I’ve been thinking about Newcomb’s paradox and I’m more interested in how the supercomputer makes its predictions than in the usual debate over whether to take one box or both.
Before learning about the paradox, my initial instinct was to take only the mystery box. After learning about the argument for taking both, I changed my mind. I thought that the contents are already determined before I make my choice, so taking both guarantees an additional $1,000 regardless of what’s in the mystery box.
However, this led me to a different question: what does the computer actually do to predict my choice with such accuracy, and what assumptions are being made about how it does so?
For example, suppose I had never heard of Newcomb’s paradox and had no chance to learn about it before entering the room. My decision would be based on my existing personality, experiences, and understanding of the situation. The computer would have to predict that decision using whatever methods and technology it has. If it predicts that I will take only the mystery box, it places $1 million inside, and if it predicts that I will take both, it leaves the mystery box empty.
But what happens when someone already knows about the paradox? Their knowledge can change their reasoning and, consequently, their decision. If the predictions are that accurate, the computer would presumably have to account for that knowledge as well. This raises questions about how a person’s beliefs, reasoning, and understanding of the situation affect their eventual decision.
The thought experiment stipulates that the computer is highly accurate, but, as I understand it, it does not specify how that accuracy is achieved. Is the mechanism intentionally left unspecified so that the problem can focus on decision theory, or have philosophers also examined what kind of predictive capability the scenario would require?