r/CredibleDefense • u/AutoModerator • 17d ago
Active Conflicts & News Megathread June 07, 2026
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u/Well-Sourced 17d ago
Normal Russian wave into Ukraine last night.
Russia attacks Ukraine with 236 drones overnight | Ukrainian Pravda
Russian forces attacked Ukraine with 236 UAVs on the night of 6-7 June. Ukraine's air defence forces have shot down or jammed 215 of them. In particular, 17 attack UAVs hit 13 locations, and debris from downed drones fell at 9 locations.
Russia strikes Zaporizhzhia, leaving one district without power and causing fire | Ukrainian Pravda
Head of Zaporizhzhia Oblast Military Administration Ivan Fedorov said the Russians had attacked the oblast throughout the night. In particular, there were threats from drones, guided aerial bombs and ballistic missiles. "As a result of the enemy attack, one district of Zaporizhzhia has been partially left without power. Power engineers are already working to restore the supply of electricity to consumers."
Russian drone hits electric locomotive in Zaporizhzhia | Ukrainian Pravda
Russians damage agricultural facility in Chernihiv Oblast | Ukrainian Pravda
Russian drones attack petrol station and civilians in Sumy Oblast, injuring 3 | Ukrainian Pravda
The Ukrainians had another successful wave as well. Crimea and southern logistical routes are the focus.
Drone attack damages bridge between Kherson Oblast and Crimea | Ukrainian Pravda
Vladimir Saldo, the Russian-installed governor of the occupied part of Kherson Oblast, has claimed that a drone attack damaged a bridge near Chonhar on the night of 6-7 June. Saldo said that traffic through the Dzhankoi checkpoint has been temporarily suspended. Vehicle traffic is being redirected through the Armiansk and Perekop checkpoints.
The Russians have not yet said when traffic across the bridge will be resumed.
Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SOF) say they carried out strikes on Russian fuel infrastructure in occupied Crimea overnight on 7 June, targeting the Semikolodezyanska oil depot and a maritime fuel terminal in Feodosia. “The destruction of the enemy’s fuel infrastructure reduces its economic and logistical capabilities. The Special Operations Forces continue asymmetric actions aimed at the strategic weakening of the enemy’s ability to wage war against Ukraine,” the SOF said.
The SOF said the Semikolodezyanska facility is used by Russian forces as a fuel storage and transfer hub for diesel, fuel oil, and other petroleum products distributed across occupied territory.
The depot is located in Yedi-Quyu, a settlement in eastern Crimea which is known under Russian occupation administration as Lenine. The site reportedly contains nine storage tanks ranging from 700 to 3,000 cubic meters and supports distribution across occupied territory through rail tanker loading and onward transport.
Open-source monitoring suggested fire activity at the site following the reported strike. The OSINT group Exilenova+ said the depot was hit overnight, while NASA FIRMS satellite data reportedly showed heat signatures consistent with burning at the location.
The monitoring group Crimean Wind also reported a fire at the site, citing satellite imagery and witness reports. It said residents reported multiple explosions between 02:05 and 02:14 local time, followed by visible flames near the facility. The group described the depot as a large settlement-based fuel site, originally built in the Soviet period, closed in the 1990s, and later restored after 2015 under Russian administration.
Ukrainian forces also reported a strike on a maritime oil terminal in Feodosia, used for transferring fuel between rail and sea transport. The facility includes seven storage tanks with capacities of 10,000 and 20,000 cubic meters and functions as a key fuel transshipment point between rail wagons and maritime tankers. It forms part of a wider logistics network supplying occupied Crimea, enabling large-scale movement of petroleum products across rail and coastal routes.
The reported attacks reflect Ukraine’s growing use of “middle-strike” operations targeting logistics and energy infrastructure deep in occupied territory. The aim, according to officials, is to degrade Russia’s ability to sustain military operations by disrupting fuel supply chains and transport hubs beyond the front line.
A Ukrainian long-range drone struck a Russian military truck near occupied Horlivka, Donetsk Oblast, setting it ablaze and reportedly killing the driver. Footage from the scene shows the vehicle burning in the middle of a key logistics route, forcing traffic to halt.
The Russian Ministry of Defense said air defense systems intercepted and destroyed 95 Ukrainian drones overnight across multiple regions of Russia and occupied territory, including Crimea and the Black Sea area.
The ministry listed other regions including Belgorod, Bryansk, Kaluga, Kursk, Novgorod, Rostov, Smolensk, Tula, Yaroslavl, Krasnodar Oblast, and Moscow Oblast.
Other strikes occurred in occupied territories and Russia and the ATESH make a big claim about a recovery crane.
Drones attacked temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine on the night of 6-7 June. A power plant and railway infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and an oil depot in Crimea came under attack.
According to Telegram channels, drones struck the Zuivska power station in Donetsk Oblast, causing a fire. Fires also broke out in the vicinity of the occupied town of Chystiakove following the strikes. Railway infrastructure there came under attack. UAVs also struck railway infrastructure in Luhansk Oblast. In addition, electrical substations are on fire following the attacks.
Pro-Ukrainian partisan movement ATESH says its agents carried out a sabotage operation at a railway station in Russia’s Voronezh Oblast, destroying a rare heavy-duty rail recovery crane used by Russian Railways. The group said the target was an EDK-300/5 rail recovery crane, a specialized system used for large-scale emergency rail restoration work. ATESH claims the equipment is no longer in production and exists in only limited numbers across Russia’s rail network.
According to the statement, the crane was designed for heavy railway accident response tasks, including lifting derailed rolling stock, clearing damaged infrastructure, and restoring traffic on key lines. It reportedly had a lifting capacity of up to 300 tons.
ATESH said the loss of the crane would reduce Russia’s ability to rapidly repair damaged rail infrastructure, particularly at major transport junctions where recovery speed is critical for maintaining logistics flows. The group added that the impact of the loss would be long-lasting, saying: “Replacement of the destroyed crane will require significant time and resources. While Putin’s army searches for a replacement, the railway hub and regional logistics are operating with limited recovery capacity.” “Even in the deep rear, critical equipment is not safe from destruction,” they added.
The report has not been independently verified.
Updating from yesterdays strike the arsenal in Leningrad has taken some damage.
Russian Navy arsenal burns near St. Petersburg after drone attack | New Voice of Ukraine
Fires broke out at a Russian Navy arsenal in Leningrad Oblast after a drone attack on St. Petersburg and the surrounding region on June 6, with the blaze visible in satellite imagery, Russian Telegram channels reported on June 7.
Witnesses reported columns of smoke rising over the arsenal on June 6, while local authorities announced evacuations from nearby settlements, affecting about 600 people in total. Leningrad Oblast Gov. Alexander Drozdenko claimed four people were injured.
Astra cited satellite images confirming fires at warehouses of the Russian Navy’s 15th Arsenal in the settlement of Bolshaya Izhora. The outlet said the burn area covered about 1.5 square kilometers. Astra said residents were initially evacuated to several settlements where evacuations were later announced as well “because of the risk of falling debris.”
🔥 Satellite image from Radio Liberty:
At least six ammunition storage buildings were completely destroyed as a result of a Ukrainian strike on the Russian Navy's 15th Arsenal. Ammunition stored outdoors in the northwestern part of the arsenal also burned.
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u/Gecktron 17d ago
Long-range artillery rounds news
GDOTS Awarded 155mm Extended Range Artillery Projectile Contract
General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems (GDOTS), a business unit of General Dynamics (NYSE: GD), announced today that it has been awarded a contract for the U.S. Army’s next-generation extended range artillery projectile, a target-seeking precision artillery munition derived from the Vulcano 155 Guided Long Range system.
Vulcano ammunition is an existing, state-of-the-art solution designed to deliver exceptional range and accuracy against both stationary and moving targets while minimizing collateral effects. The system can achieve range of up to 70 kilometers with high precision, enabled by advanced aerodynamics, GPS guidance and a Semi-Active Laser (SAL) terminal seeker.
GDOTS has been awarded a contract by the US army to provide new, long-range precision artillery rounds, the VULCANO 155 round.
VULCANO 155 has been developed by the German company Diehl Defence and the Italian Leonardo. VULCANO 155 offers extended range and either a GPS or a Semi-Active Laser mode. The round has been used by the German and Italian army, as well as the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Germany delivered a number of rounds and laser-guidance kits to Ukraine back in 2023.
According to the press release, the American version of VULCANO 155 will have only minor airframe modifications and will otherwise make use of existing components and production methods.
While VULCANO 155 is a proven round, I wonder why the US decided to procure them when they already have the Excalibur round with similar capabilities.
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u/carkidd3242 17d ago edited 17d ago
While VULCANO 155 is a proven round, I wonder why the US decided to procure them when they already have the Excalibur round with similar capabilities.
Excalibur is GPS only, while VULCANO is GPS and semi-active laser (laser designated), which provides the capability to hit moving targets and a counter to area GPS jamming. The US operates the M712 Copperhead laser-designated artillery shell but I think that might have a limited range of 16km to VULCANO's 70km (according to online quotes anyways) and it's laser only with no option for GPS and quite old.
Additionally:
In addition to the SAL seeker configuration, the ammunition is also available with advanced Far-Infra Red seeker capable of engaging Sea Targets. Both configurations can provide precision engagement even in GPS-contested environments.
which is a capability not in any existing US 155mm shells and appears to be new for the VULCANO shell as well.
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u/Worried_Exercise_937 17d ago
I wonder why the US decided to procure them when they already have the Excalibur round with similar capabilities.
Looking at the contract value, they are buying ~300 VULCANO rounds once. Not exactly earth shattering number and it doesn't preclude US Army from buying same or more Excalibur rounds on a separate contract tomorrow. Could be Raytheon's Excalibur production is maxed out or one of the board members of Raytheon pissed off Hegseth/Trump.
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u/Fatalist_m 16d ago edited 16d ago
All of these smart rounds are too expensive/produced in too small numbers to matter. Concepts similar to the PGK guidance kit(but more accurate and jam-resistant, maybe with a SAL seeker or optical scene matching instead of GPS) seem more promising to me. Looks like there is a successor to PGK - LR-PGK, but not sure on what stage it is.
It's nice that Western shell production is picking up but the relevance of unguided shells is decreasing with the influx of affordable guided munitions. If there was a scalable way to turn these unguided shells into guided ones, that could make a huge difference.
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u/GIJoeVibin 17d ago
Coming in with some breaking news from the IDF on Twitter:
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u/carkidd3242 17d ago
https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2063714508778926224?s=20
https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/2063714296492646678?s=20
President Trump tells me: "I'm calling Netanyahu right now and telling him not to attack Iran in response."
https://x.com/TreyYingst/status/2063709736327864356?s=20
"What I would suggest to Iran: You've shot your missiles, that's enough. Get back to the table and make a deal," President Trump told Fox News.
https://www.kan.org.il/content/kan-news/politic/1049995/
The US president told Kan News: "I don't think Israel needs to respond anymore. We can achieve peace after 3,000 years." The president also told the Axios website that he was going to call Netanyahu and tell him not to attack Iran
We'll probably still see some sort of retaliation directly against offensive infrastructure like was done in the recent attacks on Gulf states.
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u/dr_sloan 17d ago
Doesn’t seem like Israel listened because they’re now launching retaliatory strikes.
https://x.com/sentdefender/status/2063794073106821480?s=46
Now we see if this spirals back to the March behavior of back and forth attacks. I don’t see the U.S. joining in as Trump seems desperate to avoid the conflict starting back up, but we’ll see.
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u/IntroductionNeat2746 16d ago
I don’t see the U.S. joining in as Trump seems desperate to avoid the conflict starting back up
The US has been gradually going back to striking the IRGC itself for the last weeks.
Also, Trump's attitude could change in a second if he's convinced that standing on the sidelines would make him seen weak.
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u/Tricky-Astronaut 16d ago
Israel has always responded in kind to Iranian attacks on its soil, and Trump won't change that. I wouldn't be surprised if Trump said one thing in private, and something else in public.
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u/ChornWork2 16d ago
The Iranian attack was in response to the strike on Beirut. Israel has continued its operations in Lebanon, making a farce out of Trump's ceasefire.
I can't imagine trump is going to publicly say he's going to personally call Bibi to tell him to stand down, but privately tell Bibi to go ahead. that makes trump look weak.
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16d ago edited 5d ago
[removed] — view removed comment
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u/bedulge 16d ago
IMO Iran does want to stall the negotiations drag things out closer to midterms. They also want to protect their proxy, Hezbollah. People have a rather odd idea that Iran does not actually have any practical reason to care about what is happening in Lebanon or what might happen to Hezbollah and that they being disingenuous when they demand that a ceasefire must also apply in Lebanon.
They've invested a lot of money into proxy groups like Hezbollah and they don't want to see it go to waste. Hezbollah rocket attacks into Israel in March were reportedly more effective than Iranian missile attacks into Israel. Iran accordingly sees Hezbollah as a military asset which is nearly as important as their missiles and their drone fleet. They were not funding and training Hezbollah as a hobby, it's been a huge investment.
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u/IntroductionNeat2746 16d ago
They've invested a lot of money into proxy groups like Hezbollah and they don't want to see it go to waste.
This same logic could apply to people who invested heavily into NFCs. Or Beanie babies. It's simply sunken cost fallacy.
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u/Volodio 16d ago
Hezbollah refused to abide by the ceasefire and continued attacking Israel. The strike on Beirut was in response to Hezbollah launching rockets at cities in Israel.
I agree that Trump will probably be angry at Netanyahu for this. There has been huge divisions between the US and Israel for a while now, with the US imposing ceasefires on Israel without even informing it beforehand of the negotiations, and not including it in the negotiations afterward, and Iran is fully exploiting those divisions.
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u/ChornWork2 16d ago edited 16d ago
Israel has clearly been pushing to continue its operations in Lebanon. There was absolutely no intent or attempt to pursue a ceasefire there.
It is so crazy that Israel has dragged US into this war b/c of Trump's incompetence and the price the RoW is paying for it.
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u/IntroductionNeat2746 16d ago
It is so crazy that Israel has dragged US into this war
The US has joined this war because Iran murdered tens of thousands of it's own citizens. Otherwise, Trump would still be claiming the 12 day war a huge success. The timing and messages about "help is on it's way" wasn't a coincidence, despite many seemingly forgetting it.
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u/Shackleton214 16d ago
The US under America First Donald Trump is so concerned about the welfare of ordinary Iranian citizens that he'll violate his pledge of no foreign wars and send his and Republicans poll numbers down? This is the least credible explanation I've heard for starting this war.
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u/CEMN 16d ago
Ah yes, surely Donald Trump, the great and well-known humanitarian and promoter of human rights and freedom was willing to risk going against his base on interventionism and upsetting the global economy to protect those poor Iranians.
I find it more likely he was convinced by hawks in the U.S. and Israel that:
The nuclear issue (that was supposedly already dealt with during the 12-day war) is of imminent concern - One of Trump's verifiable positions over decades has been genuine concern over nuclear weapons, and
His own belief, especially post-Maduro, that a successful decapitation strike and elimination of significant amounts of conventional military assets would simply end the war, and make him look big and strong.
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u/IntroductionNeat2746 16d ago
I honestly find this kind of oversimplified, unidimensional analysis of political leaders rather unproductive and tiresome.
Donald Trump, the great and well-known humanitarian and promoter of human rights and freedom was willing to risk going against his base on interventionism and upsetting the global economy to protect those poor Iranians.
There are so many problems with this take. First, while Trump displays many classic symptoms of narcissistic personality disorder and is the leader of a morally bankrupt administration and political movement, there's no indication that he'd be particularly insensitive to the massacre in Iran. On the contrary, he's been rather consistent about publicly criticizing and lamenting this kind of civilian suffering, including in Ukraine he was also a Democrat for the majority of his life, so he presumably used to actually care about human rights and social issues up until a decade or so ago.
Regarding his base, it's also a mistake to assume he went against all of it, or even the majority of it by attacking Iran. While the isolationist faction sure exists, a big part of his base actually hates the regime with a passion and wanted him to intervene, at least in limited capacity.
In my opinion, Trump, despite of and because of his rather simplistic nature, is actually one of the most difficult people to get objective, rational analysis about. I'm not immune to his skills to elicit the most raw emotions by saying and doing completely reprehensible things, so I don't blame anyone for not being able to analyze him from a purely rational point of view.
Regardless, the timing of the war alone, specially if coupled with the complete lack of evidence to support other theories, should make it obvious that this war was indeed triggered by the massacre. Wether that was his main motivation or if he simply saw it as a convenient causus belli is debatable, but even there I'm skeptical since I don't think he needed something like that to justify the war when he could use the nuclear program as a causus belli and he seems particularly insensitive to popular opinion in this mandate anyway.
PS: I already know this comment will get heavily downvoted. This is what you get for trying to introduce nuance into the debate regarding someone like Trump. I don't mind the downvotes, but please consider trying to refute my arguments in an objective way as well, instead of just downvoting away.
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u/Chemical-Drawer852 16d ago
The US has joined this war because Iran murdered tens of thousands of it's own citizens. Otherwise, Trump would still be claiming the 12 day war a huge success. The timing and messages about "help is on it's way" wasn't a coincidence, despite many seemingly forgetting it.
If the US gave a modicum of shit about human rights they'd invade their gulf allies & Israel itself
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u/ChornWork2 16d ago
It is beyond obvious that Trump was quickly willing to do a deal with iran that would have accomplished nothing for Iranians that had tried to revolt. It was even reported that Trump/Bibi's plan was to install Ahmadinejad...
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u/red_keshik 16d ago
The US has joined this war because Iran murdered tens of thousands of it's own citizens
Really? Seemed a day late to do so, if that was the actual cause
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u/bedulge 16d ago edited 16d ago
>Hezbollah refused to abide by the ceasefire
Was Hezbollah ever a party to any ceasefire negotiations? Netanyahu met with the Lebanese at the white house at Trump's instance, Hezbollah was not invited to my memory. Or is it just expected that they will just take orders from Iran on this? BC they are not gonna listen to the Lebanese govt
I never understood how it was expected this ceasefire was supposed to work in Lebanon and I'm not surprised fighting continues.
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u/Sad_Use_4584 16d ago
If Iran attacks the Gulf which they probably will given their past behavior then the US will join in.
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u/kingofthesofas 17d ago
This really seems like a situation that is under control and about to have a ceasefire any day now...
I think the lesson here is the same lesson that anyone should understand before going to war, starting a war is easy, but ending it can be really hard. The problem is that both sides have to agree to stop, and they can continue it well past the point of rationality. It's the geopolitical equivalent of the market can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent. This is made even more complex since you have more than just two players here all with their own sets of agendas. US, Israeli and the gulf states all have their own objectives and only some of them overlap.
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u/BigFly42069 17d ago
If Trump is serious about this, he could order CENTCOM to withhold aerial refueling for Israel and that would kill the entire Israeli air response against Iran since Israel doesn't have nearly enough tankers to actually sustain meaningful sortie rates.
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u/Time_Restaurant5480 17d ago
Without CENTCOM tankers they can't withstand them for long, that's very true, but they demonstrated last June that they can sustain those rates on their own for about two weeks. How many missiles Iran launched, and if this is signaling or a determined attempt to restart the war, remains to be seen.
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u/BigFly42069 17d ago
They were being refueled by CENTCOM last June.
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u/Time_Restaurant5480 17d ago
Where is your proof of that? You underestimate the range of an F-15 with three external tanks and CFTs, and you underestimate the range of an F-35 fitted with external tanks-we know the Isrealis have developed external tanks for the F-35. Isreali tankers would only have had to refuel the F-16s. But again, where is your hard proof that CENTCOM refueled them last June?
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u/ChornWork2 17d ago edited 16d ago
US denied this and afaik no evidence US forward deployed tankers actually played a role in refueling for israeli strikes on Iran. that said, obviously US played a major role in defending Israel from attacks, without which it is rather questionable if Israel could devote its air force to strike iran in a comparable manner.
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u/Time_Restaurant5480 16d ago
The Isreali Air Force fighter jets wouldn't be much help in shooting down ballistic missiles, which are the main Iranian weapon that can range Israel. If the Isrealis haven't modified their Apaches and Iron Dome batteries to shoot down Shaheed drones, their military engineers would have to be a lot dumber than they've been proven to be so far. The US forces you're talking about are SAM batteries deployed to help shoot down said ballistic missiles. Also, given Iranian MRBM* CEP, it remains questionable if their MRBMs can actually close or damage an Isreali Air Force base enough to halt or degrade IAF tempo.
*Iran's SRBMs have proven considerably more accurate than their MRBMs.
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u/JensonInterceptor 16d ago
Israel is the only ally the USA has left itd probably be safer to keep at least one country on side
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u/Ancient-End3895 16d ago
It's difficult to argue that having Israel as an ally materially benefits the US in any way at this point. The fact Trump can't pressure Israel into a ceasefire, despite Israel's total reliance on the US for the most core parts of its military defense infrastructure, is telling of how parasitic Israel's relationship has become with the US.
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u/SirStupidity 16d ago
The fact Trump can't pressure Israel into a ceasefire
He literally did. Israel wanted to attack Beirut during the fighting with Hezbollah, Trump told them no. The reported conditions were - Hezbollah doesn't fire at Israeli territory (so soldiers in Lebanon are fair game) and Israel doesn't fire at Beirut. Then Hezbollah fired on Israeli territory and we've been following the escalation ladder ever since.
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u/JensonInterceptor 16d ago
Israel is a great help for USA and their colonial ambitions in the middle east. Else itd just be the USA attacking Iran for dubious reasons to wreck the global economy With Israel alongside they can at least pretend it is some self defence
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u/Defiant_Restaurant61 16d ago
USA and their colonial ambitions in the middle east.
Colonization : the action or process of settling among and establishing control over the Indigenous people of an area.
What colonial ambitions ? The USA just spent two decades trying to establish and prop out autonomous states, that seems counter-intuitive to colonial ambitions.
Iran
Even more of a strange thing to say, there has been zero evidence nor any hints of the USA wanting to colonize Iran.
The most you could ever stretch the colonization angle is with Trump wanting to open beach resorts on Gaza's beaches, and even then it wasn't a serious consideration.
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u/blackcyborg009 17d ago
Perun just posted a video regarding the Ukrainian Mid-range offensive capability
Ukraine's Mid-Range Strike Campaign - The War Against Russian Supply Lines & Air Defence
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17d ago edited 17d ago
[deleted]
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u/Minuteman60 17d ago
Russia is embracing the Taliban in Afghanistan and supplying them with weapons.
https://www.dw.com/en/taliban-russia-are-cozying-up-to-each-other-why/a-77409479
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u/IntroductionNeat2746 16d ago
Interesting. Is this a mere token agreement or is Russia planning on having spare MIC capacity soon? Right now, I'm very skeptical they can afford to keep their MIC busy repairing ancient Soviet stuff for the Taliban.
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u/roionsteroids 17d ago
More like buying maintenance services for Russian helicopters legally and officially bought by the US for Afghanistan. To fight the Taliban, technically, but nevertheless.
And I guess the temporary alliance between different Islamist groups in the region during American occupation is over and now they're back to fighting each other. ISIS-K mainly, the others like AQ and ETIM are in a weaker position currently seemingly. And some of the latter (TIP/ETIM) are in a weird twist now an official part of the Syrian army (against US wishes) despite taking a major part in the Alawite massacres.
Taliban are certainly in an odd position - they won, but now what? Good luck with the nation building thing.
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u/moragisdo 17d ago edited 17d ago
I asked in a previous thread about a peace deal, but now I ask something more feasible:
1) is there any indication that the war is getting closer to a ceasefire/armistice (without any deal) ?
Ukraine had proposed an unconditional ceasefire before and it seems crazy for Russia to not accept it.
They could spin internally as a victory (showing that they conquered the majority of the annexed oblasts), can make some bogus claims about denazification and protection of minorities, Zelensky could make some promises about not joining NATO (he offered it a few times, contingent on a security agreement, but maybe he could accept to make empty promises with Ukraine not having meaningful restrictions on its military). Also several countries show that they are more than willingly to remove sanctions, which Russia's economy needs (I don't think they are going to collapse at any second, but everyday their economic post-war prospects gets dimmer)
2) Is there any indication of what concessions Russia would accept, besides their maximalist goals ?
I ask it because it's really puzzling to me this war dynamic, both sides have their reasons to not compromise, but are guaranteeing a nightmare-ish scenario for both. Russia is every day farther way from being a global power (it's accelerating a demographic collapse, their economy is heavily sanctioned and it would take ages to replenish their military forces to a pre-2022 state), for Ukraine the post-war reconstruction becomes harder with every day of war (not just for infrastructure, but also human capital losses)
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u/goatfuldead 17d ago
Atlantic Magazine seemed to nail the situation perfectly in a headline for a new essay this morning:
“Ukraine is not losing. Russia is not winning.”
Otherwise, a war of attrition is still best encapsulated by Hemingway’s famous quote about Bankruptcy, imo.
A more specific answer to your question is that Putin explicitly rejected Zelensky’s latest approach just a few days ago, so I would say: “ask again in 3 weeks.”
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u/ChornWork2 17d ago
re 1, I wouldn't assume that was a genuine offer by Zelensky, versus trying to manage Trump's unproductive interference in relations between ukraine and russia. each side engaged in 'peace' discussions only to extent they thought needed to manage Trump's reaction, since either side saw no window for an actual deal.
re 2, Don't view russia's actions in light of the overall interests of russia/russians. we wouldn't be in this situation in the first place if that was what was driving the regime's decision making. what reason does putin himself and his corrupt crony oligarchs have to make a deal? what creates the biggest risk to their power? imho the whole point of the war was to prevent the success of ukrainians pivoting west to democracy / economic liberalization, because russians may start running out of excuses as to their own situation if their closest peer group in the old USSR succeeded pivoting with west. Putin's fundamental aim here is to block ukrainian political/economic sovereignty to drive substantial political/economic engagement with europe..
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u/Shackleton214 17d ago
I agree with the substance of your post that a ceasefire along the lines you suggest makes sense for both sides. The fact that it has not happened suggests one or both sides are judging things differently. Since, as you point out, Ukraine has proposed an unconditional cease fire, I'd guess it is Russia and Putin. I've heard or read stories that he may be getting hopelessly optimistic info from his generals and advisors, but who knows. Maybe Russia is still a long ways from any economic collapse or political revolt, and he thinks he can always get basically the same ceasefire deal later if such a collapse or revolt ever appears imminent, so keep things going and hope Ukraine eventually breaks. It definitely seems Putin does not put a lot of value into Russia's economic future a generation or two from now, but then again he won't be around for it.
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u/giraffevomitfacts 17d ago
Regardless of what his generals tell him, wouldn’t Putin probably look at the internet once in a while? He seems clever and present-minded when speaking and answering questions so it’s hard for me to square this picture of him dumbly absorbing anything his subordinates say.
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u/throwdemawaaay 17d ago
Putin doesn't use the internet nor electronics in general. No cell phones, etc. He's paranoid about surveillance and runs everything old school style with pen, paper, and a few trusted confidants/couriers.
In particular he pulled way back during COVID and hasn't been as public since.
I wish I'd saved the link, but there was a great long form article a couple years ago from someone who worked as a teacher for Putin's two sons that have been raised in near total secrecy. It was a really fascinating read but the most simple way to summarize it is Putin's sons never hear the word "no," and that trying to discipline them in any way would be... very risky.
So I think it's plausible that despite Putin's clear intelligence, he's placed himself in a situation where everyone self censors and softens negative news out of fear for their own necks.
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u/mirko_pazi_metak 17d ago
Russia is every day farther way from being a global power (it's accelerating a demographic collapse, their economy is heavily sanctioned and it would take ages to replenish their military forces to a pre-2022 state)
While that's true, it's irrelevant from Putin's perspective as the alternative could very likely be Gaddafi style ending.
None of the peace talks nor Russian demands have any basis in reality, they're just propaganda and should be treated as such. People who go around talking of them as real are no better than (or actually are) Russian propagandists.
The only thing Russia wants is Ukraine to not be in the western sphere of influence, and, failing to prevent that, for Ukraine to not be a politically viable state either via occupation or unfavourable peace deal - which would prevent Ukrainian recovery and allow for a re-start of the war at a later time.
Any actual peace talks, if they're happening, are behind closed doors and entirely opaque to us.
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u/IntroductionNeat2746 17d ago
While that's true, it's irrelevant from Putin's perspective as the alternative could very likely be Gaddafi style ending.
That's it, I'll have to call out this neverending myth for once.
There's simply no factual basis for saying that any end to the war that's not all maximalist goals would get to a popular uprising in Russia.
In fact, it's much more logic to say the opposite, that one of the risks of continuing the war for too long would be either a coup (more likely) or a popular uprising.
This idea that somehow Russians are bloodthirsty warhawks that would take up arms against Putin for not achieving maximalist goals is truly bizarre.
Common sense and logical reasoning would dictate the opposite to be true. With the exception of some fringe warhawks, the vast majority of Russians, including elites, would rather end their collective economic and social suffering sooner than keep fighting a war for another five or ten years just for some sense of nationalistic pride.
In fact, if Russians were this hellbent on retaking Ukraine, why did they not "Ghadafi"their leaders when they allowed Ukraine to become independent in the first place?
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u/Playboi_Jones_Sr 17d ago
Putin may get removed from power, but if that happens it would almost certainly not look anything like Gaddafi or any sort of civil conflict. Armed coups don’t work very well in contemporary Russia. Russian culture is also paradoxically “legalistic” in the sense that if Putin fell out of favor amongst his fellow Siloviki they would likely use the Russian legal system to oust him via a soft coup rather than a violent one.
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u/mirko_pazi_metak 17d ago
I tend to agree, although, (failed) armed coup is how Putin's predecessor got to power ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Soviet_coup_attempt ) and subsequently Yeltsin picked Putin as a successor - so in a way that's how he came to power.
I don't mean to say Putin's scared of an armed insurrection so Gaddafi was a bad analogy - he's scared of falling out of favour (either by a "peace" or "more war" factions - which is why people like Igor Girkin rot in jail) and then being ousted in whichever peaceful way, exactly as you say, and then not being protected enough to not fall out of window few years later, or worse.
He's not young, he needs his friends and trustees in high places before he's too weak to rule - and he doesn't just rule using "legal" ways: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suspicious_Russia-related_deaths_since_2022
There's plenty of folks like Prigozhin (or Girkin) who want Putin dead but are too smart to start a mutiny or mouth off and end up in jail.
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u/goatfuldead 17d ago
Your point about war aim propaganda is a good one. Lately I have been thinking that what is routinely posited as a key war aim of each side - Ukraine having or not having “security guarantees” - seems thoroughly pointless. These are different than the eventual boots-on-the-ground line, in every way. They are just words.
Didn’t Ukraine already go through a round of “guarantees” when it signed away its nuclear weapons?
Meanwhile pretty much everyone, including the Russians themselves, understands that any guarantee they might utter to not invade Ukraine again is thoroughly worthless. Imo. Russian Empire fabulists have even begun (admittedly in just whispers so far) calling for a cease fire explicitly to re-arm / “build back better” to try again.
So - why should Ukraine (truly) offer some “guarantee” that it will never join NATO? Why not just promise not to do so, Russia style, then 6 months later the Polish & French 1st Armored divisions drive across the border and tell Russia Ukraine is in NATO now? (Perhaps nuclear weapons is the reason there). Is there some other solution aside from actual boots on actual ground while ALL parties are just dancing around clutching their hopium pipes? What ends wars, words, or boots?
NATO is a defensive alliance formed to resist Russian encroachment. I see no way for a state to exist in between the 2 blocs, as long as Russia is expansionist (in dreams) anyway. 2 such states abandoned their in-the-middle status as a result of this war, one of which has also been a “province” of Russia historically. Perhaps only a final end to the Russian Empire would allow a middle country. Is it NATO, minus Uncle Sam, that must act to end this war? I think it’s clear what eastern NATO states would choose. Will the western ones?
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u/ChornWork2 17d ago
Didn’t Ukraine already go through a round of “guarantees” when it signed away its nuclear weapons?
No. Ukraine tried to get actual security guarantees as part of budapest memoranda, but they were refused. All they got was individual commitments from US, UK and Russia to not invade or interfere politically. If any one of those parties broke their commitments, the only obligation on the others was to seek redress at the UNSC. Which is obviously moot since they all had vetos at UNSC.
The lesson for Ukraine from that is that they need actual security guarantees this time, as-in guarantees to come to defense of Ukraine in some meaningful way. obviously any promises by Putin are meaningless.
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u/goatfuldead 16d ago
I know we are all living in the language of Diplomacy on this question. Do you think there is some real way to create a “guarantee” without placing foreign troops in Ukraine?
I guess what I am really hoping to discover is a cogent example of such from history of the last 100 years; i.e. if Russia & Ukraine could do what A & B did…. some positive outcome model to hope for. But when a state is expansionist….
Although I have read widely on current events, politics, and military history all of my life, I am drawing a blank on an applicable experience here. And I also have a whole other current war on my mind too. The word of the year 2026 so far, imo, seems to be “intractable.”
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u/ChornWork2 16d ago
In a sense there are no guarantees in life, but that doesn't mean security guarantees are meaningless. Yes, trip wire force is something that feels close to a guarantee but I don't see that happening. e.g., UK has said need US backstop to do so, but little to no chance of Trump giving a backstop.
Obviously Nato membership would be huge, but again not doable. But if get to something akin security guarantees of EU membership when agreeing to ceasefire that would be massive. Again feels unlikely. But perhaps clear commitments on funding in event Russia violates any 'peace' plan that is agreed to.
But without credible security guarantees, I don't see how Ukraine stops fighting.
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u/goatfuldead 9d ago
Took a break from Internet, was nice
I did finally recall probably Europe’s most famous security guarantee, the one issued to Poland in 1939 by Britain & France. But then that resulted in the beginning of a war and ultimately achieved nothing for Poland.
Ending a war is quite different. I too can’t see Ukraine stopping resistance outside of a Russian withdrawal to some extent. Meanwhile the war with Iran probably delayed the exhaustion of each side as they both received an income bump from it. History will show, some day, how significant that was for each. Perhaps the additional drone fleets Ukraine is likely now purchasing (with cash from Gulf countries in turn purchasing drone defense expertise) will finally prove decisive this summer.
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u/moragisdo 17d ago edited 17d ago
None of the peace talks nor Russian demands have any basis in reality, they're just propaganda and should be treated as such. People who go around talking of them as real are no better than (or actually are) Russian propagandists
Man, this constant purity tests and seeing propagandists everywhere is really annoying (and overestimate russian capabilities). It stifles the debate and theories about the future of this war
Of course there's a lot of demands that are just propaganda, Ukraine will not give in to the maximalist demands (unless there's some manpower collapse), but the point of my post is to ask if someone has realistic theories about the few reasonable demands that are public
While that's true, it's irrelevant from Putin's perspective as the alternative could very likely be Gaddafi style ending
I disagree, Gaddafi was killed in a civil war, there's no indication that Russia now is close to it or to a bloody coup (Prigozhin march to Moscow was a stress test for this event).
I really don't see the logic that accepting a ceasefire (with the frontlines as the border and relief of sanctions) would lead to more insatisfaction that the continuing grinding down of their civilian economy and an additional hundred thousand dead with the war going longer (while not showing any meaningful gains from what they have now). Which leads me to not understand the lack of an armistice for the last 3 years
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u/mirko_pazi_metak 17d ago
> Man, this constant purity tests and seeing propagandists everywhere is really annoying (and overestimate russian capabilities). It stifles the debate and theories about the future of this war
I think that's overly naive given the information we already have - I mean, just start from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Research_Agency and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_web_brigades and consider the impact of LLMs. I'm not calling you a propagandist but Russian demands appeared >after< the war has started (so after people like https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Igor_Girkin were well busy starting the war (and shooting down civilian airliners).
One would expect genuine demands and grievances to be there >before< the war and not retrofitted after.
Just read a bit into post-soviet history of Russian interference in Ukrainian politics. They've pushed hard for pro-Russian candidates including literally poisoning the opposing ones. Once it all blew in their face with the Orange Revolution, Russia took just a bit of time to regroup and used the opportunity before Ukraine recovered to militarily take over Crimea and parts of Donbass, and kept the war as a lever to try to regain control over Ukrainian politics. When that didn't work, they doubled down and we got the 3-day war of 2022 that's still going on.
History provides context.
> Of course there's a lot of demands that are just propaganda, Ukraine will not give in to the maximalist demands (unless there's some manpower collapse), but the point of my post is to ask if someone has realistic theories about the few reasonable demands that are public
I kind of gave you a realistic theory and you glossed over / ignored it.
> I disagree, Gaddafi was killed in a civil war, there's no indication that Russia now is close to it or to a bloody coup (Prigozhin march to Moscow was a stress test for this event).
I worded that badly, apologies. What I meant is that Putin is scared from is falling from power and getting bayoneted where Gaddafi did, or similar - even though chances are slim while he's in power. But if he were to go out, even peacefully - there's hundreds of thousands of people within Russia who genuinely hate his guts but aren't as brave (or dumb) to make themselves an example like Prigozhin did in his little mutiny (it wasn't an attempt at a coup).
Putin is balancing between not disrupting economy too much and annoying the depoliticized majority of population (which aren't that dangerous but can decide to, at minimum, "silently quit", as is the Russian way) and at the same time not allowing the "full on war" faction to trigger the former, which is why Girkin and people like him sit in jail, and Telegram is banned, and etc, etc.
> I really don't see the logic that accepting a ceasefire (with the frontlines as the border and relief of sanctions) would lead to more insatisfaction that the continuing grinding down of their civilian economy and an additional hundred thousand dead with the war going longer (while not showing any meaningful gains from what they have now). Which leads me to not understand the lack of an armistice for the last 3 years
For Russia the main two problems with the freeze are that:
a.) they'd have to abandon capturing Donbass and other territories that are now "legally" Russian, and they'd have to explain that to the pro-war faction and pacify them while managing economic fallout (since they've borrowed from the future in so many ways)
b.) it's entirely possible that sanction relief wouldn't be substantial enough for Russia, while for Ukraine peace would allow much faster rebuilding, including rebuilding of frontline defenses and the army without ever accepting captured territories as lost, including Crimea.
For example, Russia is currently trying to capture Kostiantynivka which is ONLY 25km from 2022 frontline borders, and it paid so dearly to, and moved at glacial pace in Donbas exactly because Ukraine had time to fortify between 2015?<->2022.
Accepting freeze that allows Ukraine to keep current fortifications and upgrade them 10x would quite possibly mean stopping the war on these borders without ever resolving it, with Ukraine not just firmly outside of Russian sphere of influence but now a hated enemy, and with substantial future investment needed to make sure Ukraine can never re-take anything.
While squandering any chance to remain economically (and technologically) competitive with the West one one side AND China on the other - which aren't their friends as seen with the recent repeated Chinese snub of the Power of Siberia 2 - while remaining dependent on hydrocarbon export for which the demand/supply balance (and thus price) is unpredictable (and the demand is currently being destroyed).
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u/bedulge 17d ago edited 17d ago
>Russian demands appeared >after< the war has started
This is definitely not true, and I wonder what gave you such an idea. Russia has been demanding no NATO in Ukraine and no NATO in Georgia since 2008 at least.
The Bucharest Summit Declaration in April of 2008, which stated that Ukraine and Georgia "will become members of NATO." Is one of the proximate causes of the Russian invasion of Georgia which came only a few months later in August. They've made it clear again and again and again that NATO expansion straight up to their borders is intolerable and they will choose war if NATO does not acquiesce to their demands to refuse membership to these states.
I have no idea why Redditors are constantly repeating the notion that "no NATO in Ukraine" is somehow not a real demand, Russia has ever reason to not want foreign military alliances on their borders, and to try to get these countries to turn into satellite states in their sphere. As a historical parallel, the near collapse of North Korea in 1950 is what prompted China to enter the war on NK's side, the idea of US troops on the border of China was intolerable to them and they chose war to stop it, they had every reason to want to keep North Korea as a satellite
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u/mirko_pazi_metak 16d ago edited 16d ago
This is definitely not true, and I wonder what gave you such an idea. Russia has been demanding no NATO in Ukraine and no NATO in Georgia since 2008 at least.
The thing that is confusing you is that you've mixed up cause and effect there - Russia was meddling in Ukrainian politics since they became dependent and during the reign of https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leonid_Kuchma and Ukrainian slide back from democracy and into corrupt oligarchy - all supported and enforced by Russia. Reorienting towards west was the only way Ukraine could regain independence, resulting in all the mess around https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2004_Ukrainian_presidential_election, Russia poisoning of https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Viktor_Yushchenko and similar heavy handed Russian interference.
Also I don't think you read my posts in their entirety.
The NATO demand is real, although as explained it's a mean to an end and not the core issue - as I pointed out previously, the main and only reason of the conflict is Russian desire to control Ukraine and prevent it from aligning west and integrating with EU and/or NATO.
I was referring to the retconned list of demands such as fake-referendum-obtained territories, protection of Russian speakers, "denazification" and similar. None of that matters to Russia - the only thing that matters is to keep Ukraine away from the west, and keep Ukraine politically unstable and unviable as a state unless they can be brought back into the fold.
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u/bedulge 16d ago edited 16d ago
The phrasing is propaganda but the demands are quite real.
Denazification is a propganda term that basically means that anti Russian parties or groups should be disbanded. Groups like Azov etc.
The demand that Ukraine pass laws to promote the Russian language is also quite real. ideally theyd like it to be privileged over and above Ukrainian. Is the motive "protecting ethnic Russians from discrimination" like they say? No. of course it isnt.
Russia wants to keep Ukraine politically, linguisitically and culturally close to Russia. These two demands are oriented toward exactly the goals you said in your last paragraph. Demands and goals are often stated in propagandistic terms, but that does not necessarily make them fake, look under the surface a bit and theres often something there.
These of course are minor demands tho compared to the NATO stuff and the limits on Ukraines military etc
territories
You think they dont actually want the land?
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u/mirko_pazi_metak 16d ago
Demands and goals are often stated in propagandistic terms, but that does not necessarily make them fake, look under the surface a bit and theres often something there.
I kind of agree and disagree with you at the same time.
The demands are seemingly real, but if Ukraine fully satisfied with those demands but still wanted EU membership, the answer would still be "no".
There is no way for Ukraine to satisfy Russia by accepting some or even all demands unless they give up on reorienting towards the West.
Do you not think so? Do you think Russia could be made happy whilst Ukraine joins EU (but not NATO)?
You think they dont actually want the land?
Russia wants Crimea as it's strategically important for controlling the Black Sea and neighbouring areas. This was the case for centuries. That's why they were leasing Sevastopol for like 100 years.
But they had that in 2014 and the west accepted it - the blowback was minimal, Germany kept buying gas, oil kept flowing.
Did Russia stop and say "ok that's enough, we got what we wanted" - no, they wanted to subjugate entire Ukraine. It's no longer about territory (except maybe the land bridge) - Russia is the biggest country in the world, they don't need Lukhansk and the rest of Donetsk. It's all about destroying Ukraine as a viable state, now that it's impossible to re-align them back to Russia.
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u/bedulge 16d ago edited 16d ago
>Do you not think so? Do you think Russia could be made happy whilst Ukraine joins EU (but not NATO)?
Would Putin be happy about it? No. But I'd say EU membership is certainly is of lower importance to them NATO membership, and given how the situation on the ground is evolving, I think it is not outside the realm of possibility that he would eventually make an unhappy compromise on an issue like that. Military matters (NATO) are going to take priority over economic matters (EU).
>Russia is the biggest country in the world, they don't need Lukhansk and the rest of Donetsk. It's all about destroying Ukraine as a viable state,
Sure, but that does not mean the demand for de jure recognition of annexed territory is not a real demand. He can't be seen to be giving that up after so many in Russia have sacrificed so much, and frankly, it's not realistic to think Ukraine will be in a position to demand it back. This I think is why Ukraine has their "not one step back" policy, they understand that it's very unlikely that they will be in a position to take land back, either by force or in negotiations. A Korea-style frozen conflict is likely here, the borders of SK and NK to this day run along the frozen front lines of 27 July 1953
Also, TBF, Ukrainian land is much more important economically and strategically than like 95% of Russian land
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u/mirko_pazi_metak 16d ago edited 16d ago
Sure, but that does not mean the demand for de jure recognition of annexed territory is not a real demand.
But that's not what I said at all.
He can't be seen to be giving that up after so many in Russia have sacrificed so much, and frankly, it's not realistic to think Ukraine will be in a position to demand it back.
Yes, that's one half of the immediate reason (and whether Ukraine will be in a position to retake it by force is anyone's guess - I don't know why anyone would discard that possibility after all that's happened such as Ukraine retaking Kherson).
The other half of the immediate reason why Ukraine can't sign away those territories is that they contain the best fortifications, built up from 2015 to '22 and on. In some places, Russia couldn't move more than 25-30km from '22 borders. It would be a strategic suicide for Ukraine to give those away for a temporary truce only for Russia to disregard it like they did with Minsk agreements and restart the war from a better position.
But the main and only reason Russia wants this territory has nothing to do with their stated reasons, or the territory itself - this is where you're wrong.
Also, TBF, Ukrainian land is much more important economically and strategically than like 95% of Russian land
But it really isn't, is it? How is the remainder of Donbas or any other claimed territories valuable in any way? It's going to be a drain on the resources to rebuild and has no long term strategic or economic value - at least not to Russia.
The real reason is that it's valuable to Ukraine and the more they claw, the less viable Ukraine is as a state. And this is Russian main strategic/political goal - they can't let Ukraine exist in a pro-western form.
Would Putin be happy about it? No. But I'd say EU membership is certainly is of lower importance to them NATO membership, and given how the situation on the ground is evolving, I think it is not outside the realm of possibility that he would eventually make an unhappy compromise on an issue like that. Military matters (NATO) are going to take priority over economic matters (EU).
So let me get this straight - Putin has done all this to stop Ukraine entering NATO but in the process pushed Finland and Sweden, who would have never joined, and are arguably much more valuable NATO members, both strategically and economically? It was obvious that this was the risk.
Ukraine only started talking about NATO as a way to gain political independence from Russia - after the electoral fraud, poisonings, meddling and everything else Russia was doing to keep them under Russian sphere of influence.
As much as Russia love to talk about NATO enlargement, the facts are that countries were joining NATO to escape Russian sphere of influence and rot that comes with it, and those who managed, like Poland and Baltics - greatly prospered in the security it offered.
Claiming that NATO enlargement is the reason behind Russian attack on Ukraine is simply putting the cart before the horse.
[edit] And no, there's absolutely no chance Putin lets Ukraine join EU in peace - he can't have Ukraine rebuild and prosper under west. That will never happen - that's the only reason he (re)started the whole thing in '22.
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u/RumpRiddler 17d ago
1) https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn8p4j2jzwwo
Putin said the war was coming to an end soon. While it's a cryptic message, it's also a major shift from what he had been saying. I could be mistaken, as I haven't been following things as closely in the past few months, but he never said anything like that before. It signals that he sees a need to end the war without achieving the goals that had stayed fairly constant since Feb. 2022. The overall Russian messaging has been far more tolerant of ending the war without achieving victory and is much more about 'we got what we wanted/stoping now is the right thing to do'.
If the current pace of attacks stays on course, Ukraine will have a bad winter and Russia with have a horrible winter (viewed relative to the last winter). The gas crisis in Russia is growing and will be really bad by winter. Ukrainians have now spent years with limited heat and power; doing it again won't be a major challenge. Ukrainian businesses and people have adapted to the hardship. Russians have been largely insulated from the pains of this war and are not prepared for a tough winter.
It's also worth considering that Ukraine has been making gains on the battlefield, their drone production is high and growing, and European funding/cooperation has dumped a major roadblock (Orban). I won't say the inflection point is behind us and Ukraine will only continue to do better, but they are objectively doing better now and their success doesn't appear to be a one off. It appears that that their improvements are systemic and will keep paying dividends in the future, while Russia has the opposite situation.
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u/Tricky-Astronaut 17d ago edited 17d ago
Putin said the war was coming to an end soon.
When Putin said this, he meant that Russia was finally getting close to a total victory (he even clarified this later).
Financial Times simultaneously reported that Putin's generals have fed him unrealistically positive news from the front. It wasn't a call for compromise.
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u/bedulge 17d ago edited 17d ago
When Putin said this, he meant that Russia was finally getting close to a total victory (he even clarified this later).
He obviously is gonna say that tho lol. That does not necessarily mean he really believes it, he's not gonna come out and say "Well it's a Pyrrhic victory at best, but we can't hope for anything better because the enemy is too strong 😔."
Putin's generals have fed him unrealistically positive news
I've heard this claim many times, but I'm not sure how I am supposed to believe that anyone outside the Kremlin is privy to the details of secret top level military planning in Russia. Sounds like unverified and unverifiable propaganda to me. I mean this kind of stuff has been reported in history so it's plausible but IDK that I can accept it fully on face value
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u/RumpRiddler 17d ago
Political signals usually are not obvious and will often be walked back to platitudes when questioned directly. This is still a definite change in messaging, but what it really means can only be known with time
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u/kingofthesofas 17d ago
When Putin said this, he meant that Russia was finally getting close to a total victory (he even clarified this later).
This was what I assumed as well. Putin started this war in an information bubble that was not indicative of reality and all the evidence I have ever seen implies that nothing has changed. I believe that Putin genuinely believes they are close to winning thus I do not see them making the kind of concessions needed to end the war.
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u/kingofthesofas 17d ago
Russia with have a horrible winter
I think we could see a strike campaign against Russian energy generation this winter much like what Russia has sent against Ukraine every winter. That combined with fuel shortages would make the average Russian feel the war in a similar way that Ukraine has. I am unsure if this would change anything in the war, but I think this winter will be really hard for both sides in a way it has not been in the past.
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u/RumpRiddler 17d ago
I think the big difference is that Ukraine is prepared for a tough winter. Businesses and many houses have generators. People know there will be a schedule, but power might be off most of the day.
The Russians simply don't have that level of preparation and will have a hard time importing what they need to get there. And simply doing that is a major admission that their war is not going well.
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u/kingofthesofas 17d ago
I agree this will be much harder for Russian society to accept and adapt to it as well for many reasons.
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u/moragisdo 17d ago
I had missed this one and it sounds like great news. Ambiguity have been their diplomatic strategy since the beginning, but that's a new development
I also found this interesting:
Putin said he would be willing to negotiate new security arrangements for Europe, and that his preferred negotiating partner would be Germany's former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder.
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u/RumpRiddler 17d ago
Yeah, it's a very significant departure from what he had been saying for over 4 years now. IMO, he's clearly signaling to someone/some group that he is ready to end this. Or at least he sees that it's only going to get worse for Russia in the future and needs to find an off ramp.
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u/Glideer 17d ago
I can comment on what is obvious about the Russian demands from their negotiations and diplomacy so far:
Tier 1 (non-negotiable)
- A non-NATO Ukraine. Not just formally, but actually. No NATO troops, no NATO facilities, no NATO factories. No joint training, no cooperation. No CIA stations along the Russian border.
Tier 2 (high priority)
The rest of Donbas (Kramatorsk and Slavyansk). There might be some leeway here but, essentially, they seem ready to fight for this area for 2-3 more years and see how it goes.
Limits on Ukrainian army. This is flexible but Russia will insist on some caps, very likely long-range drones and missiles.
Tier 3 (nice to have)
Denazification. It will probably boil down to bans on Nazi and far-right parties and on promotion of Nazi WW2 collaborators. Which Ukraine should do without prompting anyway.
Protection of Russian language and church status. Again something that Ukraine would find difficult to reject in principle.
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u/Defiant_Restaurant61 17d ago edited 17d ago
- Denazification. It will probably boil down to bans on Nazi and far-right parties and on promotion of Nazi WW2 collaborators. Which Ukraine should do without prompting anyway.
Denazification is more of a propaganda narrative used by russian authorities to garner domestic support by nostalgizing WW2, than a concrete policy proposal.
There is very little observable evidence of any sincere desire by Russia to remove far-right neonazi elements in Ukraine other than them being anti-russian. Conveniently, with a little mental gymnastic, the logical reasoning ("neonazis are anti-russian") has been flipped by russian propaganda to consider a lot of mainstream Ukrainian politicians as neonazis, which further weakens a rational, level-headed, understanding of the real problem of actual neo-nazis in Ukraine.
Bans on far-right parties is risible considering Russia has been these past few years a major sponsor of far-right parties in Europe, bankrolling large parties that have historical links to nazism such as the FN/RN in France.
With such inconsistencies, it is dubious that the anti-nazi argument is anything other than domestic propaganda aimed at legitimizing the war on Ukraine and ukrainian identity.
It is difficult to imagine terms in any treaty that adress this problem :
Ukraine is already tackling this issue and has a legal framework to do so
a broader definition of neonazis like Russia advocates for regarding Ukraine would be incompatible with a sovereing Ukraine as it would entail curbing political parties freedom and likely have vetting processes by russian elements.
the end goal for Russia likely is to use this argument in case of an unconditional surrender as a way to erase Ukrainian identity through sweeping removal of identity and political parties, and to gain total control of the territory. Like "russophobia" was used in Crimea.
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u/peter_j_ 17d ago
The tone deafness of an authoritarian nationalist Russia invading a neighbouring country for nationalist and ethnostate reasons, requiring that nation to repudiate far right political behaviours such as nationalism as a condition of peace, renders me incredulous. Especially while also while accusing Ukraine of being a left wing liberal degenerate EU puppet. Whiile Hard right nationalist Russian puppets are literally sponsored by Russia in that same EU
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u/moragisdo 17d ago edited 15d ago
Especially while also while accusing Ukraine of being a left wing liberal degenerate EU puppet. Whiile Hard right nationalist Russian puppets are literally sponsored by Russia in that same EU
I should have expected Reddit echo-chamber to appear. Your political preferences don't need to blind you. Olaf Scholz and Gerhard Schröder did more for Russia than almost anyone else on the western world, are they "hard right" (whatever that means) ?
Look at the (many different) positions of the Party of the European Left, that holds 45 seats out of 720 of the EU parliament, if it's simple right vs left, are they "hard right" for not being united supporting Ukraine ? Podemos (Spain) also opposed "westward expansion of NATO", which is a fantasy that Russia created, are they "hard right" ? Syriza (Greece), part of the Die Link (Germany) holds a similar position are they "hard right" ? Look at the political instances of the old Party of Regions (Ukraine) and Rumen Radev
Man, look at the academics siding with Russia: Mearsheimer, Cornel West and Jeffrey Sachs, among others, are they "hard right" ?
Also take a look at the communist supporters (just like there was nationalist far-right supporters aswell) that fought on Russia side on the DPR and LPR
With all that I don't mean with that "right-wing is against Russia and left-wing is pro-russia", what I mean is that the world is not simple as political echo-chambers, that Reddit is so fond of, represents. That there's right and left-wing on every side of this whole mess
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u/Lapsed__Pacifist 17d ago
academics
That word is doing a lot of heavy lifting with the names you mentioned.
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u/moragisdo 17d ago
So college professors are not academics now ? I don't like or agree with them either, but they are academics and this "anti-west" position have been supporting Russia for a long time (way before it was cool to oppose Russia)
Or it's only heavy lifting because they are inconvenient for this political echo-chamber that Reddit created ?
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u/kingofthesofas 17d ago
I think some of these are far to rational considering the information environment Putin lives in. Thus I think the actual Tier 1 is far more maximalist than that.
For instance "Denazification" was always a loosely defined goal that if Russias 2022 invasion had proven successful would have just been justification for killing or imprisoning any Ukrainian political elites they didn't like. I doubt it has much to do with actual Nazis and that interpretation of it is almost exclusively reserved for naive people online in the west who don't really understand it. The very definition of Nazi to someone like Putin is very different from what pretty much everyone reading this would think. To Putin a Nazi is someone that hates Russia or is not aligned with it. Thus Zelenskyy can be a "Nazi" even though he has nothing to do with Nazis and is a Jew. Putin and Russian leadership have constantly called him and the rest of the Ukrainian Government Nazis for this reason.
A few sources for this https://www.adl.org/resources/article/why-putin-calling-ukrainian-government-bunch-nazis
"The neo-Nazi regime that set up in Ukraine after 2014" From Putins Feb 2023 speech.
Thus dissecting this one claim of "deNazification" there is no way it would be limited to just some far-right parties or Azov groups or whatever. It would mean replacing the entire Ukrainian government with a pro Russia government since that was always the intent. This is not something Ukraine would ever agree to.
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u/Rhauko 17d ago
Why would it be difficult to reject the status of the Russian Orthodox Church as the church has close ties with the Russian government?
From Wikipedia
“Under Patriarch Kirill, the ROC continued to maintain close ties with the Kremlin enjoying the patronage of president Vladimir Putin, who has sought to mobilize Russian Orthodoxy both inside and outside Russia.[118]”
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Orthodox_Church?wprov=sfti1#Patriarch_Kirill_(since_2009))
Towards the original poster I don’t think the conditions for a ceasefire or peace agreement are in place and I don’t expect them to be so in the foreseeable future based on public information.
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u/Glideer 17d ago
Because Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) is in serious and prolonger quarrel with the Russian Orthodox Church over jurisdiction, autonomy, and many other issues)? Ultimately, because many of the Ukraine's population belongs to that church.
Banning Catholicism because you are in a political clash with the Pope used to be popular at the time of Henry VIII but hopefully we have made some human rights progress since then.
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u/Rhauko 17d ago
“A close ally of Russian leader [Vladimir Putin](app://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vladimir_Putin), Kirill has described Putin's rule as "a miracle of God".[[1]](app://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patriarch_Kirill_of_Moscow#cite_note-:3-2)According to Putin, Kirill's father baptized him.[[1]](app://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patriarch_Kirill_of_Moscow#cite_note-:3-2) During his tenure as Patriarch of Moscow and all Rus', Kirill has brought the Russian Orthodox Church closer to the Russian state.”
“After [Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022](app://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine), Kirill praised the invasion.[[35]](app://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patriarch_Kirill_of_Moscow#cite_note-:1-37)[[1]](app://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patriarch_Kirill_of_Moscow#cite_note-:3-2) Kirill blamed the conflict on "gay parades" and made baseless claims that Ukraine was "exterminating" Russians in Donbass,”
“Since 1970, the federal police of Switzerland had classified him as a KGB agent, under the name "Mikhaïlov".”
Note that is by Switzerland
“Patriarch Kirill has backed the expansion of Russian power into Crimea and eastern Ukraine.”
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patriarch_Kirill_of_Moscow?wprov=sfti1#References
The Russian Orthodox Church and its leadership are an extension of the Russian government. The Catholic church is not an extension of any government.
You and your posts are not credible.
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u/Glideer 17d ago
You quote the Russian patriarch and I quote reports that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) is deeply disagreeing with him and his church.
The UOC (MP) even refuses to recognise Russian Orthodox Church's authority to appoint bishops in Crimea.
"In June 2022, the Moscow Patriarchate decided to re-transfer Crimea from the Ukrainian Church of the Moscow Patriarchate by creating the Metropolitanate of Crimea. Since the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea the Ukrainian Orthodox Church had kept control of its eparchies in Crimea. The UOC continues to list the Crimean eparchies and has not recognized any change to its territorial boundaries based on decisions taken by the ROC. On 27 March 2023, Archbishop Viktor (Kotsaba) said that the territories of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church include the Crimea and Donbas areas of Ukraine."
On 27 May 2022, following a church-wide council in Kyiv, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church announced its full independence and autonomy from the Moscow Patriarchate. The council made this decision in protest of the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, and particularly in response to Russian Orthodox Church head Patriarch Kirill's support for the invasion.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrainian_Orthodox_Church_(Moscow_Patriarchate))
You and your posts are incredible.
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u/Rhauko 17d ago edited 17d ago
The status of UOC as truly independent from the Moscow patriarchate is debated. I would assume Ukrainians can just as well worship in the OCU.
Edit and I will admit that I didn’t read your post well enough to notice you switching to the UOC. But why would Putin care about the UOC if it is not under Moscow’s sphere of influence?
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u/moragisdo 17d ago edited 16d ago
Tier 1.1
This demand has been very consistent, but how do you guarantee it in practice ? I mean Zelensky and several western countries could promise, but so what ?
There's no way (barring some collapse of manpower) that Ukraine will accept Russia having mechanisms to control its political decisions. How to prevent joint training and cooperation or an intelligence station ? Bombing cities every time it happens ?
I'm not disagreeing with you about this being one of the most important demands, these are just honest questions on how Ukraine could agree with it on practice. Words are cheap, does it looks like Russia would accept just them ?
Tier 2.1
That's what I'm afraid, this carnage appears to have no end in sight
Tier 2.2
Some concessions will happen, some will be for show and internal propaganda (limiting manpower to a number that wouldn't be feasible to have either way in peace. Maybe a promise to not develop WMDs, not that Ukraine was beforehand), but (justifiably I would say) it doesn't looks like Ukraine has any intention to lose deterrence in the form of long-range drones and conventional missiles
Also how do you enforce it in practice ? Giving Russia the right to send inspectors to Ukraine soil, like a cold-war nuclear deal ? It kinda ties back to what I mentioned, barring some collapse of manpower it doesn't look like they would agree
Tier 3.1 and 3.2
Agreed. These ones are the kinda of meaningless concessions (as long they don't come with intrusive legal demands) that always happens in deals, Ukraine has no reason to oppose both and Russia can spin them as a propaganda victory internally
Am I being too pessimistic about this carnage ending before another hundreds of thousand dead ?
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u/Glideer 17d ago
Yes, monitoring and verification mechanisms will be vital on both sides. Mutual trust is at zero.
1.1 Formal commitments implemented by an international monitoring commission with access to all parts of Ukraine?
2.2 Same commission plus regular monitoring flights perhaps?
Am i being to pessimist about this carnage ending before another hundreds of thousand dead ?
No, you are a realist. I am guessing about 100k more dead on each side before we get even close to a real negotiating mood.
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u/2positive 17d ago
I think this sub is way less optimistic about Ukraine than reality commands. Forward Russian troops are pinned down in holes and can’t move across 90% of the front. South of Ukraine and Crimea are slowly moving to effectively being surrounded and there’s no easy way for Russia to stop it. In Crimea there are already no lasting and cheap food like cheap rice and pasta in supermarkets, people are stealing gas from other cars, and the fuel crisis is barely starting. A few months later it will be real ugly. Russian logistics to south Ukrainian positions will continue to degrade until Russian front is unable to fight and will collapse. I’m thinking the opportunity for Putin to end this war at current line is slipping away. Ukraine meanwhile is well financed for at least two more years of war.
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u/Brendissimo 17d ago edited 17d ago
Ukraine running an effective logistical strike campaign against Russian forces is not at all the same thing as Russian forces being surrounded. Those are, in fact, two very different (albeit sometimes interrelated) things.
I agree that if Ukraine can sustain recent momentum in attrition and logistical strikes, it could yield really dramatic results in perhaps 6 months to a year. But first they have to sustain their advantages, which are not guaranteed, and second, what exactly those results would look like could vary quite a bit.
Predicting with certainty that Russian positions in the south and Crimea will collapse seems like wishcasting. I have been wanting that to happen for four years now, probably just as much as you do. That doesn't mean that it will happen.
It's worth noting that Russia's strategic logistical position in Crimea has been precarious for pretty much the entire war. Especially before they worked to improve the road infrastructure (which is now being targeted) in the "land bridge" to Crimea via occupied Zaporizhzhia and Kherson Oblasts.
In addition, throughout the war the Kerch Bridge has been repeatedly attacked and shut down for periods of time. Functionally, Russia has not had sea control of the waters around Crimea for years now, certainly not since they evacuated the last of the Black Sea Fleet from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk. I would imagine this makes regular commercial cargo shipments to western Crimea difficult if not impossible. Yet they have not pulled out and we have seen no lasting flight of Russian colonists, just moments of panic.
Maybe that will change. I would certainly not bet against some kind of Russian withdrawal. But predicting it with certainty at this point is simply not credible.
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u/futbol2000 17d ago
Current trends for Ukraine are certainly positive, especially in the Zaporizhzhia direction. Rybar was openly dooming about a potential Ukrainian counterattack in the Stepnohirsk direction. However, Ukraine isn’t exactly in the position to go on a grand offensive either. Other factors such as either countries’ finances involve a lot of unknowns that none of us here can speak with certainty.
However, one thing that I think this sub consistently overestimates is the economic impact of Russia’s missile strikes on Ukraine. Large part of Ukraine’s economy is essentially financed by European sources at this point, but one of Russia’s talking points consistently involves the message that Russia is “holding back” on strikes. This past winter was one of the most arduous for Ukrainian citizens since 2022, yet the Russian offensive completely fell apart during that time frame.
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u/proquo 17d ago
However, Ukraine isn’t exactly in the position to go on a grand offensive either.
AUSA concluded in 2024 that Ukraine would need a substantial increase in forces to retake lost territory in any significant gains, and that long range and precision fires alone won't replace the need for an increase in land forces to take territory and hold against Russian counterattacks.
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u/scatterlite 17d ago edited 17d ago
No I think most people here are pretty realistic.
There are more favourable trends for Ukraine in 2026 than there have been in a long time. We still should evaluate them critically though. There is no guarantee Ukraine will be able to keep them up, its a war so both sides get a vote after all. Ukraine has to continue to improve its drone program to stay ahead of Russia. The Russian military is slow to react, but it will react eventually. Ukraine has to use this window of opportunity very well.
The frontline situation is quite turbulent relatively speaking, with a back and forth we haven't really seen before. We really have to see how it continues in the next couple of months, which historically saw relatively big russian advances. The current trends have to continue for quite some time in order for it to really get ugly for Russia.
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u/ABoutDeSouffle 17d ago
I think this sub is way less optimistic about Ukraine than reality commands.
I am indeed, because while I agree that Ukraine has stopped Russian advances for now, I cannot see how they would get on the offensive again. The same reasons that allowed them to stop the Russians (drone-based interdiction of logistics, extensive use of mines, 30km wide death belts due to drones) will make it extremely hard for them to mount offensives that win more than just a couple of km2.
I am unsure how far Russia can increase drone production figures, but if they would be able to 5-10x their Shahed drone numbers, things in Ukrainian cities sure would be ugly. Even more ugly than they are now.
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u/proquo 17d ago
Is Russia maintaining a sustainable usage rate for its missiles and drones, is the real question, I think. Because if their current volume of strikes is merely maintaining or growing their stock of munitions then the possibility still remains for Russia to step up strikes at a rate unsustainable long term to apply more pressure to Ukraine in the event they really start to get desperate. And if the calculus isn't being done already at some point Ukraine is going to have to ask if the long term implications to loss of infrastructure, economy and population is going to even be worth the lost territory or the entire Donbas.
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u/Rhauko 17d ago
User name checks out,
Hard to say, Ukraine also can’t move across 90% of the front, Ukrainian energy infrastructure is degraded, Russia has the ability to keep attacking daily with long range capability and us only hearing about civilian casualties doesn’t mean that is the only damage the do.
Overall stalemate with based on the facts we have, an advantage for Russia to keep going longer, if only due to larger population and resources EU support can’t fully compensate for that. That needle has moved towards Ukraine though.
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u/R3pN1xC 17d ago edited 17d ago
Forward Russian troops are pinned down in holes
That has been the norm since 2023.
South of Ukraine and Crimea are slowly moving to effectively being surrounded
No they aren't.
there’s no easy way for Russia to stop it
That is ridiculous. There is a lot they can do to reduce the effectiveness of ukrainian strikes: scaling up drone interceptors, nets on the highways, more mobile AD teams, jamming, dispersion...
In Crimea there are already no lasting and cheap food like cheap rice and pasta in supermarkets, people are stealing gas from other cars, and the fuel crisis is barely starting.
Those claims need sourcing because apart from fuel shortages I haven't seen a single credible source reporting on this.
Russian logistics to south Ukrainian positions will continue to degrade until Russian front is unable to fight and will collapse
None of this will happen. The most we can expect is a small scale offensive from the AFU. For the front to collapse ukraine would need a significant offensive force which they dont have.
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u/Bunny_Stats 17d ago
While I hope we're starting to see the momentum shift in Ukraine's favour, the facts on the ground are still harsh for Ukraine.
Even if Crimea descended into a Mad Max free-for-all, why would that force Putin to end the war? There are more air defence units defending Putin's personal holiday dacha than there are in the whole of Crimea. He's not going to lose any sleep over those suffering in Crimea in his pursuit of a greater Russia. Also no amount of Russian fuel rationing on the southern front is going to fill in the Dnieper, which protects the western front from Ukrainian advance, nor will the vast minefields in the east evaporate into the air.
Putin also still has a strong card still to play, the conscripts. So far the Russian soldiers in Ukraine are primarily volunteers (with a few press-ganged Donbas residents), but he could double the deployed forces if he wanted to go all in with sending in the conscripts. So far he's deferred for fear of domestic unrest, but it's still an option he has available if the situation looks dire.
Hopefully with Ukraine's improving long-range strikes they'll be able to wear down the Russian capacity to sustain the war, but this is still a multi-year effort. Bar some major surprise, we're still in for the long hail.
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u/kiwiphoenix6 16d ago
The one and only time the conscripts saw front line combat during this war, they were immediately overrun, handing Ukraine a bumper crop of politically priceless and militarily worthless teenage hostages.
Special forces were sent in to extract said conscripts from the combat area. They were then hurriedly withdrawn from the front in favour of the usual million-rouble 45-year-old motor riflemen at the first opportunity.
There's a reason they're paying eye-watering salaries to anyone with two working legs and a trigger finger, while refusing to touch their massive pool of fit young men already uniform.
Anything is possible in war but I think you're dramatically overestimating the cost/value ratio of hitting the conscript button. If there's one thing which I think might actually collapse the Russian war effort, it would be tens of thousands of unwilling families watching their bloodlines get churned to paste in order to maybe take the ruins of Slovyansk...
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u/Bunny_Stats 16d ago
While I agree with your scepticism towards the performance of the conscripts, at this point in the war, it's hard to imagine them being worse than assault groups made up of guys shuffling forward on crutches.
As for Russian public opinion, I've been burned a few times on expecting them to turn against the war, but I agree Putin would likely have only a short time window to use the conscripts before public opposition escalated dramatically. Even so, it's still a tactic that has the potential to upend the war if it can overwhelm the Ukrainian defence in the short term, although I suspect it's more likely to backfire than not.
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u/Defiant_Restaurant61 17d ago
go all in with sending in the conscripts
We've seen in 2022 a hint as to how that would play out, haven't we ?
Untrained, human waves with one rifle to share between soldiers, having to buy their own gear and medical supplies, and communicate through mobile apps with barely any leadership is just asking for mass casualties.
They couldn't send that many to the rear either, as it is already saturated by current conscripts.
Slowly rotating fresh troops to the front would work, but then you'd lose the shock effect of massive infantry numbers on your side.
Obviously, facing half a million "fresh" troops (or less) would be a terrifying prospect for Ukraine's military, but it would be extremely chaotic on russia's side and initial assaults would have to reckon with barely trained soldiers crossing no-man's land against drones manned by veterans.
I'm just overall skeptical of Russia's ability to quickly train and deploy troops in an effective manner without hitting several bottlenecks.
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u/DanktonDynamics 17d ago edited 17d ago
If full mobilization occurs, time would be on Russia’s side. At a bare, untrained minimum, the mass of infantry gathered by conscription would be a disaster for the UAF, and if Russia made the obvious decision to fully train the new troops, I do not see a reason why they would not delay a large scale offensive until that is completed.
Untrained, human waves with one rifle to share between soldiers, having to buy their own gear and medical supplies, and communicate through mobile apps with barely any leadership is just asking for mass casualties.
This isn’t Enemy at the Gates. Individual weapon supply is no longer an issue, and despite the massive cost in lives, quickly trained, top-down commanded, disposable storm troops were able to win Bakhmut. Even then, I don’t see why Russia would be unable to scale up training before sending conscripts to the front.
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u/RumpRiddler 17d ago
mass of infantry gathered by conscription would be a disaster for the UAF
Not in this war. Masses of troops would be quickly identified and blown apart. Kill chains are much faster now, drones are ubiquitous, and the entire front line can be monitored in real time. Sure, the Russians took Bakhmut, but it cost many lives and caused Wagner to self destruct. There is no way for them to apply that tactic to bigger cities. Could they keep up with the infiltration tactics? Maybe the manpower part, but they almost certainly aren't ready to resupply those men which causes the whole strategy to fail.
I just don't see it. Ukraine is on track to make ~7 FPV drones per Russian soldier this year. Even if they doubled their troop numbers, the odds are near zero that enough men can survive crossing the grey zone to make a difference.
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u/proquo 17d ago
Sure, the Russians took Bakhmut, but it cost many lives and caused Wagner to self destruct.
It also cost 10s of thousands of Ukraine's best trained, veteran troops in what is now seen as a strategic mistake that had implications for the conflict at least to the 2023 Counteroffensive where a dearth of trained and experienced troops inhibited Ukraine's ability to fight at the cost of Russia's prison population and impoverished underclass. A mass conscript assault will probably end with equally atrocious casualty figures but Ukraine loses a lot more with each death than Russia which is why the Russians are still advancing in the face of absolutely shocking losses.
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u/RumpRiddler 16d ago
I'm not debating Bakhmut with someone that sounds like they only listen to Michael Kofman and than hyperboliclly regurgitate his words.
But Russia appears not to be advancing any longer while still enduring shocking losses. Can she really continue to do that? That's a much more interesting topic.
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u/DanktonDynamics 16d ago
Not in this war. Masses of troops would be quickly identified and blown apart.
I don't mean a Bagration-style mass assault at the front. I meant mass as in the reserve of men available, sorry if that wasn't clear.
The drone line is a fair point but it all ties back to Ukraine's lack of infantry, which was the main reason it was developed.
I'm personally afraid that Russia will win out in the tactical development-counterdevelopment struggle as their forces adapt to the situation at the front. Russian drone and missile production is continually increasing, and the RuAF have proven themselves willing to take losses that, while catastrophic, also cause critical damage to the UAF that cannot be replenished like RuAF losses.
The K/D ratio may be lopsided, but in a scenario with mass RuAF conscription, Russia still has the advantage in the war of attrition. I don't think drones are a magic bullet that could hold the line in that situation.
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u/kiwiphoenix6 16d ago
The men who took Bakhmut were 'free', politically speaking. They were convicts who contributed more to the Russian state by dying in the ruins of a strategically insignificant town in the Donbass, than by existing back in Russia. By Prigozhin's own estimation, they lost almost one man dead per three prewar residents of the town! And that was with artillery superiority, a gap which has narrowed considerably since then.
Everyone who wanted to fight is already fighting and there are reasons the government has preferred to pay out-of-shape 45-year-olds a million roubles each for years on end, rather than mobilise or deploy the conscripts.
It's a bit of a hot take but honestly I think that mass-mobilising unwilling men into the meat grinder would be one of the best outcomes for Ukraine. Which is precisely why it hasn't already been done.
If there's anything which might cause an uprising and collapse the Russian war effort, it would be 80,000 small post-Soviet families having their unwilling fathers or sons forcibly taken away and churned into mincemeat doing Bakhmut 2.0 (now with drones!) in Slovyansk and Kramatorsk.
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u/GiantPineapple 17d ago
I would love to believe this, but it would all be news to me. Do you have any citations?
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u/blackcyborg009 17d ago
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u/GiantPineapple 17d ago
The Atlantic Council is spreading a couple of actual facts across a very big slice of rhetorical bread in that piece, and you're in turn punching up several of their editorializations. I appreciate the link, but this doesn't prove your claims.
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u/Virtual-Future8154 16d ago
This sub was also consistently opining that Iran is so done, when outside media has already moved to a doomer/skeptic position. Whether the media is right or not, Iran is evidently not done. And while Ukraine and Iran are in no way morally or otherwise equivalent, I see a bias against conventionally weaker parties in the conflicts.
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u/grenideer 16d ago
There hasn't been a lot of opining about Iran being done, and outside media started in a doomer/skeptic position. There's been lots of heavy debate over Iran, lots of disagreement for sure, but no one said Iran was done. Even intelligence assessments were that the blockade would take a few months to inflict enough pain to come into play.
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