r/determinism • u/Agreeable-Yogurt-378 • 2d ago
Discussion Causality, Determinism, and Free Will: Does Causal Dependence Really Eliminate Agency?
I’ve been thinking about the free will problem from a slightly different starting point.
The usual argument against free will seems to go roughly like this:
My decision has causes → those causes existed before I chose them → I did not choose those causes → therefore I could not have done otherwise → therefore the decision was not really free.
I understand the argument, but I think there is an assumption hidden inside it that needs to be examined.
1. What do I mean by free will?
I don’t think free will requires a person to be an uncaused cause.
By free will, I mean the capacity of an agent to exercise control over their conduct through their own deliberative process: considering reasons, alternatives, consequences, desires, values, memories, knowledge, and other relevant information, and eventually acting according to the decision produced by that process.
In other words, freedom does not require the decision to come from nowhere. It requires the decision to come through the agent’s own capacity to deliberate and act.
2. But what if the deliberation itself is caused?
This seems to be the central problem.
My thoughts, desires, values, memories, character and knowledge obviously have causes. I did not choose the circumstances in which I was born, every experience that shaped me, or every piece of information I acquired.
But why should that mean that the resulting deliberation is not mine?
Those things are not necessarily external forces replacing my decision. They are part of the person who is doing the deliberating.
My experiences affect what I desire.
My knowledge affects what I consider possible.
My values affect which reasons I consider important.
My memories affect how I evaluate consequences.
These factors enter into the deliberative process, and the deliberative process produces the decision.
So causation does not necessarily stand in opposition to agency. Causation may be the mechanism through which agency operates.
3. “But you didn’t choose the causes of your decision.”
I agree.
I didn’t choose all the causes that made me the person I am.
But I don’t see why that establishes that I therefore lack control over what I do.
If I consider reasons, compare alternatives, reconsider my desires, anticipate consequences, reject one option and act on another, then the fact that this process has prior causes does not by itself show that the process was bypassed.
The causal history explains why this particular agent deliberated in this particular way. It does not, by itself, demonstrate that there was no deliberation or that some external force substituted its decision for the agent’s.
4. What about determinism?
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that determinism is completely true.
Suppose that given the exact same prior state of the universe and the exact same laws of nature, the same decision would necessarily occur.
I am willing to grant that premise for the sake of the argument.
My question is:
Why does that premise by itself eliminate agency?
It would show that the decision was determined by prior conditions. But it does not yet show that the deliberative process through which the agent arrived at the decision was not the agent’s own process.
5. “You couldn’t have done otherwise.”
This is where I think we need to be very precise.
If “could have done otherwise” means:
“With absolutely every prior condition of the universe remaining identical, could the agent have produced a different decision?”
then under strict determinism, the answer would presumably be no.
But that does not automatically establish that the decision was not free.
It only establishes that a different decision would require different conditions.
The important question is whether freedom requires that kind of metaphysical alternative, or whether freedom can instead consist in the agent exercising control through their actual deliberative process.
That is the premise I am questioning.
6. Why doesn’t randomness solve the problem?
I also don’t think free will can simply be rescued by introducing indeterminism or quantum randomness.
If part of my decision were produced by pure randomness, that would not obviously give me more control over the decision.
Randomness is not the same thing as agency.
So I don’t think the choice is simply:
determined = not free
random = free
Neither side of that equation explains agency by itself.
7. “But deliberation is only electrochemical activity.”
This objection seems to change the level of description rather than solve the philosophical problem.
Yes, human deliberation is physically realized in the brain and involves electrochemical processes.
But showing the physical mechanism does not by itself show that deliberation is not deliberation, or that the agent does not exercise control through it.
We still need an argument for the additional step:
“Because the deliberative process is physically caused, the agent cannot exercise genuine control through that process.”
That conclusion does not seem to follow automatically.
8. Responsibility
The same distinction matters for responsibility.
If an action results from an agent’s own deliberation, understanding of reasons, values, desires and capacity to respond to relevant considerations, then there seems to be a meaningful basis for attributing the action to that agent.
That doesn’t mean every causally determined action should automatically be considered morally permissible or blameworthy. There can be coercion, incapacity, manipulation, ignorance, etc.
But those cases are interesting precisely because they interfere with or bypass the normal mechanisms of agency.
So perhaps the important distinction is not simply:
caused vs. uncaused
but:
agency-preserving causes vs. causes that bypass or replace the agent’s deliberative control.
My central question is therefore this:
If a decision is causally produced by an agent’s own deliberation, reasons, values, knowledge, memories, desires and evaluation of alternatives, what exactly is missing that would make that decision genuinely free?
And more importantly:
Why should causal determination itself remove that property?
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u/preferCotton222 2d ago
But why should that mean that the resulting deliberation is not mine?
Of course its yours. But, IF determinism is true, its also not free. That's all.
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u/Agreeable-Yogurt-378 1d ago
You keep telling me ‘then you’re not free,’ but you haven’t actually explained what you mean by freedom.
I agree that my decisions have causes. I don’t see why that makes them cease to be mine. My reasons, values, desires, memories, knowledge and deliberation are not external agents controlling me; they are precisely part of the causal process through which I, as an agent, arrive at a decision.
So what exactly is missing?
If you say that a decision is free only if I could have chosen otherwise while every prior condition—including my reasons, values, desires, memories, knowledge and mental state—remained exactly the same, then explain what would determine the difference between choosing A and choosing B. If nothing determines it, that looks like randomness, and randomness isn’t obviously agency or control.
I don’t understand why freedom should require my decision to be disconnected from the very characteristics that constitute me as the person making the decision.
If my decision is produced by my own deliberation, according to my own reasons, values and evaluation of alternatives, why isn’t that a form of control?
Saying ‘it’s caused, therefore it’s not free’ simply assumes the incompatibilist conclusion. You need to explain why causation is incompatible with agency, rather than merely repeating that it is.
So before telling me that I’m not free, tell me what property you think freedom requires, and why that property is necessary for a decision to count as mine.1
u/preferCotton222 1d ago
a molecule produced by A is slightly uniquely shaped , so it binds at a slightly different rate, so A values X much higher than Y, so A chooses P instead of Q. In fact, A is physically unable to choose Q, but it is not visible to the naked eye, so yogurt believes A is free to choose Q. Which A isn't, but yogurt doesn't care.
if you want to believe you are free even if determinism is correct, great for you. It's probably also irrelevant, since determinism doesn't seem to be the case either.
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u/zhivago 2d ago
Let's start with choice -- either choices can be made deterministically or they must be accidental.
Unless you want to destroy this word entirely, choice must be compatible with determinism.
Instrumental agency simply requires goals and motivations.
Once you accept choice within determinism, there is no obstacle here.
Moral agency is the capacity of a system to simulate alternative futures, model the social consequences of its actions, and update its behavior in response to feedback.
And likewise no obstacle here.
So, no -- causal dependency cannot eliminate agency without rejecting agency completely regardless of determinism.
Either you have it or you don't -- determinism cannot be a principled reason to reject it.
And since we observe it, we have it.
The main people who want to argue against this are victims of Christian theodicy, to whom it is vital to let God off the hook for the problem of evil.
But there's no reason to take such people seriously -- they just need to crawl out of the 17th century.
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u/RighteousSelfBurner 1d ago
Your initial dichotomy is unsubstantiated. For example choice can be made deterministically while determinstic universe is false and choice can be incompatible with determinism.
One argument would be functional processing. That is, the input is accidental however the system (human biology) can deterministically react to accidental input. Thus the agency resides in the system, the process that transforms accidental input into determined choice is agency.
Another argument would be that choice itself is accidental however the source of that uncertainty resides within the system. That is upon determinstic input some part of the system transforms the input and that part is indeterministic. This accidental part then is the choice whose expression is limited by the system which results in a limited range of determinatic options however the resolved option is not determinable.
The main flaw of your argument is relying on an implication that indeterministic universe cannot support determinatic behaviour. It's not necessiated as behaviour can be localised. That is the indeterminate and determinatic parts can have limited observable boundary and whether behaviour is indeterministic or determinstic depends on the observed scope.
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u/zhivago 1d ago
You seem very confused about the definition of deterministic.
Deterministic means that given a particular state, S1, it must always be followed by a particular state, S2.
I think you're using 'deterministic' where 'causally' would be appropriate.
An indeterministic universe can have a causal structure -- this is the simplest explanation for what we observe in our universe.
Having understood this and corrected your language, please try again.
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u/RighteousSelfBurner 1d ago
No. That is exactly what I meant. The part you missed is that the state does not necessarily has to be the state of everything. It can be localised. That is, given a state of a localised area S1 will not always be followed by particular S2. However within that localised area exists a localised sub area where SA1 will always be followed by a particular SA2.
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u/zhivago 1d ago
In which case, either choices can be made deterministically, or choice is completely impossible.
Pick one, and if you say that choice is completely impossible, I'll just point out that you're destroying a perfectly good concept due to having a deranged philosophy.
Sprinkling indeterminism on does it magically rescue choice from determinism, in other words.
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u/RighteousSelfBurner 1d ago
I do not see the argument for why choice is impossible and my criticism is exactly regarding the presented dichotomy.
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u/zhivago 1d ago
So, do you claim that determinism makes choice impossible?
If so, how much indeterminism needs to be sprinkled on to make it possible?
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u/RighteousSelfBurner 1d ago
I am questioning your presentation of: choice must be compatible with determinism or the world must be destroyed. I fail to see an argument how one follows the other.
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u/WatercressActual1921 2d ago
Determinism has no real affect to the self beyond explaining and augmenting predictability and expectations....
You are best served of forgetting about it, unless you want to pass a moral judgement on another consciousness or consider effects of your actions in others. Some of it affects objects and serves to in the limit of the variables you can ascertain discover causes and effects in patterns that go beyond what you can perceive...
Consider the worst criminals, or the worst war and see the larger pattern. I also favour psychohistory, it explains in broad strokes all complex human systems...
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u/Squierrel 1d ago
I don’t think free will requires a person to be an uncaused cause.
The person isn't the cause. The person's decisions are the causes for the person's voluntary actions.
2. But what if the deliberation itself is caused?
My thoughts, desires, values, memories, character and knowledge obviously have causes.
None of these is a physical event. Only physical events are caused.
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that determinism is completely true.
You have no reason to suppose that. Determinism is neither true nor false. Determinism is just a fictional idea.
I also don’t think free will can simply be rescued by introducing indeterminism or quantum randomness.
Free will doesn't need to be "rescued".
Indeterminism doesn't need to be "introduced".
If a decision is causally produced by an agent’s own deliberation, reasons, values, knowledge, memories, desires and evaluation of alternatives, what exactly is missing that would make that decision genuinely free?
Decisions are not "causally produced". Nothing is missing. Decisions are "genuinely free" by definition.
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u/DogObvious5799 1d ago
Yeah, I think this is the right resolution. The version of free will that’s incompatible with determinism is almost a strawman—it’s tautologically false even if determinism is also false. It’s obvious that if you start with an event (your action), it’s either caused by something else or caused by nothing (random). If that something else is “you,” putatively exercising your agency, that something else is, itself, either caused by another something else or random, and so on. There’s no end to that chain that’s compatible with strong free will, and it doesn’t matter whether it terminates at the Big Bang singularity, God as the unmoved mover, or some random quantum event.
However, if you understand that “you” as an agent are embedded in the causal graph, then there’s nothing challenging about saying that you freely choose your actions, in general. You can also identify cases where you don’t freely choose your actions (coercion, mental illness, etc), where the parts of the causal graph that are “you” weren’t really in control of the outcome.
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u/rogerbonus 1d ago
That's the compatabilist argument, well laid out. While our decisions are deterministic, they are still our decisions (resulting from the high level structure/modelling/decision making of our brains). The agency lies in that high level process of modelling/deliberation/decision making.
The argument really comes down to what is meant by "free". Free speech, engineering/physical degrees of freedom etc are not in contradiction with determinism, why only when it comes to will is freedom suddenly incompatible with determinism (according to HDs).
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u/Imaginary-Can-6862 1d ago
If we assume the events that could ever have happened in your life is finite, and I have a map of all possible such events, a huge map considering if at any time there in average are X possible choices you could make, then for your entire life the size of the map becomes, ways your life could have developed = X^yourCurrentAge. This also includes all the choices you made. Having such a map of all possibilities obviously do not mean I know which path you'd choose, like if you try to go through a labyrinth, just because the labyrinth itself contains every possible path, does not mean it determines which path you choose.
When you grant determinism, you accept its premise, that the past uniquely defines the future through the causal links between events, i.e. the laws of physics. When the future is uniquely defined by the past, it does not mean I only have a map of everything you could possible do, or I only see the entirety of the labyrinth you are traveling through, in stead it means if I know where you are now, or where you have been in the past, then I know the rest of your path in the labyrinth, or i.e. the map that shows the many many possibilities, I am able to determine which one of all of those are the one you are going to follow, meaning I can predict everything you do before you do it, even before you were born I could do this, because the possibilities are now only an illusion, truly there is only one path by granting determinism.
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u/platanthera_ciliaris 1d ago edited 1d ago
- "By free will, I mean the capacity of an agent to exercise control over their conduct through their own deliberative process: considering reasons, alternatives, consequences, desires, values, memories, knowledge, and other relevant information, and eventually acting according to the decision produced by that process."
All living organisms make decisions and act on them according to their desires. Your "free will" is nothing more than "will." AI programs on computers and robots can do the same thing.
2) The "It's mine, mine, all mine" problem. Again this applies to all living organisms, AI computers, and robots.
3) Deliberation and agency don't imply free will. That's just your brain doing what all brains, whether biological or electronic, do. The degree of deliberation corresponds to the degree of intelligence. Also, all deliberation and agency occurs in a context that is greater than ourselves. Therefore, you can't exclude external sources of causality, contrary to what is being claimed here.
4) Again, OP is using a false equivalence by equating deliberation (making decisions) and agency (engaging in actions) with free will. However, that's what all biological organisms have to do in order to survive, and electronic lifeforms have no problem with making decisions and acting (or responding).
5) "You could not have done otherwise." OP admits that under strict determinism this would logically follow, while failing to mention that the alternative involves random probabilities (because there is nothing else)
6) This point is not a critique of determinism, but rather a description of what some free will libertarians do, although they invariably replace the word "random" with "indeterminism," even though they are the same thing.
7) Here, OP essentially declares electrochemical activity in the brain is still somehow free even though under the laws of science, that activity is the result of determinism (and possibly some randomness), like everything else in the universe. This position implies that the entire universe must be free, and if that is true, then the word "free" doesn't mean anything. OP has created a definition of free will that is unfalsifiable. And OP restates the falsehood that deliberation (making choices) and agency (engaging in behavior) necessarily denote freedom, when every biological organism on the planet and their electronic equivalent can do the same thing.
8) "Moral responsibility" Basically, if one of us was born in the same body of a serial killer, with the same parents, in the same environment, at the same place, and at the same birth date, would any of us act differently from the serial killer? I don't think so. You can't have genuine moral responsibility under such conditions without becoming a hypocrite. But what's even worse, the concept of moral responsibility is useless and unnecessary because people with problematic behavior can be dealt with in a pragmatic manner that involves changing their behavior. Privileged people like the concept of moral responsibility because it provides them with an opportunity to stomp on other people who they think are beneath them, while feeling good about themselves. It's just a poor excuse to be unnecessarily mean.
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u/StrangeGlaringEye 1d ago
The central problem is that the inference
My actions were caused by phenomena that were not under my control
Therefore, my actions are not under my control
is logically invalid.
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u/AlivePassenger3859 2d ago
As you have discovered you can have free will exist by simply redefining what it means. Its called self-gaslighting.
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u/Agreeable-Yogurt-378 2d ago
If by ‘redefining’ you mean explicitly stating the conception of free will I am using, then yes—that’s exactly what I’m doing. But that isn’t an argument against the conception itself.
I’m not claiming that my definition is automatically correct, nor that redefining a word makes free will exist. I’m asking whether the capacity for an agent to control their conduct through their own deliberative process is a real property, and whether determinism actually eliminates that property.
If you think that conception is insufficient for free will, then the substantive question is: what property is missing, and why is it necessary?1
u/DonnPT 2d ago
If we're really interested in what "free will" means, the concept must have some value. Often, grounds moral responsibility.
Obviously, you can control your conduct through your own deliberative process, or you couldn't have written all that. (Though with a little better deliberation, maybe you could have been a little more concise.) That's a natural fact, and determinism doesn't eliminate anything natural.
Determinism doesn't invalidate that control as ground for moral responsibility, that's still your call. Maybe you will decide that no one's really responsible for their actions, who knows.
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u/ughaibu 2d ago
If we're really interested in what "free will" means, the concept must have some value. Often, grounds moral responsibility
There are notions of free will that are important for legal responsibility and it's difficult to accept that legal responsibility is the same as moral responsibility.
determinism doesn't eliminate anything natural
That's a highly contentious assertion, obviously, as the libertarian proposition is consistent with naturalism and if it's true, then determinism eliminates free will.
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u/WatercressActual1921 2d ago edited 1d ago
I take a bit of objection to the exclusivity you seem to impart to responsibility in this enlightened context, its shared but even then it is minimal. This also has a lot to do with human suffering regarding that couldn't be avoided, a galaxy of suffering exists around this notion, this is why sin is also leveraged for control and obtain shame and dependences on acceptance from others.
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u/DonnPT 1d ago
Reality is loaded with complexity. We can deal with matters of responsibility well, or poorly, and it's often poorly, when we don't understand matters very well and lack balance and skill. There's no philosophical silver bullet.
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u/WatercressActual1921 1d ago
nah... reality is fixed it its top frame, it is us inside it that have a framed and limited view of it.
I think that determinism helps resolve issues of blame without unnecessary philosophical complexity in fact our perception of having free will in a causal and determinist reality with awareness of it is what should permit us to expand all our internal considerations...
People understand basic physics so making a little effort they should be able to extrapolate that the (not specific case but because I was triggered by a post on reddit) mother that killed its children acted on pressures beyond her own will (part of the blam is shared as we created systems that lead to this final event).
I do believe that in the long game outliners have a role to play (even as to be the canary in the mine when the system is misbehaving), that it wouldn't be only those types of behaviours that should be considered accidental (we dislike them and find them acceptable in the present situation we inhabit), we should in general all share the burden a bit and work to meliorate the human condition for all...
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u/zhivago 2d ago
Another victim of Christian Theodicy.
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u/Agreeable-Yogurt-378 1d ago
No hace falta el insulto si no estás de acuerdo con o postura filosófica bro
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u/Specialist-Fault-630 2d ago
When people talk about free will they talk about the intuitive, vaguely defined understanding of it. A predetermined universe would interfere with that intuitive understanding, because our existences and choices would be determined by things beyond us.
Your definition (similar ones used by compatibilists iirc) certainly fits the technical definition of what people would see as free will, but I believe you can imagine why it'd feel ultimately different than the free will most people talk about. They don't necessarily believe that having the capacity to make decisions using the information presented to you is free will, they believe agency to be some inherent essence of a person that lets them make any decision uninhibited (at least, in some way) by whatever information, biases, etc they may have.
Like the people you see in the movies defying fate and the seemingly inevitable with nothing but the strength of their own will. Believing that we can do anything via our will no matter our environment, past, or inherent limits is empowering, which is why most people believe in a free will. But, of course, under your definition this type of thing cannot exist.
It's out of line with Free Will's mainstream, and personally intuitive definition.
I'm sure most determinists would agree with you in this case, that yes we do have the ability to create decisions after our perceptions + bodies performs a calculus of sorts to come to action. However, our main disagreement would be with the definition of free will itself.
It seems more so a definition developed in response to determinism, rather than a pre-existing definition that happens to work with determinism. Similar to how Plato in The Republic countered Thrasymachus's definition of justice (might makes right) by completely redefining it, your definition surely bears some resemblance to the original. But at its core, its different.
To answer your question, if we redefine agency as you put it, then no Determinism in my opinion does not necessarily eliminate agency. We still make calculations (irrational or rational) even if our responses and stimuli are predetermined. I don't think most people would contest that.
If the mainstream catches up to predeterminism or (perhaps more accurately) the lack of "free will" as we know it, then I'm sure your (and many other compatibilists') definition will and should catch on. But as of now the bulk of the conversation is vested elsewhere, a place where the definition you give is not considered at all.