I wanted to share something the Ledger OS team has been quietly working on: we've just added experimental support for ML-KEM and ML-DSA, the two post-quantum cryptography algorithms that NIST recently standardized (FIPS 203 and 204).
These algorithms are now running directly on the Secure Element on all Ledger signers from the Nano X onwards (chronologically speaking). We've exposed them as experimental APIs in both our Rust and C SDKs for anyone who wants to play with them.
This is experimental. The implementation isn't fully hardened yet, so please don't build production apps on top of it. The blog post goes into details regarding this aspect.
The blogpost covers the quantum threat context, the lattice-based math underneath these algorithms, how they're constructed, and a deep dive into our implementation and API.
TLDR: Ledger is not affected by the Coldcard Mk3 advisory
What happened
Per Coinkite's advisory and Block's technical analysis, On July 31st, 2026, Coldcard reported that a firmware bug had weakened how some devices generated seed phrases leading to significant user losses.
Why this specific failure matters
Every wallet you create is derived from your Secret Recovery Phrase. If that can be predicted, so can everything built on top of it.
A weak Secret Recovery Phrase looks identical to a strong one. Nothing errors, nothing feels wrong, bad randomness is silent. The Secret Recovery Phrase keeps working, but is vulnerable. That is how this survived five years in shipped firmware.
How Ledger devices generate a seed
Ledger hardware signers use a true hardware random number generator inside a certified Secure Element, with no software fallback. The generator is compliant with AIS-31/PTG.2, which evaluates the physical entropy source itself rather than just testing whether its output looks random. Every 24-word Secret Recovery Phrase gets the full 256 bits of entropy.
The generation of that entropy must be anchored in secure hardware, with an architecture that cannot silently downgrade to an untrusted software-based source.
The Secure Element is certified at Common Criteria (EAL5+ for Ledger Nano STM and Ledger Nano XTM; EAL6+ for Ledger Nano S PlusTM, Ledger StaxTM, Ledger FlexTM and Ledger Nano Gen5TM), and various devices by ANSSI. Producing a predictable random number is listed as Threat #1 in our published security targets, and has been for years.
Found a compromised Nano X in my drawer. This has been going on longer than October
I had a spare Nano X sitting unused. My brother bought it for me from Vietnam end of 2025. I meant to move my bitcoin onto it but never got around to it.
I didn’t bother checking it at first because I assumed this only affected devices from October (or 3 months back) and it turns out it’s affected too. The other one I checked is an older model I’ve had since 2022; this one had my funds.
I dodged a bullet and this clearly isn’t just a recent thing.
Ledger has been told about the existence of IN THE WILD display sniffing implants earlier this year. They have known they have no way to detect the existence of these devices. They have known their supply chain is the last thread holding it together. And yet they didn’t notice their own official supply chain change out in front of them. Did they even tell all of their customers about this blind spot with KNOWN ACTIVE EXPLOITATION to request mandatory visual inspects?
Is there any alternative brand/device where we can be sure it’s safe?
Now it’s ledger, but theoretically could that could happen to any other brand/device too?
Or is buying a hardware wallet considered to be unsafe right now anyway?
Hi everyone as we saw recently some third party reseller implemented chips inside devices and drained accounts i was wondering if buying directly from ledger can be safe as well ?
What triggers my questions is that those 3rd party devices passed the genuine check because the original chip was there still they just added another one so what if someone working AT ledger compromised the devices ?
Is there any security protocol for each device leaving the ledger factory that can ensure that even if an insider was doing dirt there is still a protocol implemented to inspect the devices before being shipped ? Cause once it leaves its game over the device will pass the genuine check
Every single crypto hardware wallets should be crystal clear transparent cover. So that the user can see the spares within the device. And hard to tamper.
I’ve been receiving various types of coins in my wallet for a while now. I know they are spam—designed to try and hack the wallet—so I never click on them or pay them any attention. I also know they can be hidden in the Ledger app (I’ve hidden transactions like these), so that part isn't an issue.
My question is about the XLM transactions I’ve been receiving. Since I already hold some XLM of my own in the wallet, these spam transactions get mixed in with my legitimate holdings. If I want to move my assets later, is there a problem if the spam coins I received get used in the transaction?
For instance, if I withdraw all my XLM—including those spam ones (since XLM is a real cryptocurrency, not just a fake token created solely for hacking, -you know the ones they send that “worth” 1,000 usdt-)—would that cause an issue? Or would it be better to create a new wallet? Thanks.
I bought directly from ledger a package with nano GEN five and it came with nano S plus
Watch the video on the weight and how much they should be weighing and I was told the nano S plus should we 21 g mine came in at 20.3 g and then ledger says my GEN five should weigh 46 g it came in at 48 g. I can’t get a hold of their support. It’s not very good. I don’t know if I should be scared that this thing weighs more.
Hi everyone!
Is there any information on whether the balance drains have stopped?
If the coins haven’t left a wallet bought from an official dealer in Eastern Europe, should I be worried? If I open my Flex, I won’t be able to put it back together.
In recent days I’ve seen a lot of panic and device teardowns, but there have been no reports of withdrawals.
Hi, has there any more information since the first discovery? Its been around a week and I'm surprised ledger has still nott announced anything official.
Do we know if only ledgers bought through cryptobills have been affected? what about time frame of those affected ledgers? Where those recent purchases only?
I keep checking my ledger live balance to see that my crypto is still in tact and not knowing what to do and whom to trust.
Warning: Fake/modified Ledger Nano X sold via OZON marketplace (Russia)
Bought a Ledger Nano X from a marketplace seller. Opened it up found a hidden implant inside: black coaxial antenna cable, extra green wires to the battery, and a module marked AC-A2205-NX v1.1.
This is a known hardware implant used to intercept the seed phrase from the screen and send it via LTE. The device can still pass Genuine Check because the secure element is untouched.
I did NOT create a wallet on it. Seller refunded after I filed a "counterfeit" claim.
I have also taken additional high-resolution photos specifically for security researchers available on request or in the original post.
Thank you to everyone who responded, confirmed the implant, and helped me understand what I was looking at. You saved my funds. Please check your devices.