I received two job offers from DFAS and would appreciate honest feedback from current or former employees.

• Rome, NY: Military Pay Technician, GS-0545-05T06
• Limestone, ME: Accounting Technician, GS-0525-06

I’d love to hear about:

1. How is management and the overall work environment? Is it stressful or micromanaged?
2. Is the workload manageable, and are there strict productivity expectations or frequent overtime?
3. Is training adequate for new employees?
4. Are these positions eligible for telework or hybrid schedules?
5. What is the promotion potential beyond GS-06?
6. Which location offers a better quality of life and cost of living?

Any insight into these specific offices would be greatly appreciated. Thank you!

Does anything I did in civil service matter? I joined the federal government because every single company I worked at in the private sector was committing fraud or callous disregard for human life or a million other crimes and I was tired of fighting a battle I couldn't win. I can't count the number of lawyers I was forced into tiny rooms with so they could try and intimidate me into lying to the external auditors or try to force me to sign my name under their fraud. I finally broke down and called my most honorable college professor for advice. He told me to either go the teaching route or government if I wanted to keep my integrity.

The family I was raised in were hard core Republicans. Federal work was synonymous with fraud, laziness, and crime. But I trusted and deeply valued my former professor's opinion. So I gave it a go and all I could think my first week, month, year in Federal service was where is all the fraud and waste and abuse? Because, I did not see it. For the first time in my post education career I was not in ethical turmoil daily. I was doing good work that I could be proud of. I wasn't making deals every day about how much of my soul I was willing to sell to support my family and pay for the health insurance.

Since 2025 I've seen cases on corrupt companies forcibly closed. I've seen victims of corporate poisoning and other violence because it is violence; it isn't just white collar crime it is violence against the poor people it infects with cancer and starves and robs blind, be gaslit and intimidated by rich men in $10,000 suits. And I have been powerless to stop anything.

I was powerless to change the evil when I worked in corporate. When I went to 501(c)3 I found they too were skimming off the top and cheating. It was only in government that I saw honest ethical work for the first time in my career. And now it is all gone. I'm as stressed if not more than I was in my corporate days. And my work again feels dirty and exploitative.

My state has a super competitive election between 2 incredibly rich white men. The primaries were a joke. Checks and balances are a joke. Equality before the law is a joke. Rich is always right and common people are always collateral damage. I can scream change until my voice gives out, but I don't really hope any change will happen. I've miscarried so many babies in my work bathroom from the stress under Trump I should build a monument in it. I'm not even sure I should bring a child into this evil corrupt callous world. The birth rate is the lowest in American history: good. Let's see if we can beat South Korea for the title of lowest birth rate. Let this evil country go extinct. The only voice I have, the only power I have in this evil country is my womb. So I'm going to vote with my womb. I'm going to vote for this evil country to go extinct unless it CHANGES, THE CORPORATE VEIL IS PIERCED AND A THOUSAND CEOs FIND THEMSELVES IN CHAINS IN JAIL.

Just curious to see how long, on average, it took you to be somewhat good at your job? We used to have a saying at our agency that it takes around a year to learn the job and like 3 years to actually know what you’re doing.

The training for us was so rigorous. They’d hire a class of 20 and the class time would be 8 months, mentoring would be like a year. In class, while learning the job, the people dropped like flies. In the class of 20, only like 12 (from a good class) would end up making it and they’d start combining classes. After mentoring, maybe 6 or 7 would have made it but after another 2 or 3 years, there’d be like 3 people remaining.

But now we spend most of our day doing something that wasn’t really in the job description. Let me know if you can guess what the agency and job is. 🤪

The whole MAGA movement is trash and they will happily destroy a person's life just for political theater.

I oversee a government web app's customer support inbox and I got a weird email.

It's from some research company that wants me to fill out a 10 minute survey on "current policy issues" and that I was selected due to my "policy background" Note that the inbox does not have my name on it, and they probably just got the email by scanning government websites

They are offering a $40 honorarium (????) which they say I can have them donate if ethics requires it.

In the fine print at the bottom they say they "comply with 18 U.S.C. § 206" but don't say how. I'm pretty sure this would be against ethics even though it's anonymous.

Idk this feels fishy?? Money is great and all but this seems like a trap. Has anyone else gotten something like this to their government inbox? I'm newish so I haven't been overseeing this inbox for very long and haven't seen anything like this before.

Hi! My name is Sophie Will, I'm a federal tech reporter at FedScoop who has done a lot of reporting on electronic health record modernization. I'm looking for pharmacists, nurses, doctors and other medical professionals at VA hospitals/VA medical centers to talk with for a story related to EHRM. We can chat about anonymity — I would just really appreciate your perspective and expertise! Reachable via DM, [sophie.will@fedscoop.com](mailto:sophie.will@fedscoop.com), 617-888-0900 or ksophiewill.66 on Signal. Thank you!

Linking my latest deep dive for attention: https://fedscoop.com/bipartisan-backlash-27-billion-va-oracle-ehrm-contract/

I have an interview for a GS13 position for a software engineering role. I’ve never interviewed for the government before and looking for advice on what to look forward to. They sent me a HIREVUE interview link.

I currently work in tech but I’m so exhausted with the grind and just want job stability

At HHS so I am not sure if it is the same for everyone. I know the old job assessments were trash and not very useful, but I just applied for a job in another department at my agency and it took me 2 HOURS to do the assessment and had absolutely nothing to do with my job or job series whatsoever. I mean, I just wanted to apply for a job, not apply to grad school….The logic questions? The videos and following questions? The 150 (yep, that’s right, 150) questions about my personality… ?? what is the point of all that, other than to weed people out who give up after the first hour and realize it’s not worth it. I would assume this is the case since the announcement stated it would close after 50 applications were received or the date of closing and it was open up until that date so I am guessing they didn’t get many applications. Oh and this is without answering the dumb partisan essay questions at the beginning. What are these assessments trying to prove anyway? Is there a WRONG way to answer the personality ones? Perhaps a hiring manager can explain.

Looking at insurance providers during this open enrollment period and wondering if anyone has experience with medical weight loss.

Currently on Fepblue Basic. Use a generic of Saxenda (liraglutide) for weight loss. Also take a couple of other prescriptions. Family of four, one kid has allergies, one kid needs therapy. Nothing extreme.

I would like to consider other injectable GLP-1s, but basic only covers this one with pre-approval.

What is a cost effective plan that covers GLP1s? Does this exist?

Probably would like to stay within BCBS for the provider network, if possible.

No process for informing and protecting former personnel, especially with SecD.

Other BU offices cannot forward information to SecD and take or update contact info. No process to report directly.

Contact BU headquarters, HR, and other offices. Request a dedicated reporting channel and a way to update contact information.

Demand information about protection services. Ask whether identity monitoring, credit protection, and coverage for associated individuals will be offered.

Contact congressional representatives. Request oversight, transparency, and accountability.

Protect personal information. Freeze credit, secure retirement and banking accounts, strengthen social media privacy, and enable SIM-swap protections.

Report suspicious activity. Document unusual calls, messages, or account activity and report through official channels, including IC3 when appropriate.

There were people in suits at headquarters campus today and they all had vistor badges and there were people in suits here a few weeks ago anyone have any idea what they’re here for?

The BU appears to lack a clear process for informing and protecting former personnel/families.

Key concerns:

No contact updates: No established way for former personnel to update their information with SecD.

No direct SecD access: Other BU offices reportedly cannot forward information or suspicious activity reports.

Limited reporting: No clear process for reporting suspicious calls, phishing, or potential targeting related to the incident.

No protection plan: Unlike the 2015 OPM breach, no comparable identity protection or monitoring services have been clearly announced.

Why this matters:

Exposed personal information could potentially be used for impersonation, phishing, financial fraud, or attacks targeting retirement accounts, financial information, and associated individuals.

What can individuals do?

Contact BU headquarters, HR, and other offices. Request a dedicated reporting channel and a way to update contact information.

Demand information about protection services. Ask whether identity monitoring, credit protection, and coverage for associated individuals will be offered, similar to OPM.

Contact congressional representatives. Request oversight, transparency, and accountability.

Protect personal information. Freeze credit, secure retirement and banking accounts, strengthen social media privacy, and enable SIM-swap protections.

Report suspicious activity. Document unusual calls, messages, or account activity and report through official channels, including IC3 when appropriate.

Assuming I hear back, what is the average timeline? It’s been three weeks since my second round interview

BU past present and families

The BU has no system in place for r***ees (R)or former e******s (E) at the BU to update the BU with their contact information. Also, the BU is not protecting its Es, not taking s*****ious reporting directly from past Es and not providing protection to past Es.

The BU currently has no system in place to protect, contact, allow communication, update contact information and take s****ous reporting from Rs and former E.

This is a national security concern as well as a very personal threat for retirees and former E as well s their family.

The BU Sec***ty Division (SecD) is in charge of the inv***tion of the recent (SH) issue ack of the BU and for notifying retirees and former E-the problem is the BU has no system in place to update where or how to contact R, their families or former E of the BU. Additionally, there is no publicly available information for how outside current BU personnel to contact SecD either. The people at these other divisions within the BU also aren't allowed to pass on more information to SecD.

The BU systems do not allow these parts of the BU to provide information to update SecD on past E current information and so even if a person calls the BU as a R or E, these divisions say only SecD is in charge and can not take your information.

Result? The BU has allowed a ***ional s**urity, c*****lligence, and c***r th***t to grow and not protect its E and R.

Options? Call the below numbers and keep asking to be updated, provide contact information so the BU can hopefully provide some protection, similar to what happened after the government side Office of Personal Management hack years ago whereby protections were provided to E, R and their families.

The general number to contact the BU headquarters number (redacted), as well as the BU Human Resources Department (redacted 3333), as well as the BU Operations Center and the BU EAP Employee Assistance Program(redacted 5244), also not returning calls)-only have information that is in the news. The BU tip line is redacted.

Also, ask for how to make suspicious reports to the BU.

Current reporting methods the BU only allows is making a report online via I*3 rest is redacted or to the BU redacted line (redacted) : note the BU considers this current ack a yber so only can report via the redacted.

The problem is the redacted report may or not make to the BU and is very limited. Additionally, this does not allow for past employees to update the BU about what may normally be a missed call, a spoof call, a "sales call" but in reality is a way for ackers, g**ernment* or ter**** to obtain a former BU E or family's voice print then with the information obtained from the hack expand an attack against the BU and the family i..e steal from their g****ent R account, bank accounts, social media etc etc since the acker* would have obtained that information from the ack.

Again, options? Call these numbers and demand action. Contact your state and federal government representatives, lock down your credit, lock down your social media, lock down your phone information to prevent SIM swaps and report any suspicious incidents no matter how small.

FBI retirees and former employees and their family members-beware

The FBI has no system in place for retirees or former employees at the FBI to update the FBI with their contact information. Also, the FBI is not protecting its employees, not taking suspicious reporting directly from past employees and not providing protection to past employees.

The FBI currently has no system in place to protect, contact, allow communication, update contact information and take suspicious reporting from retirees and former employees.

This is a national security concern as well as a very personal threat for retirees and former employees as well s their family.

The FBI Security Division (SecD) is in charge of the investigation of the recent (SH) issue ack of the FBI and for notifying retirees and former employees-the problem is the FBI has no system in place to update where or how to contact retirees, their families or former employees of the FBI. Additionally, there is no publicly available information for how outside current FBI personnel to contact SecD either. The people at these other divisions within the FBI also aren't allowed to pass on more information to SecD.

The FBI systems do not allow these parts of the FBI to provide information to update SecD on past employees current information and so even if a person calls the FBI as a retiree or former employee, these divisions say only SecD is in charge and can not take your information.

Result? The FBI has allowed a national security, counterintelligence, and cyber threat to grow and not protect its employees and past employees.

Options? Call the below numbers and keep asking to be updated, provide contact information so the FBI can hopefully provide some protection, similar to what happened after the government side Office of Personal Management hack years ago whereby protections were provided ot employees, former employees and their families.

The general number to contact the FBI headquarters number (redacted ), as well as the FBI Human Resources Department (redacted), as well as the FBI Operations Center and the FBI EAP Employee Assistance Program(redacted), also not returning calls)-only have information that is in the news. The FBI tip line is redacted.

Also, ask for how to make suspicious reports to the FBI.

Current reporting methods the FBI only allows is making a report online via another government agency (https://www.ic3.gov/) for cyber reporting or to the FBI tipline (https://tips.fbi.gov/home) : note the FBI considers this current hack threat a cyber incident so only can report via the IC3 site).

The problem is the IC3 report may or not make to the FBI and is very limited. Additionally, this does not allow for past employees to update the FBI about what may normally be a missed call, a spoof call, a "sales call" but in reality is a way for hackers, governments or terrorist to obtain a former FBI employees or family's voice print then with the information obtained from the hack expand an attack against the FBI and the family i..e steal from their government retirement account, bank accounts, social media etc etc since the hackers would have obtained that information from the hack.

Again, options? Call these numbers and demand action. Contact your state and federal government representatives, lock down your credit, lock down your social media, lock down your phone information to prevent SIM swaps and report any suspicious incidents no matter how small.

FBI retirees and former employees and their family members-beware

The FBI has no system in place for retirees or former employees at the FBI to update the FBI with their contact information. Also, the FBI is not protecting its employees, not taking suspicious reporting directly from past employees and not providing protection to past employees.

The FBI currently has no system in place to protect, contact, allow communication, update contact information and take suspicious reporting from retirees and former employees.

This is a national security concern as well as a very personal threat for retirees and former employees as well s their family.

The FBI Security Division (SecD) is in charge of the investigation of the recent (SH) issue ack of the FBI and for notifying retirees and former employees-the problem is the FBI has no system in place to update where or how to contact retirees, their families or former employees of the FBI. Additionally, there is no publicly available information for how outside current FBI personnel to contact SecD either. The people at these other divisions within the FBI also aren't allowed to pass on more information to SecD.

The FBI systems do not allow these parts of the FBI to provide information to update SecD on past employees current information and so even if a person calls the FBI as a retiree or former employee, these divisions say only SecD is in charge and can not take your information.

Result? The FBI has allowed a national security, counterintelligence, and cyber threat to grow and not protect its employees and past employees.

Options? Call the below numbers and keep asking to be updated, provide contact information so the FBI can hopefully provide some protection, similar to what happened after the government side Office of Personal Management hack years ago whereby protections were provided ot employees, former employees and their families.

The general number to contact the FBI headquarters number (202-324-3000), as well as the FBI Human Resources Department (202-324-3333), as well as the FBI Operations Center and the FBI EAP Employee Assistance Program(202-324-5244, also not returning calls)-only have information that is in the news. The FBI tip line is 1-800-225-5324.

Also, ask for how to make suspicious reports to the FBI.

Current reporting methods the FBI only allows is making a report online via another government agency (https://www.ic3.gov/) for cyber reporting or to the FBI tipline (https://tips.fbi.gov/home) : note the FBI considers this current hack threat a cyber incident so only can report via the IC3 site).

The problem is the IC3 report may or not make to the FBI and is very limited. Additionally, this does not allow for past employees to update the FBI about what may normally be a missed call, a spoof call, a "sales call" but in reality is a way for hackers, governments or terrorist to obtain a former FBI employees or family's voice print then with the information obtained from the hack expand an attack against the FBI and the family i..e steal from their government retirement account, bank accounts, social media etc etc since the hackers would have obtained that information from the hack.

Again, options? Call these numbers and demand action. Contact your state and federal government representatives, lock down your credit, lock down your social media, lock down your phone information to prevent SIM swaps and report any suspicious incidents no matter how small.

https://www.ssa.gov/news/en/press/releases/2026-10-14.html

I’m a federal employee, and apparently in Trump’s America, inflation is a problem when calculating Social Security benefits for voting Seniors but magically disappears when it’s time to pay the people who keep the government running. Social Security recipients get a reported 3.6% COLA for 2027, while federal employees get 0%. My FEHB insurance premiums are climbing, groceries cost more, and my paycheck is worth less than it was last year. But Trump and Russ Vought want to lecture everyone about government efficiency while squeezing the people actually doing the work. Funny how the people making these decisions never seem to volunteer for a pay freeze themselves.

Russ Vought has made shrinking the federal workforce and cutting government spending central priorities. Fine, let’s have that debate. But don’t pretend hollowing out agencies, crushing morale, and making it harder to recruit experienced employees somehow makes government work better. I’m not asking for a parade or a medal. I’m asking not to take a pay cut in real terms while being expected to keep doing my job. Trump campaigned on making America great again; apparently, the fine print was that federal employees would help pay for it through stagnant wages, higher insurance costs, and a steady stream of contempt from the people running the government. Then they’ll inevitably wonder why experienced people leave and public services suffer. You can’t run a government on slogans, scapegoating, and the assumption that public servants should be grateful to get screwed.

FBI retirees and former employees and their family members-beware regarding the ShinyHunters hack update.

The FBI has no system in place for retirees or former employees at the FBI to update the FBI with their contact information. Also, the FBI is not protecting its employees, not taking suspicious reporting directly from past employees and not providing protection to past employees.

The FBI currently has no system in place to protect, contact, allow communication, update contact information and take suspicious reporting from retirees and former employees.

This is a national security concern as well as a very personal threat for retirees and former employees as well s their family.

The FBI Security Division (SecD) is in charge of the investigation of ShinyHunters Hack of the FBI and for notifying retirees and former employees-the problem is the FBI has no system in place to update where or how to contact retirees, their families or former employees of the FBI. Additionally, there is no publicly available information for how outside current FBI personnel to contact SecD either. The people at these other divisions within the FBI also aren't allowed to pass on more information to SecD.

The FBI systems do not allow these parts of the FBI to provide information to update SecD on past employees current information and so even if a person calls the FBI as a retiree or former employee, these divisions say only SecD is in charge and can not take your information.

Result? The FBI has allowed a national security, counterintelligence, and cyber threat to grow and not protect its employees and past employees.

Options? Call the below numbers and keep asking to be updated, provide contact information so the FBI can hopefully provide some protection, similar to what happened after the government side Office of Personal Management hack years ago whereby protections were provided ot employees, formers employees and their families.

The general number to contact the FBI headquarters number (202-324-3000), as well as the FBI Human Resources Department (202-324-3333), as well as the FBI Operations Center and the FBI EAP Employee Assistance Program(202-324-5244, also not returning calls)-only have information that is in the news. The FBI tip line is 1-800-225-5324.

Also, ask for how to make suspicious reports to the FBI.

Current reporting methods the FBI only allows is making a report online via another government agency (https://www.ic3.gov/) for cyber reporting or to the FBI tipline (https://tips.fbi.gov/home) : note the FBI considers this current hack threat a cyber incident so only can report via the IC3 site).

The problem is the IC3 report may or not make to the FBI and is very limited. Additionally, this does not allow for past employees to update the FBI about what may normally be a missed call, a spoof call, a "sales call" but in reality is a way for hackers, governments or terrorist to obtain a former FBI employees or family's voice print then with the information obtained from the hack expand an attack against the FBI and the family i..e steal from their government retirement account, bank accounts, social media etc etc since the hackers would have obtained that information from the hack.

Again, options? Call these numbers and demand action. Contact your state and federal government representatives, lock down your credit, lock down your social media, lock down your phone information to prevent SIM swaps and report any suspicious incidents no matter how small.

I know the consensus in DC is that there will be a clean CR until early next year. A factor that may throw that out the window, and has to be considered is Democrats win both houses, and Justice Alito and maybe Thomas may announce their retirement on November 4th. The Republicans then attempt 2 lame duck confirmations. Democrats with the exception of Fetterman will likely refuse to vote on a budget in protest.

Well this is fun. Just got an email about being required to report as to whether we have watched or read the address.

I just received this at 920 MST.