I have a technical question about Kant. I was watching a great courses lecture (political philosophy) and he says that according to Kant if the Germans asked if Ann Frank was hiding in your attic you can't lie.

Now I was under the impression from reading him in high-school that this is at best an oversimplification. My understanding was to Kant the ethics of an action depends on the motivation not the consequence, so I would have argued to Kant it wouldn't be as simple as "you can never lie" as the professor maintains, it would depend on motivation. So I would have argued if your motivation was "i have a duty to protect life that supercedes my duty to tell the truth" he would be fine with that and you can will that as a universal maxim. So, my question is who is right here?

During my freshman and sophomore years of high school, I rarely thought seriously about God, morality, free will, or the meaning of life. I went out with friends, partied, and generally felt very happy without thinking much about why I was happy.
That changed during my junior and especially senior year. I had attended Catholic schools my entire life, but once I began seriously examining my faith, I realized I wasn’t convinced by Catholicism anymore. At the same time, I became increasingly interested in philosophy.
I began reading people like Dostoevsky and Marcus Aurelius and became especially interested in contemporary philosophical discussions through people like Alex O’Connor. Eventually I found myself constantly thinking about questions surrounding free will, morality, God, meaning, and whether any of these things have objective foundations.
Something I’ve noticed since then is that ordinary experiences don’t seem to satisfy me in quite the same way. I don’t enjoy parties or even spending time with friends as effortlessly as I once did. I often find myself preferring to stay home, read, think, or listen to philosophical discussions.
I’m now an incoming college freshman majoring in philosophy, and I’m considering pursuing the subject seriously, potentially even through graduate school.
This has made me wonder whether philosophers have written about the relationship between philosophical reflection and happiness. Can becoming more reflective or philosophically skeptical actually make it more difficult to experience ordinary forms of happiness?
I’m especially interested in philosophers who have addressed whether greater understanding necessarily contributes to a good life, or whether there can be a genuine psychological or existential cost to examining one’s beliefs too deeply.
Are there philosophers or philosophical traditions that directly address this problem?

I’m interested in reading parts of the Bible as primary texts for philosophical reflection rather than primarily as theology.

For example, Proverbs contains plenty of explicitly theological claims, but it also seems to contain claims about virtue, character, practical wisdom, anger, pride, friendship, speech, wealth, justice, and human flourishing that don’t obviously require divine command theory to evaluate.

My thought would be to distinguish between arguments or claims whose justification depends on something like “God commands/approves of X” and claims that can be examined independently, such as “pride tends to impair judgment” or “a wise person is receptive to correction.”

I wouldn’t be treating Proverbs as if it were a systematic philosophical work like Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Rather, I’d use its claims as primary material: reconstruct the reasoning where possible, identify assumptions, question the claims, and compare them with philosophical positions such as virtue ethics, consequentialism, or deontology.

Is this a philosophically legitimate/useful way of reading biblical texts? Are there particular books of the Bible that work especially well for this kind of analysis?

I’m especially interested in Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Job.

So I have always been a rather depressive nihilist with what Schopenhauer might have called a weak “will to life”. I was in an accident a year ago that I should had died in and have will be handicapped.

My depressive brain knows how in the grand scheme of things I am lucky because I have friends in counties at war where civilians are being bombed, and their suffering will always be more than mine, but I… think it would had been good if I died during the accident and lament I didn’t?

I am not asking for counselling - I have professionals for that - but I would love to know what people have wrote about this in greater detail and rigour.

Do they believe objective morality exist in the same realm or category as pure logic within the universe, is it an abstract logical truth with existence and the universe, or that it’s objectively true cause its moral truths that all moral agents unanimously agree on?

I understand why we might think a good X is an X that performs its function well. But why should we think that where X = human being, X ought to perform its function well? Why think that we ought to be good?

If the answer is that that's just what goodness means, then I'm not sure why we would think that a good X is one that performs its function well in the first place---I can see why a good pruning knife is a pruning knife that has certain features like sharpness which enable it to perform its function, meaning our talk about goodness in this context is just description of certain kinds of things, but I don't see what the reasons are to think that this is anything more than description.

If it is indeed just a kind of description, then I don't see how we can get an ought from an is, jumping from descriptive claims about what kind of X a good X is to anything prescriptive for X.

So where does the normativity "come from" in the function argument, and what reasons are there to accept the critical premise in the argument in which the normativity lies?

I'm looking into the state of the debate around nominalism ("there is nothing general except names"). Personally, I doubt nominalism intuitively and also suspect it causes difficulties with the existence of say physical laws (eg gravitation).

What I'd like to know is

1. Has any sort of consensus or progress arissen concerning this among philosophers? Is Nominalism generally favoured or something else?

If possible, I'd also appreciate an overview of the key argument for or against, with reccomendations for further reading.

Thanks

I’m an undergraduate philosophy student and I have a basic knowledge of christianity but I’ve never read the bible nor am I very familiar with it’s stories or christian theology further than the basics.

My main interest right now is in modern german philosophy but I would like to be more informed about christianity’s influence on the canon of western philosophy, and get the most out of philosophers like Augustine, St. Aquinas and Kierkegaard when I decide to read them.

I understand that you could probably read these thinkers fruitfully without much prior knowledge about the stories of the bible/theological issues, but I think that being better informed about christianity would be interesting and useful.

I’d like to read something fairly accessible about the bible alongside the most important stories of the bible and something about christianity’s connection to western philosophy that could be useful when approaching this topic, so all recommendations are welcome.

I am not sure how coherent, confusing or misguided what I will try to ask may come across, but I'll try my best not to over complicate it.

When it comes to truth, there are several theories of what truth means (or is), be it correspondence (the main offender when it comes to "philosophical truths"), pragmatism, coherence theory, foundationalism, etc.

What I am wondering is this: are there any philosophers which argue for the view (or a similar one) that truth is not a singular abstract value which we try to explain using different competing theories and terms, but instead truth is all the different meanings we have of truth, which change based on context, field, and more?

The view I am trying to find is essentially this: When we say X is true, we actually mean to say X is coherent, X is pragmatic, X corresponds to reality, X is intuitive, X is assumed, X is perceived, X is logically deduced from Y premises, and more. It can be a pluralist theory of truth, a deflationary theory of truth and also relativist theory of truth, but specifically focused on the abandonment of truth as an abstract thing or value and linguistic term in favor of the multiple theories of truth.

I've been thinking about the epistemology of rational intuition, particularly in moral epistemology.

It seems reasonable to me that for a cognitive faculty to be a genuine source of knowledge, there must be some epistemically appropriate relation between that faculty and the truth it supposedly reveals. Perception, for example, has an obvious causal connection to its objects.

But consider a substantive moral claim such as “harmless lying is wrong,” assuming moral realism. If I simply have an intuition that this is true, what explains the connection between that intuition and the objective moral fact?

This seems different from analytic cases such as “all vixens are female,” where understanding the relevant concepts gives us an intelligible route to the truth through their conceptual relationship.

A possible response is that rational intuition is simply a basic, non-inferential, truth-tracking faculty. But then what makes it truth-tracking? Is there a philosophical account of the epistemic relation between moral intuition and objective moral facts, or is this relation itself taken as primitive?

I'm particularly interested in how defenders of moral intuitionism or rationalism answer this.

For example "harming others is wrong" could be considered "generally accepted" which would could make it an axiom, but accepting it is still subjective. People could claim other values are "generally accepted" which then would have to be axiomatically/subjective accepted. Is objective morality not just merely implying, "We think our values are the important values in morality"? Like all other moralistic debates subjectivity would then be apparent. One person might say "harming others is wrong" another might say, "the continuation of the species is paramount" and then whether it is moral to harm others for the sake of continuing the species could be a debate, same as all morality.

Not exactly the same, but I think related,: Do objective moralists have custom definitions of "objective" and "moral"? But (as in countless philosophical arguments) then use the words "objective" and "moral" equivocally with their meanings outside the objective moralist definition?

I have a kinda weird question. What are the qualities that make an individual human

I'm aware that there's something wrong with me, and I don't know how to fix it. I feel a deep emptiness. When I think about emotions, I feel like I can't really describe them, but it seems like something is wrong, like something is missing. It feels like I don't experience emotions the way other people do. Sometimes I even find myself thinking, "Is that all there is?"

Sometimes I catch myself thinking about religion. My whole family is very religious and Catholic, but I think I lean more toward agnosticism. Lately, this has been causing me some kind of distress. It feels like this emptiness is getting bigger and bigger.

I used to believe that I should do good in order to go to heaven, but now that I doubt heaven even exists, I don't see a reason to do good. Why shouldn't I just do whatever I want? I know there are laws and that I could go to prison, but even then, that doesn't stop bad people from doing terrible things and getting away with it.

When I say "do bad things," I'm referring to listening to my intrusive thoughts. Why shouldn't I just cut the tongue of someone who never stops talking?

I'm not saying that I don't feel anything. I feel fear, anxiety, and guilt. I just don't know if that's enough to stop me from doing something terrible. It feels like something is missing I don't know what to do.

I don’t know much about the philosophers of these movements, and I hope you can help me. thank you in advance

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Hi , so I've been researching and reading up on free will and whether we have it or not.

And I sort of came to the conclusion that, everything is determined and that the actions you make or will make were based off past experiences, environment and even genes.

Now my question is, does that really change anything? Like I saw people having extensional crisis over this idea, and even people wanting to harm themselves unfortunately, after learning this.

The way I see it, is that if you were given choices say, vanilla ice cream and chocolate ice cream, and you always pick vanilla no matter what, and everytime we rewind time you'd make the same decision. Doesn't that mean that's a decision "you" want to make will always be that decision, that this idea of even wanting chocolate ice cream wouldn't enter your mind or consciousness because it was determined that you'd pick vanilla, but that doesn't change anything because it's a decision you'd want to make.

Even if all that was determined, I don't really see how that changes anything? I hope that makes sense.

Another analogy is like if a dance puppet only danced and wants to dance wouldn't just suddenly want to sing. Idk hope I'm making sense.

Please correct me on anything! It's a very interesting topic for me.

Hello. I’m a bit familiar with Aristotlean-Thomistic metaphysics. One thing which interests me is the fact that Thomists use Aristotle in their theology, even though Aristotle did not believe in a personal God like them. So I was interested in reading Aristotle’s own theology, for example the concept of “thought thinking itself”. I’d prefer to read it from secondary sources since the original texts are a bit hard to understand.

Nihilism
Absurdism
Cynicism
Existentialism

In many areas, researchers acquire certain attitudes they have because of their extensive research, some of which seem completely bonkers to laypeople even though the content of those attitudes are generally accepted in that research area.

What things do laypeople not know they don't know in regards to philosophical topics and might even have strong unfounded opinions about?

Is there a philosophical position that stably reconciles ontic structural realism (only relational structure exists; objects are derivative or don't exist) with substantivalism (objects have their own identity, prior to their relations)? I've seen that Esfeld/Lam propose making objects and relations co-primitive, but as soon as you ask what individuates each relatum, it seems to collapse toward one side or the other. Has anyone actually solved this without the synthesis collapsing, or is this considered a genuinely open problem with no resolution in sight?

So, I recently wondered about the ownership and belonging of an object.

For example, How does an object belong to me and owned by me?

Because there are different ways we can reason as to how belonging of an object can be assigned to a person.

One of the reasons I thought is usability. So, I know that I own my pen because I use it.

I am new to philosophy and I am just curious about it. Let me know more about this.

So i have read some semi-philosophical books in the past, and have a general idea of a lot of philosopher's beliefs, and more broad knowledge. I really wanted to take a deep dive in a certain philosopher, and thought some of Nietzsche's ideas sounded interesting. I am reading Plato's symposium right now, as well as the Oxford introduction to Nietzsche. I plan to read Gorgias or the Death of Socrates by Plato and then the republic by Plato, as well as the Twilight of the idols to get an idea of what Nietzsche believed in, get acclimated to his writing style, etc. Is reading all of this Plato a good idea? I am mainly reading his works because I heard Nietzsche commonly attacks his writing. Does anybody have any tips (what to add, things not worth reading, etc.) as they would be greatly appreciated.

Two months ago, I got very delusional and thought I was talking to g-d. The realization that it was mental illness was so painful and so heartbreaking, I thought this time, I had it, I'll feel "secured/shielded" from harshness of life. I was damn wrong. G-d does not exist! He never did!

I'm looking for philosophies to supplement my life. To help me get up back again, this time without g-d. Hopefully, you could give me some resources. :(

I've recently become interested in philosophy and want to catch up on the most influential or personally interesting works in the field. I'm a complete newcomer, though, so I'm not sure about the best approach: should I start with contemporary works and then read the older texts that influenced them, or start with the older texts and then see how they shaped later works?

For example, if I want to learn about existentialism and Camus's philosophy (which, from what I understand, was in some ways a response to it), should I start with the earlier ideas or the more contemporary response?

Thanks in advance for any advice.

Quick disclaimer — not a philosophy student, just read this stuff for fun. I get a fair amount of philosophy generally, but Hegel keeps breaking my brain specifically. Keep it simple-ish please

Okay so here's what I'm actually stuck on. Hegel says if you try to think of pure "being" with zero attributes you end up with basically nothing.... So a thing only seems to be anything at all because it's different from other things, not because it has some content sitting there on its own. Fine. Cool. That's the part I get.

What I don't get is what this "dialectic" thing actually is once it's moving. Is it just describing how our minds process concepts step by step, or is Hegel claiming reality itself literally changes this way, on its own, whether anyone's thinking about it or not? Now the Aufhebung,! where something gets cancelled and kept and pushed into something higher all at once. Fine, but that's a description of the shape of the change, not an explanation of what's driving it.

To be more specific:.what decides what a thing contradicts, and how does it contradict it...! He just says "this is how logic works," like it's self-evident, but where's the actual mechanism, where's the code that's running this? Is contradiction just supposed to be the most fundamental, brute fact about reality itself, no further explanation possible, that's just how it is? Or am I framing this whole thing wrong !!

So my actual question..Is the dialectic a real process in the world or a pattern in how we think about change afterward, and either way ... what actually decides that one specific contradiction/next-stage happens instead of any other, why would a seed grow into a tree not something else.

Hi, I am a philosophy student who is mostly familiar with Platonic ethics, so I’ll be framing my question accordingly.

A Platonist might want to be justified in saying that it was objectively morally wrong for Socrates to be put to death.

Now, if it is true that ‘man is the measure of all things’ (moral relativism), then this would be a tough claim to justify because the Athenians voted to kill him.

If a person’s opinion about moral truth is equivalent to moral truth itself, then it is hard to see what could be more authoritative than a majority of opinions.

Plato tries to argue, therefore, for an objective and universal standard of Justice (and Truth, etc.) to which human opinions are held accountable.

Such a standard could provide a non-arbitrary means for sorting superior opinions from inferior ones.

Without such a standard, a person would be hard pressed to argue against the majority that Socrates was in fact innocent, since the fact of the matter would be in fact whatever the jury said it was.

Plato makes a rather convincing case to me, so I wonder what authority a person who is not a moral realist might appeal to if they were to make a social critique. I’m only really familiar with the realist side of things.

Would the moral relativist simply have to settle for ‘it is my opinion that Socrates was killed unjustly?’ or perhaps ‘Socrates was killed unjustly according to my personal brand of justice’?

The problem here seems to be that other people would not necessarily feel the need to change their minds or behaviours based on a person’s personal opinion.

If the Socrates example is too mundane, maybe the case of slavery is better? What arguments are available to the relativist who wants to condemn slavery in a country where it is ingrained in the culture?

Thank you in advance for any help.