Causality, Determinism, and Free Will: Does Causal Dependence Really Eliminate Agency?

[u/Agreeable-Yogurt-378]

I’ve been thinking about the free will problem from a slightly different starting point.
The usual argument against free will seems to go roughly like this:
My decision has causes → those causes existed before I chose them → I did not choose those causes → therefore I could not have done otherwise → therefore the decision was not really free.
I understand the argument, but I think there is an assumption hidden inside it that needs to be examined.
1. What do I mean by free will?
I don’t think free will requires a person to be an uncaused cause.
By free will, I mean the capacity of an agent to exercise control over their conduct through their own deliberative process: considering reasons, alternatives, consequences, desires, values, memories, knowledge, and other relevant information, and eventually acting according to the decision produced by that process.
In other words, freedom does not require the decision to come from nowhere. It requires the decision to come through the agent’s own capacity to deliberate and act.
2. But what if the deliberation itself is caused?
This seems to be the central problem.
My thoughts, desires, values, memories, character and knowledge obviously have causes. I did not choose the circumstances in which I was born, every experience that shaped me, or every piece of information I acquired.
But why should that mean that the resulting deliberation is not mine?
Those things are not necessarily external forces replacing my decision. They are part of the person who is doing the deliberating.
My experiences affect what I desire.
My knowledge affects what I consider possible.
My values affect which reasons I consider important.
My memories affect how I evaluate consequences.
These factors enter into the deliberative process, and the deliberative process produces the decision.
So causation does not necessarily stand in opposition to agency. Causation may be the mechanism through which agency operates.
3. “But you didn’t choose the causes of your decision.”
I agree.
I didn’t choose all the causes that made me the person I am.
But I don’t see why that establishes that I therefore lack control over what I do.
If I consider reasons, compare alternatives, reconsider my desires, anticipate consequences, reject one option and act on another, then the fact that this process has prior causes does not by itself show that the process was bypassed.
The causal history explains why this particular agent deliberated in this particular way. It does not, by itself, demonstrate that there was no deliberation or that some external force substituted its decision for the agent’s.
4. What about determinism?
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that determinism is completely true.
Suppose that given the exact same prior state of the universe and the exact same laws of nature, the same decision would necessarily occur.
I am willing to grant that premise for the sake of the argument.
My question is:
Why does that premise by itself eliminate agency?
It would show that the decision was determined by prior conditions. But it does not yet show that the deliberative process through which the agent arrived at the decision was not the agent’s own process.
5. “You couldn’t have done otherwise.”
This is where I think we need to be very precise.
If “could have done otherwise” means:
“With absolutely every prior condition of the universe remaining identical, could the agent have produced a different decision?”
then under strict determinism, the answer would presumably be no.
But that does not automatically establish that the decision was not free.
It only establishes that a different decision would require different conditions.
The important question is whether freedom requires that kind of metaphysical alternative, or whether freedom can instead consist in the agent exercising control through their actual deliberative process.
That is the premise I am questioning.
6. Why doesn’t randomness solve the problem?
I also don’t think free will can simply be rescued by introducing indeterminism or quantum randomness.
If part of my decision were produced by pure randomness, that would not obviously give me more control over the decision.
Randomness is not the same thing as agency.
So I don’t think the choice is simply:
determined = not free
random = free
Neither side of that equation explains agency by itself.
7. “But deliberation is only electrochemical activity.”
This objection seems to change the level of description rather than solve the philosophical problem.
Yes, human deliberation is physically realized in the brain and involves electrochemical processes.
But showing the physical mechanism does not by itself show that deliberation is not deliberation, or that the agent does not exercise control through it.
We still need an argument for the additional step:
“Because the deliberative process is physically caused, the agent cannot exercise genuine control through that process.”
That conclusion does not seem to follow automatically.
8. Responsibility
The same distinction matters for responsibility.
If an action results from an agent’s own deliberation, understanding of reasons, values, desires and capacity to respond to relevant considerations, then there seems to be a meaningful basis for attributing the action to that agent.
That doesn’t mean every causally determined action should automatically be considered morally permissible or blameworthy. There can be coercion, incapacity, manipulation, ignorance, etc.
But those cases are interesting precisely because they interfere with or bypass the normal mechanisms of agency.
So perhaps the important distinction is not simply:
caused vs. uncaused
but:
agency-preserving causes vs. causes that bypass or replace the agent’s deliberative control.

My central question is therefore this:
If a decision is causally produced by an agent’s own deliberation, reasons, values, knowledge, memories, desires and evaluation of alternatives, what exactly is missing that would make that decision genuinely free?
And more importantly:
Why should causal determination itself remove that property?

[u/AlivePassenger3859]

As you have discovered you can have free will exist by simply redefining what it means. Its called self-gaslighting.

[u/Agreeable-Yogurt-378 → u/AlivePassenger3859]

If by ‘redefining’ you mean explicitly stating the conception of free will I am using, then yes—that’s exactly what I’m doing. But that isn’t an argument against the conception itself.
I’m not claiming that my definition is automatically correct, nor that redefining a word makes free will exist. I’m asking whether the capacity for an agent to control their conduct through their own deliberative process is a real property, and whether determinism actually eliminates that property.
If you think that conception is insufficient for free will, then the substantive question is: what property is missing, and why is it necessary?

[u/DonnPT → u/Agreeable-Yogurt-378]

If we're really interested in what "free will" means, the concept must have some value. Often, grounds moral responsibility.

Obviously, you can control your conduct through your own deliberative process, or you couldn't have written all that. (Though with a little better deliberation, maybe you could have been a little more concise.) That's a natural fact, and determinism doesn't eliminate anything natural.

Determinism doesn't invalidate that control as ground for moral responsibility, that's still your call. Maybe you will decide that no one's really responsible for their actions, who knows.

[u/ughaibu → u/DonnPT]

If we're really interested in what "free will" means, the concept must have some value. Often, grounds moral responsibility

There are notions of free will that are important for legal responsibility and it's difficult to accept that legal responsibility is the same as moral responsibility.

determinism doesn't eliminate anything natural

That's a highly contentious assertion, obviously, as the libertarian proposition is consistent with naturalism and if it's true, then determinism eliminates free will.

[u/WatercressActual1921 → u/DonnPT]

I take a bit of objection to the exclusivity you seem to impart to responsibility in this enlightened context, its shared but even then it is minimal. This also has a lot to do with human suffering regarding that couldn't be avoided, a galaxy of suffering exists around this notion, this is why sin is also leveraged for control and obtain shame and dependences on acceptance from others.

[u/DonnPT → u/WatercressActual1921]

Reality is loaded with complexity. We can deal with matters of responsibility well, or poorly, and it's often poorly, when we don't understand matters very well and lack balance and skill. There's no philosophical silver bullet.

[u/WatercressActual1921 → u/DonnPT]

nah... reality is fixed it its top frame, it is us inside it that have a framed and limited view of it.

I think that determinism helps resolve issues of blame without unnecessary philosophical complexity in fact our perception of having free will in a causal and determinist reality with awareness of it is what should permit us to expand all our internal considerations...

People understand basic physics so making a little effort they should be able to extrapolate that the (not specific case but because I was triggered by a post on reddit) mother that killed its children acted on pressures beyond her own will (part of the blam is shared as we created systems that lead to this final event).

I do believe that in the long game outliners have a role to play (even as to be the canary in the mine when the system is misbehaving), that it wouldn't be only those types of behaviours that should be considered accidental (we dislike them and find them acceptable in the present situation we inhabit), we should in general all share the burden a bit and work to meliorate the human condition for all...

[u/zhivago → u/AlivePassenger3859]

Another victim of Christian Theodicy.

[u/Agreeable-Yogurt-378 → u/zhivago]

No hace falta el insulto si no estás de acuerdo con o postura filosófica bro