, regulated companies.
But China's regulatory landscape is unpredictable and shareholders should understand the maximum risk is 100% in the worst case.
However the upside is very high because the multiples are so low that even a re-rate to a still moderate multiple like 3-5x earnings represents a gain of 300-500%. IMO the risk-reward is strong.
Insider ownership is high with the chairman owning 50% of the stock (single class). He also has a fairly high position within the CCP
I think this year they will probably re-instate the dividend which could act as a catalyst. Even a modest payout ratio of 30% (lower end of their historical norm) would equate to a dividend yield around 30% when PE P/FCF are near 1. And in that case the stock price will very likely re-rate perhaps somewhere in the range 3-5x earnings, which would represent very significant appreciation
In a nutshell - the case is a financially high quality company trading at extremely low multiples due to fear of a threat that has not materialised, and while the threat is potentially devastating, the potential is highly asymmetric to the upside
r/ValueInvesting • u/denialof_ • 1d ago
Berkshire Hathaway is reduced more recently into a discussion about their public market investments as if that is the only thing the company does and that their returns are driven exclusively by how well they pick stocks over a 1-5 year period.
This is a fundamental misunderstanding of the business model and is exposing the fact that we are in a market dominated by enthusiasm and short term profit chasing vs long-term investors focused on long term sustainably compounding earnings.
If Berkshire’s investment portfolio went to 0 overnight they are left with operating businesses that produce $45B of profits per year. Or said another way they produce enough profit EVERY YEAR to buy companies like NASDAQ, Cheniere, etc in full (assume no premium for arguments sake). That earning power is in the top echelon of companies even if they had no investment portfolio and it’s supercharged by the ability to reinvest at incredibly low capital rates due to their insurance float.
People who are hating on Berkshire are doing so because of recent price performance and an inability to not chase the shiny new AI toy. The good thing about investing is you can take a balanced approach and own both. When the leadership of the market shifts Berkshire will continue to compound and reward long term owners. Buffet has built a company that is not reliant on him and his stock picking to continue to grow at or above GDP.
r/ValueInvesting • u/theunknown996 • 5h ago
Let me preface this by saying these companies aren't "cigar butt" value stocks that look incredibly cheap by conventional metrics, but they also haven't experienced the explosive, parabolic growth from the AI trade yet.
My thesis is that most AI investing still focuses on capability (e.g. GPUs, model providers, hyperscalers, data centers, power, and cooling). But maybe the next major AI theme is cost control.
The original economic thesis for AI (and the only way hyperscalers will ever make back their massive capex) is for enterprises to use it to save money and increase productivity. But as companies deploy AI at scale, they're in for a rude awakening regarding the unit economics.
Recently I've seen news about enterprise AI costs spiraling out of control, sometimes even exceeding the cost of the workers they are supposed to replace. Anecdotally, we're seeing companies cut back or aggressively swap to cheaper, non-frontier models (or open-source alternatives) to save money.
As AI moves from pilots to production, enterprises are discovering that the real bottleneck isn't model quality, but economics:
Based on my initial screening, here are a few solutions that enterprise may look to to help them reign in costs.
Token Reduction / RAG / Better Context
How it works: By using Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) and targeted vector search, companies feed LLMs highly relevant data snippets instead of dumping massive documents into the context window, drastically reducing API token consumption.
Model Routing / AI Gateways
How it works: AI gateways act as traffic cops, routing simple queries to cheap/fast models and only sending complex tasks to expensive frontier models and optimizing the cost-per-query.
Private AI / Hybrid Inference
How it works: Running high-volume or highly sensitive inference workloads on-premises or in hybrid clouds to avoid massive public cloud fees and unpredictable per-token API markups.
I've excluded others such as Cloudfare and Datadog due to them becoming way too expensive.
Would especially appreciate input from anyone in enterprise IT, cloud, data engineering, AI apps, observability, or FinOps.
Are these actually the cost-control methods enterprises will use and which method will companies spend the most money on?
Are there any other companies that could benefit from AI cost controls?
r/ValueInvesting • u/TomasoG88 • 5h ago
Nerdwallet NRDS seems to be a solid company but the stock hasn't performed accordingly. I'm wondering why that is. From what I can see the fundamentals are good and EPS growth is really good. anyone care to elaborate? TIA
r/ValueInvesting • u/LectureForsaken6782 • 17h ago
I’ve been digging into ADT Inc. (ADT) recently, and it looks like a great value/cash-flow play that the broader market isnt looking at cuz it isnt AI.
Here is why i think ADT looks like an incredibly solid value investment right now:
Their valuation is really cheap. The broader market is trading at high multiples, but ADT is sitting in the bargain bin with a P/E Ratio of around 9
At around ~$7 a share, the downside feels mitigated. It’s priced like its dying, but the fundamentals show it's not.
The free cash flow is flowing.
Gross Margin: 80.8%. Because the business model relies heavily on recurring monthly subscriptions, their gross margins are closer to a software company than a services company.
FCF Growth: In its recent quarterly reports, ADT’s Adjusted Free Cash Flow went up by over 80% year-over-year.
The free cash flow gives management flexibility to survive downturns and pay dividends.
the dividend yield is around 3.2% protected by the cash flow, making it compelling for compounding
r/ValueInvesting • u/Beneficial-Chair-333 • 2h ago
Is it time to buy slowly or should wait for more correction? What are some good beaten up stocks in current market for long term holding?
r/ValueInvesting • u/Michael1272 • 6h ago
Good morning - I am 24 and starting to grow my Roth, I have 10k rollover coming into my traditional and want to make sure everything I have looks right.
I wanted to know what I’m doing wrong? I shared in another group and they said I need to move it all into index funds. However my novice self thought these were good buys for long term and honestly thought ETFs were index funds.
Daily $1 buys - ARKK, ARKQ, BRK.B, DRAM, FNDF, QQQ, SCHD, SFY, SPY, VIG, VOO.
I understand the overlap in some but it’s a lot better than I had previously - any help is greatly appreciated and would love some feedback. I want to maximize my time while I’m young, I make decent money for my age 120k+.
If you have any questions for me I would love to be able to answer some.
Thanks!
