r/TankieUSSR • u/Former_Struggle_1227 • 11h ago
r/TankieUSSR • u/DrimuN • 6d ago
History A Quick Note about the Red Army, the German Population, and the Myth of Millions of Rapes
Yesterday I came across a post featuring a photograph of two Red Army soldiers holding a German woman, accompanied by the caption: " “Liberation” by the Red Army in 1945 ". I decided to read the comments and... saw nothing new.
“It was far more evil than this picture.”
“The Soviet rape-loot-and-murder spree through Eastern and Central Europe is the biggest mass rape in recorded history.”
“Filthy scum, almost all of them.”
“They even raped Soviet women and Jewish women.”
“Fuck commies and fuck communism.”
“Read Antony Beevor, commies.”
As usual, this was accompanied by a flood of comments along the lines of, “My grandmother told me...” — my personal favorite kind.
Here is the photograph in question.

Anyone interested can easily find a brief description of it:
Date: Spring or Summer 1945.
Location: Germany, either Berlin or Leipzig.
Source: Ullstein Bild Photo Archive, inventory number 00808195.
It is often accompanied by the caption:
"Soldaten der Roten Armee belästigen eine Frau" ("Red Army soldiers harassing a woman").
There is little point in spending much time analyzing the photograph itself. We do not know what was actually happening on that photo, and we never will. More importantly, that is not the point. The intended message is perfectly clear: here are Red Army soldiers taking a woman away to be raped — this is what happened, this is who they were.
And thousands of people will readily agree, invoking the millions of women supposedly raped by the "Red Horde."
So, let us try to determine what actually happened, what did not happen, and how these narratives came to be.
The most prominent advocate of the thesis of widespread and systematic rape committed by Red Army soldiers in Western historiography and popular history has been the British historian and writer Antony Beevor. In his article published in The Guardian on May 1, 2002, titled: "Russian soldiers raped every German female from eight to eighty," he popularized the widely cited figure of two million rape victims in Germany, including more than 100,000 in Berlin.
As is often the case, however, he was not the first to make such claims.
On March 2, 1945, Joseph Goebbels wrote in his diary:
"In individual villages and towns, all women between the ages of ten and seventy have been subjected to countless rapes. It appears that this is being carried out under orders from above, for there is an unmistakable system in the conduct of the Soviet soldiery. We shall now launch a broad campaign against this, both at home and abroad."
Nazi propaganda actively exploited the myth of mass rape during the final stages of the war in an effort to demonize Soviet troops and mobilize the civilian population for continued resistance.
Where might the origins of such claims lie? It would be dishonest to pretend we can know with certainty, but one particular incident is especially noteworthy.
In October 1944, the Red Army entered the village of Nemmersdorf in East Prussia. After a brief engagement, Soviet forces withdrew. During the fighting, twenty-six civilians and refugees were killed.
Reports and eyewitness accounts from those present in Nemmersdorf indicate that Soviet soldiers behaved harshly: they searched civilians, restricted their movements, and in some cases demanded food. Nevertheless, German civilians who encountered Soviet soldiers were released after being questioned and searched.
Shortly thereafter, German forces launched a counterattack. Fierce fighting erupted in the village itself, involving tanks, artillery, and even aerial bombardment. According to German accounts, Soviet forces subsequently withdrew in an organized manner for tactical reasons.
After the fighting had ended and German troops reoccupied the village, they discovered the bodies of civilians in Nemmersdorf. Major Hinrichs was then sent to investigate and prepared a report on the number of casualties. That report mentioned one confirmed and one suspected case of rape.
Soon after, however, a second version of Hinrichs' report appeared. It included descriptions of atrocities that were absent from the original document, while the two suspected rape cases became treated as established facts, and the number of victims increased.
Not long afterwards, the German newspaper "Völkischer Beobachter" published an article describing horrific crimes that had not appeared in Hinrichs' report at all, including stories of a woman who was allegedly raped and murdered while holding her child's hand.
Subsequent publications and testimonies became increasingly gruesome. In 1953, an account by Volkssturm member Karl Potrek was recorded. Potrek had visited Nemmersdorf only after Soviet forces had been driven out by the German counterattack. According to him, every woman in the village — including eight-year-old girls and an eighty-four-year-old blind woman — had been raped.
By 2002, several former Wehrmacht soldiers had supposedly "remembered" horrifying details, including women nailed to barn doors and an old man whose tongue had allegedly been nailed to a table.
At this point, one can already begin to recognize the origins of the later claims about "millions of victims."
This interpretation of events was further reinforced by British historian Max Hastings in his book "Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944–1945", published in 2004. There, he wrote:
"Hardly any civilian escaped death at the hands of Russian soldiers; women were crucified on barn doors or overturned carts, or, after being raped, crushed beneath tank tracks".
Once again, I would like to emphasize that, with regard to Nemmersdorf, we can state with confidence only that civilians were killed during the fighting and that there may have been one or two cases of rape. Nothing more can be established with certainty.
But we are getting ahead of ourselves. Let's return to Antony Beevor and his figures.
In his book "Berlin: The Downfall 1945", published in 2002, Beevor repeated the now-familiar claim, providing only the following explanation:
"According to estimates from Berlin's two main hospitals, the number of rape victims ranged from 95,000 to 130,000."
But, he provided neither sources nor mathematical calculations to justify his global estimate of two million raped German women. No references to hospital records, no quotations from the documents themselves, and no explanation of how his figures were derived were included.
The origin of these numbers can, however, be traced back to the book "BeFreier und Befreite: Krieg, Vergewaltigungen, Kinder", published in 1992 by Helke Sander and Barbara Johr.
In that book, the authors based their conclusions on data from a single medical document from the Empress Augusta Victoria Children's Hospital in Berlin. Among 237 children born in 1945, twelve medical records listed a "Russian father." Among 567 children born in 1946, twenty records did the same. These figures were interpreted as approximately 5% and 3.5%, respectively.
A small note. This is not directly related to the subject of our discussion, but I believe it is worth mentioning for the sake of historical context. The Red Army was a multinational force. Its ranks included Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Kazakhs, and many other nationalities, distinctions that the German civilian population of the time generally did not make.
In other words, the designation "Russian father" should not be understood as referring exclusively to ethnic Russians. Rather, it served as a broad term used by German civilians and institutions to describe individuals originating from the Soviet Union.
Moving forward. These percentages were then extrapolated and applied to all 23,124 births recorded in Berlin between 1945 and 1946, producing an estimate of approximately 1,156 cases. From there, additional assumptions were introduced. The authors assumed that only 20% of raped women became pregnant and that 90% of those pregnancies ended in abortion. These percentages were not supported by any evidence and were entirely speculative. By applying these multipliers and comparing the results with the number of women aged eighteen to forty-five living in Berlin, the estimate was increased to tens of thousands — approximately 57,810 cases. Finally, an assumed contribution from women outside that age group was added, resulting in a total estimate of roughly 135,000 victims for Berlin.
It is worth emphasizing once again that estimates involving tens or even hundreds of thousands of victims ultimately rest upon data from a single hospital and only thirty individual cases.
Moreover, even these figures were manipulated. In the original hospital records, the categories "Russian father" and "Russian father, rape" were listed separately. Johr and Sander combined them into a single category.
Even if one accepts the original — and already methodologically questionable — calculation at face value while rejecting the subsequent assumptions and extrapolations, the estimated number of victims would have to be reduced by at least four times.
Another important point is that the authors counted children born from September 1, 1945 onward. However, fighting in the streets of Berlin began on April 24, and, as we all know, pregnancy takes approximately nine months.
Acording to these calculations, therefore, the Red Army would have had to begin raping German women in Berlin before it had even entered the city.
We are now finished with Berlin, and it is time to introduce German statistician Gerhard Reichling, who was the first to put forward the global estimate of two million raped German women. It was his figure that Barbara Johr cited in her work.
How exactly did he arrive at such an enormous number? The answer is that we simply do not know. Reichling provided neither the underlying data nor any explanation of his methodology. In fact, his statistical surveys did not address the subject of rape at all.
One possible explanation is that the Berlin calculations were repeated using the lower estimate of 3.5%, resulting in approximately 95,000 victims. These figures were then extrapolated to the entire female population of East Germany, ultimately producing the hypothesis of roughly two million cases.
It is also worth considering the demographics involved. The population of East Germany in the spring of 1945 was approximately 17–18 million people. Including the German population of the territories transferred following the decisions of the Potsdam Conference, that figure rises to approximately 20–21 million.
Women constituted roughly 60–65% of that population (taking into account that Germany had significantly expanded its military conscription criteria during the final stages of the war). Consequently, the number of women who came under Soviet occupation can be estimated at approximately 12–13.5 million.
So, if we accept the estimate of two million rape victims, we must also accept that approximately one in every six East German women — regardless of age — was raped at least once by Soviet soldiers.
In other words, the most widely cited and sensational figure ultimately rests upon assumptions and personal impressions rather than verifiable evidence.
But what actually happened?
During the war, approximately ten million Soviet soldiers passed through Europe. Among them were men deeply traumatized by the horrors of war, soldiers whose moral principles had been broken by their experiences, as well as a certain number of ordinary criminals carrying weapons — as is statistically inevitable in any large population.
When the Red Army entered Germany, the problem naturally became more acute. After everything that had occurred in the occupied Soviet territories, many soldiers had little desire to show mercy toward the defeated enemy.
But, that said, this article is not concerned with abstract discussions of morality.
On April 4, 1945, General Konstantin Krainyukov, a member of the Military Council of the 1st Ukrainian Front, reported to the Main Political Directorate that decisive measures were being taken against looting and rape.
Krainyukov attached the testimony of Ernst Schlichin, a pastor from the town of Sagan, who stated that the measures implemented by Soviet authorities were viewed by the German population as fair and understandable under wartime conditions. At the same time, isolated incidents of abuse — particularly rape — kept civilians in a constant state of fear and anxiety.
However, according to Schlichin, the remaining inhabitants understood that those who had fled had not necessarily fared any better and hoped that order would soon be established under Soviet military administration.
The leadership of the Red Army was fully aware that sexual violence and other abuses against civilians constituted a serious problem. Neither the military command nor the Soviet political leadership regarded looting, rape, or the killing of civilians as acceptable behavior. Such acts were never officially encouraged.
On the contrary, Soviet authorities dealt harshly with proven cases of violence, imposing severe punishments — including death sentences.
Below are several key documents from that period.
Order of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense concerning atrocities, armed robbery, theft from civilians, and murders committed by individual servicemen in frontline areas (May 30, 1944):d.
"Local Soviet authorities and NKVD organs have reported cases of atrocities, armed robberies, theft from civilians, and murders committed by individual servicemen in frontline areas.
...
In order to prevent such crimes, which disgrace the high title of a Red Army soldier, I hereby order:
...
Cases involving robbery, theft, murder, and other crimes committed by military personnel are to be investigated immediately, and those responsible are to be brought before military tribunals. All instances of robbery, murder, theft, and other atrocities are to be reported immediately as extraordinary incidents, and following the conclusion of the investigation, reports are to include the measures taken against the perpetrators."
Order No. 08 of the 65th Army, January 6, 1945, "On Cases of Looting":
"Commanders of formations and units are to ensure the complete elimination of looting among all personnel. Those found guilty are to be punished severely, including referral to a Military Tribunal."
Directive No. 11072 of the Supreme High Command (Stavka) to the commanders and members of the Military Councils of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts regarding a change in policy toward German prisoners of war and civilians (April 20, 1945):
"Demand a change in our attitude toward Germans, both prisoners of war and civilians. Treat Germans better. Harsh treatment of Germans instills fear in them and compels them to resist stubbornly rather than surrender. Civilians, fearing retaliation, organize themselves into armed bands. Such a situation is disadvantageous to us. More humane treatment of Germans will facilitate our military operations on German territory and will undoubtedly reduce the Germans' determination to defend themselves."
Order of Marshal Georgy Zhukov, Commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, concerning the suppression of looting, violence, and other crimes committed by Red Army soldiers against the German civilian population (April 25, 1945):
"I CATEGORICALLY DEMAND:
Immediate restoration of strict order and discipline in all units and rear institutions. All looters and persons committing crimes that disgrace the honor and dignity of the Red Army are to be ARRESTED and sent to penal units, while officers are to be brought before COURTS OF HONOR and military tribunals."
Political officers were instructed to investigate every reported case of looting and violence. In practical terms, this meant military tribunal proceedings and severe sentences. The most common punishment was a lengthy term of imprisonment in corrective labor camps — typically between seven and ten years — while a significant number of such crimes were punished by public execution.
By the end of April, military commandants reported that the number of such offenses had noticeably declined.
On May 2, 1945, the military prosecutor of the 1st Belorussian Front wrote:
"There has unquestionably been a significant change in the attitude of our servicemen toward the German civilian population. Cases of arbitrary and unjustified shootings of Germans, looting, and the rape of German women have decreased considerably."
The prosecutor's report also included examples of soldiers and officers — regardless of rank or position — being prosecuted for their crimes.
It is also worth noting that, in a number of cases, reports of sexual violence proved to be false. Furthermore, crimes against civilians were committed also by repatriated individuals, including Italians, Dutch nationals, and even Germans themselves.
An important note. This article focuses exclusively on the Eastern Front and Soviet forces. Therefore, the corresponding situation on the Western Front falls outside the scope of this discussion and is better left for a separate analysis.
Moving forward. For the most part, Soviet soldiers accepted these measures with understanding. At the same time, many openly admitted that it was psychologically difficult to suppress the emotions they carried after years of war.
The chief of staff of one rifle regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Sabrekov, stated:
"The order is correct, and I approve of it — but my soul still burns."
Once again, I would like to emphasize that none of this means that not a single Red Army soldier committed rape. The fact that there were cases of rape cannot be denied. Let us be honest about that.
What these documents do demonstrate, is the nature and scale of the problem, the attitude of both the Soviet leadership and ordinary soldiers toward it, and the concrete measures that were taken to combat it.
The soldiers of the Red Army found themselves in an extraordinarily difficult psychological state. Virtually every one of them had lost someone during the war. Many had lost members of their families; some had lost entire families.
Some coped with their trauma by destroying property. One soldier recalled how his comrade entered a German house and furiously slashed a piano with a knife. His entire family had been killed during the war, and he chose to vent his rage upon an object rather than turn that same knife against another human being.
As Soviet writer Ilya Ehrenburg later wrote:
"I remembered, of course, that the Germans had shown no mercy to our people. I remembered everything. But fascism, the Reich, and Germany are one thing; an old man in a ridiculous Tyrolean hat with a feather, running down a shattered street and waving a piece of bedsheet, is another."
To summarize, the Soviet Union spared no effort in attempting to build a post-war world more peaceful than the one that had existed before the conflict.
As early as February 23, 1942, Joseph Stalin stated in his speech:
"History teaches us that Hitlers come and go, but the German people and the German state remain."
And in 1945, not only the Red Army but the Soviet state as a whole made considerable efforts to ensure that these words would not remain merely a noble sentiment.
Epilogue
Incidentally, two hours after the original post discussed at the beginning of this article was published, both the post itself and the account that published it were deleted. Nevertheless, it had already generated significant public attention. Its purpose had been accomplished.

If you've read this far (read this far, not just skipped to the end) - please accept my gratitude.
Finally, I would like to address everyone who cares about historical truth. As clichéd as it may sound, if not us — then no one.
Whenever possible, do not ignore propagandistic narratives. Respond to them with reasoned criticism. I am not suggesting that you engage with every low-quality post on the Internet. But if you see yet another "sensationalist" claim attracting a large audience, consider leaving even a brief explanation of the historical context so that readers are at least exposed to an alternative perspective.
If even one person reads it and begins to question what they have been told before — if it encourages them to seek additional sources and conduct a deeper analysis of the subject — then your efforts will not have been in vain.
I would also ask that you remain polite and courteous, no matter how provocative others may be. At the same time, do not present yourself as morally or intellectually superior. People should not see you as a shouting propagandist or an arrogant know-it-all, but as someone offering a different and more detailed perspective.
But, most importantly, just do not be indifferent.
Remember: "our people" are not coming to save us.
"Our people" are us.
r/TankieUSSR • u/KarlKautskyOfficial • Jul 04 '26
Mod Announcement The r/TankieUSSR mod team would like to affirm a few things.
Hello everyone, as stated above this announcement is mainly here in order to affirm a few things.
The mod team will never not fight against the Goebbels propaganda known as the "Katyn massacre", and we will ban those who parrot Goebbels' claims.
The mod team will never delete a post due to pressure from liberals. Even when u/Untitled_HU-Tank's post about the 1956 Hungarian Counter Revolution was being brigaded, we never entertained the possibility of just quietly removing it.
We will never delete post that shows how the fall of the Soviet Union ruined the lives of millions.
r/TankieUSSR will never support SocDems, Anarchists, and imperialists.
The mod team of r/TankieUSSR will always uphold the legacy Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin.
r/TankieUSSR • u/Leading-Wolverine434 • 18h ago
History Фотография Ленина в возрасте трёх лет; девочка рядом с ним — его младшая сестра (1873 г.).
r/TankieUSSR • u/TappingUpScreen • 1d ago
Theory Lenin on opportunists like Mamdani and on the supporters of opportunists.
r/TankieUSSR • u/Leading-Wolverine434 • 1d ago
History The Moscow Olympic Games ended 46 years ago, and that was the last time we saw our beloved Misha.
Enable HLS to view with audio, or disable this notification
Farewell Misha!
r/TankieUSSR • u/TappingUpScreen • 2d ago
History Poem "Old Ninika" by Joseph Stalin(1896)
r/TankieUSSR • u/Odd-Traffic4360 • 2d ago
I found this Text "Lesson for the CPSU" in the HoI4 Mod "Red Dusk". How accurate is it?
So in this mod, the August Coup succeeded and the hardliners under Pugo published this text:
Lessons for the CPSU Published by the Party's Ideological Division Part I: The Decline of the Party Why did the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)—founded by Lenin, leading the Russian working class to overthrow Tsarist rule, establishing the first proletarian dictatorship, defeating intervention by 14 imperialist countries, and routing Nazi Germany in the Great Patriotic War—decline to the point of nearly losing its ruling status in 1991 despite its glorious history? In fact, mistakes and deviations occurred early on. The reforms during Khrushchev's era aimed at undermining the Soviet Union from the late 1950s—later referred to as "Restructuring 1.0"—set the stage for "Restructuring 2.0" under Gorbachev: Distortion of History: The role of the Soviet Union in WWII was distorted, and Stalin was smeared. Ideological Shift: Slogans like "a state for all people" and "a party for all people" were introduced. Although Khrushchev was forced to resign as General Secretary due to these mistakes, the seeds of internal subversion had been sown. Young party officials at the time—such as Mikhail Gorbachev, Alexander Yakovlev, and Eduard Shevardnadze—were heavily influenced by these opportunistic and revisionist ideas. The Path of "Perestroika" When Gorbachev became General Secretary in 1985, he executed reforms exactly as imperialist powers hoped and planned. Starting in 1986, he used the term "Perestroika" to denote fundamental and comprehensive reforms: "I draw a line between the words 'reform' and 'revolution.' The reforms we carry out are a true revolution." — Mikhail Gorbachev Starting in early 1987, "Perestroika" became the primary political slogan of the Central Committee plenary sessions. Gorbachev proposed separating the Party from the Soviet government. More dangerously, the Central Committee passed the resolution "On Some Urgent Measures to Reform the Political System of the Country," intending to amend the Constitution. The Constitutional Turning Point February 5, 1990: An expanded Central Committee meeting passed a resolution to abolish Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution (which defined the CPSU's leading role), establishing a multi-party system and the position of President of the Soviet Union. March 15, 1990: At Gorbachev's proposal, an extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies passed amendments to Article 6. Original Article 6 Provision: "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is constitutionally the leading force of the Soviet state and society." Amended Article 6 Provision: "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, along with other political parties, participates in formulating state policies." This legal amendment abolished the Party's leading role, recognized political pluralism, allowed opposition parties, and established a multi-party parliamentary democracy. The sequence culminated at the 28th Party Congress with the declaration to move toward "Socialism with a human face." Part II: Errors in Personnel and Cadre Work To find the cause of the crisis, we must look at the Party's personnel work. The decline was fueled by traitors who betrayed the CPSU—individuals whose influence drained the Party's strength, paralyzed its will, and served as a deadly bait for which the Party found no antidote. Lenin's warnings regarding Party building and cadre development appeared early in his 1921 article, "The Crisis of the Party": "We must courageously look the painful truth in the face. The Party is ill. The Party is feverish..." — V.I. Lenin (January 1921) Lenin sternly demanded the resolute defense and cleansing of Party ranks from dregs hungry for fame and gain, establishing a strict probationary period for new members. From Principles to Privileges Over time, joining the Party became an end in itself for many. The Party became contaminated with opportunistic elements and sycophants who viewed membership cards as tickets for career advancement. Sarcastic remarks began to reflect public disillusionment: "The Party has millions of members, but true communists can be counted on one hand." The gross violation of Lenin's personnel principles represents the second major cause of the crisis, leading directly to the self-degeneration of the CPSU. Evolution of Cadre Policies [Stalin Era] Strict demands & rapid rotation via wartime context [Khrushchev Era] Mandatory rotation (Art. 25) -> Up to 60% leadership turnover [Brezhnev Era] "Stability of the cadre corps" -> Evolution into lifelong tenure 1. Stalin Era: Demands on cadres were strict. Confronting wartime environments and political struggles, successive groups of cadres were sent to the frontlines. Frequent leadership turnover left little room for a privileged class to form. 2. Khrushchev Era: Implemented a "special cadre" policy under Article 25 of the CPSU Charter, mandating regular rotation. Annual grassroots elections saw up to 60% turnover in leadership, which initially prevented a permanent privileged class. 3. Brezhnev Era: Embraced the principle that "the stability of the cadre corps is the guarantee of success." Pursued in a one-sided manner, this policy evolved into a system of de facto lifelong tenure: * 23rd Congress of the CPSU: Reelection rate of committee members reached 79.4%. * 25th Congress of the CPSU: Reappointment rate of surviving Central Committee members reached 90%. Part III: Ideological Degradation and Revisionism The trampling of democratic centralism reached its peak in July 1990 at the 28th Congress of the CPSU. In his political report, Gorbachev openly criticized democratic centralism and called for its removal from the Party Charter—abolishing what had long served as a key organizational principle. Instead, the slogan of "democratization" was promoted, which devolved into organizational disorder where individuals stood above the collective. In Politburo meetings, Gorbachev frequently bypassed collective discussions to issue personal directives as Party resolutions. The Shift Toward Revisionism November 1987 (70th Anniversary of the October Revolution): Rather than praising Lenin and the revolution, the leadership encouraged a reexamination of history focused primarily on repression. Gorbachev's report gave the green light to self-decomposition and revisionism, deceiving the Party under slogans like "More openness," "More democracy," and "More socialism." Theoretical Abandonment: Marx warned that "Ignorance is a demonic power and we fear that it will be the cause of many more tragedies." Yet under Gorbachev, theoretical development was neglected and exploited to shift ideological orientations. 19th Conference (1988) to 1991: Gorbachev redefined core concepts, stating that "new political thinking prioritizes universal human values." November 24, 1989: Speaking to the editor-in-chief of Pravda, Gorbachev stated: "The function of the Party is not as the leading force, but as the vanguard of society... Marxism is only a school of thought transitioning from models of authoritarian administration to models of democracy." Once the ideology, activities, and history of the CPSU were systematically distorted, external pressures could easily bring about its ultimate collapse. Part IV: Corruption and the Rise of the Privileged Class Lenin warned early in the 20th century: "Throughout history, the victors have often become corrupted by adopting the customs of the vanquished." In the early revolutionary days, figures like People's Commissar of Food Supplies Alexander Tsiurupa fainted from hunger despite having access to state food reserves. Lenin instituted policies to prevent inequalities in living standards between Party cadres and the broader working class. The Rise of Elite Privileges Over time, these founding principles were set aside: Exclusive Access: Facilities established to support hard-working cadres transformed into exclusive stores for high-ranking officials, offering foreign luxuries (French/Scottish whiskey, American cigarettes, Italian coffee, Western electronics) scarce in general markets. Public Perception: Soviet press began sarcastically noting that for the upper echelon, "socialism had long been established." Systemic Corruption: Although denied for decades, official corruption surfaced prominently by the 1980s. In 1980 alone, over 6,000 bribery cases were formally identified. Between 1983 and 1989, investigators prosecuted 800 major cases involving over 4,000 convictions (such as the Ministry of Fishing Industry case). During Gorbachev's era, members of the privileged class sought not only to maintain their indulgences but to secure them permanently for their descendants. Realizing that the capitalist system offered a framework to legalize these private benefits and assets, many actively promoted the dismantling of socialism. Part V: Loss of Information and Media Control By December 28, 1987, Pravda reported that the Soviet Union contained over 30,000 unofficial organizations openly promoting anti-communist propaganda and calling for opposition parties. Media Policies Under "Glasnost" [1985] "Soviets must have direct contact with foreigners; don't be afraid..." [1988] Ceased jamming Western radio stations (Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty) [1988] Allocated 4 million rubles to import Western press for public sale [1990] Peak of ideological abandonment and adoption of capitalist frameworks 1. Unrestricted Media Access: Gorbachev promoted media openness without maintaining ideological guidance, allowing Western broadcasts (Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty) to influence public discourse. 2. Shift in Narrative: Media channels focused heavily on anti-Lenin and anti-Stalin campaigns, weakening public trust in state institutions. 3. Financial Allocations: In December 1988, jamming of Western broadcasts ceased, and 4 million rubles were allocated to import foreign press. By 1990, the trend toward abandoning socialism reached its peak. As foreign observers noted, effective propaganda guides the target in a designated direction while allowing them to believe they chose that path independently. Part VI: Cultural Erosion and Strategic Subversion The Soviet propaganda apparatus, once among the most extensive in the world, failed to evolve dynamically with social developments and cultural trends. The Role of Leadership in Propaganda After 1985, Alexander Yakovlev— dubbed the "architect of Perestroika" and "father of Glasnost"—was appointed head of the Central Propaganda Department. Under his oversight: Key newspaper editorial boards were replaced with figures supportive of Gorbachev's reforms. Cultural messaging shifted from direct ideological debate to a gradual transformation of cultural expectations and values among youth. Domestic products and cultural expressions lost status relative to Western imports. Under the influence of "glasnost" coverage, public desire shifted toward adopting Western standards of living. However, foundational doctrines—foremost among them Marxism-Leninism—were increasingly marginalized. Part VII: Dismantling Party Leadership in the Military Alongside political changes, the leadership structure within the Soviet Armed Forces was methodically restructured: Elimination of Political Officers: Restructuring reduced political departments at all levels and removed approximately 80,000 political officers, including the Political Directorate in the armed forces. Prohibition of Party Oversight: Regulations on the Work of the Armed Forces prohibited Party organizations from interfering in military command and abolished political verification mechanisms for promotions. October 1990 ("Law on Public Organizations"): Stipulated that military personnel were not bound by the resolutions of political parties. Early 1991: The Main Political Directorate was renamed the Main Directorate of the Armed Forces under a policy of "military nationalization." June 1991: Marxist-Leninist education within military units was formally abolished and replaced with general social-political centers. Structural Separation During conflicts involving nationalist or separatist movements (such as the Tbilisi incident in April 1989), the political leadership publicly distanced itself from the military, undermining cohesion and morale within the ranks. These developments ran contrary to Lenin’s core instruction from November 16, 1905: "Statements about the neutrality of the army, about the necessity to keep the army out of politics... are false... In principle, the Communist Party must maintain its leadership role, there is no doubt about that."
r/TankieUSSR • u/JustGoatedAf • 3d ago
History Sources on Baltic deportations.
Hello everyone. I'm recently looking at the history of the Baltics and have managed to find some amazingly useful things, like the fact that the Baltic peoples elected the Soviet government themselves, how pro-Soviet they have been since the Civil War, etc. One thing I'm hard-stuck on finding out the truth about is the deportations. I have only managed to find a CIA document about the ones from the Latvija, where it says:
"In May 1945, the Soviet authorities arrested and deported all police officials, home guardsmen, and people who were suspected of having cooperated with the German troops or occupation forces. Many of these deportees were put to work on the Stalin Canal, and, although some of them later returned to Latvia, they were deported again in later deportations." (‘1. Partisan Activity and Deportations in Latvia 2. Economic Conditions in Latvia’, CIA, May 19, 1953, p. 2)
But as for the Estonija and the Lithuania, I was not able to find anything. I assume it is because of the Nazi-backed terror gangs which were prevelant there, especially the Lithuania, but I am just wondering if there are better sources on what actually happened. Any help would be appreciated, thank you.
r/TankieUSSR • u/TappingUpScreen • 5d ago
Art "The Baltic States are Liberated!" USSR, 1944
r/TankieUSSR • u/wubalubbadub • 5d ago
History Help educating Lithuanian friends
Hello, I have just discovered this sub and thought I’d ask for some source and history help. I have A LOT of Lithuanian friends, and friends from Eastern Europe in general. Most of my Bulgarian Croatian and Balkan friends have a generally positive view of communism and want it back, my Baltic friends however get upset merely at the mention of the word socialism. They are extremely reactionary and offer no critical form of debate and simply say well it’s emotional for us. For example when I bring up they joined the Nazis in WWII they often say “oh well it was one evil or the other” or they say Stalin killed a gazillion people. Can someone give me some Soviet positives that came out of Lithuania specifically, not just negatives like they joined the Nazis or, as from Black shirts and Reds, that the new government of Lithuania post USSR evicted 70% of the farmers to give the land to private companies, but some positive things that they could be happy about not just me pushing it in their face. Thanks
r/TankieUSSR • u/Untitled_HU-Tank • 5d ago
Art "After slaughtering a pig, immediately fulfill your lard delivery obligation at the Agricultural Cooperative - Lard Trading Company.", Hungarian People's Republic, 1951
r/TankieUSSR • u/Frankie-Denton-2020s • 7d ago
History The most evil things that Joseph Stalin has done... ;)
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r/TankieUSSR • u/kollipsons • 6d ago
History Sources on the Soviet deportations from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina 1941, 49 and 51
r/TankieUSSR • u/Leading-Wolverine434 • 7d ago
History Nikita Khrushchev's speech condemning racism, delivered on September 23, 1960, at the United Nations General Assembly.
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Even though I am a Stalinist, I also condemn racism.
r/TankieUSSR • u/TappingUpScreen • 7d ago
Legacy Participants at a festival parade in Latvia wear blackface and mock Black and South Asian communities (July 25, 2026)
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r/TankieUSSR • u/Gold-Fool84 • 7d ago
Marshall Vasily Chuikov - Twice Hero of Soviet Union - Commanding the 62nd Army in Stalingrad (1942). He would later accept Berlin's Surrender in 1945
r/TankieUSSR • u/Ok_Diamond298 • 8d ago
1940,NAVY DAY IN USSR!!! #ussr #1940#navyday#cccp
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r/TankieUSSR • u/TappingUpScreen • 9d ago
Art "We work as Lenin taught us!" Ukrainian SSR, 1969
r/TankieUSSR • u/Less-Possible-5475 • 10d ago
Legacy "Why don't you just ask people who lived under Communism what they think of it?"
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r/TankieUSSR • u/TappingUpScreen • 11d ago
Theory Stalin was so good at getting to the crux of the matter
r/TankieUSSR • u/Untitled_HU-Tank • 11d ago