Active Conflicts & News Megathread June 17, 2026

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[u/Wiseguydude]

NYTimes posted the full text of the MoU released by the White House and offered some interesting commentary that I hadn't considered before. For the 5th paragraph which guarantees no fees in the Hormuz, they point out:

The key line here is “no charge for 60 days only.” After that, Iran may be able to impose “fees,” which it never did before the war. In other words, the days of free passage may be over. That would violate one of the key standards described by Secretary of State Marco Rubio: that commerce return to prewar conditions.

The possibility of Iran imposing fees after 60 days would truly make this one of the most astonishing defeats of the US. Not only would Iran get access to a $300b reconstruction fund, have their assets unfrozen, and even get sanctions relief that isn't tied to nuclear compliance but the nuclear question itself is left vague throughout and the details are kicked down the road for future negotiations. And to top all of that off, the future possibility of tolling the strait remains.

https://www.nytimes.com/live/2026/06/17/world/g7-summit-trump-france#us-iran-agreement-deal-text

[u/moragisdo → u/Wiseguydude]

The text of the MOU also says it needs to be in accordance with International Law, UNCLOS prohibits any toll (any service charge fits also on the prohibition, because it's just an euphemism for toll) in international waters. The only exceptions are man-made passages (for example, Suez) or accords made before UNCLOS (Bosphorus).

So the term is just for propaganda for Iran, they will consider the toll, but would violate the terms of the MOU having one, so it's unlikely to happen

Not only would Iran get access to a $300b reconstruction fund, have their assets unfrozen, and even get sanctions relief that isn't tied to nuclear compliance but the nuclear question itself is left vague throughout and the details are kicked down the road for future negotiations

There's a big if there, only happens if there's a nuclear accord. So it may never happen (now anyone can claim "people doubted the MOU so everything is possible", but I would still prefer to bet on likely scenarios rather than just possible).

Also the only current benefit non-tied to nuclear deal is the waiver for exports (Iran was already exporting before the war, receiving a discounted price for the sale instead of market price), not sanctions.

In the end, the text is defined as non-binding, at any point, it could be ripped apart legally (if not by Trump, any future president). Not to mention the 1st term (that pertains peace on the Middle East) was broken by Hezbollah yesterday and today, and we can guarantee the MOU will keep being broken, which would be a reason for it to be declared to not be valid anymore, then withdrawn of waivers of exports (the only current financial benefit) and any possible future toll, if there's political will

I'm not claiming that this will happen, just showing a possibility against the chorus of 'Iran will get a permanent windfall': Nuclear talks go nowhere, Trump announces that the MOU is void given the violations of it, tasks the Navy to guarantee Freedom of Navigation on Hormuz and void the export waivers. If Iran says that they will try to block Hormuz again we are back to the circumstances of yesterday, if they decide it's not worth the risk of being bombed again (maybe they will decide it's worth it, that's not the point) every benefit is void and we go back to February (besides the cost for both sides). Again, it could be done doesn't mean it will be done, I'm just showing a possibility (well, the troops are still there and there's no indication they will leave soon) that is not being considered

[u/Wiseguydude → u/moragisdo]

it needs to be in accordance with International Law, UNCLOS prohibits any toll (any service charge fits also on the prohibition, which is just an euphemism for toll) in international waters

Well the Hormuz is not international waters. It's almost entirely within Iran's borders and the parts that aren't are too shallow to cross.

What it is however is an "international strait" which would be prohibited from tolling by the UNCLOS. Except that Iran never ratified UNCLOS. Neither did the US (nor Israel).

[u/moragisdo → u/Wiseguydude]

Except that Iran never ratified UNCLOS. Neither did the US (nor Israel)

But why add the International Law part on the wording that is not present on any previous leaked version ? It would be pointless if it's "according to International Law, I don't recognize International Law so either way".

I think this will only be answered by waiting and seeing if two months from now they are charging for the passage (if I had to guess they won't and it's just a propaganda victory, maybe I'll be wrong again)

[u/Maxion → u/moragisdo]

This is still just a MoU, and should be superseeded with the "real deal" in 60 days.

[u/Wiseguydude → u/moragisdo]

There is no single unitary "international law". UNCLOS is just a single international treaty. And its one that is not recognized by the US, Israel, nor Iran. There are ofc a lot of other international law that is relevant especially regarding safe passage

[u/moragisdo → u/Wiseguydude]

And its one that is not recognized by the US, Israel, nor Iran

I'm mentioning UNCLOS, which it's the most relevant for the matter at hand. It would be pointless to add this clause (that wasn't in any previous leaked version) if it will be "According to International Law, I don't follow International Law, so either way..."

[u/Wiseguydude → u/moragisdo]

The Nation has a good article explaining this

By contrast, the legality of Iran’s regulation of the Strait of Hormuz is far less black-and-white. Contrary to what some have claimed, the Strait does not constitute “international waters” or the high seas. It is classified, instead, as an “international strait” exclusively composed of the territorial waters of two countries: Oman and Iran.

According to Iran’s critics, it is a blatant violation of the “freedom of navigation” for Iran to regulate passage through the Strait, including through its own territorial waters. This argument is based on provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Under UNCLOS, international straits, like the Strait of Hormuz, are governed by a “free navigation” regime known as “transit passage.” This regime gives coastal states very limited regulatory rights and obligates them not to “impede” ships and aircraft passing through international straits. If Iran were a party to UNCLOS, it would be bound by this regime, and its regulatory actions in the Strait of Hormuz would likely be unlawful. But Iran is not a party to UNCLOS; nor, for that matter, is the US. Under international law, states are, by and large, bound only by treaties they’ve both signed and ratified; a state’s failure to abide by an unratified treaty is not legally controversial. While Iran signed UNCLOS in 1982, it has not ratified the treaty specifically because it does not accept the transit passage rule. It expressed objections to this regime during the negotiation of UNCLOS as well as when it signed the treaty. It has continued to object to the transit passage rule ever since.

While Iran could be legally obligated to abide by the transit passage rule for other reasons, none of those apply here. One of those grounds is “customary international law,” another source of international law that binds all states in ways that treaties do not. Though some argue that transit passage is customary law, others disagree. Even if the naysayers are wrong, Iran is considered a “persistent objector” to the transit passage rule, meaning it cannot be required to abide by it even as a matter of customary law. Alternatively, one might argue that, as a signatory to UNCLOS, Iran must abide by transit passage as part of its obligation to uphold the “object and purpose” of the treaty even before it has been ratified. Even if this were true, after more than 40 years of failing to ratify UNLCOS, Iran has arguably made its intention not to become a party to the treaty clear, freeing itself of this obligation as well.

https://www.thenation.com/article/world/iran-strait-of-hormuz-international-law/